If your last sentence suggests that the Western allies have demanded of Ukraine to accept a bad peace - I don't believe that has really happened in any operationally meaningful way - yet. A return of Donald Trump to the White House may however accelerate such a push. The real problem (under status-quo leadership conditions in the West) is that this conflict will drag-on for a very long time with no obvious end in sight at very high cost to all involved in whatever roles. At some juncture when the pain point seems just too high, someone needs to say "ouch" and really press for a negotiated settlement that saves face all-round. Not clear what or how that is.
Finally, a coherent, logical and compelling narrative for how to assess Russian/Putin’s intent rather than panicking and assuming the worst and then living in fear. The simple lessons of “listen to what is being said” is so important here. Also, rather than assuming the worst, assess the options available and like responses given those options. Putin may be “strategic fanatic” but he is not “irrantional” or suicidal as you have noted here, Lawrence.
Your short history of the escalation ladder and thinking and that we have some kind of illusion of control colors western thinking to our own detriment. Putin understands the west better than we understand him in that he listens to what we say, yet we do not listen closely to what he says. That is our fault and does not make Putin a “master strategist” but it makes him a better poker player and allows him to take on more calculated risks.
One thing that is paramount here, given the role and understanding of Russian history, is not only how we have misunderstood or misinterpreted it in the west (I concentrated in Russian and Soviet history as an undergraduate over 30 years ago), but how Putin and his intellectual circle have also perverted their own history. This makes Dallin’s contribution even more valuable and worthy of rereading again.
It is very apt for Lawrence to quote Alexander Dallin in this piece, and the comments that this has invoked from readers, notably Paul M Sotkiewicz and Ben Willatts are percipient. But it occurs to me that it is surely time for another Project Solarium, albeit that the first one was in 1953. This would be useful in achieving some consensus in the West, so maybe not actually in the White House Solarium, but in London, Paris, Berlin or Brussels. The reason Project Solarium is not particularly well known is that it largely confirmed the then current American thinking on Russia / the Soviet Union. I would also be interested in some informed comment on whether the subsequent Truman / Eisenhower attitude to the Soviet Union has actually followed us down to this day. I would also greatly appreciate Lawrence's comments on Emma Ashford’s article in The Guardian (22 April 2024) entitled ‘Did Boris Johnson really sabotage peace talks between Russia and Ukraine?’ The reality is more complicated’. Not particularly from the point of view of what role Boris Johnson might have had, but the whole idea of the possibilities of a negotiated peace. After all, as Alexander Dallin said, things change, even in Russia. International Affairs is always dynamic and contingent.
“These are system which have not been tested for a long time”.
The core of Russian and U.S. nuclear systems are coded in Cobol or similar, old programming languages back in the 1950s. All such systems are difficult and expensive to test. Testing a (newer) Trident missile costs 17 million pounds.
It is inconceivable that Russia would relinquish Crimea, or, for that matter, most of what they now occupy in eastern Ukraine.
A scenario, where a western-aided Ukraine 'recaptures' such territories is not on the horizon, and, even, if achieved would carry high risks.
Do we even know that the remaining residents of much of the occupied territories want to be so liberated?
What is on the horizon is a long grinding largely pointless stalemate, paid for in human terms mainly by conscripts and civilians, at increasing monetary cost to western countries, for little or any apparent long term benefit.What long term good did western intervention in Afghanistan do for its people?
Perhaps, such a long term stalemate is the unavoidable price that has to be paid for Putin's folly and hubris, but a few contrarian musings offered below as a stab at least as an alternative to prevailing group think.
Could not the outlines of a long term strategic peace involve a partly demilitarised eastern area, administered by Russia, with safeguards for the freedom of existing residents to travel to Ukraine, which, as a quid pro quo, the Russians would accept could join NATO and the EU?
I’ve seen nothing to suggest Putin has abandoned the maximalist objectives he had at the start of the war which makes the suggestion you put forward somewhat academic.
To Lawrence’s point this is presumably because Putin believes Ukraine should be subservient to Russia and Putin considers he has the capabilities to achieve this.
Ben, I think you have this right. To put it more bluntly, “Believe Putin when he tells you who he is and what he wants.” Putin has been transparent about his goals and desires, but so many in the West try to read some other hidden motive or goal into it as a means to argue for a peace that Putin will only break later to get to his ultimate goal. This fits perfectly into Lawrence’s nomenclature of a “strategic fanatic.”
I agree Paul. I think the most likely outcome if a deal was forced on Ukraine now is a continuation war a year or two down the line (after Russia has reconstituted its forces).
As per my original comment, I also see no evidence that Putin is seeking or after a deal at this time. On the contrary, it feels like he is a racing against the clock to try and achieve a victory this year.
We are definitely seeing things the same way. Putin will never stop, even if he no longer has the military means he will find another way to continue forward through information warfare.
It’s possible under certain conditions i.e. both sides concluding they cannot achieve their objectives by force, that there might be scope for some type of deal down the line.
If this happens it would need to be a deal that doesn’t rely on Russia sticking to its commitments but puts in place security guarantees for Ukraine i.e. NATO membership, that provide a credible deterrence.
At the moment two things seem pretty clear though: 1) Putin isn’t looking for an “off ramp” 2) If you want to communicate with Putin you need to do it in a language he understands: force i.e. giving Ukraine the weapons it needs to hurt Russia and impose significant costs.
I agree with the no easy answers part. Re a way forward, any peace deal will depend on both sides concluding they are unable to achieve their objectives by force. I still think we are a long way from that.
As per my comment to Paul, Putin clearly still thinks he can carve out some type of victory on the battlefield. Arguably, 2024 is his best window of opportunity as European defence industrial capacity should start to ramp up next year and Russia will also start running out of old Soviet equipment to upgrade.
Ultimately, it seems unlikely Ukraine will get all of its territory back but it may yet be able to retake a significant amount (not this year though). Personally, I struggle to see how Ukraine could accept any deal that doesn’t allow for NATO membership as previous security assurances (Budapest Memorandum) weren’t worth the paper they were written on.
Putin is not young, any idea as to who what might replace him? Realise its a tricky impossible question etc..
However lets say that Ukraine with better western support is able to push Russia back even retake Crimea. But there is no real regime change of heart in Moscow; would we be in something akin to the early thirties, just wondering when they will, have another go at it?
If your last sentence suggests that the Western allies have demanded of Ukraine to accept a bad peace - I don't believe that has really happened in any operationally meaningful way - yet. A return of Donald Trump to the White House may however accelerate such a push. The real problem (under status-quo leadership conditions in the West) is that this conflict will drag-on for a very long time with no obvious end in sight at very high cost to all involved in whatever roles. At some juncture when the pain point seems just too high, someone needs to say "ouch" and really press for a negotiated settlement that saves face all-round. Not clear what or how that is.
Finally, a coherent, logical and compelling narrative for how to assess Russian/Putin’s intent rather than panicking and assuming the worst and then living in fear. The simple lessons of “listen to what is being said” is so important here. Also, rather than assuming the worst, assess the options available and like responses given those options. Putin may be “strategic fanatic” but he is not “irrantional” or suicidal as you have noted here, Lawrence.
Your short history of the escalation ladder and thinking and that we have some kind of illusion of control colors western thinking to our own detriment. Putin understands the west better than we understand him in that he listens to what we say, yet we do not listen closely to what he says. That is our fault and does not make Putin a “master strategist” but it makes him a better poker player and allows him to take on more calculated risks.
One thing that is paramount here, given the role and understanding of Russian history, is not only how we have misunderstood or misinterpreted it in the west (I concentrated in Russian and Soviet history as an undergraduate over 30 years ago), but how Putin and his intellectual circle have also perverted their own history. This makes Dallin’s contribution even more valuable and worthy of rereading again.
I would love to know what you thought was the most interesting question you were asked after the lecture?
It is very apt for Lawrence to quote Alexander Dallin in this piece, and the comments that this has invoked from readers, notably Paul M Sotkiewicz and Ben Willatts are percipient. But it occurs to me that it is surely time for another Project Solarium, albeit that the first one was in 1953. This would be useful in achieving some consensus in the West, so maybe not actually in the White House Solarium, but in London, Paris, Berlin or Brussels. The reason Project Solarium is not particularly well known is that it largely confirmed the then current American thinking on Russia / the Soviet Union. I would also be interested in some informed comment on whether the subsequent Truman / Eisenhower attitude to the Soviet Union has actually followed us down to this day. I would also greatly appreciate Lawrence's comments on Emma Ashford’s article in The Guardian (22 April 2024) entitled ‘Did Boris Johnson really sabotage peace talks between Russia and Ukraine?’ The reality is more complicated’. Not particularly from the point of view of what role Boris Johnson might have had, but the whole idea of the possibilities of a negotiated peace. After all, as Alexander Dallin said, things change, even in Russia. International Affairs is always dynamic and contingent.
“These are system which have not been tested for a long time”.
The core of Russian and U.S. nuclear systems are coded in Cobol or similar, old programming languages back in the 1950s. All such systems are difficult and expensive to test. Testing a (newer) Trident missile costs 17 million pounds.
It is inconceivable that Russia would relinquish Crimea, or, for that matter, most of what they now occupy in eastern Ukraine.
A scenario, where a western-aided Ukraine 'recaptures' such territories is not on the horizon, and, even, if achieved would carry high risks.
Do we even know that the remaining residents of much of the occupied territories want to be so liberated?
What is on the horizon is a long grinding largely pointless stalemate, paid for in human terms mainly by conscripts and civilians, at increasing monetary cost to western countries, for little or any apparent long term benefit.What long term good did western intervention in Afghanistan do for its people?
Perhaps, such a long term stalemate is the unavoidable price that has to be paid for Putin's folly and hubris, but a few contrarian musings offered below as a stab at least as an alternative to prevailing group think.
Could not the outlines of a long term strategic peace involve a partly demilitarised eastern area, administered by Russia, with safeguards for the freedom of existing residents to travel to Ukraine, which, as a quid pro quo, the Russians would accept could join NATO and the EU?
I’ve seen nothing to suggest Putin has abandoned the maximalist objectives he had at the start of the war which makes the suggestion you put forward somewhat academic.
To Lawrence’s point this is presumably because Putin believes Ukraine should be subservient to Russia and Putin considers he has the capabilities to achieve this.
Ben, I think you have this right. To put it more bluntly, “Believe Putin when he tells you who he is and what he wants.” Putin has been transparent about his goals and desires, but so many in the West try to read some other hidden motive or goal into it as a means to argue for a peace that Putin will only break later to get to his ultimate goal. This fits perfectly into Lawrence’s nomenclature of a “strategic fanatic.”
I agree Paul. I think the most likely outcome if a deal was forced on Ukraine now is a continuation war a year or two down the line (after Russia has reconstituted its forces).
As per my original comment, I also see no evidence that Putin is seeking or after a deal at this time. On the contrary, it feels like he is a racing against the clock to try and achieve a victory this year.
We are definitely seeing things the same way. Putin will never stop, even if he no longer has the military means he will find another way to continue forward through information warfare.
It’s possible under certain conditions i.e. both sides concluding they cannot achieve their objectives by force, that there might be scope for some type of deal down the line.
If this happens it would need to be a deal that doesn’t rely on Russia sticking to its commitments but puts in place security guarantees for Ukraine i.e. NATO membership, that provide a credible deterrence.
At the moment two things seem pretty clear though: 1) Putin isn’t looking for an “off ramp” 2) If you want to communicate with Putin you need to do it in a language he understands: force i.e. giving Ukraine the weapons it needs to hurt Russia and impose significant costs.
Sure, Ben, in the short term.
Putin, no doubt, is holding on to await November American election. Let us all hope that Trump is not elected.
In that context, recent Congress approval of additional aid is welcome and necessary given recent Russian advances.
But what about going forward beyond that?
A continuing stalemate would mean an indefinite hell for the Ukrainian people.
Realise, no easy answers, if any.
I agree with the no easy answers part. Re a way forward, any peace deal will depend on both sides concluding they are unable to achieve their objectives by force. I still think we are a long way from that.
As per my comment to Paul, Putin clearly still thinks he can carve out some type of victory on the battlefield. Arguably, 2024 is his best window of opportunity as European defence industrial capacity should start to ramp up next year and Russia will also start running out of old Soviet equipment to upgrade.
Ultimately, it seems unlikely Ukraine will get all of its territory back but it may yet be able to retake a significant amount (not this year though). Personally, I struggle to see how Ukraine could accept any deal that doesn’t allow for NATO membership as previous security assurances (Budapest Memorandum) weren’t worth the paper they were written on.
Putin is not young, any idea as to who what might replace him? Realise its a tricky impossible question etc..
However lets say that Ukraine with better western support is able to push Russia back even retake Crimea. But there is no real regime change of heart in Moscow; would we be in something akin to the early thirties, just wondering when they will, have another go at it?