Escalation, Red Lines, Risk and the Russo-Ukraine War This piece is my Alexander Dallin Memorial Lecture delivered to the Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies, Stanford University, 18 April 2024, which explains why it is somewhat longer than my usual posts.
If your last sentence suggests that the Western allies have demanded of Ukraine to accept a bad peace - I don't believe that has really happened in any operationally meaningful way - yet. A return of Donald Trump to the White House may however accelerate such a push. The real problem (under status-quo leadership conditions in the West) is that this conflict will drag-on for a very long time with no obvious end in sight at very high cost to all involved in whatever roles. At some juncture when the pain point seems just too high, someone needs to say "ouch" and really press for a negotiated settlement that saves face all-round. Not clear what or how that is.
Finally, a coherent, logical and compelling narrative for how to assess Russian/Putin’s intent rather than panicking and assuming the worst and then living in fear. The simple lessons of “listen to what is being said” is so important here. Also, rather than assuming the worst, assess the options available and like responses given those options. Putin may be “strategic fanatic” but he is not “irrantional” or suicidal as you have noted here, Lawrence.
Your short history of the escalation ladder and thinking and that we have some kind of illusion of control colors western thinking to our own detriment. Putin understands the west better than we understand him in that he listens to what we say, yet we do not listen closely to what he says. That is our fault and does not make Putin a “master strategist” but it makes him a better poker player and allows him to take on more calculated risks.
One thing that is paramount here, given the role and understanding of Russian history, is not only how we have misunderstood or misinterpreted it in the west (I concentrated in Russian and Soviet history as an undergraduate over 30 years ago), but how Putin and his intellectual circle have also perverted their own history. This makes Dallin’s contribution even more valuable and worthy of rereading again.
It is very apt for Lawrence to quote Alexander Dallin in this piece, and the comments that this has invoked from readers, notably Paul M Sotkiewicz and Ben Willatts are percipient. But it occurs to me that it is surely time for another Project Solarium, albeit that the first one was in 1953. This would be useful in achieving some consensus in the West, so maybe not actually in the White House Solarium, but in London, Paris, Berlin or Brussels. The reason Project Solarium is not particularly well known is that it largely confirmed the then current American thinking on Russia / the Soviet Union. I would also be interested in some informed comment on whether the subsequent Truman / Eisenhower attitude to the Soviet Union has actually followed us down to this day. I would also greatly appreciate Lawrence's comments on Emma Ashford’s article in The Guardian (22 April 2024) entitled ‘Did Boris Johnson really sabotage peace talks between Russia and Ukraine?’ The reality is more complicated’. Not particularly from the point of view of what role Boris Johnson might have had, but the whole idea of the possibilities of a negotiated peace. After all, as Alexander Dallin said, things change, even in Russia. International Affairs is always dynamic and contingent.
“These are system which have not been tested for a long time”.
The core of Russian and U.S. nuclear systems are coded in Cobol or similar, old programming languages back in the 1950s. All such systems are difficult and expensive to test. Testing a (newer) Trident missile costs 17 million pounds.
Putin is not young, any idea as to who what might replace him? Realise its a tricky impossible question etc..
However lets say that Ukraine with better western support is able to push Russia back even retake Crimea. But there is no real regime change of heart in Moscow; would we be in something akin to the early thirties, just wondering when they will, have another go at it?
It is inconceivable that Russia would relinquish Crimea, or, for that matter, most of what they now occupy in eastern Ukraine.
A scenario, where a western-aided Ukraine 'recaptures' such territories is not on the horizon, and, even, if achieved would carry high risks.
Do we even know that the remaining residents of much of the occupied territories want to be so liberated?
What is on the horizon is a long grinding largely pointless stalemate, paid for in human terms mainly by conscripts and civilians, at increasing monetary cost to western countries, for little or any apparent long term benefit.What long term good did western intervention in Afghanistan do for its people?
Perhaps, such a long term stalemate is the unavoidable price that has to be paid for Putin's folly and hubris, but a few contrarian musings offered below as a stab at least as an alternative to prevailing group think.
Could not the outlines of a long term strategic peace involve a partly demilitarised eastern area, administered by Russia, with safeguards for the freedom of existing residents to travel to Ukraine, which, as a quid pro quo, the Russians would accept could join NATO and the EU?
If your last sentence suggests that the Western allies have demanded of Ukraine to accept a bad peace - I don't believe that has really happened in any operationally meaningful way - yet. A return of Donald Trump to the White House may however accelerate such a push. The real problem (under status-quo leadership conditions in the West) is that this conflict will drag-on for a very long time with no obvious end in sight at very high cost to all involved in whatever roles. At some juncture when the pain point seems just too high, someone needs to say "ouch" and really press for a negotiated settlement that saves face all-round. Not clear what or how that is.
Finally, a coherent, logical and compelling narrative for how to assess Russian/Putin’s intent rather than panicking and assuming the worst and then living in fear. The simple lessons of “listen to what is being said” is so important here. Also, rather than assuming the worst, assess the options available and like responses given those options. Putin may be “strategic fanatic” but he is not “irrantional” or suicidal as you have noted here, Lawrence.
Your short history of the escalation ladder and thinking and that we have some kind of illusion of control colors western thinking to our own detriment. Putin understands the west better than we understand him in that he listens to what we say, yet we do not listen closely to what he says. That is our fault and does not make Putin a “master strategist” but it makes him a better poker player and allows him to take on more calculated risks.
One thing that is paramount here, given the role and understanding of Russian history, is not only how we have misunderstood or misinterpreted it in the west (I concentrated in Russian and Soviet history as an undergraduate over 30 years ago), but how Putin and his intellectual circle have also perverted their own history. This makes Dallin’s contribution even more valuable and worthy of rereading again.
I would love to know what you thought was the most interesting question you were asked after the lecture?
It is very apt for Lawrence to quote Alexander Dallin in this piece, and the comments that this has invoked from readers, notably Paul M Sotkiewicz and Ben Willatts are percipient. But it occurs to me that it is surely time for another Project Solarium, albeit that the first one was in 1953. This would be useful in achieving some consensus in the West, so maybe not actually in the White House Solarium, but in London, Paris, Berlin or Brussels. The reason Project Solarium is not particularly well known is that it largely confirmed the then current American thinking on Russia / the Soviet Union. I would also be interested in some informed comment on whether the subsequent Truman / Eisenhower attitude to the Soviet Union has actually followed us down to this day. I would also greatly appreciate Lawrence's comments on Emma Ashford’s article in The Guardian (22 April 2024) entitled ‘Did Boris Johnson really sabotage peace talks between Russia and Ukraine?’ The reality is more complicated’. Not particularly from the point of view of what role Boris Johnson might have had, but the whole idea of the possibilities of a negotiated peace. After all, as Alexander Dallin said, things change, even in Russia. International Affairs is always dynamic and contingent.
“These are system which have not been tested for a long time”.
The core of Russian and U.S. nuclear systems are coded in Cobol or similar, old programming languages back in the 1950s. All such systems are difficult and expensive to test. Testing a (newer) Trident missile costs 17 million pounds.
Putin is not young, any idea as to who what might replace him? Realise its a tricky impossible question etc..
However lets say that Ukraine with better western support is able to push Russia back even retake Crimea. But there is no real regime change of heart in Moscow; would we be in something akin to the early thirties, just wondering when they will, have another go at it?
It is inconceivable that Russia would relinquish Crimea, or, for that matter, most of what they now occupy in eastern Ukraine.
A scenario, where a western-aided Ukraine 'recaptures' such territories is not on the horizon, and, even, if achieved would carry high risks.
Do we even know that the remaining residents of much of the occupied territories want to be so liberated?
What is on the horizon is a long grinding largely pointless stalemate, paid for in human terms mainly by conscripts and civilians, at increasing monetary cost to western countries, for little or any apparent long term benefit.What long term good did western intervention in Afghanistan do for its people?
Perhaps, such a long term stalemate is the unavoidable price that has to be paid for Putin's folly and hubris, but a few contrarian musings offered below as a stab at least as an alternative to prevailing group think.
Could not the outlines of a long term strategic peace involve a partly demilitarised eastern area, administered by Russia, with safeguards for the freedom of existing residents to travel to Ukraine, which, as a quid pro quo, the Russians would accept could join NATO and the EU?