Escalation, Red Lines, Risk and the Russo-Ukraine War

Escalation, Red Lines, Risk and the Russo-Ukraine War

This piece is my Alexander Dallin Memorial Lecture delivered to the Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies, Stanford University, 18 April 2024, which explains why it is somewhat longer than my usual posts.

It is a great honour to have been invited to deliver this lecture in memory of Alexander Dallin as we approach the centenary of his birth and celebrate his enormous contribution to Russian studies. I have been reading him again, enjoying the combination of deep learning, vigorous analysis and sharp writing that marks his work. In particular I have been looking at some of the essays gathered together in the volume – The Uses of History - edited by Gail Lapidus.  These essays demonstrate his determination to maintain scholarly objectivity in a politically charged field, while avoiding getting stuck in an ideological rut. These are qualities much needed today.

The themes of those essays feel very contemporary. The context is very different, but we have the same questions about continuities in Russian history, and the possibilities of change. Meanwhile the challenges of maintaining a degree of objectivity as Russia fights an aggressive war are, if anything, even greater.

Dallin saw the dangers of assuming the worst and taking a hard line on all matters Soviet. It could mean adopting a ‘vulgar demonology’ that denied ‘actual or latent diversity, variety, change or choice’. There had been earlier periods when observers of the Soviet Union succumbed to naivete and wishful thinking and autocracy, repression, and centralisation were formidable continuities. He was nonetheless unsympathetic with those hawks who abused history in order to argue to that there was no point engaging with the Soviet Union because its patterns of behaviour had been fixed rigid long ago.

Of course change did happen, and when it did Dallin was one of the first to observe that the collapse of the Soviet Union had not been inevitable but depended on a combination of underlying trends and poor choices. The challenge always was to avoid assuming that Russian politics were destined to follow a particular course and to recognise that along with factors that might seem to be embedded one must always stay alive to the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.

In an early paragraph in his essay on the ‘uses and abuses of Russian history’, he describes two distinctive positions, both of which he considers ‘woefully wide of the mark.’

‘If there are some whose reading of the past leads them to conclude that the values and purposes of the Russians are and will remain incompatible with those of the civilised West, there are also those others who find the key to Soviet behaviour abroad in the fear engendered by memory of a millennium of invasions and incursions from abroad, making Moscow’s policy but a defensive response to this trauma.’

We can easily recognise the 2024 versions of those conclusions, except that now our  thoughts are no longer dominated by the durability of a one-party system but of a personalised dictatorship. 

In March 2014 Vladimir Putin embarked on a war against Ukraine which has now lasted almost as long as did the war in Afghanistan, which eroded the legitimacy of the old Soviet system. This war reached new levels of destructiveness with the full-scale invasion of February 2022. Thus far it has been used by Putin to tighten his hold over Russian politics, with his opponents either killed off, incarcerated, or hiding in exile.

From Party Rule to Dictator

One-party states have in principle a governance structure that can restrain tendencies to dictatorship even if they can’t eliminate them altogether. Putin did not advance by navigating his way through party structures, but through taking patronage where he could find it, proving himself with administrative competence, and demonstrating a quiet ruthlessness. He was barely noticed as he rose and then underestimated as he made his push for the presidency. He now shows no interest in sharing power and lacks an obvious successor, always a sensible precaution for an autocrat but ensuring a power struggle when he eventually departs.

He is advised by a few like-minded courtiers, with a state apparatus that he has fashioned and populated to suit his purposes. Instead of the optimistic project dictated by the precepts of Marxism-Leninism or the modernisation he promised in 2000, he is pursuing objectives that are both deeply reactionary and revanchist. He claims to be preserving the values of a civilisation under threat and offering protection to those who embody those values – if only because they speak the language.

As a result of all of this we spend an inordinate amount of time trying to make sense of the belief system and calculations of this one man. Policy debates in the West revolve around what matters to Putin and why, and what, if anything, might lead him to change his mind. This inevitably includes questions about his sanity and risk-taking propensities.

In a recent essay I described Putin as a strategic fanatic. I did not mean by this that he is crazy or even irrational. As has been demonstrated many times he is able to speak at length on a range of topics. He does not rush into hard decisions and often puts the most difficult ones off in the hope that they can be avoided. At times he has been pragmatic. He is always smartly turned out and has not taken to dressing up as a field marshal and pretending, as did Stalin, to be a natural generalissimo with his own unique and perspicacious theories of war. There is a logic to what he does. Ends are related to means in a consistent fashion.

But being rational is not the same as being sensible or reasonable. Dictionary definitions of a fanatic point to someone with extreme beliefs that lead them to behave in unreasonable ways, and that is what he does.

The unreason in Putin’s case stems from his fixation with Ukraine, or a caricature version of Ukraine as an artificial construct with a divided society and an illegitimate government. Almost as soon as he began his second stint as president his determination to bring Ukraine firmly into the Russian sphere began a series of calamitous errors of strategic judgment.  When faced with the dire consequences of bad decisions he doubled down in the conviction that even more extreme measures would give him the result he sought. To get a measure of this calamity compare the situation in the summer of 2013 when Ukraine had the most pro-Russian president it was ever likely to get and the situation now.

Putin is more than capable of a tactical lie, but he can also be quite transparent. The starting point for any analysis should be to pay attention to what he says. This is obviously important when assessing the causes of the war. This is an issue that has been addressed many times and I will not dwell on it here. Against those who claim that the aggression was a valid response to NATO expansion we can point to Putin’s long essay of July 2021, in which he gave, not for the first time, his historical exegesis on why Russia and Ukraine should be considered as one. He ordered the invasion of Ukraine because he thought it should be subservient to Russia.

This invasion went badly wrong, although with a bit more luck it might have succeeded, at least in the first instance before the problems of occupying such a vast and hostile country became apparent. Putin has always been a risk-taker, prepared to use armed force to achieve his objectives. He pacified Chechnya, bloodied Georgia, annexed Crimea messed with eastern Ukraine, and intervened in Syria. In all he made his calculations and achieved some success. He had deliberated about Ukraine in 2022 and presumably believed he had a plan. He just got it wrong.

In his calculations he will have been influenced less by the West’s assertive promotion of Ukraine’s strategic interests than its hopes that all difficult situations could be contained and managed. There was a dry run with Georgia in 2008 when it became clear that Western instincts were to calm conflicts down. As Défense Secretary Robert Gates the noted: ‘The United States spent 45 years working very hard to avoid a military confrontation with Russia. I see no reason to change that approach today.’ Even after Crimea the consensus view in Europe was that its energy dependence on Russia, which was allowed to grow, limited its options.

We miscalculated how much control of Ukraine mattered to Putin, and were therefore shocked when he gambled on being able to subjugate his neighbour in a matter of days. We miscalculated again when we assumed this would succeed quickly when the invasion failed to achieve its immediate objectives. The Russian campaign soon faced yet more setbacks, leading to a massive loss of life and equipment, and a need to devote ever more resources to the war effort.  Yet Putin did not buckle and from late last year was confident that he had regained the initiative.

The main reason for this is the painful Congressional dance surrounding military assistance to Ukraine, now finally concluded. But we must also consider to what extent Ukraine’s lack of vital capabilities, or at least the delay in getting them, which meant that it could not do more when it had the initiative, is due to Western countries allowing themselves to be intimidated by what are considered to be Putin’s extreme risk-taking propensities, including a readiness to contemplate nuclear escalation.

The Escalation Metaphor

My argument in this lecture is that the West was influenced by a combination of Putin’s assumed recklessness shaped by a familiar strategic construct  - the escalation ladder – that can be seriously misleading.  In particular I’ll argue that it led policymakers to start with the most dreaded scenario – nuclear use – and then work backwards to ask how it might come about. A better approach would have been to start with the situation faced by Putin and the options available to him, of which nuclear use was but one and by far the least compelling.

I’ll start by unpacking the notion of an escalation ladder and explain where it came from. I’ll then show how it was applied to the Russo-Ukraine War before considering why the application led to some poor policy choices, particularly by the US. I am not saying that the US has got everything wrong  - it has got much right - or that the nuclear risks can be ignored. My point is only that the way that they were assessed led to undue caution in the support given to Ukraine.

‘Escalation’ is used regularly in connection with any type of conflict to show how it might move to a new and potentially more dangerous and violent level and become much harder to contain and resolve. The term entered the strategic lexicon in the 1950s in connection with debates on how a nuclear war might be fought in a limited way. It was used to point out that this was an illusion. However restricted the opening salvos in their yields and targets the war would soon become total. The image of the escalator was employed to convey this tragedy. Once you stepped on the escalator you were bound to go up to the next level even if you soon concluded that you’d rather not. The dynamics behind escalation would be provided either by the tit-for-tat mentality that means that if one side ups the ante, the other must surely follow, or else the sort of miscalculation or chance event common in war.

The escalation metaphor was soon criticized for being too simplistic. It failed to recognize the potential for graduated moves. Escalators can go down as well as up. In between the ground and top floor there are intermediate stages where one can step off. In due course the metaphor was not so much abandoned as subverted. Escalation was presented as not so much a tragedy but a process that could be controlled. Herman Kahn introduced the concept of the ‘escalation ladder’, one of the great oxymorons of strategic thought. He argued that the challenge was to find a level of warfighting which left the enemy at a disadvantage while daring it to move a new and even more dangerous level. This was called escalation dominance.

These conceptual developments were heavily influenced by attempts to navigate the dilemmas of the nuclear age, and in particular how to exploit nuclear threats to achieve political objectives while avoiding a suicidal all-out war.

The escalation ladder has had an unfortunate effect on strategic thinking. The problem lies in the idea that war progresses through a series of discrete, sequential steps, each one carrying more risk than the one before, so that a war becomes more violent and gets out of control by degrees. The individual steps on the ladder could supposedly be distinguished one from the other, and potentially recognised by the enemy, so that the significance of each move, each passing threshold, would be appreciated. Each step up the ladder had a potentially political as well as a military content. While trying to win whatever battles were being fought, a message was sent to the enemy about the extent to which restraint was still being shown and the consequential risks if these restraints were removed. It was a form of bargaining, a competition in risk taking which must not be allowed to get out of hand.

Kahn recognised that the adversary might have a different ladder in mind, with more or fewer steps, with thresholds viewed differently. If that was the case then this was likely to be an imperfect means of communication. The intended significance of each move might be missed as they would be appreciated through quite different conceptual lenses.

More seriously the metaphor bore little relation to the actual conduct of wars. They rarely unfold in a linear fashion, moving from one step to the next. Big engagements can come early in a war and then subside. Different types of battles, of varying degrees of violence and intensity, can occur at the same time in a range of locales,

The idea of controlled escalation was influential in Vietnam in the mid-1969s, with attempts to manipulate North Vietnam’s behaviour through the calibrated use of force, as if steady increments of pain could be added until the enemy’s breaking point could be found—the form of coercive diplomacy described by another famous Stanford figure, Alexander George, as ‘turn-of-the-screw.’ The experience demonstrated the problems with the approach: enemies could adjust to steady increases in pressure while not always appreciating the political nuances supposedly conveyed in the various ways in which they were being bombed.

Escalation and the Biden Administration’s Ukraine Strategy

I’ll now turn to the current war and the influence of concerns about escalation on US policy.

In May 2022 President Joe Biden provided the most authoritative statement of the US position.

‘We do not seek a war between NATO and Russia. As much as I disagree with Mr. Putin, and find his actions an outrage, the United States will not try to bring about his ouster in Moscow. So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict, either by sending American troops to fight in Ukraine or by attacking Russian forces. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.’

He then added that while there were no indications that Russia has intent to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, he wanted to be clear: ‘Any use of nuclear weapons in this conflict on any scale would be completely unacceptable to us as well as the rest of the world and would entail severe consequences.’

This statement had important implications.

Most obviously, the US would not get involved in the war. As Russia began to attack civilian areas with missiles and bombs, Biden had already turned down Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s request for a non-fly zone as this would involve direct combat between US and Russian forces. Yet it still took time before modern air defence systems were approved. Nor would Ukraine be supplied with notionally ‘offensive’ systems for the US was ‘not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders.’ It must not take the fight to the Russians.

These limits were set by reference to presumed Russian red lines. The only American  red line identified was that there could be a direct military engagement if Russia used nuclear weapons. In an interview with CBS, Biden was asked what he would say to Putin ‘if he is considering using chemical or tactical nuclear weapons.’ Biden replied: ‘Don't. Don't. Don't. You will change the face of war unlike anything since World War II.’ When asked about consequences, Biden said:

‘You think I would tell you if I knew exactly what it would be? Of course, I'm not gonna tell you. It'll be consequential. They'll become more of a pariah in the world than they ever have been. And depending on the extent of what they do will determine what response would occur.’

Senior officials explained that the Russians had been warned of the potential consequences but these would not be made public. According to the New York Times, ‘administration officials have said they could think of almost no circumstances in which a nuclear detonation by Russia would result in a nuclear response’  Non-nuclear responses ranged from a conventional strike against a unit or base responsible to providing longer-range systems to Ukraine, to other ‘forceful’ responses, as well as using Russia breaking the ‘taboo’ to get more neutral countries to adopt sanctions. The punishment would not necessarily fit the crime.

There was an imbalance in the narrative. While even in response to such a terrible act the implication was that the US would take care with its response, much of the debate focused how readily and wildly Russia might lash out if provoked. Great effort was put into identifying Russian red lines with the presumption that might quickly lead to nuclear use.

The most obvious trigger point was NATO fighting directly alongside Ukraine. There were a number of others.

The next most obvious was that Russia might be losing. Colin Kahl, as Under Secretary of Defense for policy:

‘Ukraine’s success on the battlefield could cause Russia to feel backed into a corner, and that is something we must remain mindful of.’ 

Graham Allison argued that if it came to a choice between losing and using nuclear weapons Putin would barely hesitate:

‘forced to choose between humiliating defeat, on the one hand, and escalating the level of destruction…there's every reason to believe he chooses the latter.’

Even if not losing completely another trigger might come if  Ukraine looked like it might be taking back Crimea. Thus Kevin Ryan:

‘… if a Ukrainian offensive threatens the loss of Crimea or the provinces that form the land bridge to it, Putin would demand an escalation of the fighting to prevent that loss.’

Even with deadlock in the battlefield Putin might be so frustrated that the weapons could coerce Ukraine to surrender. Matthew Kroenig warned that a Russian nuclear strike ‘could cause a humanitarian catastrophe, deal a crippling blow to the Ukrainian military, divide the Western alliance, and compel Kyiv to sue for peace.’

Lastly, Masha Gessen warned that Putin would use nuclear weapons almost because he could, as a matter of retribution. ‘The losses the Russian military is suffering now can only motivate Putin to create more terror, against more people.’

We can highlight four features of these speculations – for that is all they were.

First, any  escalation to the highest level of all-out nuclear war would largely arise as a  result of Russia’s military failings in its aggressive war and Ukraine’s efforts to take advantage.

Second, with any nuclear use Ukraine would be the victim, and the most likely systems to be used would be short-range systems with relatively small yields – so-called ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons.  Thus Nina Tannewald worried:

‘that if the war continues going badly for Russia, Putin might reach for a tactical nuclear weapon—a low-yield bomb designed for use on the battlefield—out of frustration.’

Third, these scary scenarios had important policy implications, whether in urging care when it came to humiliating Putin or in advice to  Ukraine to cut a deal before matters really got nasty.

Fourth, this speculation often depended more on a psychological analysis of Putin than any reference to what he had said, or consideration of what options he had available in the event Russia faced serious difficulties, let alone how, if at all, nuclear use would help in these situations.

Putin’s Nuclear Strategy

What has Putin actually said? His approach follows the June 2020 Russian Federation policy statement on nuclear deterrence which reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of weapons of mass destruction against it but also ‘aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.’

It does not refer to minor setbacks or anger at being shown a lack of respect. It accepts that the use of the nuclear arsenal would be a big deal. The arsenal is something important to own. Its existence and size affirms Russia’s great power status and its capacity to deter American power. It is, to quote Putin, ‘the key guarantee of Russia’s military security and global stability.’ It is not something to be squandered on matters which are essentially secondary.

This is the spirit in which Putin has uttered his deterrent threats. They are not directed at Ukraine, which by itself does not require them, but at the US and its allies, telling them not to enter the war directly on Ukraine’ side. In 2014 he remarked that other countries ‘should understand it’s best not to mess with us,’ with a reminder that ‘Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers.’ On 24 February 2022 as he announced the full-scale invasion, he said:

‘No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.’

He has never deviated from this position. When announcing the annexation of the four provinces and full mobilisation on 21 September 2022, he blamed the west for threatening a nuclear catastrophe. It was in response to this supposed NATO threat:

‘I want to remind you that our country also has various means of destruction, and in some components more modern than the NATO countries. And if the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people. It's not a bluff.

The citizens of Russia can be sure that the territorial integrity of our Motherland, our independence and freedom will be ensured - I emphasize this again - with all the means at our disposal.’

On 14 October 2022, after a period in which there had been intense speculation about Russia ‘going nuclear’ Putin was asked at a press conference about whether NATO would send troops into Ukraine if it faced defeat. He replied:

‘ …..  sending troops into direct engagement, a direct clash with the Russian Army is a very dangerous step that could lead to a global catastrophe. I hope those who talk about this will be smart enough not to undertake such dangerous steps.’

He has therefore always directed his threats at the West and not Ukraine.

While of course he might still fail in Ukraine at no point has Russia been at risk of occupation or subjugation by Ukraine. There is therefore no existential threat to Russia.

As noted it has been argued that while a loss would not be existential for Russia, it would be for Putin.  Of course there are personal, political risks to Putin with failure in Ukraine, although perhaps not as much as there would be to leaders in democratic countries. I believe it is the case that Putin would prefer to keep this war going rather than face the reckoning of admitting that he has failed in his quest to subjugate Ukraine or consolidate his hold over Ukrainian territory. That is not the same as saying that he would take a decision with incalculable consequences because he can’t think of anything better to do or felt personally threatened.

Putin is not the only senior Russian opining on this matter.  Figures such as Peskov and Lavrov have stayed close to Putin’s stated position. The exception in official circles is former President Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, who regularly raises the spectre of a ‘nuclear apocalypse’ if Western countries act against Russia’s interests. Thus following an American observation that it would be legitimate for Ukraine to attack Russian targets in Crimea, Medvedev warned that if Crimea was attacked, ‘Judgment Day will come very fast and hard. It will be very difficult to hide.’

 After the announcement in 2023 that Ukraine would be receiving F-16 aircraft, he described a scenario of ‘Loss for everyone. A collapse. Apocalypse. Where you forget for centuries about your former life, until the rubble ceases to emit radiation.’  Referring to US deliveries of Abrams tanks he foresaw direct conflict with NATO, which had ‘turned into an openly fascist bloc like Hitler's Axis, albeit larger. We are ready, although the result will be achieved at a much greater cost to humanity than in 1945.’ And so on. The tone and regularity of Medvedev’s comment, the lack of follow-through, and regular rumours about his sobriety, has led to these threats being taken less seriously than he might have wished.

There have been numerous statements, sometimes quite wild, by media propagandists, but also disturbing proposals made by more established commentators such as Dmitri Trenin and Sergei Karaganov. In particular an article by Karaganov in September 2023 attracted a lot of attention. He argued that Russia had both ‘thoughtlessly set too high a threshold for the use of nuclear weapons’ and also ‘inaccurately assessed the situation in Ukraine.’ After 75 years of relative peace, people, especially in the West, had ‘forgotten the horrors of war and even stopped fearing nuclear weapons.’ Somehow the West must be persuaded to retreat or even surrender. ‘Roughly speaking, it must “buzz off.”’

This required lowering the nuclear threshold

‘by rapidly but prudently moving up the deterrence-escalation ladder,’ even getting to the ‘point when we will have to urge our compatriots and all people of goodwill to leave their places of residence near facilities that may become targets for strikes in countries that provide direct support to the puppet regime in Kiev.’ 

His assumption was that the only way to get a supine government in Kyiv was to scare its supporters away.

Within Russia these arguments were challenged. The critics noted that nuclear use would not solve the issues between Russia and the West, would aggravate Russia’s international position, and create a risk of all-out nuclear exchanges. They warned against underestimating the West’s readiness to climb the escalation ladder, and overestimating the possibility of China and others tolerating a strike. Most importantly when, at the October 2023 Valdai Conference, Karaganov put his thesis directly to Putin, Putin responded that he understood the sentiment but then reaffirmed established doctrine.

‘Nuclear weapons would be used as a retaliatory strike in the event of a first US strike, if possible from when an incoming attack was first detected, and the second from when ‘something would threaten Russian statehood and the existence of the Russian state.’

He had already, in June 2023, rejected the idea of using tactical nuclear weapons: ‘First, we see no need to use it; and second, considering this, even as a possibility, factors into lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons’.

September 2022

The existential threat to the Russian state has not arisen and is unlikely to arise. There was one point in the war where it looked like Russia might be losing in September 2022 when Ukraine mounted successful offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson. The Russian campaign was in serious trouble, and Putin was facing pressure from ultra-nationalists about the incompetence with which military operations had been conducted, and the enormous loss of manpower and equipment.

This was the point where US intelligence reportedly picked up chatter about tactical nuclear weapons among responsible Russian commanders, although it never moved beyond chatter. This led to the Biden Administration making strenuous efforts to get in touch with their Russian counterparts to warn them not to do anything foolish. CIA Director William Burns was deputed to meet with FSB director Sergei Naryshkin to warn of the dangers associated with any nuclear use. The odd thing about this meeting is that Naryshkin was expecting some sort of peace proposal and was surprised by the nuclear concerns, which he dismissed.

More helpfully, at Washington’s instigation German Chancellor Scholz used the opportunity of a visit to Beijing to persuade President Xi to pronounce against any nuclear use. Later Xi’s joint statement with Putin of 21 March 2023 restated the standard formula ‘that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it must never be unleashed.’

None of this meant that Putin lacked options in September 2022 to help him get out of the predicament he faced. He escalated but in ways relevant to the state of the war. He raised the stakes, setting the objective of annexing the four additional oblasts and ordered mobilisation. The immediate focus of the Russian effort shifted from taking land to hitting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure.

The Biden Administration has shown itself to be particularly worried about the impact on Moscow’s calculations of attacks on Russian territory, even if they were far from constituting an existential threat. This concern meant that the US held back on providing Ukraine with long-range systems, even though Russia was acting with impunity against Ukrainian territory.

This is a good example of how blurry these red lines can be.

Moscow insists that Crimea is part of the Russian Federation, and since September 2022 that also goes for Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson, although none have ever been fully occupied. Yet there was no way that Washington could tell Kyiv to avoid Russian targets in these territories though for Moscow these were now all equivalent parts of the Russian Federation. How can there be a red line with no agreement where it should be drawn?

Although a Ukrainian push to liberate Crimea was one of the speculative scenarios,  nuclear use would hardly appear as an appropriate response to random and occasional Ukrainian attacks, at first using their own equipment, on military targets in Crimea. Yet the cumulative effect of these, especially on the port of Sevastopol, has been substantial. The hits on the Kerch Bridge, linking Crimea to mainland Russia, have made Putin, visibly angry.

More seriously, one might think, Ukraine has developed their own long-range systems capable of attacking Russian territory independently of allied systems. This has been done with increasing regularity. This has included drone attacks on Moscow, and attacks by Ukrainian-sponsored Russian oppositional groups into the border territory of Belgorod (from where many attacks on Ukraine have been launched). However embarrassing Russia finds these there is a tendency to play them down because they do not want to suggest that such attacks really hurt.

These attacks have become more serious for Russia with a more sustained Ukrainian campaign against oil facilities. This has led to American complaints, partly because of the effect on oil prices, but also as a bad strategic choice. The argument is that Russia can recover from these and they provide an excuse for the much more devastating attacks on Ukrainian energy systems – as if the Russians need an excuse. It would be better, on this argument, to concentrate on liberating territory from Russia – although this may appear as a bit rich given that the lack of serious American material support for the last six months has left the Ukrainians engaged more in desperate defence than bold offensives. At any rate a risk of nuclear escalation has not been mentioned as an argument against this action, and even if there is a debate to be had about this specific set of  targets the right to attack some targets inside Russia is no longer seen to be fraught with existential risk.

It remains the case that Western countries do not want to be implicated in attacks on recognised Russian soil. The Ukrainians made explicit  promises that systems such as the UK Storm Shadow air-launched missiles, or US ATACMS would not be used in this way. Nonetheless, the general trend was for the Biden Administration, to quote the Washington Post, to become less worried about Russia’s red lines because Putin ‘has not followed through on promises to punish the West for providing weapons to Ukraine.’ As each system was delivered, usually after long delays and deliberations, there was no particular response other than those the Russians would have taken anyway to protect their military position. As this was recognised by NATO countries the more relaxed they became about giving the Ukrainians what they asked for. The steps were incremental, not great leaps up an escalation ladder.

Operational Problems

The most serious problem with much of the nuclear speculation is the lack of explanation of what strategic value the Russians might get from resorting to these weapons.

Let’s consider some of the operational issues.

How actually would the Russian military go about the first use of nuclear explosives since 1945?

Would they want surprise? Given what we know about US Intelligence capabilities, which might pick up on evidence of weapons being moved out of storage and into position, or communications between relevant units, the preparations might be picked up and broadcast by the US, as they did prior to the invasion. Would the Russians deny this? What would the Chinese say? What for that matter would the Russian people think if they thought the country would on the brink of nuclear war? Might there be flight from the major cities?  

Supposing they achieved surprise, would they want to make a coercive point with a demonstration shot, warning what might come next if Ukraine does not comply with its demands. His would sill raise all the issues that would arise with preparations to use the weapons revealed or deliberate prior warning, in terms of international reactions,  against what is to come, again have to cope with the reaction from anxious friends. 

These are system which have not been tested for a long time. Have they been well maintained? What would be the impact if the delivery systems were intercepted or the warheads turned out to be duds?

That is a relevant consideration with regard to a demonstration shot as well as one intended to make a military difference. Any doubts about reliability might argue for a larger attack, in which case, depending on the number of ground bursts, this could lead to fallout. Where might that drift? Would Ukrainian formations in the field or civilian facilities and areas be the main targets?

If the former are there places where there are no other military options available and no Russian troops in close proximity to the Ukrainian targets? If the latter would the aim be decapitation of the Ukrainian leadership? After that Russia would still be left with the problem of what to do with Ukraine and there would be nobody with whom a surrender could be organised.  Would this make any subsequent occupation any easier?

I opened this lecture with Alexander Dallin’s warnings about allowing an image of the Soviet Union to be shaped by prior policy preferences or concerns about appearing complacent. I am not arguing in this lecture for sanguinity about either nuclear risks or  Vladimir Putin’s mental state. I am arguing against allowing our analysis of one of the most difficult and fateful conflicts we have seen in Europe for almost 80 years to be overly influenced by our worst fears and simplistic theories about how they might be realised. Hard strategic assessments of the state of the war may lead to awkward conclusions but we have not helped ourselves, let alone Ukraine, by opting for an approach which has results in demands that Ukraine accept a bad peace and caution in providing it with the weapons it needs to achieve a better peace.