I agree with Lawrence about the 'realists' who call for a Russian friendly peace treaty. They are not realists, they are living in a fantasy world - and not a particularly pleasant one either. Neither side is showing the slightest interest in a lasting peace treaty and I can't see the Ukrainians having any faith at all that Putin and his pals will keep their side of any bargain. A skepticism shared by just about anyone with a memory and knowledge of the track record of the Moscow regime.
We have a terrible, corrosive, habit in this era of equating rank cynicism with "realism." If a press outlet or a politician predicts a positive outcome and proves to be wrong they will forever be hammered as a fool. But the fools who reflexively predict doom can be wrong a hundred times and still their "wisdom" is valued.
Hi Lawrence, I'd be interested know how you check any optimism bias in these posts. To a lay reader they come across as incredibly balanced about the opportunities and challenges for Ukraine to win the war, but I wonder if you have specific techniques to achieve that? We're all looking for good news after all.
Its an issue. I look at some pro-Russian media to see what they are saying but its rarely very empirical. There are a number of analysts such as Michael Kofman and Jack Watling who avoid getting too carried away by the latest news and I follow them. I always try to stress that I'm not predicting and the conditional aspects of my analysis. But in the end its a cop out not to try to show how you think the war is developing - not sure its optimistic because even if Ukraine prevails that will still come at an enormous cost.
"He concluded that the ‘Ukrainians may have a window in which they can take advantage of what may turn out to be only a temporary Russian weakness.’"
One critical aspect is whether and if when the Russians mobilize. The second aspect is the ability of the Ukrainians to train and equip heavy units needed for offensive operations. The Ukrainians have more infantry, the Russians still more useful hardware and ammunition.
A too early Ukrainian offensive that is not really decisive but triggers the Russian mobilization may be counterproductive as the Russians would use the winter to fill their depleted infantry units which are essential for a successful defense, i.e. the Russians would be much better shape next year.
The alternative for the Ukrainians is to wait with an offensive until spring 2023, use the time for training and for attrition of good Russian equipment and have a larger window of opportunity in 2023, the risk here is of course that the Russians still mobilize during winter.
Personally, I would wait until 2023 with an offensive.
An offensive creates expectations, if it don't delivers because it is premature you get a more negative result than with a delayed offensive IMHO. Tricky situation.
A counter-offensive now has the added resource of not-yet-worn-out partisan/guerilla potential of the Kherson population. Waiting until next year may mean Russians will be better able to purge the local population of Ukrainian patriots. Additionally, if they go through with the sham "referendum", they will consider Kherson Russian territory de-jure, which means an attack on it might be justification for activating some points of their military doctrine as well as heighten the ressentiment that Russia will be feeling for decades to come.
"A counter-offensive now has the added resource of not-yet-worn-out partisan/guerilla potential of the Kherson population."
This resource does not matter without enough heavy weapons (and ammunition) and well trained units that actually are able to perform offensive operations in a sustainable way.
Your assumptions about the lack of heavy weapons (and ammunition) to perform _what_ _is_ _needed_ (and not what you think it has to look like) are just that — assumptions. Economical use of ammunition requires knowing where to shoot. Not-yet-purged people who can let you know these things are not a resource that "does not matter" — they are a resource that matters very much.
And that is even looking _only_ at the military side of things. Not taking into account the overall value of a not-exterminated human potential (even if we don't insert the considerations of empathy and not giving one's compatriots over to torture, suffering, disappearances, etc.) and the Kherson's oblast economic value which shouldn't be bolstering Russia — it should be bolstering Ukraine.
"Your assumptions about the lack of heavy weapons (and ammunition) to perform _what_ _is_ _needed_ (and not what you think it has to look like) are just that — assumptions. "
Look, try to understand the issue of artillery and ammunition. Then we can discuss. Information is useless if you do not have enough ammunition to hit hard, attacks which lack the reserves to translate tactical success into oprational success are of limited usefullness.
Check Perun on youtube, he gives a lot of really useful information on these topics.
You strike at the sound of the first drum (when the fighting spirit is highest). (Chinese saying; English equivalent is “strike while the iron is hot”). Men are not machines, and morale is to material as 3 is to 1.
It's quite a difficult one. Can the Ukrainians afford a counter-offensive (given the current state and the fact that it is much more manpower intensive)?
The plans to conduct a counter-offensive have been appearing in the media for the past two week or so, which would mean that should there be one, the Russians would be on high alert right now. I see Olaf's point and concur that a failed counter-offensive would be fatal, but given that the counter-offensive has been mentioned so many times, to call it off would probably be even worse, especially for the morale of the troops on the ground and the credibility in the eyes of the NATO Alliance.
Russia has as minimum to HOLD ground, that can be done with infantry supported by heavy weapons, of which still enough are in depots in acceptable quality.
Russia has severe issues with mobile warfare, again in many cases due to the lack of infantry that screens forces and controls communication lines, that in addition to quality problems of the hardware.
A Russian mobilisation now would change a lot, but would come with high political costs.
My point is that overall Russia has more artillery and ammunition but lacks infantry, and my point is that Ukraine needs well trained and equipped forces to attack and produce operational success. A premature attack that stalls too early has the opposite effect, it destroys morale.
OK, military expert, why don’t you think the UA is well-trained enough? Also, why do you think that Russia will be able to bring its superiority in artillery to bear? It’s not as if the UA is just going to let Russia supply Kherson unimpeded.
Ukraine must act as soon as is militarily possible. Taking Kherson back completely undermines the Russian narrative, puts Crimea at risk, and demonstrates to the EU/USA that their efforts are paying off and worth continuing. Also, thanks to Ukrainian irregulars inside of Kherson, the Ukrainian military does not need to engage in such an expensive operation as taking a major city usually entails. They just have to control access to Kherson and starve/exterminate the occupying Russians piecemeal with offers to take their surrender becoming more and more hard to resist. Russians cut off will know that there is no practical hope for their being relieved and so are more likely to run as the city starts to be overtaken and exit routes shrink.
Only real question is does Ukraine have the combat readiness to execute this objective. I think it's quite possible. They certainly can't afford to be cautious in these circumstances. A Russian mobilization would not be effective in light of such circumstances.
Ukrainian leaders have given end of summer as the time for a counter-offensive for months. Most people seemed to ignore these claims but this has always made the most sense considering the timeframe of their mobilization. Keep in mind that they're holding their cards close to their chest in terms of how large their army is becoming. People keep assessing their capabilities based on the beginning of the war or where they were last month. But this thing is moving.
Ukraine is a large nation, fully mobilizing, being armed with superior Western weapons.
If they're hitting the Russians in Kherson, it's because they're ready to do it. And it's a juicy target as the Russians are over-extended and their entire position on the west bank can be carved into isolated pieces by dropping the bridges across the Dneiper and across the tributaries. Russia is in deep trouble.
On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine a viable future Ukrainian state that does not include Kherson and southern Ukraine.
On the other hand, if Ukraine succeeds in retaking Kherson, that would mean a major defeat to Russia that could not be dissimulated from its population. In particular, it would mean isolation of Crimea (cutting the land connection and water resources, possibly allowing the destruction of the Crimea bridge). In such a situation, the Russian regime seems posed to try to seek salvation in escalating the conflict further. And the Russian population at large might support and expect such a reaction.
What to answer to analysts who claim that a major Russian setback in southern Ukraine will lead to further escalation of the conflict, ultimately possibly nuclear? Do you see a chance of a defeated Russia simply retreating from Ukraine, without trying to employ all of its considerable resources before? You once wrote that nuclear escalation would solve none of Russia’s problems, but it seems to me that a display of resolve could well succeed in intimidating the Western population.
Agreed, but I think this analysis and conclusions are in no way exceptional. Well stated, however. When Russia brandishes its nuclear armament, US, French and British representatives might ask how many nuclear weapons Moscow would like to receive, because the order book is taking reservations. The West has been admirably restrained about equipping Ukraine and making military adjustments of its own forces, hoping to clearly avoid any escalatory behavior. If this is unappreciated by Russia, and does not engender reciprocal behavior, behavior can change.
Hi Lawrence, if it’s in your “wheelhouse” at the moment, it would be great to get your thoughts from you on US/China/Taiwan and the Pelosi trip at some point. Thx!
The Russian Regime may very well use nuclear weapons against the Ukraine once it realises that it loses this war. The rationale being that Russia's existence is in danger or, more accurately, that Putin's henchmens' grip over Russia is in danger. So, I am not convinced, that Putin will not use his nuclear bombs as he is as unhinged as everyone's favourite black sheep Adolf Hitler.
A rationale has to be rooted in reality. Presuming that Putin is rational (and I believe he is, not unhinged; he just severely overestimated his military's abilities), you think that Putin thinks that by using nukes, he would increase his chances of survival? Please explain the logic here.
I would think, rather, that if he used nukes, folks around him would actually start to think that he is unhinged and have a strong incentive to remove him. They want to survive, after all. You think that a world where Russia nukes Ukraine would be a safer world for them?
I very much hope that there will be someone who does NOT execute / push the nuke button.
Anyway, so you think that all rhetoric in Feb22 about nuke usage was just a bit if sabre rattling?
If you listen carefully to all the propaganda coming out of Russia, then you cannot stop feeling that you have heard (read) it all before between 1933-45.
Lots of dictators bluster and threaten. I mean, just listen to Kim in NKorea. But very few of them had the capabilities Hitler had at his disposal. And it's not like Hitler had a death wish. He actually did think aggression was rational (and Putin does now). But was the solution to Hitler to back down? Appeasement and selling out Czechoslovakia was what started WWII after all. Hitler was astonished when the UK and France declared war on him over Poland, because he had learned that the West would appease him every time he threatened or invaded before. Just like Putin did, because the West had not reacted strongly enough to Putin when he invaded Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine the first time, or supported mass murder in Syria.
If you appease a dictator/bully, he will only cause even more suffering the next time. So you have to change his calculus, by making him understand that if he transgresses more, he will be hurt even worse.
Agree re. zur Appartement argument. Wishful thinking on the part of the Rußlandversteher" (understanders of Russia) as well as latent leftist predispositions / bias towards Russia (= ex-USSR) played a big part in 'misunderstanding' Putin and his fellow chip-on-the-shoulder travellers.
The deal to export Ukraine's grain will produce a sham of historic proportion: Russia will bask in UN praise for providing a corridor through its own blockade and bringing relief from Mideast/Africa famine that it alone has caused. Ukraine is desperate. It has to implement the deal even in the face of Russia's attacks. It must at the same time ask NATO to help it keep the grain flowing but under Ukraine's sovereign aegis. NATO could readily provide a peaceful but defended near-shore corridor, entirely in territorial waters, from Odesa to the Bosporus. Russia is likely incapable of interdicting it. Even trying to do so would demonstrate Russia's indifference to the threat of world famine, undercut its diplomatic line, and neuter its propaganda. Ukraine should do this no matter what else it does on the ground.
Russia can crow all it likes. Exporting grain from Ukraine has immense benefits to Ukraine and to the world. I'm expecting Russia to sink a grain ship or two in the next week or so, just to make a point. Once those ships are past Snake Island/mouth of the Danube, they should be pretty safe. And they will be escorted and monitored. You can be sure there will be GPS and satellite photography. But it's only a day's voyage from Odesa to Turkey. Of course, Russia could also interdicts grain ships in the Mediterranean, but let's cross that Rubicon later.
Ukraine may have to defend territory it takes back from the Russians. I hope Ukraine now has a way to defend Kherson it did not use at the outset of the conflict.
Thank you for the excellent article. Fully support Ukraine retaking their territory. Do you foresee any circumstances where Russia would escalate/test the west further (e.g conventionally or otherwise) if Ukrainian counteroffensive(s) are successful, which will be far from palatable for a regime built on perceived ‘strength’?
I agree with Lawrence about the 'realists' who call for a Russian friendly peace treaty. They are not realists, they are living in a fantasy world - and not a particularly pleasant one either. Neither side is showing the slightest interest in a lasting peace treaty and I can't see the Ukrainians having any faith at all that Putin and his pals will keep their side of any bargain. A skepticism shared by just about anyone with a memory and knowledge of the track record of the Moscow regime.
We have a terrible, corrosive, habit in this era of equating rank cynicism with "realism." If a press outlet or a politician predicts a positive outcome and proves to be wrong they will forever be hammered as a fool. But the fools who reflexively predict doom can be wrong a hundred times and still their "wisdom" is valued.
As I’ve said before, many IR “realists” seem completely out of touch with reality.
Hi Lawrence, I'd be interested know how you check any optimism bias in these posts. To a lay reader they come across as incredibly balanced about the opportunities and challenges for Ukraine to win the war, but I wonder if you have specific techniques to achieve that? We're all looking for good news after all.
Its an issue. I look at some pro-Russian media to see what they are saying but its rarely very empirical. There are a number of analysts such as Michael Kofman and Jack Watling who avoid getting too carried away by the latest news and I follow them. I always try to stress that I'm not predicting and the conditional aspects of my analysis. But in the end its a cop out not to try to show how you think the war is developing - not sure its optimistic because even if Ukraine prevails that will still come at an enormous cost.
Interesting, thanks for the reply. And for the substack, which is incredibly valuable.
"He concluded that the ‘Ukrainians may have a window in which they can take advantage of what may turn out to be only a temporary Russian weakness.’"
One critical aspect is whether and if when the Russians mobilize. The second aspect is the ability of the Ukrainians to train and equip heavy units needed for offensive operations. The Ukrainians have more infantry, the Russians still more useful hardware and ammunition.
A too early Ukrainian offensive that is not really decisive but triggers the Russian mobilization may be counterproductive as the Russians would use the winter to fill their depleted infantry units which are essential for a successful defense, i.e. the Russians would be much better shape next year.
The alternative for the Ukrainians is to wait with an offensive until spring 2023, use the time for training and for attrition of good Russian equipment and have a larger window of opportunity in 2023, the risk here is of course that the Russians still mobilize during winter.
Personally, I would wait until 2023 with an offensive.
I see the point but don't think the Ukrainians can wait - and it looks like the offensive is now underway.
An offensive creates expectations, if it don't delivers because it is premature you get a more negative result than with a delayed offensive IMHO. Tricky situation.
A counter-offensive now has the added resource of not-yet-worn-out partisan/guerilla potential of the Kherson population. Waiting until next year may mean Russians will be better able to purge the local population of Ukrainian patriots. Additionally, if they go through with the sham "referendum", they will consider Kherson Russian territory de-jure, which means an attack on it might be justification for activating some points of their military doctrine as well as heighten the ressentiment that Russia will be feeling for decades to come.
"A counter-offensive now has the added resource of not-yet-worn-out partisan/guerilla potential of the Kherson population."
This resource does not matter without enough heavy weapons (and ammunition) and well trained units that actually are able to perform offensive operations in a sustainable way.
Your assumptions about the lack of heavy weapons (and ammunition) to perform _what_ _is_ _needed_ (and not what you think it has to look like) are just that — assumptions. Economical use of ammunition requires knowing where to shoot. Not-yet-purged people who can let you know these things are not a resource that "does not matter" — they are a resource that matters very much.
And that is even looking _only_ at the military side of things. Not taking into account the overall value of a not-exterminated human potential (even if we don't insert the considerations of empathy and not giving one's compatriots over to torture, suffering, disappearances, etc.) and the Kherson's oblast economic value which shouldn't be bolstering Russia — it should be bolstering Ukraine.
"Your assumptions about the lack of heavy weapons (and ammunition) to perform _what_ _is_ _needed_ (and not what you think it has to look like) are just that — assumptions. "
Look, try to understand the issue of artillery and ammunition. Then we can discuss. Information is useless if you do not have enough ammunition to hit hard, attacks which lack the reserves to translate tactical success into oprational success are of limited usefullness.
Check Perun on youtube, he gives a lot of really useful information on these topics.
You strike at the sound of the first drum (when the fighting spirit is highest). (Chinese saying; English equivalent is “strike while the iron is hot”). Men are not machines, and morale is to material as 3 is to 1.
"Men are not machines, and morale is to material as 3 is to 1.."
And morale is a fickle affair. :-)
It's quite a difficult one. Can the Ukrainians afford a counter-offensive (given the current state and the fact that it is much more manpower intensive)?
The plans to conduct a counter-offensive have been appearing in the media for the past two week or so, which would mean that should there be one, the Russians would be on high alert right now. I see Olaf's point and concur that a failed counter-offensive would be fatal, but given that the counter-offensive has been mentioned so many times, to call it off would probably be even worse, especially for the morale of the troops on the ground and the credibility in the eyes of the NATO Alliance.
Russia has as minimum to HOLD ground, that can be done with infantry supported by heavy weapons, of which still enough are in depots in acceptable quality.
Russia has severe issues with mobile warfare, again in many cases due to the lack of infantry that screens forces and controls communication lines, that in addition to quality problems of the hardware.
A Russian mobilisation now would change a lot, but would come with high political costs.
So, military expert, why are you so confident that Russia has enough strength to hold ground?
My point is that overall Russia has more artillery and ammunition but lacks infantry, and my point is that Ukraine needs well trained and equipped forces to attack and produce operational success. A premature attack that stalls too early has the opposite effect, it destroys morale.
OK, military expert, why don’t you think the UA is well-trained enough? Also, why do you think that Russia will be able to bring its superiority in artillery to bear? It’s not as if the UA is just going to let Russia supply Kherson unimpeded.
Russian troops are currently overextended and exhausted, which makes morale-sapping reverses more likely to happen.
And if it results in a general mobilization, that may not be so bad. Calling up more people won't help Russia's equipment problems. And it comes with a political and economic cost for Russia that Putin has cause to worry about. See https://kyivindependent.com/hot-topic/putin-lacks-troops-in-ukraine-but-fears-mobilization-in-russia for more.
Ukraine must act as soon as is militarily possible. Taking Kherson back completely undermines the Russian narrative, puts Crimea at risk, and demonstrates to the EU/USA that their efforts are paying off and worth continuing. Also, thanks to Ukrainian irregulars inside of Kherson, the Ukrainian military does not need to engage in such an expensive operation as taking a major city usually entails. They just have to control access to Kherson and starve/exterminate the occupying Russians piecemeal with offers to take their surrender becoming more and more hard to resist. Russians cut off will know that there is no practical hope for their being relieved and so are more likely to run as the city starts to be overtaken and exit routes shrink.
Only real question is does Ukraine have the combat readiness to execute this objective. I think it's quite possible. They certainly can't afford to be cautious in these circumstances. A Russian mobilization would not be effective in light of such circumstances.
Ukrainian leaders have given end of summer as the time for a counter-offensive for months. Most people seemed to ignore these claims but this has always made the most sense considering the timeframe of their mobilization. Keep in mind that they're holding their cards close to their chest in terms of how large their army is becoming. People keep assessing their capabilities based on the beginning of the war or where they were last month. But this thing is moving.
Ukraine is a large nation, fully mobilizing, being armed with superior Western weapons.
If they're hitting the Russians in Kherson, it's because they're ready to do it. And it's a juicy target as the Russians are over-extended and their entire position on the west bank can be carved into isolated pieces by dropping the bridges across the Dneiper and across the tributaries. Russia is in deep trouble.
Thank you!
On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine a viable future Ukrainian state that does not include Kherson and southern Ukraine.
On the other hand, if Ukraine succeeds in retaking Kherson, that would mean a major defeat to Russia that could not be dissimulated from its population. In particular, it would mean isolation of Crimea (cutting the land connection and water resources, possibly allowing the destruction of the Crimea bridge). In such a situation, the Russian regime seems posed to try to seek salvation in escalating the conflict further. And the Russian population at large might support and expect such a reaction.
What to answer to analysts who claim that a major Russian setback in southern Ukraine will lead to further escalation of the conflict, ultimately possibly nuclear? Do you see a chance of a defeated Russia simply retreating from Ukraine, without trying to employ all of its considerable resources before? You once wrote that nuclear escalation would solve none of Russia’s problems, but it seems to me that a display of resolve could well succeed in intimidating the Western population.
If the West is populated by cowards and simpletons, I suppose. If not, then it’s easy for the West to see bluster for what it is.
Thank you for your deep "analysis". Respect. :-)
Agreed, but I think this analysis and conclusions are in no way exceptional. Well stated, however. When Russia brandishes its nuclear armament, US, French and British representatives might ask how many nuclear weapons Moscow would like to receive, because the order book is taking reservations. The West has been admirably restrained about equipping Ukraine and making military adjustments of its own forces, hoping to clearly avoid any escalatory behavior. If this is unappreciated by Russia, and does not engender reciprocal behavior, behavior can change.
Hi Lawrence, if it’s in your “wheelhouse” at the moment, it would be great to get your thoughts from you on US/China/Taiwan and the Pelosi trip at some point. Thx!
The Russian Regime may very well use nuclear weapons against the Ukraine once it realises that it loses this war. The rationale being that Russia's existence is in danger or, more accurately, that Putin's henchmens' grip over Russia is in danger. So, I am not convinced, that Putin will not use his nuclear bombs as he is as unhinged as everyone's favourite black sheep Adolf Hitler.
A rationale has to be rooted in reality. Presuming that Putin is rational (and I believe he is, not unhinged; he just severely overestimated his military's abilities), you think that Putin thinks that by using nukes, he would increase his chances of survival? Please explain the logic here.
I would think, rather, that if he used nukes, folks around him would actually start to think that he is unhinged and have a strong incentive to remove him. They want to survive, after all. You think that a world where Russia nukes Ukraine would be a safer world for them?
I very much hope that there will be someone who does NOT execute / push the nuke button.
Anyway, so you think that all rhetoric in Feb22 about nuke usage was just a bit if sabre rattling?
If you listen carefully to all the propaganda coming out of Russia, then you cannot stop feeling that you have heard (read) it all before between 1933-45.
Lots of dictators bluster and threaten. I mean, just listen to Kim in NKorea. But very few of them had the capabilities Hitler had at his disposal. And it's not like Hitler had a death wish. He actually did think aggression was rational (and Putin does now). But was the solution to Hitler to back down? Appeasement and selling out Czechoslovakia was what started WWII after all. Hitler was astonished when the UK and France declared war on him over Poland, because he had learned that the West would appease him every time he threatened or invaded before. Just like Putin did, because the West had not reacted strongly enough to Putin when he invaded Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine the first time, or supported mass murder in Syria.
If you appease a dictator/bully, he will only cause even more suffering the next time. So you have to change his calculus, by making him understand that if he transgresses more, he will be hurt even worse.
Agree re. zur Appartement argument. Wishful thinking on the part of the Rußlandversteher" (understanders of Russia) as well as latent leftist predispositions / bias towards Russia (= ex-USSR) played a big part in 'misunderstanding' Putin and his fellow chip-on-the-shoulder travellers.
The deal to export Ukraine's grain will produce a sham of historic proportion: Russia will bask in UN praise for providing a corridor through its own blockade and bringing relief from Mideast/Africa famine that it alone has caused. Ukraine is desperate. It has to implement the deal even in the face of Russia's attacks. It must at the same time ask NATO to help it keep the grain flowing but under Ukraine's sovereign aegis. NATO could readily provide a peaceful but defended near-shore corridor, entirely in territorial waters, from Odesa to the Bosporus. Russia is likely incapable of interdicting it. Even trying to do so would demonstrate Russia's indifference to the threat of world famine, undercut its diplomatic line, and neuter its propaganda. Ukraine should do this no matter what else it does on the ground.
Russia can crow all it likes. Exporting grain from Ukraine has immense benefits to Ukraine and to the world. I'm expecting Russia to sink a grain ship or two in the next week or so, just to make a point. Once those ships are past Snake Island/mouth of the Danube, they should be pretty safe. And they will be escorted and monitored. You can be sure there will be GPS and satellite photography. But it's only a day's voyage from Odesa to Turkey. Of course, Russia could also interdicts grain ships in the Mediterranean, but let's cross that Rubicon later.
Ukraine may have to defend territory it takes back from the Russians. I hope Ukraine now has a way to defend Kherson it did not use at the outset of the conflict.
Thank you for the excellent article. Fully support Ukraine retaking their territory. Do you foresee any circumstances where Russia would escalate/test the west further (e.g conventionally or otherwise) if Ukrainian counteroffensive(s) are successful, which will be far from palatable for a regime built on perceived ‘strength’?