End of Year Review: the Russo-Ukraine War

For his end of year audit Sam was able to assess his performance against some reasonably objective indicators – election outcomes and the mismatch between revenue and spending. My task is different as the wars I follow tend to drag on, without a definite conclusion against which to assess past analyses. In addition, because of the limits of the available information, especially when it comes to decision-making processes in Moscow and Kyiv, I must rely more than I would wish on inference and speculation. Accepting these limitations requires dealing more in possibilities than predictions. That is why I prefer explaining history to forecasting the future.

Yet questions about the future cannot be ducked. My aim is usually to consider available policy choices, for Western countries as well as the belligerents. That depends on identifying, and critiquing, assumptions about how conflicts are developing, and the key factors that are likely to most influence their outcomes. Over time this becomes less difficult because the approach of key decision-makers to their wars gets established and one can work out what they are trying to do even if it can be hard on a day-to-day basis to see how well they are succeeding. The country that is most difficult to get right is the US. Its leadership has been conflicted on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, in both cases knowing which side they most support, yet seeking to impose restrictions on their military operations to prevent damage to American interests. ‘What will Trump do?’ is now the starting point for the analysis of almost any geopolitical issue.

I did not only cover wars this year, and those I did cover were not only those in Europe and the Middle East. I am pleased that I included some assessments of the wars in Africa (here and here), which are still neglected in the western media. But it is the wars in Europe and the Middle East that have unavoidably commanded the attention of Western policymakers the most, and these are the ones upon which I have spent most time. In this post I’ll deal with Ukraine, and in my next I’ll look back at the Middle East, before returning again to Africa.

The Structure of the Conflict

My overall views on the structure of the conflict have not changed much since September 2022. Up to that point I thought it was possible that Vladimir Putin would seek to cut his losses after a disastrous six months of war, especially if the Ukrainians could keep pushing Russian forces back. Instead Putin decided to double down on his commitment to subjugating Ukraine, demanding the annexation of a chunk of the country, much of which he had yet to capture (and has still not captured). He also put Russia onto a war footing, mobilising men for the front and turning factories over to military production, as well as improving defences of occupied territory and beginning systematic missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian’s critical infrastructure. This air campaign has been unrelenting. The latest set of strikes against Ukraine’s energy systems came on Christmas Day. Putin boasted that this was a ‘success’ although Ukraine appears to have coped.

Once Russia’s overall strategy was in place I could not see how any outcome short of Ukraine’s subjugation could satisfy Putin. Despite the regular calls for ceasefires and negotiations I have not been able to identify any obvious compromise solution. (Here is a guide to the various proposals and this was my most recent attempt to identify any basis for a deal). Nor because of Ukraine’s resilience could I see how Russia could win this war by force of arms. Far too many in the West arguing for a deal assume that for Moscow it is only about NATO, ignoring the deep and dark ideological underpinnings behind claims of a ‘civilisational’ war with the West and the longing for control over Ukraine.

Ukraine, and for that matter its Western backers, did not follow Russia in 2022 in its sharp move to a war footing. Then too much was pinned on the 2023 counter-offensive. When that petered out there was no option for Ukraine other than to accept that this would be a long war, for which preparations had yet to be made. This meant becoming even more resilient, strengthening defences, and building up its means of taking the war to Russia. As it was going to be difficult to liberate all lost territory through land offensives, the way to get to a serious compromise was to keep on hurting Russia – whether through attrition of its land forces or attacks on assets inside Russia or encouraging the steady deterioration of its economy. The risk for Ukraine was always weariness and declining Western support to the point where it could not cope with attacks on its towns and cities and was unable to hold ground.

I have not seen any reason to change this basic framework for understanding the conflict during 2024. The issue remains one of assessing how well the two sides can cope with the demands of the long haul. The control of territory still matters, and if one side faced a rout on the battlefield then that might create the conditions for an outcome that would approximate to a victory. Russia has been on the front foot all year so Ukraine has been assumed in most reporting to face the greatest risk of defeat. The best option for Ukraine was to hold on in the hope that they could demonstrate to Russia the futility as well as the cost of their efforts and so far it has managed to do so.

Optimists and Pessimists

Military activity during 2024 was expected to follow the grinding pattern already established at the start of the year, and largely followed by Russia through all its offensive operations after the first weeks of the full-scale invasion. I noted in a January 2024 post the pessimistic tone surrounding Ukraine’s situation– quoting a headline from the New York Times on 13 January - ‘Russia Regains Upper Hand in Ukraine’s East as Kyiv’s Troops Flag’. Ukrainians troops were described as ‘weary, short of ammunition and outnumbered, and their prospects look bleak.’ The Financial Times on 19 January described ‘Ukraine’s military prospects’ as ‘dimming.’ Countless similar stories have been written over the course of the year, and are still being written.

There were reasons for the pessimism. Ukrainian defenders were largely outmanned and outgunned, in part because of problems with mobilisation but also because of a hiatus in US support (of which more below). The problem with these analyses was not in overstating Ukraine’s difficulties but the lack of attention to those faced by Russia. It was as if no amount of casualties and equipment losses could stop its onward march; as if it made operational sense to continue to treat troops as expendable (their sacrifices at least got defenders to reveal their positions); as if Russia had inexhaustible supplies.

Despite all their supposed advantages Russian progress has been exceedingly slow. Typically the Ukrainian defenders have held on to particular Russian targets far longer than anticipated (the latest is Pokrovsk which many expected the Russians to enter in the autumn) so that when these targets do fall the cost to the Russians has been enormous (the word used most often is ‘staggering’) and the ‘prize’ has been ruined to obliteration by the fighting. At some point Ukrainian defences may get thinned out so much that a real breakthrough is achieved, but Russia is still far away from a decisive victory in the land war.

In May Russia did try something different when it launched a new offensive into the Kharkiv oblast, ostensibly to create a new buffer zone but also to add to the threat to Kharkiv City. This initially caught the Ukrainians by surprise but it did not prosper as intended. My thought then was that it reflected Russian urgency out of concern that Ukraine would become stronger, at least in its ability to mount long-range strikes:

‘The current balance of military power favours Russia in a way that may not last. They therefore need to maximise their gains while they can.’

This is one of those judgements that is hard to test. Russian strategy since late 2023 seemed to me to reflect urgency, and it is a point I have made regularly. If you expect a long war the it makes sense to control the pace of fighting and the rate of attrition, yet Russia was just throwing human and other resources at the Ukrainians in what seemed to be a desperate attempt to break them. I think Putin did expect this to lead to big territorial gains by the end of this year. He regularly expressed optimism during the first months of the year that Ukraine was in trouble. This was his view:

‘Now it is quite obvious, not only (Ukraine's) counter-offensive failed, but the initiative is completely in the hands of the Russian armed forces. If this continues, Ukrainian statehood may suffer an irreparable, very serious blow.’

Another interpretation is that the wasteful use of human and material resources was less a reflection of a considered strategic judgment, demanding a quick end to the war, and more the only approach the Russian generals knew how to follow, at least once they lost the ability to manoeuvre in numbers and at speed. For Moscow the urgency certainly remains and so the question is whether they have suffered too much attrition in the push for an early victory and whether they will struggle to sustain this sort of intensity in the future.

In August the Ukrainians mounted a surprise offensive of their own, on a much larger scale, into the Russian oblasts of Kursk. They succeeded in capturing a significant amount of territory. It took time before the audacity of the move could be appreciated. Then, as I observed, the competing narratives on the war shaped responses:

‘Those convinced that Ukraine can turn the tide of war see the attack on Kursk as an exciting indication that at last this may be happening; those who believe that Russia is bound to prevail insist that this is a monumental blunder that will hasten Ukraine’s inevitable defeat. The positive can note the boost to Ukrainian morale and compare favourably the amount of Russian territory acquired by Ukraine in a matter of days with the amount of Ukrainian territory captured by Russia at huge cost over months. The negative warn about the vulnerability of the soldiers now in exposed positions in Kursk while those defending tenuous positions in Donetsk are denied desperately needed reinforcements.’

I was struck by how much the pessimists insisted within days that the supposed Ukrainian objective of obliging the Russians to move troops out of Ukraine and into Kursk had been dashed because there was as yet no evidence of this happening. Looking back one can see that opening up a new front led to both Ukrainian and Russian forces becoming more stretched, to the point where Putin had to ask the North Koreans to send troops to help out in Kursk. This glass half empty/half full continues: the pessimists lament that the Ukrainians have had to retreat from half the territory taken; the optimists note that the Ukrainians still hold half the territory taken despite the evident Russian determination to get it all back.

This debate between the pessimists and the optimists can be traced back to the days before the full-scale invasion, and it continues to this day. Ukraine’s problems are more visible. and include issues with mobilisation, command and political in-fighting that have not been tackled well. By contrast, there is a dogged and relentless quality to Russian strategy even though it has involved enormous losses for marginal territorial gains. In the absence of any signs of any uncertainty about the course and conduct of the war from the Kremlin, despite some grumbling from Russian military bloggers, there is a tendency to assume that Russia can cope with its losses, however great. Perhaps it can continue to find sufficient manpower, equipment, and ammunition for the front-line ‘meat-grinder’ under all circumstances, though I am less sure.

One of the big issues for 2025 may well be the gathering problems with the Russian economy. ‘The problem with a booming defence economy,’ I noted in May, ‘is that it is largely geared to producing things that go boom without any lasting benefit to the economy.’ Now labour shortages, high inflation and penal interest rates, are already causing bankruptcies, and neglect of the civil sector. A downward trend in oil prices could also hit hard. The impact of all of this may be cumulative and not sudden but the idea that somehow the war was a great boon to the Russian economy is no longer tenable.

US Support and Conditions

The two surprise attacks fed into the question of the nature of the support provided to Ukraine from its most important backers, and in particular the United States. There were three aspects to this. The first was the disappointing pace of production of new kit and ammunition in the West and deliveries to Ukraine, which reflected inefficiencies as much as deliberate political choices. Then there was the deliberate refusal by the Republicans in Congress to back a new assistance package, which lasted from late 2023 until April, and added to the strain on Ukraine’s front-line forces and anxiety about the long-term. Lastly there were the restrictions imposed by the Biden Administration on how the long-range systems provided to Ukraine could be used, and in particular against targets deep inside Russia.

The debate surrounding these restrictions became increasingly acrimonious through the year. From Washington could be heard a variety of concerns: that Ukraine was making bad operational decisions with its scarce resources; that it did not appreciate just how scarce these resources actually were; that if they hit strategic targets in Russia too hard too often this might even provoke a nuclear response from Russia. My main criticism of the US caution was that it reflected a simplistic assessment of the risks of escalation, which I explained here. The ease with which Putin would resort to nuclear use was always exaggerated, a point I developed in a piece for the New York Times. Putin was not reluctant to escalate but he did not need nuclear weapons to do so. He has escalated repeatedly in non-nuclear ways in his search for ways to hurt Ukraine, and in his readiness to adopt measures short of war to disrupt the West.

I have come to view the main problem as being diverging strategic approaches. The American approach was to gear all efforts to the land war, which is why they relented on long-range strikes against targets in Russia when they were clearly linked to battles in the Kharkiv and Kursk sectors. They could see the value of attacks on ammunition dumps and air bases, although noted that many Russian air assets had been placed out of reach. They did not see the point of attacking oil refineries, although these attacks have caused Russia real difficulties. The Ukrainian view is that so long as it remains hard for either side to achieve a decisive breakthrough on land then it is vital to take the war to Russia by all possible means and impose pain where they can.

Increasingly this argument will become moot as Ukraine’s own long-range strike drones and missiles come off the production line, but it has been damaging. Many in Ukraine and their supporters have made the easy polemical point to the effect that Western leaders are pathetic conciliators. The Ukrainians do have reason to be frustrated, but the amount of support that has been provided (including the recent stepping up of sanctions) should not be discounted. The sort of ‘Ukraine fatigue’ that was predicted from the summer of 2022 onwards (when the war was having its most negative economic impact on the West) has not materialised.

The tensions between Washington and Kyiv were unfortunate. They help explain why Ukrainian policymakers appear surprisingly relaxed about Biden being replaced by Trump. Yet any American president, and this certainly includes Trump, will have to think about American interests when deciding on how best to support Ukraine. Despite the polemics about ‘appeasement,’ Biden has not tried to impose an unjust peace on Kyiv and Trump might.

Diplomatic Breakthroughs?

This is all context to what has been set up as a big diplomatic push by the Trump administration to end the war. Before the election, looking at statements from those close to Trump, notably the now Vice-President elect Vance, it was natural to assume that Trump might be prepared to give Putin all he wanted, on the (large) assumption that Ukraine could be strong-armed into complying. Since the election, with two traditional Republican foreign policy hawks, Mike Waltz and Marco Rubio, having been allocated to the key jobs of National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, more balance has been restored to the policy-making, and the issue of how to put pressure on Putin has started to be addressed.

Ukrainian President Zelensky has been careful to get as close as possible to Trump and has professed his earnest desire for a diplomatic settlement. The Russians have been less forthcoming, but have recently tried to sound more positive without actually shifting their stance on what is acceptable. Both sides are aware that Trump is invested in getting a deal of some sort and so they will be working hard to ensure not so much that he is satisfied but that the blame for any failure will be assigned to the enemy.

The main danger for Kyiv is that the eagerness to get a deal will lead the administration to take apparent concessions more seriously than they deserve. An early example of this is Trump’s designated envoy Keith Kellogg, who is quoted positively in a Fox News story about the readiness of both sides to negotiate. Yet when one reads the warm words from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov there are no new concessions – only a demand that the US offers something to Russia first before serious talks can begin. It is best to approach any negotiation without high expectations of success, let alone dreaming of a future Nobel Peace Prize, lest you mistake reworking of old formulas for true breakthroughs.

In contrast to its position earlier in the war, Kyiv is prepared to agree to a ceasefire, though this would involve its territory still being occupied by Russia. It has no short-term prospect for its liberation, and needs time to recover and reconstitute. But it will not acknowledge the Russian annexation or concede on its sovereignty and still expect security guarantees of some sort while still maintaining its military capabilities. For Putin, however, a ceasefire without fundamental concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and an end to sanctions would be a defeat. True it would have chunk of Ukrainian territory, which if developed could be valuable but in its current state would be a long-term drain on resources. In the short-term it would have to assume that Ukraine would be using any respite to prepare for its own future offensives.

So we are left with issues about how far Trump is prepared to push a reluctant Zelensky to agree to restrictions on Ukraine’s future strategic options (and not just membership of NATO). Is he really prepared to abandon Ukraine completely, when much of the US support comes in the form of business for the US military-industrial complex? If he concludes that his effort will only be credible, let alone creditable, when Putin can be persuaded to concede more, what will he be prepared to do to strengthen Ukraine?

A Recycled Conclusion

I can see how some issues have moved more sharply into view during the course of 2024 but looking back I do not feel that I got a lot wrong. Oddly enough the post that reads least well is the equivalent to this one, written at the of 2023. I was then more optimistic that the US supplemental bill would soon be passed (I was soon more realistic), and more questioning about how long the Russians could keep going given the scale of their losses. Because of the apparent urgency in Russian operations I wondered whether without more progress, and hoping to avoid yet more mobilisation of Russians (I did not imagine the turn to North Korea), Putin might be tempted to cut his losses:

‘Not a prediction but it would not wholly be a surprise if Putin decided that this was as good a moment as any to suggest the possibility of a cease-fire arrangement. Otherwise he would be stuck with many more months of war without tangible progress and a growing sense of futility.’

This judgement seems odd in part because I had also concluded that Putin would be wary of a backlash should the war conclude without an obvious victory. I also added with regard to peace initiatives that;

‘Anything that generated any momentum would certainly change the context. Then both sides would have to show they cared about peace, even while reserving their positions. Military moves would start to be judged by how they affected prospective talks. But it would not necessarily bring the war to an end. Even if there was a sudden interest in peace negotiations these could well be played for time and propaganda effect without much expectation that they would lead to an agreement. All one can say is that intense diplomatic activity can generate its own dynamic and could be a feature of 2024 largely absent from 2023. After a year in which both sides looked forward to military advances and were disappointed, this new year starts with expectations so low that the only way we can possibly be surprised is by developments that get us closer to a resolution.’

This conclusion didn’t work for 2024. Let’s see if it fares any better in 2025.