32 Comments

Thank you for another excellent analysis. Some historical parallels occur to me here. Firstly, Makiivka. In the 30 Years War, concentrating an army for combat meant it would rapidly exhaust the countryside and starve, whereas dispersal for foraging and basic survival dictated an inability to assemble for potentially-decisive manoeuvre or combat. In the same way, Russia either has to concentrate its forces and supplies to enable combat (big and easily-detected targets), or remain dispersed with supplies further back, thereby preventing assembly for significant combat operations.

Secondly, Bakhmut. The Wagner Group epitomises the worst effects of a two-tier force, as seen in Spring 1918 (German Army), the growth of Arned SS, Luftwaffe field duvisions etc in WW2 (German Army again), or arguably the trend in the Brirish Army post-1992.

Thirdly, morale at home. For Russia, this seems to bear a closer resemblance to 1916 than to 1941-2.

Finally, tactics. Artillery-led, casualty-heavy attrition only worked in 1943-5 due to significant "brutal" industrial capacity and key support from external allies (USA). Neither of those factors are in play today, in fact probably the reverse.

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I think vodka to death is MY choice. They don't have a choice. Great read again Dad. Thank you for keeping us non politicly informed.

Kathleen aus Kanada

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Another good read. I think it is important to remember this war is less than a year old and Russia has only been consistently receiving setbacks since the withdrawal from Kyiv. Serious war weariness takes years rather than months and the impact of returning soldiers with horror stories has not had time to do its work on domestic attitudes to the war. Furthermore the Russian home front is likely to be starved of good news of successful offensives. It has neither the equipment, ammunition or trained motivated troops for that. So I’ve not given up hope that the war may prove very unpopular with the Russian populace in a year or two. I’m certain the Ukrainians aren’t going anywhere and will be tying down and bleeding Russian forces for a very long time.

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Some miscellaneous points.

(1) I recall reading many years ago (I can't recall where) that the point at which a military unit loses 10% of its personnel killed is the point at which unit morale is damaged beyond recovery. The numbers of Wagner losses given in the article are at or approaching this level. Is my recollection likely to be wrong, or an oversimplification or does it belong to a different era of warfare? (2) The Institute for the Study of War currently assesses that the Russian offensive at Bakhmut may be culminating (i.e. in failure) and one indication of this is that attacks are being conducted in squad strength in the numbers given in the article above and with the effect noted there, that any success cannot be exploited. Squad size attacks may still continue after culmination to show "something is being done". (3) Whilst blaming soldiers using their mobile 'phones may be intended to deflect blame from the Russian Ministry of Defence/military, there have I think been previous references to the use of mobiles e.g. due to allegedly inadequate Russian military communications. Might not significant use of mobiles have given the Ukrainians multiple confirmations of location (particularly if conversations were overheard) which might be more useful than some other sources of intelligence? I have also seen reference to some of the officers at Makiiva being themselves mobilised reservists and though this presumably reflects their status in their earlier careers, they may not have a present understanding of the need to enforce orders against soldiers (if mobile use was officially proscribed.) (4) Given the comments about the Ukrainians needing to hit large Russian concentrations and also about the prospects of further Russian mobilisation does NATO not now need to give Ukraine the ability to strike more regularly and deeply into Russian (and Belorussian?) territory where new troops and equipment will assemble on the way to Ukraine.

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M30 series rockets were developed to do exactly what Ukraine has done with them: hit troop, equipment, air power, and ammo concentrations, force Russians to remove them to the rear, and attrit mobilized forces before they ever reach the front. A Reagan-era weapon that works exactly as designed, used as intended, on an enemy who seems incapable of learning from experience.

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Seems even Germany now understands that a Ukrainian victory is the best, maybe the only, way to end this war

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Correcting a spelling error, first: "largely from the southwest district of Savatore." - should be Saratov

Second, this describes the state of feudal serfdom: "This is how we are raised,’ Aleksandr said. ‘We grew up in our country understanding that it doesn’t matter how our country treats us. Maybe this is bad. Maybe this is good. Maybe there are things we do not like about our government.’ But, ‘when a situation like this arises, we get up and go.’" They do what they are told, because that is what serfs do. Russia is fighting this war with herds of sheep, not men.

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Thank you. An important summary for our leaders to read as both sides prepare to transition from the winter impasse. A depressing conclusion is that the down-trodden Russian population will continue to submit itself in robotic fashion to the Ukrainian meat grinder where they face death or serious injury in large numbers. As things stand there are no likely scenarios we could wish for that would alter this situation in Russia; politically, socially, culturally they are destined to grind on and even a nuclear release may not exhaust their march towards destruction. War-disillusion on a national scale may begin after 18 -24 months in a democratic society, there is no reliable model for a similar disaffection in a suppressed population.

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This combination of personal docility and fatalism which allows endless streams of soldiers to march into futile battles on command, might also explain the rigid and cumbersome military command structure.

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Ukraine isn't going to run out of troops.

Ukraine isn't going to run out of weapons (the west will never cut them off).

Given this, I don't see how Russia wins without nukes.

If they want to win, they should just pull them band aid off now. Any western response can also be repelled with more nukes.

I understand this would be a phyrric victory, but what isn't such a victory at this point. Currently, its inevitable they are pushed out of Ukraine.

Perhaps Putin just isn't that committed. If so, might as well pull out now.

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Thank you!

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Thank you. This is excellent!

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Russia’s style of warfare sounds like lessons learned in World War II.

When Soviet forces attacked uphill between Uzjgorod (now Ukraine) and Kosice (now Slovakia) they suffered 30,000 casualties.

When Soviet forces attacked East Prussia, all buildings in central Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) was destroyed during heavy fighting. The cathedral has been rebuilt, and maybe four other buildings. The rest of the centre is with newer buildings.

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MakiivKa

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