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James1942's avatar

Thank you for another excellent analysis. Some historical parallels occur to me here. Firstly, Makiivka. In the 30 Years War, concentrating an army for combat meant it would rapidly exhaust the countryside and starve, whereas dispersal for foraging and basic survival dictated an inability to assemble for potentially-decisive manoeuvre or combat. In the same way, Russia either has to concentrate its forces and supplies to enable combat (big and easily-detected targets), or remain dispersed with supplies further back, thereby preventing assembly for significant combat operations.

Secondly, Bakhmut. The Wagner Group epitomises the worst effects of a two-tier force, as seen in Spring 1918 (German Army), the growth of Arned SS, Luftwaffe field duvisions etc in WW2 (German Army again), or arguably the trend in the Brirish Army post-1992.

Thirdly, morale at home. For Russia, this seems to bear a closer resemblance to 1916 than to 1941-2.

Finally, tactics. Artillery-led, casualty-heavy attrition only worked in 1943-5 due to significant "brutal" industrial capacity and key support from external allies (USA). Neither of those factors are in play today, in fact probably the reverse.

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Kathleen O'Connor's avatar

I think vodka to death is MY choice. They don't have a choice. Great read again Dad. Thank you for keeping us non politicly informed.

Kathleen aus Kanada

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