"The debates in the West on whether support for Ukraine will drain away as the economic pain intensifies and ‘war fatigue’ steps in have acquired a routine quality but all one can say is that so far this has not happened"
The projected energy prices in Europe this winter would suggest much more econmic pain is coming. Perhaps Moscow is confident this will be the decisive strategic factor?
My own thinking on this: the key allies for the Ukraine are the US and Poland. Even if Germany and France did "cave in to Moscow", do they have the leverage to force Ukraine to stop fighting? I would argue no. As long as the USA is happy to provide weapons, and Poland is happy to accomodate the logistics bases need to support this, Ukraine can continue to fight.
Is there any evidence that France and Germany are going to cave in to Moscow? I don't see much. If they did could they stop Ukraine fighting? Absolutely no chance.
By "cave in to Moscow", I only mean that they decide to pressure Ukraine to negotiate a peace treaty with Russia. Presumably they may decide to do this if lack of Russian gas begins to seriously harm economic output in the EU.
But I think you and I agree - even if this scenario played out like the Russians want, Germany and France lack any leverage to influence Ukraine. Although the obvious split in NATO/EU would be embarrassing.
The use of the energy weapon by Russia is itself proof of the fact that Russia can't be trusted to provide energy to Europe.
European govts are going to be in hard place this winter, is my guess. There's little point in them even thinking of kowtowing to Russia, because, as you say, the US and Poland and others won't stop supplying Russia. Plus, however bad it may be, it's going to be temporary - winter doesn't last forever, and as bad as it may be this winter, it will be a h*ll of a lot better next winter, etc. And for that reason, this is a one-time weapon for Russia.
People are going to be wearing a lot of warm garments inside, a lot of coats, etc. They're going to go on a lot of winter holidays to warmer places. And my guess is that there will be a lot of blaming of former govt administrations. Angela Merkel's legacy continues to look worse and worse as time goes by. She gave Brexit a critical assist and put the EU's neck under Putin's boot. Well done, Angela!
I often read that a long war of attrition will favour Russia. I'm not so sure. The Ukrainians aren't going anywhere and Russia looks like it will never capture Kiev. I'm inclined to think the Europeans and America will be happy to see Russia bleed and suffer for a very long time. Supporting Ukraine with arms seems a price well worth paying if it neuters a proven aggressive, empire seeking Russia. Putin is 68 and won't be in power for ever. If the Russians were prepared to leave Afghanistan they may be prepared to leave Ukraine after years of fruitless suffering and crippling sanctions...with a new leader.
America will be happy to see Russia bleed and suffer for a very long time: Lloyd Austin said as much early on in the war, when he spoke of demilitarizing Russia by rendering it incapable of mounting similar armed aggression against its European neighbors. Austin encountered some criticism at the time for the demilitarization framing, but today this view looks at least somewhat prescient. Austin has been from the beginning and remains a staunch supporter of the Ukrainian war effort.
I think the statement that Russia is unlikely to run out of personnel is at least debatable, if not pretty clearly wrong.
They are resorting to ever more desperate measures to raise volunteers, including paying enormous amounts of money (relatively speaking) for people as old as (or even older than) 50 to sign up for 4-6 month contracts. They are recruiting from prisons. They are press ganging every male they can in occupied Ukraine.
This seems unsustainable. Even supposing that current measures get them meaningful number of recruits, they will be the worst kinds of cannon fodder. Russian sources complain about not having enough infantry - well, infantry isn't just a bunch of random middle-aged guys who have nothing else to live for than the bottom of a bottle of vodka. The kind of infantry Russia needs is that which is highly trained in combined arms tactics - how to work with tanks to take ground, for instance.
I agree that what we're seeing is a war of attrition - and that, so long as both sides keep fighting, a war of attrition lasts until a critical resource on one side is exhausted. Well, it appears the most obvious critical resource being reduced to unacceptable levels is Russian personnel. If Russia gets to the point where it's no longer able to staff one or more of its fronts, then Ukraine will start rolling back Russia in whatever geography that is. And Russia starts to clearly lose in Ukraine, that will likely have very material domestic and international ramifications.
And it's clear that Putin is desperate not to declare this as an out-and-out war, presumably because doing so would make him look very bad domestically. So, yeah, Putin could declare war, but if that were an easy option, he'd already have taken it.
I reckon, the statement of RU not running out of personal is true. For Putin it is boom or bust. Nothing in between. If he cannot find enough volunteers, a mobilization of some sort will be implemented. RU could easily mobilize +1 Mil soldiers against Ukr. Regarding the wording 'special military operation' vs 'war', that´s just a technicality. RU just needs to declare the conquered territory as part of RU (Which will happen after phony plebiscites) and voila RU can use conscripts to defend it.
Putin may implement a mobilization of some sort, but clearly, he views this as having materially negative consequences because he has not done it. In fact, he has very publicly condemned even the use of conscripts. When, early in the conflict, it was proven that there were conscripts in Ukraine. Putin went out of his way to say it was a mistake and would not happen again.
In terms of using conscripts by declaring, for instance, Kherson to be Russian, Russia could have done this at any time in the last few months, but instead, chose to launch these increasingly desperate moves to raise additional contractors, of whatever quality.
It's also important to distinguish between (1) use of conscripts and (2) general mobilization. The former might have some immediate military impact, though clearly at a political cost that Putin so far has gone to substantial lengths to avoid. Conscripts ain't great, but at least they're kinda trained, equipped, there's a force structure for them, etc.
By contrast, troops resulting from a mobilization would be far *less* consequential militarily, but massive consequences politically. Russia no longer has the mechanisms to make mobilization effective. You're talking about the need to train and equip a million men. You're talking months before even the first men would be available and effective - and presumably an environment where Russia is already in a really bad state (otherwise why mobilize?). You're talking massive impact to the rest of Russia as those men are pulled away from whatever else they were doing. You're talking personal and economic disruption the length and breadth of Russia.
If Russia declares a mobilization, it would be a political earthquake. Putin's internal reputation in Russia rests on two things (1) eliminating the chaos of the 1990s, especially the economy and (2) perceived restoration of Russia's military strength/international respect.
Some kind of general mobilization puts both of those at risk, to say the least.
I don't think support in the West will drop, because we cannot condone the cruelty Russia has demonstrated in the captured areas of Ukraine; the comparison with Nazi cruelty during WW2 will become more apparent. That alone will harden Western views, and make us accept any cost.
From a commercial point of view Russia has made a strategic mistake in stopping the sale of resources (gas etc), when it feels necessary. This will damage its relations with those who may be its current clients, say China, Kazhakstan, Krygystan, Turkey and others. They will be wary of relying on Russian products (and will expect significant price discounts), and so in the medium term, two to four years, Russia will feel the full force of this error.
Bleeding Russia requires bleeding Ukraine, too. Current frontline divides regions that are rapidly being depleted of citizens that belong to the other side, by language, political orientation. War in Eastern Ukraine is being fought in regions where majority speaks Russian as mother tongue, at least half consider themselves Russian. Tragic fate, harrassed in Ukraine, mobilized in Russia, regarded and used as subhumans by the US & West. When there are no more Ukrainians on the other side of the frontline, like there are none in Crimea, continuing war will become too difficult even for zealots.
"The debates in the West on whether support for Ukraine will drain away as the economic pain intensifies and ‘war fatigue’ steps in have acquired a routine quality but all one can say is that so far this has not happened"
The projected energy prices in Europe this winter would suggest much more econmic pain is coming. Perhaps Moscow is confident this will be the decisive strategic factor?
My own thinking on this: the key allies for the Ukraine are the US and Poland. Even if Germany and France did "cave in to Moscow", do they have the leverage to force Ukraine to stop fighting? I would argue no. As long as the USA is happy to provide weapons, and Poland is happy to accomodate the logistics bases need to support this, Ukraine can continue to fight.
i'd add GB to the list of key allies, but important allies are also many, Western (besides the Poles) and Southern Slavs and the Balts
and they are likely to keep Ukraine in the EU's focus
Is there any evidence that France and Germany are going to cave in to Moscow? I don't see much. If they did could they stop Ukraine fighting? Absolutely no chance.
By "cave in to Moscow", I only mean that they decide to pressure Ukraine to negotiate a peace treaty with Russia. Presumably they may decide to do this if lack of Russian gas begins to seriously harm economic output in the EU.
There is evidence that this "gas weapon" will cause big problems this winter: https://twitter.com/JavierBlas/status/1557675782486597633
But I think you and I agree - even if this scenario played out like the Russians want, Germany and France lack any leverage to influence Ukraine. Although the obvious split in NATO/EU would be embarrassing.
The use of the energy weapon by Russia is itself proof of the fact that Russia can't be trusted to provide energy to Europe.
European govts are going to be in hard place this winter, is my guess. There's little point in them even thinking of kowtowing to Russia, because, as you say, the US and Poland and others won't stop supplying Russia. Plus, however bad it may be, it's going to be temporary - winter doesn't last forever, and as bad as it may be this winter, it will be a h*ll of a lot better next winter, etc. And for that reason, this is a one-time weapon for Russia.
People are going to be wearing a lot of warm garments inside, a lot of coats, etc. They're going to go on a lot of winter holidays to warmer places. And my guess is that there will be a lot of blaming of former govt administrations. Angela Merkel's legacy continues to look worse and worse as time goes by. She gave Brexit a critical assist and put the EU's neck under Putin's boot. Well done, Angela!
I often read that a long war of attrition will favour Russia. I'm not so sure. The Ukrainians aren't going anywhere and Russia looks like it will never capture Kiev. I'm inclined to think the Europeans and America will be happy to see Russia bleed and suffer for a very long time. Supporting Ukraine with arms seems a price well worth paying if it neuters a proven aggressive, empire seeking Russia. Putin is 68 and won't be in power for ever. If the Russians were prepared to leave Afghanistan they may be prepared to leave Ukraine after years of fruitless suffering and crippling sanctions...with a new leader.
America will be happy to see Russia bleed and suffer for a very long time: Lloyd Austin said as much early on in the war, when he spoke of demilitarizing Russia by rendering it incapable of mounting similar armed aggression against its European neighbors. Austin encountered some criticism at the time for the demilitarization framing, but today this view looks at least somewhat prescient. Austin has been from the beginning and remains a staunch supporter of the Ukrainian war effort.
Putin will, in fact, be 70 in two months.
Thanks for the update., Janusz. And so much the better.
I think the statement that Russia is unlikely to run out of personnel is at least debatable, if not pretty clearly wrong.
They are resorting to ever more desperate measures to raise volunteers, including paying enormous amounts of money (relatively speaking) for people as old as (or even older than) 50 to sign up for 4-6 month contracts. They are recruiting from prisons. They are press ganging every male they can in occupied Ukraine.
This seems unsustainable. Even supposing that current measures get them meaningful number of recruits, they will be the worst kinds of cannon fodder. Russian sources complain about not having enough infantry - well, infantry isn't just a bunch of random middle-aged guys who have nothing else to live for than the bottom of a bottle of vodka. The kind of infantry Russia needs is that which is highly trained in combined arms tactics - how to work with tanks to take ground, for instance.
I agree that what we're seeing is a war of attrition - and that, so long as both sides keep fighting, a war of attrition lasts until a critical resource on one side is exhausted. Well, it appears the most obvious critical resource being reduced to unacceptable levels is Russian personnel. If Russia gets to the point where it's no longer able to staff one or more of its fronts, then Ukraine will start rolling back Russia in whatever geography that is. And Russia starts to clearly lose in Ukraine, that will likely have very material domestic and international ramifications.
And it's clear that Putin is desperate not to declare this as an out-and-out war, presumably because doing so would make him look very bad domestically. So, yeah, Putin could declare war, but if that were an easy option, he'd already have taken it.
I reckon, the statement of RU not running out of personal is true. For Putin it is boom or bust. Nothing in between. If he cannot find enough volunteers, a mobilization of some sort will be implemented. RU could easily mobilize +1 Mil soldiers against Ukr. Regarding the wording 'special military operation' vs 'war', that´s just a technicality. RU just needs to declare the conquered territory as part of RU (Which will happen after phony plebiscites) and voila RU can use conscripts to defend it.
Putin may implement a mobilization of some sort, but clearly, he views this as having materially negative consequences because he has not done it. In fact, he has very publicly condemned even the use of conscripts. When, early in the conflict, it was proven that there were conscripts in Ukraine. Putin went out of his way to say it was a mistake and would not happen again.
In terms of using conscripts by declaring, for instance, Kherson to be Russian, Russia could have done this at any time in the last few months, but instead, chose to launch these increasingly desperate moves to raise additional contractors, of whatever quality.
It's also important to distinguish between (1) use of conscripts and (2) general mobilization. The former might have some immediate military impact, though clearly at a political cost that Putin so far has gone to substantial lengths to avoid. Conscripts ain't great, but at least they're kinda trained, equipped, there's a force structure for them, etc.
By contrast, troops resulting from a mobilization would be far *less* consequential militarily, but massive consequences politically. Russia no longer has the mechanisms to make mobilization effective. You're talking about the need to train and equip a million men. You're talking months before even the first men would be available and effective - and presumably an environment where Russia is already in a really bad state (otherwise why mobilize?). You're talking massive impact to the rest of Russia as those men are pulled away from whatever else they were doing. You're talking personal and economic disruption the length and breadth of Russia.
If Russia declares a mobilization, it would be a political earthquake. Putin's internal reputation in Russia rests on two things (1) eliminating the chaos of the 1990s, especially the economy and (2) perceived restoration of Russia's military strength/international respect.
Some kind of general mobilization puts both of those at risk, to say the least.
I don't think support in the West will drop, because we cannot condone the cruelty Russia has demonstrated in the captured areas of Ukraine; the comparison with Nazi cruelty during WW2 will become more apparent. That alone will harden Western views, and make us accept any cost.
From a commercial point of view Russia has made a strategic mistake in stopping the sale of resources (gas etc), when it feels necessary. This will damage its relations with those who may be its current clients, say China, Kazhakstan, Krygystan, Turkey and others. They will be wary of relying on Russian products (and will expect significant price discounts), and so in the medium term, two to four years, Russia will feel the full force of this error.
Bleeding Russia requires bleeding Ukraine, too. Current frontline divides regions that are rapidly being depleted of citizens that belong to the other side, by language, political orientation. War in Eastern Ukraine is being fought in regions where majority speaks Russian as mother tongue, at least half consider themselves Russian. Tragic fate, harrassed in Ukraine, mobilized in Russia, regarded and used as subhumans by the US & West. When there are no more Ukrainians on the other side of the frontline, like there are none in Crimea, continuing war will become too difficult even for zealots.
No one in the west regards Ukrainians as subhuman, whatever their mother tongue. You're projecting.
Ukraine has up to 700,000 available today and more tomorrow - Russia much less due to requirement that it use contractors. See Perun's video today:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVx3Nlifo4Q
Typo: the caption of the cover photo, "Crime" should be "Crimea."
Freudian slip.