A Ukrainian solider mans a trench in the Donetsk Oblast (Photo by Ignacio Marin/Anadolu via Getty Images) Neil Hauer, in an assessment for War on the Rocks of how the Russo-Ukraine War has been covered, identifies a phenomenon which anyone following events closely will recognise – the tendency for narratives of either a Russian or a Ukrainian victory to grip the commentariat, only to be followed by a swing in the other direction as a breakthrough fails to materialise and the supposedly losing side turns out to be more resilient than expected:
It is truly amazing how narratives can shape opinion and views no matter how in incomplete or ill-informed they are. As you point out toward the end, there are Russian Telegram channels that are showing the disenchantment with the war and endemic corruption that goes with it. But we do not have a full picture.
And yes, we do have a more complete picture in Ukraine, but the media emphasis in the US is to find problems that only feeds the narrative that Ukraine cannot win, which is wrongheaded. It is done to sell papers and satisfy a certain political class.
What we need is to step back and fully analyze what we can see through other sources and OSINT and make reasonable inferences. Things cannot be going badly for Ukraine as they have opened Black Sea shipping lanes and have made Crimea and Sevastopol untenable for the Russian navy. All this without a formal navy! Ukraine is carrying out strikes in Russia in key infrastructure with far less “tech” than then Russians supposedly have. Where is Russian air defense? Apparently nothing compared to what Ukraine now possesses. How is it that Ukraine can take out key air assets of the RU AF?
But instead, the media only focus on maps and do not fully understand war and the role of logistics and supply, GLOC, and different command structures. Or understand that wars take time, unfortunately. The media do not understand the role of learning and adaptation and innovation in war. By these limited measures of course it looks like Russia has the upper hand, but none in the media then ask the follow up question. “With all these Russian advantages, why have they not taken and overrun Ukraine?” They just look at numbers (personnel and equipment) and assume...the numbers are less lopsided now than on February 24, 2022. Yet that never comes out in the media narrative.
Your final point about the lack of understanding in the media is particularly accurate. Two examples highlight this. The first is the sloppy language reporters use. Artillery shells are called missiles. Missiles become bombs. The cruiser 'Moskva' is a battleship. And so on. Too may reporters have little interest is precise and accurate language. That spills over into their grasp of the wider issues. The second is reporters' lack of curiosity about whether or not they are being manipulated. It's fascinating how often pro-Putin talking points from the Russian information space then, within a few days, slip into western media coverage. All the major organisation have fact-checkers, but I guess they're overworked. I don't envy them.
One trend I’ve noticed amongst some commentators is using one mistaken comment/piece of analysis as a basis for wholesale condemnation or discreditation of other analysts.
A good example of this is Phillips O’Briens attacks on Michael Kofman and Rob Lee. O’Brien makes some valid criticisms of Kofman and Lee’s pre-war predictions but in my opinion goes too far.
I’ve actually found Kofman and Lee to be amongst the more nuanced commentators on the war along with Jack Watling and others at RUSI. Indeed, I think O’Brien falls into the trap of optimism bias.
Yes I think it is a shame. We all get things wrong. I respect Phillips but Mike and Rob are very serious people - I've found them very helpful when I've tended to get too optimistic.
Belabouring pre-war predictions two years into the full-scale invasion is indeed immature.
Phillips "tanks are obsolete" O'Brien, also known as Phillips "Crimea liberated by summer" O'Brien, has long since lost my respect, just like Marcus "Russia has lost the war without knowing it" Keupp, or Ben Hodges, et al.
I very much more prefer the analyses put forth by Stefan Gady, Gustav Gressel, Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, or Konrad Muzyka, to name a few, reason being they visit Ukrainian front lines and speak with enlisted soldiers and officers to form their opinion.
Besides, I travel to Ukraine myself whenever I can, delivering aid, talking to people affiliated with the military.
I think O’Brien’s central criticism of how Russia’s military strength was assessed before the full scale invasion i.e. equipment/doctrine, which in turn led to overestimations of its strength is a fair one.
My main issue is as i said using one piece of mistaken analysis as a basis for condemning an analysts entire work/approach. It’s symptomatic of that ‘gotcha’ culture that gains attention but does little to encourage nuanced debate.
I also think O’Brien has overestimated the issues with Russian logistics, which were certainly a major issue in the opening phase of the war i.e. the attack on Kyiv, but now seem to have been largely ironed out. I also think he has underestimated the Russian will to fight which by many accounts (including Ukrainian ones) has been significant.
To me the biggest factor in Russian military performance in this war has been the command structure. That goes right from the top i.e. Putin’s initial miscalculation to invade to the tactical level i.e. flawed battle damage assessment which then leads to poor decision making.
With Biddle, Kofman, Gressel, et al. the "gloom" scenario is by far the most credible, as no breakthrough will likely be possible this year, nor the one after.
Do you think Ukraine will receive the money that was seized in connection with the sanctions imposed on Russia and if so, what effect would access to that money have on the war? Thanks.
I just returned from Ukraine. A man told me bluntly: "Money doesn't kill Russians". He's right.
Matériel production in Western nations should have been massively ramped up two years ago.
New production lines, new machines for new production lines, and new skilled employees for the new machines on the new production lines don't emerge by the flip of a switch. Two years were recklessly squandered, and Ukraine must fight with one arm and one leg tied behind its back.
It is truly amazing how narratives can shape opinion and views no matter how in incomplete or ill-informed they are. As you point out toward the end, there are Russian Telegram channels that are showing the disenchantment with the war and endemic corruption that goes with it. But we do not have a full picture.
And yes, we do have a more complete picture in Ukraine, but the media emphasis in the US is to find problems that only feeds the narrative that Ukraine cannot win, which is wrongheaded. It is done to sell papers and satisfy a certain political class.
What we need is to step back and fully analyze what we can see through other sources and OSINT and make reasonable inferences. Things cannot be going badly for Ukraine as they have opened Black Sea shipping lanes and have made Crimea and Sevastopol untenable for the Russian navy. All this without a formal navy! Ukraine is carrying out strikes in Russia in key infrastructure with far less “tech” than then Russians supposedly have. Where is Russian air defense? Apparently nothing compared to what Ukraine now possesses. How is it that Ukraine can take out key air assets of the RU AF?
But instead, the media only focus on maps and do not fully understand war and the role of logistics and supply, GLOC, and different command structures. Or understand that wars take time, unfortunately. The media do not understand the role of learning and adaptation and innovation in war. By these limited measures of course it looks like Russia has the upper hand, but none in the media then ask the follow up question. “With all these Russian advantages, why have they not taken and overrun Ukraine?” They just look at numbers (personnel and equipment) and assume...the numbers are less lopsided now than on February 24, 2022. Yet that never comes out in the media narrative.
Your final point about the lack of understanding in the media is particularly accurate. Two examples highlight this. The first is the sloppy language reporters use. Artillery shells are called missiles. Missiles become bombs. The cruiser 'Moskva' is a battleship. And so on. Too may reporters have little interest is precise and accurate language. That spills over into their grasp of the wider issues. The second is reporters' lack of curiosity about whether or not they are being manipulated. It's fascinating how often pro-Putin talking points from the Russian information space then, within a few days, slip into western media coverage. All the major organisation have fact-checkers, but I guess they're overworked. I don't envy them.
Thank you for your thoughtful analysis of a sad war with no easy answers.
One trend I’ve noticed amongst some commentators is using one mistaken comment/piece of analysis as a basis for wholesale condemnation or discreditation of other analysts.
A good example of this is Phillips O’Briens attacks on Michael Kofman and Rob Lee. O’Brien makes some valid criticisms of Kofman and Lee’s pre-war predictions but in my opinion goes too far.
I’ve actually found Kofman and Lee to be amongst the more nuanced commentators on the war along with Jack Watling and others at RUSI. Indeed, I think O’Brien falls into the trap of optimism bias.
Nuance is key.
Yes I think it is a shame. We all get things wrong. I respect Phillips but Mike and Rob are very serious people - I've found them very helpful when I've tended to get too optimistic.
Belabouring pre-war predictions two years into the full-scale invasion is indeed immature.
Phillips "tanks are obsolete" O'Brien, also known as Phillips "Crimea liberated by summer" O'Brien, has long since lost my respect, just like Marcus "Russia has lost the war without knowing it" Keupp, or Ben Hodges, et al.
I very much more prefer the analyses put forth by Stefan Gady, Gustav Gressel, Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, or Konrad Muzyka, to name a few, reason being they visit Ukrainian front lines and speak with enlisted soldiers and officers to form their opinion.
Besides, I travel to Ukraine myself whenever I can, delivering aid, talking to people affiliated with the military.
I think O’Brien’s central criticism of how Russia’s military strength was assessed before the full scale invasion i.e. equipment/doctrine, which in turn led to overestimations of its strength is a fair one.
My main issue is as i said using one piece of mistaken analysis as a basis for condemning an analysts entire work/approach. It’s symptomatic of that ‘gotcha’ culture that gains attention but does little to encourage nuanced debate.
I also think O’Brien has overestimated the issues with Russian logistics, which were certainly a major issue in the opening phase of the war i.e. the attack on Kyiv, but now seem to have been largely ironed out. I also think he has underestimated the Russian will to fight which by many accounts (including Ukrainian ones) has been significant.
To me the biggest factor in Russian military performance in this war has been the command structure. That goes right from the top i.e. Putin’s initial miscalculation to invade to the tactical level i.e. flawed battle damage assessment which then leads to poor decision making.
Stephen Biddle gets it right https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russia-stopped-ukraines-momentum?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=How%20Russia%20Stopped%20Ukraine’s%20Momentum&utm_content=20240129&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017 and once again, the original sin is exposed: Had western complacency, redlinery and incrementalism not allowed Russia to withdraw across the Dnipro more or less unchallenged, Ukraine for lack of matériel rendered incapable to use the momentum previously gained in the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives, the massively mined array of field fortifications, now infamously known as the Scholz-Biden-Line, would not have been built, and the valiant but impossible 2023 breakthrough attempt would not have been necessary.
With Biddle, Kofman, Gressel, et al. the "gloom" scenario is by far the most credible, as no breakthrough will likely be possible this year, nor the one after.
Do you think Ukraine will receive the money that was seized in connection with the sanctions imposed on Russia and if so, what effect would access to that money have on the war? Thanks.
I just returned from Ukraine. A man told me bluntly: "Money doesn't kill Russians". He's right.
Matériel production in Western nations should have been massively ramped up two years ago.
New production lines, new machines for new production lines, and new skilled employees for the new machines on the new production lines don't emerge by the flip of a switch. Two years were recklessly squandered, and Ukraine must fight with one arm and one leg tied behind its back.