Ukraine: What Next?

Last week on 23 October I was privileged to give the BEARR Trust annual lecture which is reproduced here with their kind permission. Details of this charity which supports civil society organisations in Ukraine and Moldova can be found at the end of the piece.

I have managed to pose for myself a question that is impossible to answer. It might be easier to answer when we know who has won the presidential election, although even then it will probably still be unwise to draw definite conclusions. Predicting the course of a war is a foolish thing to try to do, especially without access to the situation on the frontlines or the most secret conversations in the relevant national capitals.

The history of this conflict is already littered with discredited expectations, both optimistic and pessimistic. Most importantly, what happens next depends on decisions that have yet to be made. Governments still have choices.

Yet this question of ‘what next?’ is hard to duck because it is asked so regularly and so urgently that it is not one that can be easily put aside. There is currently quite a lot of doom around as people ask how long Ukraine can cope with the Russian onslaught and whether it is time to consider some compromise peace. This line of commentary often assumes that a compromise peace could be readily found if only Kyiv would abandon its dreams of total victory and appreciate the seriousness of its position. The compromise peace those urging this course usually have in mind is not, however, on offer. It bears very little relationship to the one that Putin proposes, which involves no compromises at all. He only demands Ukraine’s surrender.

That does not mean that compromises might not be found in the future. In situations such as this, with ferocious and ongoing fighting, neither side will wish to convey weakness or suggest that they are at all desperate for a way out. In private both sides might be thinking about how to bring the war to a conclusion. They might have some possible future concessions in mind. But for now they are seeking to improve their positions. Neither wishes to show their hand.

I am not an impartial observer of the war. More than most, this is a conflict that can be approached with moral clarity. It is not difficult to work out who is the aggressor and who is the aggrieved. Attempts to turn this round to show that somehow Russia had no choice but to invade in February 2022, or for that matter seize Crimea in March 2014, have either to play games with the historical record or to assume that whatever provocations they can discern in NATO policies or Ukraine’s domestic politics these can somehow be used to justify the occupation and subjugation of a neighbouring country. Vladimir Putin undoubtedly had his reasons for ordering the invasion but we are not obliged to find them compelling.

Yet while I am partial my task is to be dispassionate in analysis. Wars do not always end cleanly or in a way that serves justice as well as peace. In war good does not always triumph over evil. So little can be taken for granted and it is important to be clear-eyed about the situation and not to allow our hopes for Ukraine to guide our analysis to a suitably optimistic conclusion. Some of the current gloom and doom is overdone but not all of it can be discounted.

One of the reasons to be clear-eyed is to help identify the role that Western countries can play in supporting Ukraine to achieve a better outcome than might otherwise be the case. If Russia was not a member of the UN Security Council, wielding a veto, then it might have been put under pressure to follow the UN Charter. If it was not a nuclear power then NATO might have considered such blatant aggression in the heart of Europe to justify direct intervention to secure Ukraine’s freedom. As it is we have confined ourselves to economic and military assistance. We are not at war and our economies also should have no difficulty supporting the current levels of support and should be able to do more. At the moment, unfortunately, a more pressing question is whether election results in the US and financial pressures in Europe will lead us to do less.

I will return to that question at the conclusion of this lecture. I will first consider the strategies being adopted by Ukraine and Russia, before looking at the military situation and then the possibilities for negotiations.

Zelensky’s ‘victory plan.’

President Zelensky’s plan as presented to the Rada in Kyiv on 16 October has five key elements.

1. First, an immediate and unconditional invitation to join NATO. This is to set the process in motion rather than reach an early conclusion. This is a direct challenge to one of Putin’s key war aims which is to keep Ukraine out of the alliance.

2. Second, a permanent strengthening of Ukraine’s security through guarantees from partners that their weapons can be used for strikes inside Russia and that Ukraine’s neighbours will conduct joint air defence operations to protect Ukraine’s skies. This would also allow for continued operations inside sovereign Russian territory to ensure buffer zones that protect Ukraine, such as that undertaken in Kursk.

3. Third, a nonnuclear deterrence plan. Before full membership of NATO there needs to be security guarantees relating to how partners will come to Ukraine’s aid if attacked again. Some of these security agreements are already in place but Kyiv would want them to be firmed up.

4. Fourth, guarantees to protect Ukraine’s economic security and natural resources. These resources are of importance to Ukraine’s partners while if they can be denied to Russia that will weaken its economy and ‘war machine.’

5. Fifth, an offer for the post-war period to replace some US military contingents stationed in Europe with Ukrainian units that have gained real experience in modern warfare, the use of Western weapons, and cooperation with NATO troops. This is to underline the fact that Ukraine is not just a supplicant but could make its own significant contributions to the alliance.

The obvious and acknowledged feature of this plan is that it very much depends on Ukraine’s international partners to make it work, and in particular the United States. This means that there is little chance that the big issues of principle – NATO and long-range strike authorisations – will be addressed until a new administration is in place, although there are things that can and are being done before then. President Biden has just approved a new $425 million package of support and already indicated that he is prepared to set in motion a process for NATO accession. The interest from frozen Russian assets, although as yet not the assets, is being handed over to Ukraine.

Another feature of the plan, that has gained less comment, is that it does not presume a series of successful offensives to liberate territory. Remember that Russia still holds some 20 percent of Ukrainian territory and that it is Ukraine’s stated war aim to get it all back. It therefore requires Russia to abandon its own war aims and agree to withdraw its forces . The plan will succeed, according to Zelensky, by persuading Putin, at some point during the coming year, ‘that his geopolitical calculations are doomed.’

The emphasis therefore is on demonstrating to Putin that he cannot win even it is harder to show that he is bound to lose. In these situations not losing can be as important objective as winning – and one that is easier to attain. This is one reason why wars drag on and why it remains difficult to see Russia agreeing to accept that this war has been a terrible mistake while Putin remains in power.

The more military aspects of Zelensky’s plan are geared to ensuring that Ukraine does not lose. These include providing more protection to critical infrastructure and Ukrainian towns and cities, supporting Ukrainian forces trying to hold their positions with more ammunition and equipment, and facilitating the long-range strikes that can disrupt all Russian military preparations. Zelensky’s plan was light on what extra steps Ukraine will need to follow. It is doing a lot – with Western support - to develop its own defence industry but is still struggling with mobilisation. As Jack Watling has observed ‘the training pipeline has failed provide enough personnel or give those soldiers sufficient training.’

As the weather deteriorates in Ukraine the fighting may slow down somewhat, although it has not stopped during previous winters. The main concern about the coming months is the loss of so much energy generating capacity because of the deliberate Russian campaign to take it out. Peak electricity generation may only be a third of what is required. One point of contention within Ukraine has been whether to stay with large power stations which are vulnerable to future Russian strikes or move towards a more decentralised system of small plants, which might be privately run, carrying the risk of corruption. For now the limits on supply means that blackouts and shortages will have to be endured.

Yet as we consider the ordeal to which Ukraine has been subjected we can also note its remarkable resilience. I was struck by a recent tweet from Anton Gerashchenko, of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future

‘Yes, things are consistently bad. But the key word here is not 'bad,' but 'consistently.' We have not been defeated, our allies have not abandoned us, the frontline has not been broken through, our military industry continues to work and develop, the enemy has not captured a single regional center, logistics is functioning, air defense defends cities, the military command maintains control, the parliament is working, volunteers are working, taxes are being paid, Russian oil and weapons depots are burning, wheat is being harvested and bread is being baked daily, trolleybuses are running, and the third year of the great war is underway.’

Russian Strategy

The hope for a dawning sense of futility in the enemy capital is one important feature that Russian strategy shares with Ukrainian. There is no peace offer on the table other than a reiteration of Moscow’s most absolute objectives. Ukraine is required to accept the loss of four oblasts to Russia – Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as well as Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea. A formal neutrality is also demanded, so no membership of NATO, plus other measures designed for demilitarisation and denazification, which would limit Ukraine’s ability to sustain serious armed forces and presumably require changes to the constitution to protect Russian language speakers. Putin has demanded that Kyiv agree to all of this before a cease-fire can be considered. He is not offering a cease-fire to be followed by peace negotiations, which is the sequence expected in the West.

What was supposed to be a limited ‘special military operation’ has now been going on for almost 1,000 days. The costs to Russia have been immense in both human and material terms. It has made itself dependent on China, along with North Korea and Iran, while collapsing its political and economic relations with Europe. And after all this effort it is no closer to victory. So long as it does not control the Ukrainian government – which was its objective on 24 February 2022 – then it has no way of forcing Ukraine to accept its loss.

Because of Ukraine’s dependence on external support, Russia can work on Ukraine’s partners to get them to do less or even abandon Kyiv altogether. This has always been a key element of its strategy, from the energy crunch with accompanying inflation that it caused in 2022 to the sabotage and misinformation campaigns that have been stepped over the past year. The head of MI5 has spoken of how Russian agents have been on a mission to generate ‘sustained mayhem on British and European streets’.

Russia has sought to encourage ‘Ukraine fatigue’, a term it should be recalled was first heard over two years ago and has yet to manifest itself in terms of a significant loss of public support for Ukraine in its struggle. The evidence of fatigue is however found in finance ministries and in those responsible for enforcing sanctions. If it comes in the United States it will not be because of a general shift in opinion but because of an election decided for other reasons that puts in place a president with a known antipathy to Ukraine and a proclaimed determination to arrange a peace in days. Putin has denied in the past that he was waiting with any special eagerness for a Trump victory but it would have been surprising if he had not calculated that this might provide him with a lifeline.

Putin’s other advantage over Ukraine is the size of the country, its economy, and its population. Extraordinary resources have been devoted to the war – Russia is planning to spend 13.2 trillion rubles, or approximately $95.4 billion, for the year 2025, that is about $275 million a day. The working assumption by many in the West is that this can be sustained almost indefinitely. That is certainly safer than the alternative assumption, more regularly heard after a succession of sanctions packages were imposed on Russia, that the economy was rapidly approaching a cliff edge. Nonetheless I don’t think one should underestimate the problems that those in charge of the Russian economy face (bearing in mind that they have shown themselves to be more accomplished than those in charge of military strategy).

The most serious and obvious problem is that the economy is overheating. This is reflected in intense labour shortages, aggravated by the demands of the front line and to some extent hostility to immigrants, and by inflation at 7% which has yet to be tamed by high interest rates, which have just gone up to 21%. Sanctions clearly don’t help even if ways round them can be found, including with the help of China. The opportunity costs in terms of the civilian sector and infrastructure are considerable. Last winter there were problems with public utilities and breakdowns may be worse this time. There is also the question of the oil price. If the price of oil falls then the Russian economy will be in more trouble. Equally it will buoyed if the price goes up.

The Military Balance

Against this backdrop what has been noticeable is that Russia has not been fighting this war as if it expects it to be long but instead has been throwing resources and people into it at a frantic pace. Ever since the Ukrainian offensive petered out a year ago Russian forces have been pushing hard in all fronts with their own offensives, despite incurring heavy losses in men and equipment. They have succeeded in keeping Ukrainian forces on the back foot. In recent months they have had some breakthroughs in Donetsk, the result of exhaustion on the Ukrainian side, with units outgunned and outmanned, and glide bombs making the life of those trying to hold lines especially difficult. In some areas they have failed – the Kharkiv offensive which was launched last summer did not create the buffer zone Putin said it would.

In addition, Ukraine managed its own offensive into Russia’s Kursk region a couple of months ago, and while this had yet to see Russian troops diverted away from the main fronts in Ukraine nor have the Ukrainians as yet been pushed out. While this is only a tiny fraction of Russian territory it is embarrassing for Putin that it is still held by Ukraine. Zelensky has spoken of it as providing a Ukrainian buffer zone, and it could also be potentially traded in any peace deal.

Lastly while Ukraine cannot hurt Russia in the same way and to the same extent as Russia can hurt Ukraine, and it is frustrated by the lack of authorization to use Western systems against targets deep in Russia, it is developing long-range systems of its own which it is producing in numbers. These can be used against any targets it wishes. The most important targets are those storing weapons systems and ammunition, and a number have been attacked successfully. We have also seen some attacks on weapons factories. Earlier in the year oil refineries presented soft targets which took out some Russian capacity. With so many potential targets these strikes pose a challenge for Russian air defence in setting priorities.

The number of First-Person View (FPV) drones on the battlefield has surged from just dozens to tens of thousands in under a year, helping to compensate for the shortfall in artillery shells. Ukraine has successfully developed and deployed its own long-range drones, as well as sea drones, which have allowed Ukraine to destroy a quarter of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, denying Russia the ability to impose a blockade, and keep military facilities in Crimea on edge.

According to US estimates Russia has lost more than 600,000 personnel, dead and wounded during the course of a war that was supposed to be a limited ‘special military operation’ to be concluded in a matter of weeks. Putin is also trying to avoid further mobilisation, and is scrambling around to find more people to send to the front. Now North Koreans are being deployed, apparently in Kursk (itself a possible indication that the Ukrainians are proving to be harder to dislodge than assumed). It will be interesting to see how they are used by Russian commanders - as other disposable troops or requiring special treatment? Will some be tempted to defect? How will NATO and for that matter South Korea respond to it appearing as a belligerent in a European war?

Russian Industry is working overtime to keep the front lines supplied. The Russian generals have adapted in many ways to the demands of the war and their tactics have been refined but they still rely on the expendability of their soldiers. Without further mobilisation this may limit their ability to sustain the current level of activity into the new year. And while they have pushed Ukraine back, and continue to do so, they have not yet achieved their objectives for this year, and may be running out of time to do so.

We also have an assessment from Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Directorate of Intelligence, dealing with Russia’s ability to replace losses. Take tanks. Russia has relied on refurbishing its older Soviet-era tanks. These are no longer in production. These are being lost at a remarkable rate and new production of the T-90M tanks, at the planned rate of 150 a year, can’t fill the gaps. One estimate is that by 4 October 2024, Russian forces had lost over 539 tanks (out of total losses of 1,830 vehicles) fighting in the Pokrovsk direction this year.

Dara Massicot of the Carnegie Corporation reports that military equipment production, aside from drones, plateaued early this year, while its stockpile of multiple Soviet-era military equipment may be exhausted by 2026. Equally new jet production is unimpressive. Budanov noted that Russia plans to produce only 14 Su-57 fighters in 2024. North Korea and Iran have played an important part in keeping Russia going. Budanov described the importance of North Korean artillery shell supplies by noting how combat intensifies within 8-9 days after the arrival of a new shipment and that this effect lasts for a couple of weeks. What is unclear is the extent of North Korea’s stockpile and its readiness to run it down when it has its own needs.

Where Russia has been able to ramp up production and cause Ukraine real difficulties has been with glide bombs, long-range drones, and Iskander missiles. It flies, according to Watling, between 1,000 and 1,300 long-range reconnaissance drones over Ukraine every day, and there is little Kyiv can do about that. That is why its own electronic warfare and interceptor drone capabilities need to be scaled up. This capability has helped Russia at the front because it is difficult for Ukraine to move its own artillery forward, and it is also why Ukrainian towns and cities, especially those close to the front lines, have taken such a battering in recent months. It has insufficient Patriot systems to protect cities and the entire frontline. This is why Ukraine is so keen to find means to attack missile storage sites from a distance.

Negotiations?

The story of the past two years has been that fast-moving offensives are hard to achieve unless defences have already been thinned out. If there is still no dramatic movement on the battlefield, and even the possibility that the intensity of the battles may slow down during the course of next year, what are the possibilities of either a cease-fire or a full negotiated settlement?

Ukraine feels that it has little choice but to continue with the war. It notes Putin’s regular dismissal of Ukrainian sovereignty let alone the legitimacy of its government, the cruel behaviour of his forces in areas that it has occupied, and the disregard of past promises to respect Ukrainian security, including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. For all these reasons it is unsurprisingly reluctant to do a deal with Russia without guarantees from NATO states.

Does that mean that it would reject all compromise deals? Looking at Ukrainian polling one can imagine some territorial concessions, for example over Donetsk and Luhansk. That will be up to the Ukrainians (and the government did once promise to put any deal to a referendum). At any rate I don’t think that Ukraine could accept any deal that did not come with proper security guarantees.

What about Russia? In discussions of possible outcomes over the past couple years a hierarchy of Russian territorial claims has been identified: Crimea; Donetsk and Luhansk; Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. This reflects the order in which Putin thought about annexing them.

The last two are already problematic because they are not yet fully under Russian control. Getting full control of Donetsk along with Luhansk has been a military priority since the summer of 2022 and remains the focus of the current fighting. As of now a deal on Russia’s preferred lines would require Ukraine agreeing to withdraw troops from its own territory. But it is important to keep in mind that they have all been formally annexed and as far as Moscow is concerned, if nobody else, they are now part of the Russian Federation. Moreover even recognising Crimea as the most important acquisition then other territories are also important to provide a land bridge and to ensure that it can be kept supplied and safe. (I suspect Crimea is also Ukraine’s top priority for liberation).

So at most one can imagine a negotiation around Kherson and Zaporizhzhia leading to some Russian troop withdrawals. (Anders Aslund recently picked up on an article by one newspaper owner, Konstantin Remchukov, who appeared to be flying a kite along these lines, concentrating on the Donbas and Crimea but also recognizing Ukrainian sovereignty).

All the territories held by Russia, other than Crimea, have been ruined by the war: towns and villages have been obliterated, and infrastructure and industries wrecked. They are full of unexploded ordnance and the environment generally has been degraded. They have been depopulated and much of the population remaining is hostile to an occupation and will need policing. To reconstruct and revive these territories will be extraordinarily expensive and require continuing subsidies to keep them afloat. From Moscow’s perspective, if Ukraine is not kept demilitarised and out of NATO then there will be a long new border to be defended and this will require a major commitment of Russian forces for the indefinite future, with the possibility of sabotage and subversion to the rear. This is why Putin wanted a puppet government in Kyiv in the first place. Without one the situation for Russia is unstable.

With control over the media Putin could spin any deal as representing a great victory, and from what we can tell from polling this would be welcomed by the Russian people who do want negotiations even though they accept official rationales for its continuation and remain proud of their armed forces and unwilling to challenge Putin. But a situation in which the rump Ukraine was independent and able to reconstitute its army and forge new security relationships with NATO countries would not be seen as a great victory. The acquisition of ruined territories would be a mixed blessing, remaining desolate for some time as a testament to a foolish war.

This takes us again to the importance of not losing even when there can be no decisive victory. While the war continues Putin can avoid an awkward reckoning – for this gain was the sacrifice really worth it? But it also means that when the eventual reckoning does come it will be more severe.

Zelensky’s route to winding down the war envisages building on agreements on specific things, for example prisoner exchanges and allowing grain exports. He has spoken of the possibility of an agreement not to target critical infrastructure, although that would require Russia to abandon one of its most effective forms of pressure on Ukraine. It is hard to see Moscow agreeing to that, at least not until Ukraine has shown it can cope with another winter.

Putin’s preferred route has been through Washington. This is in line with his dismissal of the Ukrainian government as neo-Nazis, his belief that it is at any rate a puppet of Western governments so that the war is really one with NATO and can only be resolved at that level.

This is why he would welcome direct communication with the US President, and he could look forward to it should Trump return to power. Trump believes that he can do a deal. The one that Vice-Presidential candidate J D Vance has spoken about is not far from that proposed by Putin. We can also assume that Trump could use the threat of the immediate withdrawal of support to get Zelensky to agree at least to be part of the negotiations, although Putin will have little interest in talking to him. How quickly this could happen is unclear: key positions in government would have to be approved, and the ease with which that could be done would depend on what happens in the Congressional elections as well the presidential. If Ukraine insists on continuing with the fight, still helped by European partners, I am not sure that Trump would consider it a good look to be abandoning a country in a fight against Russia so decisively. Trump has hinted in the past he would give Ukraine even more support if Putin refused to offer any concessions.

All one can say is that if Trump wins, how he engages with Putin and the possible outcomes of any negotiations will soon dominate all considerations of this issue. If Trump loses we will have President Harris. This would be an opportunity to revitalise the West’s Ukraine policy, recommit to its support, and look for ways to add to the pressure on Russia. With the uncertainty of the election out of the way Putin will have to accept that Ukraine will not be abandoned and that if he is going to cut his losses he might as well do so quickly.

There is another possibility that Russia might just decide to reduce the tempo of its operations, concentrate as it did in late 2022 on defensive preparations, keeping up the attacks on Ukraine’s civil society, denying its economy the chance to recover and waiting for something else to turn up.

The stakes are extraordinarily high for Europe. While I would not argue that Russia’s next step after defeating Ukraine would be to move immediately against the Baltic states, this would usher in a period of intense instability in Europe and recriminations among the allies. Given the combined strength of European countries, leaving aside the US, it would represent a failure of political will and judgement.

Autocracies are different from democracies. To return to the question posed in the title: I don’t know what comes next. There are big decisions to be made in Kyiv and in Moscow. But there are also decisions to be taken in Western capitals, and how those decisions are made over the coming months will determine Europe’s stability and security for the rest of this decade and beyond.

Details of the BEARR Trust’s emergency appeal for Ukraine and Moldova can be found here.