The Energy War Intensifies

Ukraine’s Campaign against Russia’s Oil Refineries

On the night of 27 to 28 August Russia launched 598 Shahed-type and decoy drones at Ukrainian cities, combined with two Kinzhal ballistic missiles, nine Iskander ballistic missiles, and 20 cruise missiles. Ukrainian air defences did well - 563 drones, one Kinzhal, seven Iskanders and 18 cruise missiles – were shot down. But not well enough, for those that got through hit 13 locations, with debris falling on another 26, leaving 21 civilians dead. Kyiv was the worst hit. A residential building in Kyiv was struck which left 12 people dead, including four children, and damage was inflicted on buildings used by the British Council and the EU delegation to Ukraine. The timing reflects Russia’s frustration that Putin’s Alaska summit with Trump was not followed through with pressure on Ukraine for more concessions, and anger at the deliberations among European leaders on security guarantees for Ukraine and another sanctions package.

The scope, intensity, and frequency of Russian attacks against Ukrainian civil society has been stepped up over this past year, making life difficult and wearisome for the Ukrainian people. However hard Ukraine works on its defences there are limits on what it can do other than look for innovative ways to improve them, move quickly to put out the fires, and then repair the damage. The country has shown its resilience. It has coped with three winters’ worth of attacks on its electricity system, despite suffering blackouts and lacking adequate heating. The attacks won’t stop. Russia shows no intention of letting up on its own assault on Ukrainian energy facilities. Twenty sites, including electrical substations, oil refineries and thermal power plants, have been damaged recently.

Ukraine’s capacity to strike targets deep into Russian territory at first developed slowly and their capabilities have had to be used more sparingly and efficiently. Although first the Biden and now the Trump administration have opposed Ukraine striking too deep into Russian territory, in the belief that somehow this might constitute a dangerous escalation, this has become less of a constraint now that Ukraine has its own home-made long-range drones. It has been evident for some time that the oil industry provides some of the most suitable targets. It is important to Russia’s economy as well as its war effort.

From September 2023 to February 2025 there were approximately 100 strikes on oil refineries and depots across Russia, with some facilities hit multiple times. Since late July this campaign has been revived with added momentum. Refineries have been struck multiple times. Up to 20% of Russia’s refining capacity has been taken out, at least temporarily. This loss of capacity comes at a time of peak demand because of summer tourism and the harvest. This has led to rationing, price rises and lengthening queues for petrol.

In his review of the Russian press on 25 August, BBC Correspondent Steve Rosenberg, reported growing alarm about the situation, with the government reluctant to acknowledge the impact of Ukrainian drone strikes, preferring to refer to ‘unscheduled’ repairs. The Russian authorities have promised the situation returning to normal in September, but Ukraine will persevere with this campaign, and it has the systems to enable it to do so.

This post looks at the history of attacks against the Russian oil industry and assesses their impact. Will it effect front-line forces? Weaken Putin’s political position because of the economic and social consequences of continuing shortages? Or turn out to be a temporary blip that the Russian authorities will be able to manage?