‘With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment.’ General Sir Douglas Haig, Special Order of the Day, 11 April 1918
The 40,000,000 Ukrainian people deserve to pick their own government. And frankly, I don't think it is an overstatement to say that the entire era of free, self-determining nations in Europe that has existed since World War 2 is at risk. If we fail to support Ukraine, the world will revert to great nations simply dominating all others. It will be violent, nasty, poor and awful for people, for commerce, for humanity. Considerations of environmental change and human rights will disappear like tears in rain, as tanks and soldiers stream across borders to subjugate people around the world.
This is the time. These are the stakes. Ukraine is the point of the spear. They need our help, and we need their victory.
This makes grim reading. That said one wonders if the Russians will be prepared to treat the lives of its mobiliks with the same callous disregard that it did the 'convict volunteers' or the Donesk and Luhansk troops. If they do they could be setting the scene for widespread discontent when the wounded come home and start talking. One also wonders how good their 'elite' troops waiting to follow the cannon fodder will be. They will have been fighting for a long time and accumulated a lot of casualties over the last 11 months. I guess will have to see after the major Russian offensive is finished.
We can see Russia's hesitation in using regular mobilized troops in large-scale bloody fighting, likely because of the political dangers involved in mass losses of mobilized ordinary Russians.
Therefore Russia's attempts to find people - anyone really - who can fill the gaps instead: prisoners, Chechens, people from the Luhansk and Donetsk region, Afghani mercenaries. There was even talk of recruiting in Syria, though that seems not to have worked out.
And when it does come to using recruits, it seems Russia has a clear preference for far away, politically isolated regions like in Siberia or the Caucasus.
My best guess is that the Russian leadership wants to avoid, as much as possible, large-scale losses in mobilized men from the main political regions: Moscow, St Petersburg and the areas around there.
But Russia is running out of men from all these other sources. As Mr. Freedman has made clear, Luhansk and Donetsk are running on empty when it comes to men willing and able to fight. Prisoners are no longer willing to sign up for Wagner (and maybe the Russian military is ok with seeing Wagner being defanged). I suspect Kadyrov, Putin's man in Chechnya, will not want to sacrifice too many of his men in Ukraine, as he may need them in the near future for political survival. And the marginalized regions of Russia may resist another round of mobilization in which they bear the brunt. Meanwhile, young Russians will continue to weigh whether to leave the country, rather than wait and see whether they will be mobilized.
I would not be surprised if Russia is confronted with a huge manpower crisis somewhere this Summer of Fall, one that they can then only solve with another mass mobilization round, but this time more centered on the heartland. And such a mobilization could then well happen against a background of increasing unease and fear about the mounting losses in Ukraine.
How that will play out politically? I have no idea.
Putin thinks he's fighting WW2 again when in fact it's WW1. That would explain a great deal. On a separate but related note, Russian command structure and tactics seem to have persisted unchanged since the days of Tsar Nicholas.
I've seen multiple comparisons of the current situation to 1917, with the ultimate implication being that a possible solution to the current conflict could be regime change in Russia. It would be great to get a piece with this level of analysis looking specifically at those parallels. How different was the Russian national mood in 1917 vs today? What level of centralized control was the tsarist regime able to exert vs today? What were the largest factors leading to revolution in 1917, and how many of those factors are present today? If some of those factors are missing, is public sentiment volatile enough such that those factors could incubate quickly? Does modern technology on net allow for more state control or more revolutionary momentum?
It seems to me that the Russian state is considerably more insulated from regime change today than it was in 1917, so are the historical parallels simply wishful thinking? More analysis here would be interesting, and could shed some light on what has seemed to be casual historical analogies to date.
I fear that this next Russian offensive is going to resemble, in a small way, the catastrophe of 1918. Grand strategy is fine if you're planning it from Novo-Ogaryevo, but for the footsoldier, being thrown into battle with little preparation or tactical wisdom, it's all just a battle for survival, dog-eat-dog. The end result may be the same, too: revolution.
This commentary completely ignores the fact that Russia can, and will, use nuclear strikes to completely wipe out Ukraine if their losses get too high.
I found this analysis brilliant.
The 40,000,000 Ukrainian people deserve to pick their own government. And frankly, I don't think it is an overstatement to say that the entire era of free, self-determining nations in Europe that has existed since World War 2 is at risk. If we fail to support Ukraine, the world will revert to great nations simply dominating all others. It will be violent, nasty, poor and awful for people, for commerce, for humanity. Considerations of environmental change and human rights will disappear like tears in rain, as tanks and soldiers stream across borders to subjugate people around the world.
This is the time. These are the stakes. Ukraine is the point of the spear. They need our help, and we need their victory.
This makes grim reading. That said one wonders if the Russians will be prepared to treat the lives of its mobiliks with the same callous disregard that it did the 'convict volunteers' or the Donesk and Luhansk troops. If they do they could be setting the scene for widespread discontent when the wounded come home and start talking. One also wonders how good their 'elite' troops waiting to follow the cannon fodder will be. They will have been fighting for a long time and accumulated a lot of casualties over the last 11 months. I guess will have to see after the major Russian offensive is finished.
We can see Russia's hesitation in using regular mobilized troops in large-scale bloody fighting, likely because of the political dangers involved in mass losses of mobilized ordinary Russians.
Therefore Russia's attempts to find people - anyone really - who can fill the gaps instead: prisoners, Chechens, people from the Luhansk and Donetsk region, Afghani mercenaries. There was even talk of recruiting in Syria, though that seems not to have worked out.
And when it does come to using recruits, it seems Russia has a clear preference for far away, politically isolated regions like in Siberia or the Caucasus.
My best guess is that the Russian leadership wants to avoid, as much as possible, large-scale losses in mobilized men from the main political regions: Moscow, St Petersburg and the areas around there.
But Russia is running out of men from all these other sources. As Mr. Freedman has made clear, Luhansk and Donetsk are running on empty when it comes to men willing and able to fight. Prisoners are no longer willing to sign up for Wagner (and maybe the Russian military is ok with seeing Wagner being defanged). I suspect Kadyrov, Putin's man in Chechnya, will not want to sacrifice too many of his men in Ukraine, as he may need them in the near future for political survival. And the marginalized regions of Russia may resist another round of mobilization in which they bear the brunt. Meanwhile, young Russians will continue to weigh whether to leave the country, rather than wait and see whether they will be mobilized.
I would not be surprised if Russia is confronted with a huge manpower crisis somewhere this Summer of Fall, one that they can then only solve with another mass mobilization round, but this time more centered on the heartland. And such a mobilization could then well happen against a background of increasing unease and fear about the mounting losses in Ukraine.
How that will play out politically? I have no idea.
Putin thinks he's fighting WW2 again when in fact it's WW1. That would explain a great deal. On a separate but related note, Russian command structure and tactics seem to have persisted unchanged since the days of Tsar Nicholas.
extremely useful article.
thank you
Fantastic analysis.
I've seen multiple comparisons of the current situation to 1917, with the ultimate implication being that a possible solution to the current conflict could be regime change in Russia. It would be great to get a piece with this level of analysis looking specifically at those parallels. How different was the Russian national mood in 1917 vs today? What level of centralized control was the tsarist regime able to exert vs today? What were the largest factors leading to revolution in 1917, and how many of those factors are present today? If some of those factors are missing, is public sentiment volatile enough such that those factors could incubate quickly? Does modern technology on net allow for more state control or more revolutionary momentum?
It seems to me that the Russian state is considerably more insulated from regime change today than it was in 1917, so are the historical parallels simply wishful thinking? More analysis here would be interesting, and could shed some light on what has seemed to be casual historical analogies to date.
I'm currently watching "All Quiet on the Western Front" (https://www.netflix.com/title/81260280 ).
I fear that this next Russian offensive is going to resemble, in a small way, the catastrophe of 1918. Grand strategy is fine if you're planning it from Novo-Ogaryevo, but for the footsoldier, being thrown into battle with little preparation or tactical wisdom, it's all just a battle for survival, dog-eat-dog. The end result may be the same, too: revolution.
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This commentary completely ignores the fact that Russia can, and will, use nuclear strikes to completely wipe out Ukraine if their losses get too high.
Balanced and very informative.