Thank you for another excellent analysis. Some historical parallels occur to me here. Firstly, Makiivka. In the 30 Years War, concentrating an army for combat meant it would rapidly exhaust the countryside and starve, whereas dispersal for foraging and basic survival dictated an inability to assemble for potentially-decisive manoeuvre or combat. In the same way, Russia either has to concentrate its forces and supplies to enable combat (big and easily-detected targets), or remain dispersed with supplies further back, thereby preventing assembly for significant combat operations.
Secondly, Bakhmut. The Wagner Group epitomises the worst effects of a two-tier force, as seen in Spring 1918 (German Army), the growth of Arned SS, Luftwaffe field duvisions etc in WW2 (German Army again), or arguably the trend in the Brirish Army post-1992.
Thirdly, morale at home. For Russia, this seems to bear a closer resemblance to 1916 than to 1941-2.
Finally, tactics. Artillery-led, casualty-heavy attrition only worked in 1943-5 due to significant "brutal" industrial capacity and key support from external allies (USA). Neither of those factors are in play today, in fact probably the reverse.
The current situation in Soledar has been described as WW1-style waves of troops sent "over the top" into open ground and under fire. With vast numbers of ill-equipped and poorly trained troops, I suppose that sort of tactic makes sense.
I am also reminded of stories - perhaps apocryphal - from both WW1 and WW2 of more seasoned fighters sending hapless new recruits ahead into the most dangerous and pointless situations.
I think a key point is that the Russians don't have vast numbers of troops. Despite the large numbers bandied around of the various conscriptions (300,000 then another 300,000), I'd be sceptical as to how many of those are actually in ground combat, and in turn how many of those that are in combat are in any way effective. The descriptions of Soledar may be accurate, but I'd doubt the Russian ground forces can sustain the "human wave" tactics for very long, partly because of declining morale and relatively weak small-unit leadership.
If they pack whoever is available into a small area, and those men are as docile and fatalistic as reported, the waves of assaults could continue for a while. The hope seems to to that sheer weight of numbers will allow some to get through.
Another good read. I think it is important to remember this war is less than a year old and Russia has only been consistently receiving setbacks since the withdrawal from Kyiv. Serious war weariness takes years rather than months and the impact of returning soldiers with horror stories has not had time to do its work on domestic attitudes to the war. Furthermore the Russian home front is likely to be starved of good news of successful offensives. It has neither the equipment, ammunition or trained motivated troops for that. So I’ve not given up hope that the war may prove very unpopular with the Russian populace in a year or two. I’m certain the Ukrainians aren’t going anywhere and will be tying down and bleeding Russian forces for a very long time.
(1) I recall reading many years ago (I can't recall where) that the point at which a military unit loses 10% of its personnel killed is the point at which unit morale is damaged beyond recovery. The numbers of Wagner losses given in the article are at or approaching this level. Is my recollection likely to be wrong, or an oversimplification or does it belong to a different era of warfare? (2) The Institute for the Study of War currently assesses that the Russian offensive at Bakhmut may be culminating (i.e. in failure) and one indication of this is that attacks are being conducted in squad strength in the numbers given in the article above and with the effect noted there, that any success cannot be exploited. Squad size attacks may still continue after culmination to show "something is being done". (3) Whilst blaming soldiers using their mobile 'phones may be intended to deflect blame from the Russian Ministry of Defence/military, there have I think been previous references to the use of mobiles e.g. due to allegedly inadequate Russian military communications. Might not significant use of mobiles have given the Ukrainians multiple confirmations of location (particularly if conversations were overheard) which might be more useful than some other sources of intelligence? I have also seen reference to some of the officers at Makiiva being themselves mobilised reservists and though this presumably reflects their status in their earlier careers, they may not have a present understanding of the need to enforce orders against soldiers (if mobile use was officially proscribed.) (4) Given the comments about the Ukrainians needing to hit large Russian concentrations and also about the prospects of further Russian mobilisation does NATO not now need to give Ukraine the ability to strike more regularly and deeply into Russian (and Belorussian?) territory where new troops and equipment will assemble on the way to Ukraine.
M30 series rockets were developed to do exactly what Ukraine has done with them: hit troop, equipment, air power, and ammo concentrations, force Russians to remove them to the rear, and attrit mobilized forces before they ever reach the front. A Reagan-era weapon that works exactly as designed, used as intended, on an enemy who seems incapable of learning from experience.
Correcting a spelling error, first: "largely from the southwest district of Savatore." - should be Saratov
Second, this describes the state of feudal serfdom: "This is how we are raised,’ Aleksandr said. ‘We grew up in our country understanding that it doesn’t matter how our country treats us. Maybe this is bad. Maybe this is good. Maybe there are things we do not like about our government.’ But, ‘when a situation like this arises, we get up and go.’" They do what they are told, because that is what serfs do. Russia is fighting this war with herds of sheep, not men.
Thank you. An important summary for our leaders to read as both sides prepare to transition from the winter impasse. A depressing conclusion is that the down-trodden Russian population will continue to submit itself in robotic fashion to the Ukrainian meat grinder where they face death or serious injury in large numbers. As things stand there are no likely scenarios we could wish for that would alter this situation in Russia; politically, socially, culturally they are destined to grind on and even a nuclear release may not exhaust their march towards destruction. War-disillusion on a national scale may begin after 18 -24 months in a democratic society, there is no reliable model for a similar disaffection in a suppressed population.
This combination of personal docility and fatalism which allows endless streams of soldiers to march into futile battles on command, might also explain the rigid and cumbersome military command structure.
Why do you even assume it would be any sort of victory?
And how would “any Western response” be repelled with more nukes? The West has nukes too, and if Russia is crazy enough to use nukes on the West, you’ll see mushroom clouds over Moscow. So do you believe Putin and Russians have a death wish?
I personally don’t believe so. They don’t believe 40 virgins await them in heaven if they die.
Let's say that tomorrow Putin announces that the current line of contact is simply the new international border. All western weapons must be removed from Ukraine and all offensive operations must stop.
If people won't recognize this, Putin will use nuclear weapons to target any western weapons in Ukraine, any transport hub used to move those weapons around, and any concentrations of Ukrainian forces that are conducting offensive operations.
If the west responds by attacking Russia, any western response will be met with nuclear retaliation. If planes take off from a based in NATO to attack Russian troops, Russia will nuke that base. If America uses nukes on a Russian target, Russia will multiply that x10 in retaliation.
What would happen here? Would the West really climb the escalatory ladder until total nuclear war destroys human civilization? To determine whether Ukrainian oligarchs or Russian oligarchs rule over flattened depopulated villages in the Crimea and Donbass full of Russian ethnics that don't even want to be part of Ukraine and just want the war to end?
I would hope the people running our society aren't crazy enough to do that. They must understand that if push really comes to shove "we are going to destroy the entire world for the Donbass" is a bluff.
This is of course a hugely risky and massively destructive strategy for Putin that he can't control and I imagine he would rather avoid. But when you get right down to it in the game of chicken, of course he cares more about the Donbass than we do.
The problem with your logic is that everyone also knows Putin isn't crazy enough to risk a nuked entire Russia for the Donbass, which means that a threat that he'd respond to a Westerner nuclear strike with "10x more nukes" wouldn't be taken seriously as that would ensure that all of Russia (and yes, the rest of the world) would be nuked. So do you think any Russian would risk that? Someone who threatens "give me $100 or I'll burn my house down" just isn't terribly credible.
If you look at Cold War history, it was actually Americans who were more trigger-happy and Russians/Soviets who were more unwilling to risk total global nuclear Holocaust.
Also, the West actually can destroy all of Russia's conventional military capability without using nukes.
Another factor you're just assuming away is that Russia has actually kept it's nuclear readiness capabilities up to par.
Finally, it isn't simply who cares more about the Donbass but also who has more capabilities. Hitler cared more about Alsace and Lorraine than Americans did, but did Hitler get Alsace and Lorraine?
I’m aware that the Cold War was more dangerous then most know, and that American aggression nearly caused a nuclear war (specifically during the Cuban middle crisis, when the decision of a single soviet officer who opposed the decision of the other two officers to fire a nuclear torpedo saved the world).
I think there are a lot of parallels. The bay of pigs and positioning of missiles in turkey prompted a response by the soviets, just like western involvement in ukraine prompted a response by Russia.
Far from the blockade being brilliant, it was essentially lucky, and if we run that 100 times a not insignificant number end in annhiliation.
Why would I risk the world on the perceived mental health and motivations of Putin? What if it’s not a bluff? The price is everything.
Understand that I value ukraine in general and especially the part of ukraine being fought over today as essentially zero. If there was a 0.1% of it spiraling out of control and destroying the planet, I would give it up.
I don’t see Russia as much of a threat, and I haven’t agreed with our involvement in ukraine for a decade. I see little evidence that staying out of the conflict would have been more dangerous then where we are.
Back in the Cold War there were plenty of times when nato could have started a war in order to stand up to communism. We didn’t take the bait every time, and yet somehow we still won the war.
If Putin's nuclear threats would work in the case of Ukraine why would he stop his gamble after such a grand success? Next time, the Baltic countries, Finland, Poland,... every time the same question would be repeated why would the West take stand if Putin threatens going all out nuclear?
You’re basically asking why didn’t people enact maximum demands in the constant multi round game of chicken. We games this shit out during the cold war and you can look it up. Real life instances also tested the games.
The bottom line is that there is a sense of spheres of influence and red lines that uneasily keeps the game from escalating. Conflict results from a disagreement over those items.
Why was stopping the Czechs from getting crushed a non starter in the cold war, but Ukraine today is? Why was dividing Korea in half ok rather than using nukes like mcarthur wanted to?
It’s complicated. But we didn’t follow up Cuba by invading eastern Germany and saying (we have strategic nuclear superiority, suck it). And Cuba itself was a close run thing.
Russia’s style of warfare sounds like lessons learned in World War II.
When Soviet forces attacked uphill between Uzjgorod (now Ukraine) and Kosice (now Slovakia) they suffered 30,000 casualties.
When Soviet forces attacked East Prussia, all buildings in central Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) was destroyed during heavy fighting. The cathedral has been rebuilt, and maybe four other buildings. The rest of the centre is with newer buildings.
The problem with the "Russian steamroller" is that it requires very large reserves of mobilised troops, and very large amounts of artillery with continuous supplies of munitions (precision or otherwise). I think Russia is struggling on both counts, and will continue to do so.
Plus all that logistics and the physical and human resources for the maintanance and supplementing of both men and machines. (Hints. Ukraine is HUGE and algebra is a helluva art.... ;) )
Thank you for another excellent analysis. Some historical parallels occur to me here. Firstly, Makiivka. In the 30 Years War, concentrating an army for combat meant it would rapidly exhaust the countryside and starve, whereas dispersal for foraging and basic survival dictated an inability to assemble for potentially-decisive manoeuvre or combat. In the same way, Russia either has to concentrate its forces and supplies to enable combat (big and easily-detected targets), or remain dispersed with supplies further back, thereby preventing assembly for significant combat operations.
Secondly, Bakhmut. The Wagner Group epitomises the worst effects of a two-tier force, as seen in Spring 1918 (German Army), the growth of Arned SS, Luftwaffe field duvisions etc in WW2 (German Army again), or arguably the trend in the Brirish Army post-1992.
Thirdly, morale at home. For Russia, this seems to bear a closer resemblance to 1916 than to 1941-2.
Finally, tactics. Artillery-led, casualty-heavy attrition only worked in 1943-5 due to significant "brutal" industrial capacity and key support from external allies (USA). Neither of those factors are in play today, in fact probably the reverse.
The current situation in Soledar has been described as WW1-style waves of troops sent "over the top" into open ground and under fire. With vast numbers of ill-equipped and poorly trained troops, I suppose that sort of tactic makes sense.
I am also reminded of stories - perhaps apocryphal - from both WW1 and WW2 of more seasoned fighters sending hapless new recruits ahead into the most dangerous and pointless situations.
I think a key point is that the Russians don't have vast numbers of troops. Despite the large numbers bandied around of the various conscriptions (300,000 then another 300,000), I'd be sceptical as to how many of those are actually in ground combat, and in turn how many of those that are in combat are in any way effective. The descriptions of Soledar may be accurate, but I'd doubt the Russian ground forces can sustain the "human wave" tactics for very long, partly because of declining morale and relatively weak small-unit leadership.
If they pack whoever is available into a small area, and those men are as docile and fatalistic as reported, the waves of assaults could continue for a while. The hope seems to to that sheer weight of numbers will allow some to get through.
They may manage to capture a small piece of ground that way but Ukraine is a big country. As big as France/Texas.
I think vodka to death is MY choice. They don't have a choice. Great read again Dad. Thank you for keeping us non politicly informed.
Kathleen aus Kanada
Another good read. I think it is important to remember this war is less than a year old and Russia has only been consistently receiving setbacks since the withdrawal from Kyiv. Serious war weariness takes years rather than months and the impact of returning soldiers with horror stories has not had time to do its work on domestic attitudes to the war. Furthermore the Russian home front is likely to be starved of good news of successful offensives. It has neither the equipment, ammunition or trained motivated troops for that. So I’ve not given up hope that the war may prove very unpopular with the Russian populace in a year or two. I’m certain the Ukrainians aren’t going anywhere and will be tying down and bleeding Russian forces for a very long time.
Some miscellaneous points.
(1) I recall reading many years ago (I can't recall where) that the point at which a military unit loses 10% of its personnel killed is the point at which unit morale is damaged beyond recovery. The numbers of Wagner losses given in the article are at or approaching this level. Is my recollection likely to be wrong, or an oversimplification or does it belong to a different era of warfare? (2) The Institute for the Study of War currently assesses that the Russian offensive at Bakhmut may be culminating (i.e. in failure) and one indication of this is that attacks are being conducted in squad strength in the numbers given in the article above and with the effect noted there, that any success cannot be exploited. Squad size attacks may still continue after culmination to show "something is being done". (3) Whilst blaming soldiers using their mobile 'phones may be intended to deflect blame from the Russian Ministry of Defence/military, there have I think been previous references to the use of mobiles e.g. due to allegedly inadequate Russian military communications. Might not significant use of mobiles have given the Ukrainians multiple confirmations of location (particularly if conversations were overheard) which might be more useful than some other sources of intelligence? I have also seen reference to some of the officers at Makiiva being themselves mobilised reservists and though this presumably reflects their status in their earlier careers, they may not have a present understanding of the need to enforce orders against soldiers (if mobile use was officially proscribed.) (4) Given the comments about the Ukrainians needing to hit large Russian concentrations and also about the prospects of further Russian mobilisation does NATO not now need to give Ukraine the ability to strike more regularly and deeply into Russian (and Belorussian?) territory where new troops and equipment will assemble on the way to Ukraine.
M30 series rockets were developed to do exactly what Ukraine has done with them: hit troop, equipment, air power, and ammo concentrations, force Russians to remove them to the rear, and attrit mobilized forces before they ever reach the front. A Reagan-era weapon that works exactly as designed, used as intended, on an enemy who seems incapable of learning from experience.
Seems even Germany now understands that a Ukrainian victory is the best, maybe the only, way to end this war
Correcting a spelling error, first: "largely from the southwest district of Savatore." - should be Saratov
Second, this describes the state of feudal serfdom: "This is how we are raised,’ Aleksandr said. ‘We grew up in our country understanding that it doesn’t matter how our country treats us. Maybe this is bad. Maybe this is good. Maybe there are things we do not like about our government.’ But, ‘when a situation like this arises, we get up and go.’" They do what they are told, because that is what serfs do. Russia is fighting this war with herds of sheep, not men.
Thank you. An important summary for our leaders to read as both sides prepare to transition from the winter impasse. A depressing conclusion is that the down-trodden Russian population will continue to submit itself in robotic fashion to the Ukrainian meat grinder where they face death or serious injury in large numbers. As things stand there are no likely scenarios we could wish for that would alter this situation in Russia; politically, socially, culturally they are destined to grind on and even a nuclear release may not exhaust their march towards destruction. War-disillusion on a national scale may begin after 18 -24 months in a democratic society, there is no reliable model for a similar disaffection in a suppressed population.
Huh? It's not as if history can't be read. Russia in 1917 wasn't democratic at all yet the country still collapsed.
This combination of personal docility and fatalism which allows endless streams of soldiers to march into futile battles on command, might also explain the rigid and cumbersome military command structure.
Ukraine isn't going to run out of troops.
Ukraine isn't going to run out of weapons (the west will never cut them off).
Given this, I don't see how Russia wins without nukes.
If they want to win, they should just pull them band aid off now. Any western response can also be repelled with more nukes.
I understand this would be a phyrric victory, but what isn't such a victory at this point. Currently, its inevitable they are pushed out of Ukraine.
Perhaps Putin just isn't that committed. If so, might as well pull out now.
Why do you even assume it would be any sort of victory?
And how would “any Western response” be repelled with more nukes? The West has nukes too, and if Russia is crazy enough to use nukes on the West, you’ll see mushroom clouds over Moscow. So do you believe Putin and Russians have a death wish?
I personally don’t believe so. They don’t believe 40 virgins await them in heaven if they die.
Let's say that tomorrow Putin announces that the current line of contact is simply the new international border. All western weapons must be removed from Ukraine and all offensive operations must stop.
If people won't recognize this, Putin will use nuclear weapons to target any western weapons in Ukraine, any transport hub used to move those weapons around, and any concentrations of Ukrainian forces that are conducting offensive operations.
If the west responds by attacking Russia, any western response will be met with nuclear retaliation. If planes take off from a based in NATO to attack Russian troops, Russia will nuke that base. If America uses nukes on a Russian target, Russia will multiply that x10 in retaliation.
What would happen here? Would the West really climb the escalatory ladder until total nuclear war destroys human civilization? To determine whether Ukrainian oligarchs or Russian oligarchs rule over flattened depopulated villages in the Crimea and Donbass full of Russian ethnics that don't even want to be part of Ukraine and just want the war to end?
I would hope the people running our society aren't crazy enough to do that. They must understand that if push really comes to shove "we are going to destroy the entire world for the Donbass" is a bluff.
This is of course a hugely risky and massively destructive strategy for Putin that he can't control and I imagine he would rather avoid. But when you get right down to it in the game of chicken, of course he cares more about the Donbass than we do.
The problem with your logic is that everyone also knows Putin isn't crazy enough to risk a nuked entire Russia for the Donbass, which means that a threat that he'd respond to a Westerner nuclear strike with "10x more nukes" wouldn't be taken seriously as that would ensure that all of Russia (and yes, the rest of the world) would be nuked. So do you think any Russian would risk that? Someone who threatens "give me $100 or I'll burn my house down" just isn't terribly credible.
If you look at Cold War history, it was actually Americans who were more trigger-happy and Russians/Soviets who were more unwilling to risk total global nuclear Holocaust.
Also, the West actually can destroy all of Russia's conventional military capability without using nukes.
Another factor you're just assuming away is that Russia has actually kept it's nuclear readiness capabilities up to par.
Finally, it isn't simply who cares more about the Donbass but also who has more capabilities. Hitler cared more about Alsace and Lorraine than Americans did, but did Hitler get Alsace and Lorraine?
I’m aware that the Cold War was more dangerous then most know, and that American aggression nearly caused a nuclear war (specifically during the Cuban middle crisis, when the decision of a single soviet officer who opposed the decision of the other two officers to fire a nuclear torpedo saved the world).
I think there are a lot of parallels. The bay of pigs and positioning of missiles in turkey prompted a response by the soviets, just like western involvement in ukraine prompted a response by Russia.
Far from the blockade being brilliant, it was essentially lucky, and if we run that 100 times a not insignificant number end in annhiliation.
Why would I risk the world on the perceived mental health and motivations of Putin? What if it’s not a bluff? The price is everything.
Understand that I value ukraine in general and especially the part of ukraine being fought over today as essentially zero. If there was a 0.1% of it spiraling out of control and destroying the planet, I would give it up.
I don’t see Russia as much of a threat, and I haven’t agreed with our involvement in ukraine for a decade. I see little evidence that staying out of the conflict would have been more dangerous then where we are.
Back in the Cold War there were plenty of times when nato could have started a war in order to stand up to communism. We didn’t take the bait every time, and yet somehow we still won the war.
If Putin's nuclear threats would work in the case of Ukraine why would he stop his gamble after such a grand success? Next time, the Baltic countries, Finland, Poland,... every time the same question would be repeated why would the West take stand if Putin threatens going all out nuclear?
You’re basically asking why didn’t people enact maximum demands in the constant multi round game of chicken. We games this shit out during the cold war and you can look it up. Real life instances also tested the games.
The bottom line is that there is a sense of spheres of influence and red lines that uneasily keeps the game from escalating. Conflict results from a disagreement over those items.
Why was stopping the Czechs from getting crushed a non starter in the cold war, but Ukraine today is? Why was dividing Korea in half ok rather than using nukes like mcarthur wanted to?
It’s complicated. But we didn’t follow up Cuba by invading eastern Germany and saying (we have strategic nuclear superiority, suck it). And Cuba itself was a close run thing.
Thank you!
Thank you. This is excellent!
Russia’s style of warfare sounds like lessons learned in World War II.
When Soviet forces attacked uphill between Uzjgorod (now Ukraine) and Kosice (now Slovakia) they suffered 30,000 casualties.
When Soviet forces attacked East Prussia, all buildings in central Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) was destroyed during heavy fighting. The cathedral has been rebuilt, and maybe four other buildings. The rest of the centre is with newer buildings.
The problem with the "Russian steamroller" is that it requires very large reserves of mobilised troops, and very large amounts of artillery with continuous supplies of munitions (precision or otherwise). I think Russia is struggling on both counts, and will continue to do so.
Plus all that logistics and the physical and human resources for the maintanance and supplementing of both men and machines. (Hints. Ukraine is HUGE and algebra is a helluva art.... ;) )
MakiivKa