For the first time since the spring of 2022 a serious effort is underway to find a negotiated solution to the Russo-Ukraine War. As a candidate Donald Trump promised that he could do a deal in a day. Since his election victory there has been intense speculation about how he intended to make good on this promise, even accepting that the timetable was a tad ambitious.
He no longer claims that the war will be solved in a day or even ‘very quickly.’ The latest promise is still of a solution but not a firm timeline. Notes of caution have appeared about the extent of the challenge. Nonetheless the process has been set in motion. The administration’s intention is soon to move to formal negotiations.
Left to themselves there is no reason to suppose that the belligerents would have agreed to talks other than on secondary topics such as prisoner exchanges or commercial shipping in the Black Sea. Their positions remain incompatible. The Trump administration can get them to engage because of the likely costs if they fail to do so. Ukrainians know that if they hold back then the US will withhold assistance; the Russians are nervous that if they snub Trump then US support to Ukraine will be sustained or even increased.
The prospect of negotiations changes the dynamics of the conflict. It encourages the two sides to do what they can to improve their military positions even as they are obliged to clarify their political positions. Do they believe that there is a route to ending, or at least pausing, the war? If not, what must they do to ensure that they are not blamed for the failure? How, if at all, can they show flexibility and even a hint of compromise? Or will they stick to established positions, dressed up with a cloak of reasonableness?
The administration will need its own views on what constitutes an acceptable deal. This may not be necessary if it plans a largely mediating role, facilitating direct conversations between Russia and Ukraine in the hope that some compromises can be identified. In practice, especially if it wants to see any progress, it is likely to present itself as more of an arbitrator, trying to push the discussions towards an optimum outcome. If that outcome stays out of reach, then it will provide the benchmark for assigning blame for the failure of the talks.
If the aim is largely to stop the bloodshed then a ceasefire is the priority. A full peace deal will take much longer to negotiate, and may never be achieved, given the number and variety of potential issues that will need to be addressed. While this war is about territory and its control, at the heart of the conflict is Russia’s determination to deny Ukraine long-term independence and security. This sets the standard against which any eventual deal will be judged and the issues that will still have to be addressed if there is no deal.
Just after the election I suggested that the initial signs were that the Trump approach might be less harmful to Ukraine than feared. These initial signs have been confirmed as we have heard more from the Trump team. In this post I will first set out what we know before explaining why this approach suits the Ukrainians but not the Russians. As this may make it difficult to get the early movement that Trump seeks, the president will have to decide how he responds to a conflict that is turning out to be less tractable than he expected.
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