May 29, 2022·edited May 29, 2022Liked by Sam Freedman
Some thoughts:
1. I very much agree realignment is tough for political parties. All political coaltions have different, sometimes conflicting, interests, but there does tend to be a broad consensus on what takes priority. That's clearly been towards fiscal conservatism and markets in the Conservative party since Thatcher, and any shift from that is clearly going to be difficult for some to accept.
2. I'm not sure "social conservatism" is really the right descriptor for the instincts of the hypothetical average low income voter in Thurrock. Ed West discusses this a bit more fully here (https://unherd.com/2021/02/are-you-a-basic-conservative/) - you wouldn't expect them to respond to a campaign on pornography/marriage/abortion/gambling/alcohol. I think the better framework to look through is the one Sir Paul Collier sets out in "The Future of Capitalism" - in summary that those who are poorer, and lacking in status, tend to put more of their identity into their nationality, while the typical successful graduate puts increasingly less (Brexit has probably supercharged this effect in the UK).
3. The Lib Dems have (probably not intentionally) become a party representing and challenging in almost exclusively richer seats, especially in the South East. This might mean they can offer a social and economic way of thinking that is very effectively targeted to them that neither of the two main parties can.
4. Neither Labour nor the Conservatives seems to have a confident explanation of how they are going to manage these new groups and interests that will be increasingly key players in mid-21st century UK politics. The main difficulty to doing so being that at present the older vote is still very strong - it's big, it turns out, and it's geographically efficient (to the point where you could win most other groups at half-decent margins and still lose).
Where does this leave the Lib Dems? Targeting the leafy outer suburbs and large parts of the home counties should give them more MPs and be more efficient (re votes per seats gained) but they could then be split on issues such as planning, and do they make much of an effort in other parts of the country?
A couple of questions. Do you think the insecure graduate is voting for the policies of Labour/Liberals (whatever they are) or against those of the Conservatives? You make much of the division between graduate and non-graduate. Is this a proxy for 'the intelligent' and the 'not so intelligent? Surely, the possession of a degree is closely correlated to age and has nothing to do with cognitive horsepower? About 5% of my age cohort went to university compared with 50% today.
"What we have seen is older homeowners, in seats which had an historic attachment to Labour, choosing to vote for the party that delivered Brexit". But is it delivering the Brexit that these voters expected to get, back in 2016? How long before the fog of slogans clears away in the sunshine of economic reality?
Some thoughts:
1. I very much agree realignment is tough for political parties. All political coaltions have different, sometimes conflicting, interests, but there does tend to be a broad consensus on what takes priority. That's clearly been towards fiscal conservatism and markets in the Conservative party since Thatcher, and any shift from that is clearly going to be difficult for some to accept.
2. I'm not sure "social conservatism" is really the right descriptor for the instincts of the hypothetical average low income voter in Thurrock. Ed West discusses this a bit more fully here (https://unherd.com/2021/02/are-you-a-basic-conservative/) - you wouldn't expect them to respond to a campaign on pornography/marriage/abortion/gambling/alcohol. I think the better framework to look through is the one Sir Paul Collier sets out in "The Future of Capitalism" - in summary that those who are poorer, and lacking in status, tend to put more of their identity into their nationality, while the typical successful graduate puts increasingly less (Brexit has probably supercharged this effect in the UK).
3. The Lib Dems have (probably not intentionally) become a party representing and challenging in almost exclusively richer seats, especially in the South East. This might mean they can offer a social and economic way of thinking that is very effectively targeted to them that neither of the two main parties can.
4. Neither Labour nor the Conservatives seems to have a confident explanation of how they are going to manage these new groups and interests that will be increasingly key players in mid-21st century UK politics. The main difficulty to doing so being that at present the older vote is still very strong - it's big, it turns out, and it's geographically efficient (to the point where you could win most other groups at half-decent margins and still lose).
Where does this leave the Lib Dems? Targeting the leafy outer suburbs and large parts of the home counties should give them more MPs and be more efficient (re votes per seats gained) but they could then be split on issues such as planning, and do they make much of an effort in other parts of the country?
A couple of questions. Do you think the insecure graduate is voting for the policies of Labour/Liberals (whatever they are) or against those of the Conservatives? You make much of the division between graduate and non-graduate. Is this a proxy for 'the intelligent' and the 'not so intelligent? Surely, the possession of a degree is closely correlated to age and has nothing to do with cognitive horsepower? About 5% of my age cohort went to university compared with 50% today.
"What we have seen is older homeowners, in seats which had an historic attachment to Labour, choosing to vote for the party that delivered Brexit". But is it delivering the Brexit that these voters expected to get, back in 2016? How long before the fog of slogans clears away in the sunshine of economic reality?