A Syrian child receives medical help after a chemical weapons attack in Douma in April 2018. Assadist and Russian propagandists spread theories it was a “false flag”. (Photo by Mouneb Taim/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images) ‘Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive.’
May 6, 2022·edited May 6, 2022Liked by Lawrence Freedman
By coincidence I am currently reading the 2017 print of ‘Cheating and Deception’ by J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley (originally published 1982, updated 1991).
It presents a broad overview on the topic and provides a framework for the analysis of deception. It is an eye opener and I would highly recommend it (despite it’s age) when considering the issues involved in false flag operations.
I think it might be interesting to look at false flag in terms of Frankfurt's bullshit vs. lies.
Performing a false flag operation is a lie: You really want people to believe you, and you're likely to have a very bad time if you're caught out. So, use sparingly when you have good media control and want to send a message.
On the other hand, baselessly claiming an operation is false flag is bullshit. It's much less important that people believe you so much as you're instilling doubt - can you trust the news, etc.? It helps promote a conspiracy theory mindset. So, you can use it liberally, particularly when you don't have control of the narrative, to muddy things.
It seems quite straightforward to me. When your army/henchmen commit terrible crimes there's no point pretending they haven't happened so you simply blame your enemies, even if they are your victims. I doubt anyone but 'True Believers' (or more accurately deeply cynical fellow travelers) believe outside of Russia but that doesn't matter. The only audience Putin cares about are Russians and the corrosive effects of years of pervasive, state organized lies has meant many good people will believe and courageous truth tellers are reliably silenced or even jailed. It works fine for Putin.
It also links to a general disposition to lie about all aspects of plans and operations - about intentions to invade in the first place, war aims, evacuation corridors, storming Azovstahl, etc. This is closer to the original definition of false flag you mention. It broadens the relation between telling a lie and expecting it to be believed, or sowing confusion. This is the fog that needs to be at least partially cleared if there is to be a negotiated settlement, eventually. It makes one wonder under what terms Macron is talking to Putin, if little that is said can be believed. Is there any value in that conversation at this stage?
By coincidence I am currently reading the 2017 print of ‘Cheating and Deception’ by J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley (originally published 1982, updated 1991).
It presents a broad overview on the topic and provides a framework for the analysis of deception. It is an eye opener and I would highly recommend it (despite it’s age) when considering the issues involved in false flag operations.
Cordially,
I think it might be interesting to look at false flag in terms of Frankfurt's bullshit vs. lies.
Performing a false flag operation is a lie: You really want people to believe you, and you're likely to have a very bad time if you're caught out. So, use sparingly when you have good media control and want to send a message.
On the other hand, baselessly claiming an operation is false flag is bullshit. It's much less important that people believe you so much as you're instilling doubt - can you trust the news, etc.? It helps promote a conspiracy theory mindset. So, you can use it liberally, particularly when you don't have control of the narrative, to muddy things.
My 2 minute theory, anyway. :)
It seems quite straightforward to me. When your army/henchmen commit terrible crimes there's no point pretending they haven't happened so you simply blame your enemies, even if they are your victims. I doubt anyone but 'True Believers' (or more accurately deeply cynical fellow travelers) believe outside of Russia but that doesn't matter. The only audience Putin cares about are Russians and the corrosive effects of years of pervasive, state organized lies has meant many good people will believe and courageous truth tellers are reliably silenced or even jailed. It works fine for Putin.
It also links to a general disposition to lie about all aspects of plans and operations - about intentions to invade in the first place, war aims, evacuation corridors, storming Azovstahl, etc. This is closer to the original definition of false flag you mention. It broadens the relation between telling a lie and expecting it to be believed, or sowing confusion. This is the fog that needs to be at least partially cleared if there is to be a negotiated settlement, eventually. It makes one wonder under what terms Macron is talking to Putin, if little that is said can be believed. Is there any value in that conversation at this stage?