The enemy within

How Europe should respond to Trump's National Security Strategy

The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) has been poorly received in Europe. Two features have gone down particularly badly. First, it directly interferes in European affairs by explicitly siding with ‘Patriotic Parties’ and picking up on their themes of ‘civilisational erasure’. It is ‘more than plausible,’ the document says, ‘that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European’ (which we can assume to mean non-white). Here it recalls Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech last in February when he told an alarmed and high-level European audience that the biggest threat to their security was ‘from within’ – ‘the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values.’ This is underscored by a stress on the restoration of America’s ‘spiritual and cultural health.’

Second, it fails to discuss Russia as an adversary that poses a direct threat to freedom in Europe and is currently waging an aggressive war against a sovereign country. Against all evidence, it claims that while the European people want peace yet their governments have subverted ‘democratic processes’ to prevent this. Yet it is Russia not Ukraine that has thwarted Trump’s desire to declare an early ceasefire. The document looks forward to ‘stabilising’ relations with Russian and to a peace deal for Ukraine without reference to its likely justice or durability. All this was noted cheerfully in the Kremlin, declaring that the US strategic vision is similar to Russia’s.

Because of the document’s provenance it cannot be ignored and there is no point pretending that it does not reflect the values and instincts of Trump, Vance and their courtiers in the White House. It has to be taken seriously. The question is how seriously. Is this the definitive statement of Trump’s strategy from which all future policy decisions will flow?

Those convinced that the aim of the Trump administration from the start has been to break up NATO and hand over Ukraine to the Russians have seized upon the document as showing that they were right all along. If they are correct then Europeans must take the logic of the administration’s position seriously, as a document like this sets it in stone. They must adjust to a world in which the US cares little for their security concerns and if anything is taking the side of the aggressors.

And yet. This is hardly an administration known for its consistency or coherence. As is often the case with official strategy documents, propositions that seem to be opposed to each other can be found, sometimes in the same sentence. There are for example references to the value and importance of alliances that on their own could be considered reassuring. We also know from this tumultuous year that Trump’s actions often reflect his whims and moods, animated often by a persistent desire to punish his enemies and help those who might do him favours. He has the backing of an energetic and radical political movement but also one that, by virtue of its extremism, is prone to splits and internal rivalries. The true isolationists object to the more activist aspects of the administration’s policies, seeing too much interference in matters which are not the US’s business. The NSS reflects the most nationalist strand of that movement, but in government and Congress there are other strands which shape the eventual policy mix.

In the rest of this post I look back briefly at past NSS’s and in particular the equivalent document of Trump’s first term, before looking at the new document. I then consider whether any of it is likely to happen and how Europeans should respond.