In a recent blog for Foreign Affairs I argued that even as Putin’s original objectives drift out of reach another objective takes over - that of ‘not losing’, for with losing comes the reckoning. Failure is measured not only in the objectives that will forever stay unmet, but the casualties and costs accumulated during the course of the war, and the damage to Russia’s standing as a great power and Putin’s position as a competent leader.
Excellent article! Thank you Lawrence. Have been looking forward to your analysis of the current situation. Please keep them coming. I find yours a lot more readable than most.
Exactly the way the media is carrying on is abhorrent. I think seeing the attacks on Moscow is a manoeuvre to put pressure on Putin. Moscow citizens largely haven’t felt any impact from this war so the more they do the better.
Finally, "This is not a show. It's not a show the whole world is watching and betting on or anything. Every day, every metre is given by blood."
Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
How about “Ukraine had to adjust plans at the last minute, because Russia committed a giant act of eco-terrorism”? And the world did nothing about that.
Thank you for your deep and sober insights in the strategic aspects of this war. Writing from Germany, it is even more appreciated, since this type of military analysis is hard to come by these days in my country.
I am no military strategist, but one thought keeps crossing my mind since the start of the Ukrainian counter-offensive or even before when everybody was waiting for it to commence: Is it possible that one additional reason for the slow Ukrainian advances is Ukraine deliberately dragging out the offensive in order to keep up the pressure against the Russian side until the end of the dry season so not to allow for any Russian counter-counter-offensive before the begin of the muddy season? Despite Western support, Ukrainian military capabilities and fire power are obviously limited and inferior to Russia's brute force attitude (both in men and material). You also pointed out Russias ability to dig themselves in at the frontline. So there seems to be a considerable risk for the Ukrainian counter-offensive to run out of steam earlier than expected, offering the initiative to the Russians when it is still summer and thus time to move against tired-out Ukrainian forces. Keeping in mind how badly Putin's winter offensive went for Russian forces, denying Russia this opportunity seems a plausible objective to me, even at the cost of slower advances and limited territorial gains. I would very much appreciate your thoughts on this idea.
It seems war commenters need to calm down from their big mood swings that come from the day to day flows of the war. To use a sporting analogy this is not a T-20 game but the start of a long series of Test cricket. A really long one. Russia seems to have shown that it can’t do offensives so I can’t see it winning and the Ukrainians are arguably more determined than they were at the start of the war. Putin has given them no choice but to fight for as long as it takes and Putin himself probably knows his rule is at serious risk if he calls the troops out of Ukraine or more likely gets ejected from them. The interesting question for me is whether the Ukrainians have learned how to eat into Russian positions without suffering serious losses or at least inflicting enough casualties to make the process sustainable. I can’t see the Russians permitting withdrawals in a trading space for lives strategy so I suspect every gain they make is over dead or wounded mobliks – unless they do unauthorized retreats.
Please check out a terrific article in Time magazine about the factors impacting the Ukrainian counter offensive. It is the most detailed and insightful article I have read on the subject. I accessed it without a paywall. "The Ukrainian counter offensive can still succeed"
There has been mention elsewhere of the Russian strategy(?) of repeatedly sending out troops to fight in front of their defensive lines. The Ukrainian forces just sit tight and wipe out these waves as they come into open ground. It's like the urban meatgrinder but in open terrain. Similarly, enormous Russian resources will be used up in trying to recapture a bit of lost ground.
As Napoleon advised, Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.
There is lot written about the UA war but lets face it - Blumenthal said it correctly and honestly - it is all about US vs Russia and the US got an opportunity to kick Russian a*** for a very cheap amount of $.
That's it ... and for that a lot of Ukrainians HAVE TO die.
My suspicion, even more so after driving from Odesa to Sloviansk myself two weeks ago, seeing and listening, is that the West wants Ukraine to win, but not win too much. After all, it allowed Russia to build the "Scholz-Biden-Line" of massively mined fortifications from October until July, and is not delivering what is actually needed most for the on-going offensive - night vision devices, de-mining backpacks, drones, but also mobile GBAD, additional SPHs, additional HIMARS, additional top-tier MBTs, ammunition. For each reasonably well-trained AFU soldier, Russia can afford to waste five disposable single-use soldiers. In the long run, this is untenable.
1. I don't think one should be too quick to see the opening phase, if one can call it that, of Ukraine's counteroffensive as a misjudgement or a failure, at least around Zaporizhzhya in the south. The minefields and tank traps and so on are one thing but there was surely also a need to test the mettle of the Russian army and its commanders given the problems the Russians have had with personnel and materiel and with command structures throughout the war. In fact, according to ISW, the Russian army responded in a "doctrinely sound manner" by allowing the Ukrainian forces to advance into the forward trench line before counterattacking and pushing them back from the rear trenches. So that was an important lesson that had to be learned and there could be no avoiding a cost in men and equipment.
2. To follow up the discussion on attritional warfare above, the ISW began to assess the revised Ukrainian approach as one of creating a positive attritional gradient (I think I have got the jargon right) seeking to minimise its own losses and maximise Russian losses. I think this is part of the "shape and starve" mentioned by the UK Chief of Defence Staff. (It is interesting to note that some of the restlessness of Russian southern commanders in the aftermath of Wagner's failed rebellion made reference, critical of the Russian MOD, to the lack of counter-battery fire available to the Russian forces. However, this sort of complaint may also have been part of generals jockeying for position as they sensed weakness in the MOD leasership). The general assessment of this phase so far, however, seems to be one of toing and froing in different places on the front line, as mentioned above, with an overall reckoning of small Ukrainian territorial gains (low 00's of sq. km) thus far in the south and on the flanks of Bakhmut.
3. ISW posts in the last 2 days indicate the Kremlin may have achieved, in the aftermath of Wagner's failure and Prigohzin's apparent reduction in influence and the arrest and detention of Igor Girkin, the most extreme of nationalist milbloggers, some degree of self-censorship in the milblogger community. Also that the Kremlin may have departed from its former "official" line (that commentators should not underplay Ukrainian or overstate Russian, achievements in the war), so as to promote now the image of the Kremlin as an effective manager of the war and Russia as on the road to success. This may make it harder to assess developments on the ground, especially when marginal, as the milbloggers have been an important part of open source information but even so it may not be effective in the face of a major Russian setback.
Excellent article! Thank you Lawrence. Have been looking forward to your analysis of the current situation. Please keep them coming. I find yours a lot more readable than most.
I desperately hope that someone who makes policy decisions pays attention to what you wrote.
Exactly the way the media is carrying on is abhorrent. I think seeing the attacks on Moscow is a manoeuvre to put pressure on Putin. Moscow citizens largely haven’t felt any impact from this war so the more they do the better.
Finally, "This is not a show. It's not a show the whole world is watching and betting on or anything. Every day, every metre is given by blood."
Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
How about “Ukraine had to adjust plans at the last minute, because Russia committed a giant act of eco-terrorism”? And the world did nothing about that.
Thank you for your deep and sober insights in the strategic aspects of this war. Writing from Germany, it is even more appreciated, since this type of military analysis is hard to come by these days in my country.
I am no military strategist, but one thought keeps crossing my mind since the start of the Ukrainian counter-offensive or even before when everybody was waiting for it to commence: Is it possible that one additional reason for the slow Ukrainian advances is Ukraine deliberately dragging out the offensive in order to keep up the pressure against the Russian side until the end of the dry season so not to allow for any Russian counter-counter-offensive before the begin of the muddy season? Despite Western support, Ukrainian military capabilities and fire power are obviously limited and inferior to Russia's brute force attitude (both in men and material). You also pointed out Russias ability to dig themselves in at the frontline. So there seems to be a considerable risk for the Ukrainian counter-offensive to run out of steam earlier than expected, offering the initiative to the Russians when it is still summer and thus time to move against tired-out Ukrainian forces. Keeping in mind how badly Putin's winter offensive went for Russian forces, denying Russia this opportunity seems a plausible objective to me, even at the cost of slower advances and limited territorial gains. I would very much appreciate your thoughts on this idea.
In WW2, "The walls have ears" sent a stark warning that saying less is more.
It seems war commenters need to calm down from their big mood swings that come from the day to day flows of the war. To use a sporting analogy this is not a T-20 game but the start of a long series of Test cricket. A really long one. Russia seems to have shown that it can’t do offensives so I can’t see it winning and the Ukrainians are arguably more determined than they were at the start of the war. Putin has given them no choice but to fight for as long as it takes and Putin himself probably knows his rule is at serious risk if he calls the troops out of Ukraine or more likely gets ejected from them. The interesting question for me is whether the Ukrainians have learned how to eat into Russian positions without suffering serious losses or at least inflicting enough casualties to make the process sustainable. I can’t see the Russians permitting withdrawals in a trading space for lives strategy so I suspect every gain they make is over dead or wounded mobliks – unless they do unauthorized retreats.
Please check out a terrific article in Time magazine about the factors impacting the Ukrainian counter offensive. It is the most detailed and insightful article I have read on the subject. I accessed it without a paywall. "The Ukrainian counter offensive can still succeed"
https://time.com/6300772/ukraine-counteroffensive-can-still-succeed/
There has been mention elsewhere of the Russian strategy(?) of repeatedly sending out troops to fight in front of their defensive lines. The Ukrainian forces just sit tight and wipe out these waves as they come into open ground. It's like the urban meatgrinder but in open terrain. Similarly, enormous Russian resources will be used up in trying to recapture a bit of lost ground.
As Napoleon advised, Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.
Very well written.
It sure does seem like the best thing Putin can really hope for is a frozen conflict.
Deripaska says Russia runs out of currency to pay for continued operations after 2024. You and Putin are celebrating a little early.
There is lot written about the UA war but lets face it - Blumenthal said it correctly and honestly - it is all about US vs Russia and the US got an opportunity to kick Russian a*** for a very cheap amount of $.
That's it ... and for that a lot of Ukrainians HAVE TO die.
It's very embarrassing ...
My suspicion, even more so after driving from Odesa to Sloviansk myself two weeks ago, seeing and listening, is that the West wants Ukraine to win, but not win too much. After all, it allowed Russia to build the "Scholz-Biden-Line" of massively mined fortifications from October until July, and is not delivering what is actually needed most for the on-going offensive - night vision devices, de-mining backpacks, drones, but also mobile GBAD, additional SPHs, additional HIMARS, additional top-tier MBTs, ammunition. For each reasonably well-trained AFU soldier, Russia can afford to waste five disposable single-use soldiers. In the long run, this is untenable.
russia army is now a looser and russia is loosing and will be 3 rd world if not already
1. I don't think one should be too quick to see the opening phase, if one can call it that, of Ukraine's counteroffensive as a misjudgement or a failure, at least around Zaporizhzhya in the south. The minefields and tank traps and so on are one thing but there was surely also a need to test the mettle of the Russian army and its commanders given the problems the Russians have had with personnel and materiel and with command structures throughout the war. In fact, according to ISW, the Russian army responded in a "doctrinely sound manner" by allowing the Ukrainian forces to advance into the forward trench line before counterattacking and pushing them back from the rear trenches. So that was an important lesson that had to be learned and there could be no avoiding a cost in men and equipment.
2. To follow up the discussion on attritional warfare above, the ISW began to assess the revised Ukrainian approach as one of creating a positive attritional gradient (I think I have got the jargon right) seeking to minimise its own losses and maximise Russian losses. I think this is part of the "shape and starve" mentioned by the UK Chief of Defence Staff. (It is interesting to note that some of the restlessness of Russian southern commanders in the aftermath of Wagner's failed rebellion made reference, critical of the Russian MOD, to the lack of counter-battery fire available to the Russian forces. However, this sort of complaint may also have been part of generals jockeying for position as they sensed weakness in the MOD leasership). The general assessment of this phase so far, however, seems to be one of toing and froing in different places on the front line, as mentioned above, with an overall reckoning of small Ukrainian territorial gains (low 00's of sq. km) thus far in the south and on the flanks of Bakhmut.
3. ISW posts in the last 2 days indicate the Kremlin may have achieved, in the aftermath of Wagner's failure and Prigohzin's apparent reduction in influence and the arrest and detention of Igor Girkin, the most extreme of nationalist milbloggers, some degree of self-censorship in the milblogger community. Also that the Kremlin may have departed from its former "official" line (that commentators should not underplay Ukrainian or overstate Russian, achievements in the war), so as to promote now the image of the Kremlin as an effective manager of the war and Russia as on the road to success. This may make it harder to assess developments on the ground, especially when marginal, as the milbloggers have been an important part of open source information but even so it may not be effective in the face of a major Russian setback.