The Audit 2025 - Part 2

Lawrence looks at what he got right and wrong

I follow Sam’s end of year audit with one of my own. For those interested here are my previous ones from 2022, 2023, and 2024. One purpose is to see what I have got right and wrong but I also find it useful to look at how themes developed during the year and what this might suggest for the coming year.

While on occasion I post on positive developments by and large my posts deal with war. I have written about several this year, including the DRC and Rwanda as well as India and Pakistan. One of my regrets is that I did not get round to the war in Sudan. Nor have I looked at what is going on between the Trump administration and Venezuela, or for that matter Cambodia and Thailand. I turned to Gaza a few times, although neglected it during the spring. I also spent time on the short fight between Israel and Iran in June, in which the US briefly joined in. I have said hardly anything about China, other than in connection with tariffs, although it could be seen as the geopolitical winner for 2025. My focus has been Euro-centric, with the majority of my posts concerned with the Russo-Ukrainian War and the efforts by the Trump administration to bring it to a close.

Wars are political, military, and humanitarian events, each aspect influencing the other. As war is defined by its purposive violence, often followed by disease and famine, tragedy and suffering is always present. This creates imperatives to prevent wars happening and stop them once they have started. On occasion, as with Gaza, humanitarian issues shape the discourse. Yet ending wars will always require paying attention to their political and military aspects. My focus is therefore always on the strategic challenges posed by war, that is how the parties seek to bring their political objectives and military means into some sort of alignment.

Protracted War

A war that ends with political objectives unmet may turn out to be little more than a temporary truce, creating the conditions for a return to violence, and may also lead to challenges from domestic opponents. Countries therefore may persist with the fighting even though they can’t win because they are desperate not to lose. I have become interested in protracted wars which continue because there are insufficient incentives to bring them to a close, although if their likely length had been anticipated in advance they might never have been started. The reasons for protraction lie not just in military deadlock but also in over-ambitious political objectives. Getting out of long war may require accepting that a lesser outcome is tolerable, at least when compared with the costs of its continuation.

Protracted wars ease the challenges of prediction because they tend to settle into a pattern. What has happened in the recent past may be a reasonable guide to the future. The trick is to note any changes in the underlying conditions. I still tend to be cautious when anticipating battlefield developments. There are too many factors at play, often invisible to outside commentators, especially those trying to follow events far from the front line. Others have been less reticent about making their predictions, often making what might seem to be the relatively safe bet that Russia is bound to make military progress because of its inherent advantages, particularly in manpower but also in the size of its economy and industrial capacity. It is natural to assume that the side with superior strength should come out on top.

During 2025 claims about Russia’s ability to take more of Ukrainian territory became increasingly important as the Kremlin tried to create an aura of inevitable victory. It would not have been surprising if the Russians had moved faster – the Ukrainian problems with manpower were well-advertised and remained a major handicap while the Russians caught up in drone technology and were outproducing Ukraine. Yet accepting that I was always bound to be one step behind some critical technical or tactical developments, what continued to impress me was how much the Russians were accepting extremely high costs for remarkably little gain.

Looking at my equivalent self-assessment from a year ago I am struck by how much of the content could simply be repeated with some limited updating. Part of this reflects how little has changed in what I call the ‘structure of the conflict.’ Since September 2022 when Putin doubled down on his war aims and put his country on more of a war footing, I could not see how any outcome short of Ukraine’s subjugation could satisfy Putin. There was no obvious compromise solution. Nor because of Ukraine’s resilience could I see how Russia could win this war by force of arms.

‘The issue remains one of assessing how well the two sides can cope with the demands of the long haul. The control of territory still matters, and if one side faced a rout on the battlefield then that might create the conditions for an outcome that would approximate to a victory. Russia has been on the front foot all year so Ukraine has been assumed in most reporting to face the greatest risk of defeat. The best option for Ukraine was to hold on in the hope that they could demonstrate to Russia the futility as well as the cost of their efforts and so far it has managed to do so.

In my last post on the war for 2025 I also noted the routine assumption that Russia was pressing forward leaving Ukraine struggling and quoted a New York Times article of 6 December with the headline ‘Battlefield Picture Worsening for Ukraine.’ My 2024 self-assessment went back to the start of 2024 (that is almost two years ago) to cite a New York Times story of 13 January 2024 - ‘Russia Regains Upper Hand in Ukraine’s East as Kyiv’s Troops Flag’. Ukrainians troops were described as ‘weary, short of ammunition and outnumbered, and their prospects look bleak.’

The problem, I suggested, was not so much in overstating Ukraine’s difficulties, which were real enough, but the lack of attention to those faced by Russia. In pointing out how slow the actual Russian advances had been that year, I noted how Ukrainian defenders had held particular Russian targets far longer than anticipated. I even gave the latest example of where the New York Times had the situation ‘deteriorating’ for Ukraine as Pokrovsk, noting that the Russians had been expected to take it in the autumn of 2024. And now, at the end of 2025, Pokrovsk has yet to fall.

I also stressed then Putin’s tendency to talk up the success of his troops. He had opened 2024 with regular expressions of optimism about how Russia was on a path to victory:

‘Now it is quite obvious, not only (Ukraine’s) counter-offensive failed, but the initiative is completely in the hands of the Russian armed forces. If this continues, Ukrainian statehood may suffer an irreparable, very serious blow.’

This boosterism continues, and if anything is becoming more insistent and desperate as the Russia’s military achievements fail to match Putin’s claims. This ‘liberation on credit’ leads to very poor strategy, first because it creates demands on the army to catch up with the claims, and second because it damages the Kremlin’s credibility. It does it no good to make assertions about cities under Russian control that are demonstrably false, the latest being Kupyansk. Equally it is important the Ukraine maintains credibility by acknowledging its setbacks, as it did on Tuesday when announcing that its forces had withdrawn from Siversk.

A year ago, looking forward to 2025 I noted that one of the big issues could be the gathering problems with the Russian economy, adding that their impact might be ‘cumulative and not sudden.’ I explored the economic issues in a February post: the boom years for the economy were over and now labour shortages, high inflation and interest rates, weak investment in the civilian sectors were starting to tell. These problems have continued with the pressure on oil revenues, a combination of depressed global prices, sanctions, and Ukraine’s systematic campaign against energy targets, including oil refineries. (I wrote about that here). This is likely to prove to be an increasing constraint on Moscow but perhaps mainly in adding to the urgency behind its push to take more territory. (See this recent story in the Washington Post).

Ukraine’s ability to endure regular pummelling from Russian strikes against its cities and critical infrastructure has been impressive but it remains challenging. I highlighted in June the likely consequences of Russia stepping up production in long-range drones and missiles, and the difficulties of intercepting them have been frustrating. Ukraine’s long-range strikes have been effective and impressive, but that is because they have had a clear focus on the oil sector. They cannot hurt Russia in the way that Russia hurts Ukraine.

Two areas of self-criticism in the coverage of Ukraine. I was aware of the grumbles in Ukrainian society about corruption but did not write about it, even when the latest scandal broke. Second, I was too optimistic about the EU scheme to use Russian frozen assets to help Ukraine address its funding gap, although in the end a mechanism was found to avoid a budgetary crisis.

The Trump Effect

Views on the likely course of the war, and in particular future Russian advances on land, are relevant to the continuing efforts to get a peace deal. The essence of Putin’s case is that as he will eventually take all the territory he wants it would save a lot of pain and hardship for this to be handed over to Russia now. He has sought, with some success, to persuade Trump of this view.

The arrival of Trump for his second term transformed the international political context in which the war has been fought. Because the Europeans have taken up the slack, and the US is prepared to allow them to buy high-end equipment for Ukraine, the impact on the actual fighting has been less pronounced than might have been expected. Trump still poses substantial analytical challenges, and these have not got any easier as his behaviour becomes more erratic and his policy choices more eccentric and damaging.

There is a view that beneath all the noise and bluster Trump is following a clear ‘America first’ strategy that provides the best guide to his foreign policy. There are certainly some underlying themes to which he regularly returns but even with his signature policies, such as tariffs, implementation has been chaotic. Publications such as the National Security Strategy, discussed here, with its outrageous commentary on European politics, reflected some of his core themes, but it still conveyed a far more coherent approach than the one being followed, and even that document contained inconsistencies.

Because he is President it is necessary to take his statements seriously but a lot of effort can be wasted in explaining why something is a bad idea when for practical reasons it may never happen at all. (A good example of this was his sudden announcement that he would like the US to resume nuclear testing). It is also important to keep in mind how few people there are at the senior levels of the administration, often with multiple roles, and Trump’s own limited attention span.

This is why I have been sceptical of the view that Trump’s Ukraine policy is best explained by his determination to do whatever Putin wants, that is hand over Ukraine to Russia and break the Atlantic Alliance. If he wanted to do this he could have done so right at the start of his term, and at one point he seemed inclined to do just that, but in the end he didn’t. Too much of what he has done over 2025 does not fit with any grand plan. Sticking with this presumption that it is all about being pro-Russian requires having to explain away anomalous behaviour as a sort of trick.

In the summer I offered this guidance:

‘Never assume you know what Donald Trump is going to do or say next because it is unlikely he does. Take seriously what he says at any time because that probably accurately reflects what he is thinking, but some of his thoughts can be very transitory and are soon replaced by others. If you don’t like the positions being held on one day, push back because he might be convinced to hold a different position the next. Equally, when satisfied with today’s position do not assume it will last.’

The chaos, incoherence, and inconsistency can be exhausting but they also provide opportunities for those trying to push US policy into less damaging directions. Given the stakes, especially for Ukraine, this was the only responsible approach for European leaders, even if that meant indulging in gratuitous flattery and playing down Trump’s excesses. The word most often used to describe Trump’s approach to almost any issue is ‘transactional.’ That is true to a degree, but not so much in the quality of the deals agreed but in the extent to which the governing factor was the need to satisfy Trump’s inflated ego. Much of his presidency at home and abroad has become a branding exercise.

The Negotiations

He is also a man in a hurry and impatient for results. One reason why I was unconvinced that Trump would do a deal with Putin was that the quick win would be an immediate ceasefire, which would see the fighting come to an abrupt halt, with the details of a comprehensive settlement to be sorted out later. Yet that was exactly what Putin did not want. Putin’s view, which he outlined in June 2024 and reaffirmed in December 2024, and again this past month, is that the political settlement, which requires Ukraine to return ‘historic lands’ to Russia, must come first before a ceasefire can be considered.

I pointed this out at the time of Trump’s inauguration and it has remained true throughout the year, although on a couple of occasions Trump has come close to embracing Putin’s territorial demands. At first, however, the problem was that he refused to recognise the divergence between his position and Putin’s, and continued to insist that the Russian leader was ready for a ceasefire. This led him to assume that the main obstacle to a deal was Ukraine’s stubborn refusal to accept that they could not get all their territory back. This assumption was partly responsibility for the shameful meeting in the Oval Office at the of February in which Zelenskyy was ambushed by Vice President Vance and berated by Trump for his ingratitude before being escorted out of the White House.

This was undoubtedly a dangerous moment because the meeting was followed by supplies being cut off to Ukraine including, critically, intelligence support. To the extent this was based on a misapprehension about the respective positions of Putin ands Zelenskyy the remedy was reasonably obvious, although of course the melodrama generated by the encounter risked doing more lasting damage and required a lot of effort from European governments. I noted after the Oval Office meeting that:

‘it is vital to get the Americans focused on whether Russia will accept a ceasefire/truce rather than assume erroneously that Ukraine is the main obstacle.’

And that is more or less what happened. This early encounter helped the Europeans and Zelenskyy work out their methodology for dealing with Trump which has now been followed a number of times. In addition to smothering him with flattery, they try to avoid saying anything mildly provoking while not rising to his provocations, and keep as united a European front as possible. Whenever there is a new negotiating initiative they try to get the ball back into Russia’s court as the party which had failed to make any concessions.

In this they were helped by Putin’s intransigence. It is an interesting question as to what would have happened if Putin had given the administration some real concessions to work with, but he didn’t and Trump’s team realised that there were limits to how far they could push Kyiv, especially as no deal could be made to work without European support (for example with sanctions relief). New donations to Ukraine were ruled out from the start, but over the year there was a steady shift towards more support, with tightening sanctions, US arms reaching Ukraine, albeit only if paid for by Europeans, and Ukraine supported in its strikes on infrastructure targets well inside Russia. Yet Trump has never shaken off the idea that he is uniquely placed to do a deal with Putin.

The person who pandered most to this idea was Steve Witkoff - Trump’s friend, fellow realtor, all-purpose negotiator, and diplomatic amateur. A recent story in the Wall Street Journal shows how Putin essentially handpicked Witkoff as his preferred US interlocutor in preference to Keith Kellogg, Trump’s designated envoy, who was considered too pro-Ukrainian. Even without this revelation, it was evident that Witkoff was embarrassingly gullible when it came to Putin’s talking points and his amateurishness in not making sure that there was an agreed record of his meetings with Putin. Whenever US-Ukrainian relations were improving he stepped in, encouraging Trump to believe that the Russians were showing sufficient flexibility to make it worth reviving negotiations. Witkoff was convinced that if only Zelenskyy could be persuaded to give up the rest of Donetsk, Putin would be satisfied.

Unfortunately for Witkoff Putin never quite played his part. After the conditions had been created the Alaska summit in August, in principle a huge gift to Putin, the Russia leader blew his chances by treating his host to one of his interminable lectures about Russia and Ukraine’s shared history. Trump, very bored, ended the meeting early without any agreed way forward. In October, Witkoff tried the same trick again, this time (as we later found out), persuading the Kremlin to get Putin to ring Trump to congratulate him on the Gaza deal just before Zelenskyy was due to arrive in Washington. This resulted in a proposal for another summit, this time in Budapest. As there was no sign of any shift in Russia’s position I noted the risk of

‘another encounter that achieves nothing. Presumably Trump does not want to be treated to more of Putin’s lectures. It might be too much to cancel the summit but it would not be surprising to learn that more ‘preparation’ was needed.’

The day I expressed this view, Secretary of State Rubio moved to postpone the summit.

Similarly with the 28-point plan devised by Witkoff with the help of his friend, Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, it was evidently poorly constructed and was unlikely to serve as the basis for a settlement. For a response, based on the year’s experience, I suggested disregarding arbitrary deadlines, asking for clarity over Russian views, ensuring that the military and economic pressure was sustained, and ‘cherry picking’. One idea was to take the passage in the original proposal that had the currently contested area of Donetsk ‘considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone’ but recognised as Russian, and suggest that it could have that status but still be part of Ukraine. This is now part of the most recent version of the plan.

These discussions have followed the past pattern of a proposal slanted to Russia, pushback from Ukraine and Europeans, leading to a new version satisfactory to them but, for the same reason, unsatisfactory to Russia. What may be different this time is that there seems to be more back and forth between the parties but there is still no sign of any Russian concessions. I’ll follow this up in the new year.

Looking Forward

I noted earlier that the longer a war lasts the easier prediction should become because the future is likely to look like the past. What is surprising about Trump’s impact on the course of the war is how little he has affected its structure. Ukraine has become more explicit in its readiness to agree to a ceasefire while still holding back Russian military progress. Putin remains intransigent. But there is an asymmetry in our understanding of the problems facing Kyiv and Moscow. We know all about Ukraine’s mismanaged mobilisation, soldiers going AWOL, corruption scandals and so on. We know about Russia’s economic problems but we have little insight into how issues are assessed and debated in the Kremlin. How much do they worry about the attacks on oil refineries? How much do they believe their own propaganda about their military progress? If the war continues on its current path, and without Russia making a decisive military breakthrough, might we see more signs of tension among the Russian elite?

At the start of 2025 Ukraine was more dependent on the US than it is now. The Europeans have stepped up to improve both their financial, military and diplomatic support. I have suggested before that the logic of their position suggests that they should take a more active role in negotiations with Russia. President Macron seems to take that view. Depending on what happens with the current process, this may become an issue for 2026.

That relates to a wider issue about transatlantic relations. Trump has undoubtedly been a disruptive force but European governments have done a reasonable job up to now in limiting the damage. There has yet to be a direct assault on NATO structures and as I have shown the Europeans have been able to move him away from the more damaging peace proposals. It would be far more comfortable for Europeans if they could be self-sufficient and remove any dependence on the US for their own security. But it will take many years to disentangle decades of cooperation in the military and intelligence fields (and for the UK the nuclear as well). For now there is little choice but to try to keep the NATO show on the road, even while doing more for themselves.

Whether or not I have been too optimistic that the show can be kept on the road, and I am concerned that I might have been, depends on developments within the Trump administration. The current challenge to Europe from the administration, especially those most associated with Vance, is ideologically driven and leads to an attempted interference in European internal affairs, and in particular the promotion of far-right parties and themes, that is hard for governments to brush aside. Part of this is a consequence of Trump moving to ‘lame duck’ status, and his frailties becoming more pronounced. This does mean more pushback against the administration in Congress and even the Supreme Court, but there is also a developing rivalry between Vance and Rubio for the succession in which Vance has the advantage simply because of his position. This may make things more difficult for Europe in the near future rather than less.

So for next year: pay more attention to China, try to find out more about internal Russian debates, consider how Europe might assert itself more, and continue to try to get the measure of the Trump administration.