The Great Crisis

Europe's military and diplomatic challenge

Sunday’s gathering at Lancaster House in London had been arranged before Friday’s clashes between Trump, Vance, and Zelensky, in the Oval Office, but it gained added significance because of them. With so much in the air, as new opportunities open up while others close down, it is hard to be sure of its long-term significance. But it felt historic.

For years European states have discussed a possible moment when they will depend far less, or even not at all, on the United States for their security. Some have viewed this prospect with enthusiasm; others with apprehension. None have prepared for it.

Now circumstances have conspired to require that they address the challenges posed right away. This will not be a simple replacement of one security order with another. There are choices to be made on both sides of the Atlantic and any new arrangements will contain elements of the old. The changes will come about not because of careful deliberation but because of the pressure of events, and in particular how to cope with the continuing Russian aggression against Ukraine when the American president not only acts according to his mood but also with a limited grasp of the nature of the conflict.

The London meeting sought to set out a way forward that would be acceptable to the US as well Ukraine. At its conclusion Keir Starmer set out four requirement:

• to keep military aid flowing into Ukraine, and to keep increasing the economic pressure on Russia

• that any lasting peace must ensure Ukraine's sovereignty and security and Ukraine must be present at any peace talks

• in the event of a peace deal, to boost Ukraine's defensive capabilities to deter any future invasion

• to develop a "coalition of the willing" to defend a deal in Ukraine and to guarantee peace afterwards.

In his press conference and in parliament yesterday the Prime Minister was adamant that the Trump administration was content with the direction of travel and remained committed to a peace process that would give Ukraine a just and stable peace. But he accepted that Europeans were expected to do the heavy lifting when it came to finding extra resources to support Ukraine and provide the ‘coalition of the willing’. Since then Trump has cast doubt on the first requirement by ordering a pause in military support.

The immediate question is whether the process can be salvaged. This is obviously not a given but assuming that it can there are still other big issues raised by the approach outlined by Starmer. The most obvious are whether the statements about an American commitment to a just peace are wishful thinking, and do the Europeans really have the will and capacity to provide long-term security to Ukraine. Two less obvious issues are what is meant by a US ‘backstop’ when it comes to security guarantees and what role will Europeans be able to play in the negotiations. I’ll address these issues in turn.

Will the Americans Step Down?

‘European strategic autonomy’, to use a term first coined by French President Macron, has normally been considered a grand project for the European Union. The significance of Sunday’s meeting was that it was of members of NATO other than the US. Five of the participating governments – Canada, Norway, Turkey, as well as Ukraine and the UK – are not members of the EU. Unlike previous debates, this is not one about how the EU enhances its defence and security pillar, though that may be part of it. For now there is no structure available to replace NATO nor is one being sought. When speaking of how new initiatives are likely to be organised, in particular those connected with security guarantees to Ukraine, Starmer spoke of ‘coalitions of the willing’, that is those who happen to be available at the time and are prepared to rise to the challenges of the moment.

He has no desire to aggravate transatlantic relations when they are already in a fragile state, a point emphasised by Mark Rutte, the Secretary-General of NATO, who was also present at the London meeting. It is possible that the US will walk away completely from Ukraine, and even its wider alliance obligations. Some in the administration would be pleased if it did. Many in Europe might welcome the clarity it would bring to the situation. But while we must assume that over time the US will do progressively less, should this happen abruptly, for example if the pause in aid became permanent, it would be disastrous for Ukraine. The transition needs to be as prolonged and gradual as possible.

After the row in the Oval Office last Friday the UK, France, and Germany have been working to limit the damage. Publicly the administration appears to want more grovelling from Zelensky, despite his expressions of gratitude and support for the peace process. They are close to suggesting that he should not stay in office because he is an obstacle to peace. Given their history Ukrainians have a natural aversion to foreign powers picking their leaders. Any alternatives will not diverge from Zelensky’s line. A new election would take months to organise even if it could be done at all in war-time conditions. So many voters are refugees, displaced, fighting, or under occupation.

To salvage the process Zelensky may need to be even more explicit about his gratitude to the US and respect for Trump, agree to sign the mineral deal immediately, which he was prepared to do last Friday, and insist, contrary to Trump’s perception, that he is more than ready to agree a ceasefire (or ‘truce’ which is now the preferred language because of the connotations of past ceasefires for Ukraine) as soon as possible. There is more below on why I do not think that this will be a big concession. Indeed it is vital to get the Americans focused on whether Russia will accept a ceasefire/truce rather than assume erroneously that Ukraine is the main obstacle.

Even if a complete break with the US over this issue can be averted, that is not the same as assuming that things will carry on as before. A few weeks ago, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth pointedly asked the UK’s John Healey to take over the Chair of the Ramstein group of arms donors to Ukraine. Hegseth is urgently looking for savings in the European theatre to support a sharper focus on the Indo-Pacific. It is best to assume that, whatever happens in the peace talks, the American footprint in Europe will now start to shrink.

Will the Europeans Step Up?

This potential shift in focus for the US has been evident for some time, at least since President Obama. Most European governments concede that the Americans have a point, and that they should carry more of the burden of their own defence, but little has been done to redress the balance. The status quo has always seemed the safer and least expensive option. As the status quo is no longer tenable, this by itself requires higher European defence expenditure. In addition the fragmented, sub-optimal state of the European defence effort needs to be addressed. The whole remains far less than the sum of the individual parts.

This is a time of emergency. The challenges can be spelt out in stark terms. If Ukraine is allowed to fall, then the impact on Europe will be huge and far greater than finding an extra percentage point of GDP. But the case has to be made and the unavoidable economic risks when responding to such emergencies recognised. Big hugs for Zelensky are not enough.

As the Russians currently spend over 8% of GDP (and probably more) on their military, Europe’s targets are moving from 2% of GDP to 2.5% and on to 3% or even more. President Macron has spoken of the need for a higher benchmark, although he has yet to announce what he intends to do about the French contribution. The next German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is still forming his governing coalition and must work out how to give himself the requisite financial freedom of manoeuvre. Elsewhere there is more movement. The Poles are now looking at over 4%. The Norwegians are releasing serious funds. The whole question of how $300 billion worth of seized Russian assets can be used is being raised again.

The construction of a ‘coalition of the willing,’ when and if a force is put together to provide Ukraine with a security ‘guarantee’ (or ‘assurance’ which is the slightly weaker term currently favoured), will be even more testing, because they would potentially be close to the front line in any future European war. As discussed below this may not be a real issue for some time, although planning needs to start now, but if it largely consists of UK and French forces without much support from elsewhere it is not going to look sufficient.

Backstop

Starmer described the US role in any future security guarantees as a ‘backstop.’ This normally means a last resort, only coming into play when there is a risk of failure. The judgement is that somehow the possibility of a large and punishing US intervention must always be present, even if expressed in minimalist terms. This is vital to deter any breach of a ceasefire or peace deal.

Traditionally, the US has not been a last resort. It has been to the fore when vital decisions were taken on all aspects of European security. It naturally presents itself as a leader and not a follower. It does not see itself as a natural backstop, especially if that might mean picking up the pieces after the failure of Ukrainian and European forces to stop a new Russian advance.

If the implication of the backstop is that the European ‘assurance’ forces provide a tripwire, this takes us back to the old NATO debates from the 1950s and 1960s. The US urged that the most credible strategy would ensure that the last resort was never reached. This required a strong conventional capability to make it less likely that the wire would be tripped. If it accepted the backstop role the US would therefore have a strong interest in a force sufficient to stop any future Russian advances in their tracks. If they were unimpressed by what had been cobbled together by the ‘coalition of the willing’, and not prepared to contribute, they would be even less likely to volunteer a backstop.

Trump has consistently given little encouragement to any claims that he is inclined to be involved in any future security guarantees to Ukraine but in discussions with the French and British he has not been averse to helping with the enablers that make it possible to deploy and sustain an ‘assurance force’. The fact that Trump even accepts that such a force might be needed contradicts Russian views, although he may not have noticed.

He has also argued there is little point in worrying too much about all of this until there is a peace deal. Which helps explain his irritation with the Europeans and Ukrainians talking about little else. Given Ukrainian anxieties about past deals that have been broken by Russia this is not a detail to be left to later, which is the point that Zelensky was trying to make in the Oval Office.

But before we get to the stage where such a force could be deployed to Ukraine a lot else has to happen, and so it makes sense to focus on the first stages of a peace process rather than those that come later. Trump might engage more if an otherwise compelling deal might collapse without some stronger US commitment. Even then, the US would need to be convinced that the available combinations of Ukrainian and European forces would provide a credible deterrent. Given the potential problems with the coalition of the willing, the stress in the London summit on boosting Ukraine’s own defences to cope with future Russian invasions seems only prudent.

Negotiations

The behaviour of Trump and Vance has been appalling and it is easy to despair. But despair does not do Ukraine any good and acting as if nothing can be salvaged from the current situation will only make it more certain.

If Trump abandons Ukraine completely then he abandons his self-declared role as a peacemaker. His latest eruption was because he took remarks from Zelensky to mean that Ukraine had no interest in a ceasefire but just wanted to use American support to keep on fighting. It is part of the craziness of this situation that the side with least interest in a ceasefire is the Russians, as they have pointed out at every opportunity. Russian wants to pin down the peace deal before agreeing a ceasefire.

This is why it makes so much sense for Zelensky to agree an immediate truce, whatever his misgivings, because that puts the question back to Putin. (I am reminded of another Falklands analogy when the US peace plan presented to Thatcher was unacceptable. Instead of rejecting it the UK encouraged the US to first ask the Argentinians if they would accept it. This the US did and Buenos Aires duly rejected the proposal.)

At the moment we have not seen any American plan. The UK and France have developed some ideas for a sequential process. One danger that needs avoiding is a twin track whereby the US comes up with a plan that favours the Russians and the Europeans come up with a plan that favours Ukraine. The current priority must be, if possible, to get Ukraine playing an active role in the US-led process. Another risk is that proposals emerging out of the US-Russian dialogue would be left untested with Ukraine and gain unwarranted traction. In the end, if Trump really wants a deal then he needs Ukraine’s agreement.

Even with a serious negotiating process and intense conversations involving all interested parties a deal is likely to prove elusive. For now the Russians are rejoicing that the US is more aligned with them than the Europeans and will not be inclined to make concessions. It remains the case that what they want the US can’t deliver – more Ukrainian territory than they have been able to take and a supine and disarmed government in Kyiv. Putin may conclude that with Ukraine weakened by the loss of American support it is better off carrying on with its offensive, while patiently explaining to their American interlocutors the justice of their demands for Ukraine’s capitulation.

Trump has expressed his conviction that a deal can and should be done quickly. Perhaps Putin will appreciate that Trump represents his best way out of a disastrous war in which he has yet to achieve any of his stated objectives and is putting his economy in increasing jeopardy. Perhaps there are compromises over the land Russia keeps and that which is released. Perhaps there can be an agreement on NATO but allowances for all other measures that Ukraine could take to insure against a future Russian invasion. So far there have been not even hints of Russian concessions. The main value of a proper engagement with the Russians is to find out whether they really have any to offer. If they do then negotiations can have their own dynamics.

If Trump concludes that there are no quick wins here, that the talks are sputtering along without any momentum, and with so much else to worry about, he may well lose interest. This would then raise another intriguing possibility.

The view in Europe since the spring of 2022 has been that there is no point in talking with Russia, certainly not unless Ukraine wishes it. Treating Putin as a serious partner for peace after all he has done, with the destruction and suffering he has caused, would stick in the craw. Yet Trump has broken the taboo. Zelensky and European leaders have accepted that it makes sense to try a serious diplomatic effort even though this involves direct talks with the Russians. The precedent has been set. Which raises the question: if the Americans can talk to the Russians why not the Europeans?

For now the US does not want anybody else muscling in and the Russians are deeply opposed to any European role. But suppose that the US-Russian talks do not get anywhere, either because the Russians are unresponsive to US ideas for a quick ceasefire or because the US has lost leverage over Ukraine.

The alternative of talks with a combined Ukrainian/European team might yield fewer concessions but Moscow would have more confidence that what was agreed would be enacted. There are incentives for Russia to repair relations with Europe – in easing sanctions, restoring lost markets, and reducing dependence on China. In the days leading up to and after the full-scale invasion there were several European conversations with Putin. Going back to the Minsk agreements of 2014/15, France and Germany were direct participants. Of course this history is far from encouraging as in retrospect France and Germany were far too passive as Russia coerced Ukraine, while the UK was completely absent. Europe’s track record is not impressive.

At any rate, a European led process is unlikely for now and would not be worth considering without some strong signals that Moscow was prepared to make serious concessions. But it is not unthinkable, and with so much going on at the moment that was once unthinkable it is worth thinking about. The logic of the current situation in which Europeans are expected to take more responsibility for their own security also means that they are going to have to take more responsibility for their own diplomacy. And the experience of trying to deal with the current White House at least provides some experience that might come in handy when eventually dealing with the Kremlin.