A solitary WW2 era tank participates in Putin’s 2023 victory parade Vladimir Putin did not invent the idea of a great parade in Moscow to mark victory against the Nazis. Although during Soviet times the important date was the November anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, occasional military parades marked the big anniversaries of the end of the Second World War. Annual parades on 9 May started under Boris Yeltsin in 1995 but it was Vladimir Putin who gave these parades their importance, an opportunity to demonstrate his country’s growing military might, including its most advanced and deadliest hardware, and to promote his nationalist and militaristic cult of the Great Patriotic War. (For a history see
Even if the Ukrainian offensive fails, from the Russian viewpoint things look down- right depressing. It must surely be clear to them they can’t do successful offensives and even if Western aid to Ukraine is reduced they look very unlikely to be able to push the Ukrainians back. The Ukrainian will to resist is clearly high and defending is far easier that attacking. The Russians have lost their best trained and equipped troops and while the stocks of cannon fodder may be OK it’s hard to see how they will be trained, equipped and motivated.
The best the Russians can hope for is a frozen conflict while the Russian economy gets progressively ground down by the sanctions whose long term existence looks a certainty as long as Putin is in charge and the annexations remain. I hereby nominate V Putin for the 21st Century’s Biggest Geo-Political Blunder Award.
If nothing else, the mystery drone attack would support the various government officials' decision to shrink or cancel big parades on May 9th. Look everyone, it's not safe!
In the context of Putin's Russia, last week's drone attack could be explained as a false flag action aimed at the home audience to foment a besieged mentality. The drone's rather dramatic but ineffectual blast sending a message of danger and vulnerability - providing reasons for event greater homeland security, pushing a malleable and more fearful population towards their increasingly indispensable war leader rather than asking him awkward questions about his massive blunders.
1. If Russia could theoretically mobilise 25m new soldiers, not only might supply and training be a problem but also leadership and command. This was poor at the very outset of the war and it is difficult to see that it has improved in any way as "professional" officers have been replaced, presumably by mobilised reservists. (This also has serious implications for Russian defensive capabilities.)
2. It scarcely needs an argument to realise that NATO/"the West" must look beyond the anticipated Ukrainian offensive to the longer term. Even if, beyond all expectation, Ukraine drove Russia out of all of its territory from Crimea to Luhansk in the coming offensive, there would still be a big question mark about what Russia would do then.
3. The ability of Ukraine to make military strikes in Russia has been something of an elephant in the room since at least the Russian retreat from Kyiv. If Ukraine continues drone attacks on Russian territory and, in the occupied territories, against the symbolically important Crimea, (and also in the context of 2 above) might NATO/Western attitudes to such attacks moderate to allow Ukraine more latitude with Western weapons?
Even if the Ukrainian offensive fails, from the Russian viewpoint things look down- right depressing. It must surely be clear to them they can’t do successful offensives and even if Western aid to Ukraine is reduced they look very unlikely to be able to push the Ukrainians back. The Ukrainian will to resist is clearly high and defending is far easier that attacking. The Russians have lost their best trained and equipped troops and while the stocks of cannon fodder may be OK it’s hard to see how they will be trained, equipped and motivated.
The best the Russians can hope for is a frozen conflict while the Russian economy gets progressively ground down by the sanctions whose long term existence looks a certainty as long as Putin is in charge and the annexations remain. I hereby nominate V Putin for the 21st Century’s Biggest Geo-Political Blunder Award.
If nothing else, the mystery drone attack would support the various government officials' decision to shrink or cancel big parades on May 9th. Look everyone, it's not safe!
Good summary. Realistic.
In the context of Putin's Russia, last week's drone attack could be explained as a false flag action aimed at the home audience to foment a besieged mentality. The drone's rather dramatic but ineffectual blast sending a message of danger and vulnerability - providing reasons for event greater homeland security, pushing a malleable and more fearful population towards their increasingly indispensable war leader rather than asking him awkward questions about his massive blunders.
John Monash would probably say that 1,550 armoured vehicles, 230 tanks, and ‘vast amounts’ of ammunition. Are enough material for a good engineer...
1. If Russia could theoretically mobilise 25m new soldiers, not only might supply and training be a problem but also leadership and command. This was poor at the very outset of the war and it is difficult to see that it has improved in any way as "professional" officers have been replaced, presumably by mobilised reservists. (This also has serious implications for Russian defensive capabilities.)
2. It scarcely needs an argument to realise that NATO/"the West" must look beyond the anticipated Ukrainian offensive to the longer term. Even if, beyond all expectation, Ukraine drove Russia out of all of its territory from Crimea to Luhansk in the coming offensive, there would still be a big question mark about what Russia would do then.
3. The ability of Ukraine to make military strikes in Russia has been something of an elephant in the room since at least the Russian retreat from Kyiv. If Ukraine continues drone attacks on Russian territory and, in the occupied territories, against the symbolically important Crimea, (and also in the context of 2 above) might NATO/Western attitudes to such attacks moderate to allow Ukraine more latitude with Western weapons?