Sudan: the future of war?

Bullet holes litter a mosque dome in Omdurman, Sudan. (Photo by Mudathir Hameed/picture alliance via Getty Images.)

“I have often thought that you need a … kind of layered map to understand Sudan's civil war. A surface map of political conflict, for example—the northern government versus the southern rebels; and under that a layer of religious conflict—Muslim versus Christian and pagan; and under that a map of all the sectarian divisions within those categories; and under that a layer of ethnic divisions—Arab and Arabized versus Nilotic and Equatorian—all of them containing a multitude of clan and tribal subdivisions; and under that a layer of linguistic conflicts; and under that a layer of economic divisions—the more developed north with fewer natural resources versus the poorer south with its rich mineral and fossil fuel deposits; and under that a layer of colonial divisions; and under that a layer of racial divisions related to slavery. And so on and so on until it would become clear that the war, like the country, was not one but many: a violent ecosystem capable of generating endless new things to fight about without ever shedding any of the old ones.”

-          Deborah Scroggins, Emma’s War: Love, Betrayal and Death in the Sudan

Some years ago I used this powerful quote in a book about how the Future of War has been viewed historically. Whenever this issue is addressed the tendency is to speculate about big wars between great powers yet the wars that gained prominence after the end of the Cold War were often fought within states rather than between states, and could go on causing grief for years without ever quite coming to a conclusion.

In her eloquent and poignant book, Scroggins told the story of Emma McCune, a British aid worker who went to Sudan in 1988 and died in a car crash in 1993, after marrying a militia commander in South Sudan. She used the story to explore the confused motives and mixed effects of the Western aid community as they struggled to navigate vicious multi-faceted conflicts that they barely understood. Scroggins observed the ‘salvation fantasies’ of those convinced that they were doing something worthwhile though their actions tended to perpetuate rather than ease the violence.

It was a troubling argument because it raised the awkward question of whether external assistance does much good. Then Sudan was full of outsiders trying to assist the country, seeking to sort out the country’s administration, education and health services. The problem, as The Economist noted in 2016, talking then about South Sudan, was that

‘[i]t was all carrot and no stick. With no conditions attached, the money rarely found its way to infrastructure projects and public services.

The consultants’ advice, especially when it was about boosting governance and reforming the army, was ignored. Chiefly focused on state-building, Western aid also failed to bring together estranged communities. All this left plenty of leeway for factional chiefs to whip up tensions and consolidate power, their rivalries culminating in a full-blown civil war in 2013.’

Unfortunately acknowledging the problems caused by external intervention did not mean that left alone the country would sort itself out.

It is twenty years since Scroggins published her book and violence has never really left Sudan (nor South Sudan which gained its independence in 2011). The problem is now that the external engagement is not so much inappropriate as insufficient. International attention is concentrated on the wars between Russia and Ukraine and Hamas and Israel. Sudan’s latest war, which began in April 2023, has become, as I wrote in a post last February one of the ‘forgotten wars.’ To its credit, The Economist made Sudan its cover story a few weeks ago, now highlighting the consequences not of inappropriate interference but of ‘the wider world’s utter indifference.’

Why Sudan Matters

Even before the most recent conflict broke out the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), estimated that the legacy of past conflicts and economic chaos was that some 16 million persons were then in need of lifesaving assistance. This is how a recent UN fact-finding mission describes the war’s impact:

Since the outbreak of the conflict in mid-April 2023, the violence has led to an estimated over 18,800 persons killed and 33,000 injured. A substantial number of those are civilians, who have been impacted by airstrikes, heavy artillery shelling, and ground attacks on their homes and villages. The use of explosives with wide area effects in densely populated areas, particularly in Khartoum and Darfur, has resulted in deaths, injuries, extensive destruction of homes, hospitals, schools and other critical infrastructure, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. By August 2024, 10.7 million persons were internally displaced, which includes an estimated 7.9 million persons who fled their homes since the start of the conflict, and another 2.8 million persons who were displaced in earlier conflicts. More than 2.1 million persons, including returnees, fled to neighbouring countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa has had more than its share of political upheaval and violence, and perhaps that is a reason why yet another war does not attract attention in the West. It is not being ignored by other regional powers though their role is often more about keeping the conflict going than dampening it down. Nor can indifference be excused by a lack of strategic importance. The Economist described Sudan as ‘ a chaos machine’.

’ The war sucks in malign forces from the surrounding region, then spews out instability—which unless the conflict is halted will only get worse. As the country disintegrates, it could upend regimes in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. It could become a haven for terrorists. It could send an exodus of refugees to Europe. And it could exacerbate the crisis in the Red Sea, where attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis have already contorted global shipping.

The problem is the lack of agreement on how to stop it.

War in Sudan

Sudan has a history of coups and internal violence. It has not known a lot of peace since it gained independence from the UK in 1956. The country is divided between the majority Arab and Muslim north and the poorer Christian/Animist south.  So although the current conflict began as a power struggle it has deep roots in the way that the country developed, leaving power centralised and many communities marginalised with few opportunities for civil engagement in political processes.

The dominant figure in the more recent history of the country was Omar al-Bashir who took power in 1989 and imposed a repressive Islamist regime. In 2003 he set in motion the ‘dirty war’ in Darfur, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, and lasted until a cease-fire in 2010. When in April 2019 he was ousted in a coup, promises were made about an accountable civilian government but they did not last long.

The coup was mounted by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) along with Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, generally known as ‘Hemedti’. Hemedti’ commands the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF is an outgrowth of the notorious Janjaweed militia, a mercenary group that worked for al-Bashir and was responsible for many of the deaths in Darfur. After the coup al-Burhan and Hemedti ran the country, ostensibly intending to move to national elections and a civilian leadership. They soon reverted to military rule.

In April 2023 arguments about how best to integrate the RSF into the SAF’s chain of command suddenly erupted into a full-scale civil war. The RSF sought to take control of the capital Khartoum and capture al-Bahram, with Hemedti claiming that his rival was seeking to bring al-Bashir back to power, along with the radical Islamist groups with whom he was associated. The RSF gained control of Khartoum by isolating it from the rest of Sudan but failed to capture al-Burhan at his SAF HQ.  The SAF counterattacked, retook the airport and the state TV, but then struggled to hold on to their gains. Soon Khartoum was closed to air traffic, the internet was down, the electricity grid was damaged, and international trade ground to a halt.

When I last wrote about the conflict in February, the army, backed by Egypt and possibly Iran, largely controlled the east, while the RSF, backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), controlled Khartoum and much of the west and was gaining ground against the struggling SAF. But the army mobilized more civilians and took advantage of its superior air power and drones. It looked then as if it might be close to getting back into Khartoum but the RSF managed to keep the capital. In April the RSF continued its offensive into the city of el-Fasher in Darfur. The need to defend the city left the SAF without the resources to mount its own planned offensives. Civilians were left trapped, vulnerable and hungry by the fighting. The SAF also retreated in Kordofan as the RSF attacked.

According to the Sudan War Monitor, the SAF now controls only about half of the country, adding that

‘seasonal rains have paused or limited fighting in several combat zones over the past two months. The military has used this lull in the fighting to acquire new weapons, reinforce frontlines, and train new troops. The generals believe that these measures will turn the tide.’

The generals have believed that before and been disappointed.

International Dimensions and Peace Talks

Sudan had its own arms industry as well as many arms suppliers before the current conflict broke out and so there were plenty of weapons available to keep the fighting going once it began. Since April 2023 getting more weapons has not been too challenging.  The SAF blames its setbacks on the UAE’s support for the RSF. The UAE has been setting itself up as a major international player, not always to great effect but increasingly hard to ignore. With the Saudis it intervened unsuccessfully in Yemen. It promoted its own warlord, Khalifa Haftar, in Libya. Because of its farmland and position on the Red Sea, Sudan fits into the UAE’s efforts to establish its networks across Africa . The RSF has worked for some time closely with the UAE in both its military and commercial endeavours. Now it can use its regional connections, including Libya, Chad and Ethiopia, to sustain the RSF.

Countries wary of the UAE include Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and now Iran. They have been lending support to the SAF. The Iran connection could provide a further link to other regional conflicts, as well as to Russia. Meanwhile, the US and European states are distracted by the other wars, anxious not to argue with the UAE, and generally at a loss about what they can usefully do.

In May 2023 not long after the fighting began there was a serious effort to end the violence and the abuses of human rights. Negotiations that month culminated in the Treaty of Jeddah on 20 May. This did not include a cease-fire but instead concentrated on the safe passage of civilians and prohibitions on their use as human shields, plus protection of relief workers. Once signed the fighting continued with no notable benefits to the humanitarian situation.

It took until late October 2023 before there as another attempt to bring the RSF and SAF together for talks, again in Jeddah, and again without success. They did agree to open up channels for humanitarian aid, but this effort was abandoned in early December without any progress. The East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) tried its own peace summit in early December. These made some progress but a planned meeting between Hemedti and al-Burhan did not happen.

Most recently in August there were US and Saudi brokered peace talks hosted by Switzerland. The Sudanese delegation did not turn up, despite efforts by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to get al-Burham to attend. The RSF were represented. Al-Burham complained that the invitation had gone to the SAF rather than to the government, although the SAF runs the government, but also that the UAE had been given a role in the mediation. The core problem was more basic, present in other conflicts where one side cannot accept a cease-fire that leaves the enemy in charge of a substantial chunk of its territory. For the SAF, RSF withdrawal must be a precondition of any further negotiations. Backed by the UAE, the RSF sees no need to abandon the land it now controls. Sound familiar?

The Economist proposed putting pressure on the ‘cynical outside actors fuelling the conflict’, taking away the weapons used for the killing. It argued the need for the responsible powers to ‘impose sanctions on any business or state official exploiting or enabling Sudan’s war—including those from allies such as the UAE.’ That is not going to happen. The UAE denies its role. The UK at the moment is trying to repair relations with the UAE after complaints that it did little to dampen down criticisms of the Emiratis at a Security Council meeting over which the UK presided last April.  (The saga of the UAE’s attempt to buy the Telegraph did not help). If the SAF gets even closer to Iran then Western countries will be even more reluctant to come down hard on the UAE.

Noting that only a fraction of the $4.1 billion appeal for humanitarian aid made by the UN last February has yet been met, The Economist also urged that aid must be brought in more quickly to deal with the threats of starvation and disease:

‘Lorries laden with food must pour across every possible border. Public and private funding needs to flow to Sudanese NGOs running ad hoc clinics and kitchens. Cash can be sent to the hungry directly, via mobile money, so they can buy food where there are functioning markets.’

Sadly, the humanitarian situation is not only a consequence of war it is also an instrument of war. Alex de Waal has described how the humanitarian challenges develop out of the conduct of the war. The RSF loot as they go. At the start of the war:

‘Like a swarm of human locusts, RSF militiamen rampaged through the capital, Khartoum, stripping it bare of anything that could be pillaged and resold. The force also vandalised vital infrastructure such as hospitals and schools.’

This continued with each RSF advance. The RSF has done the most to destroy the country’s farming capacity and food reserves, particularly after it took control and plundered the state of Jazirah, using any harvested cops for its own benefit. 800,000 people are now trapped in el-Fasher with aid trucks unable to reach them.

At the same time, the SAF seek to cut off food supplies to RSF-held areas in the hope that this will break its hold over the local population and even its own units. This has led the SAF to resist talk of imminent famine and resist proposals for humanitarian aid efforts because they are detrimental to its strategy. Under pressure they have opened the only port, Port Sudan, to relief supplies, while making it difficult for the food trucks to proceed. At any rate the scale of relief effort needed requires a cease-fire and for the reasons already stated that does not seem close.

In its comprehensive and grim list of war crimes perpetrated by both sides, the UN fact finders reported:

‘humiliating and degrading treatment; rape, sexual slavery and any form of indecent assault; pillage of towns or places; conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 or using them to participate actively in hostilities; intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population; and ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict.’

Because of the failure of the parties to protect civilians they were ambitious in their recommendations, proposing in effect a humanitarian intervention - ‘the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a mandate to protect civilians in Sudan.’ Though is no evident enthusiasm among neighbouring countries or elsewhere to put together a force capable of imposing order on such a violent conflict.

Although the RSF was held most culpable for the humanitarian situation the SAF controlled government rejected the report in its ‘entirety.’ It described the UN Human Rights Council which had commissioned it as a ‘political and illegal body" and the mission's recommendations as ‘a flagrant violation of their mandate.’ The next day the RSF killed 21 people and wounded more than 70 others wounded when a busy market in Sennar, a besieged city in south-eastern Sudan was shelled. The RSF has yet to comment on the UN report.

One of the most telling and depressing ‘facts’ in the UN report is that since independence in 1956, ‘more than 46 peace agreements have been signed.’ Noting how much those who fought in prior conflicts came from the poorest communities and how much their poverty was the result of ‘neglect from the centre, underdevelopment, discrimination and ecological and demographic changes,’ it identifies as a key weakness of these many past peace processes ‘the focus on ending the conflict without addressing the root causes or enforcing accountability for mass atrocities. ‘

This takes us to another familiar and difficult issue when faced with intense conflicts. They always have roots, and in many cases their roots go deep, as demonstrated by Deborah Scroggins in the opening quote on Sudan. It is of course true that root causes are likely to continue to assert themselves even if some peace can be agreed. But without a peace of some sort then it is impossible to address the structural problems that have created the conditions for such regular surges of violence. These historic and entrenched cycles of violence can lead to fatalism. Sudan risks being left in the diplomatic ‘just too difficult’ basket’, not worth the expenditure of resources and effort required to bring together parties who find that war works for them as well as peace.

Sudan and the Future of War

Sudan is a tragic case but not an unusual one. It may be more representative of future war than generally assumed. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza are searched for lessons about the future for obvious reasons. Ukraine is of enormous geopolitical significance and high-intensity wars involving the regular forces of major powers are comparatively rare. There have already been significant innovations in tactics and technology, notably but not exclusively in drone warfare. Israel’s current fights will be studied because they are sadly not at all rare and they demonstrate the human costs of wars between regular force and well-organised militias in urban settings, but also point to the possibilities for large-scale carnage if a point is reached when air defences are unable to cope with volleys of missiles.

The war in Sudan is distinguished less by its novelty as by its familiarity. It is suggestive about the future, not so much in terms of military tactics and technology, although here too drones have made their appearance, but because of the pattern of warfare revealed a bitter struggle over the control of a poor country, fuelled not only by elite rivalries and social cleavages but also by the interventions of neighbouring countries, frustrating those trying to cope with its calamitous impact and the would be mediators trying to get the parties to agree a cease-fire. This is why The Economist described Sudan as a possible ‘harbinger of future conflicts in an anarchic, multipolar world.’

It represents a type of conflict that has become far too common in sub-Saharan Africa for reasons that seem unlikely to go away. Organisations that track the incidence and deadliness of modern warfare, such as the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), regularly put Africa as the region most likely to experience war and have the wars with the greatest number of fatalities. In a 2023 report it observed that Africa was the region with the most state-based conflicts [those that are over the territory or political control of a state]  per year. Compared to 2013, the number of conflicts in Africa had nearly doubled, from 15 to 28. While the distinction is frequently made between wars between states and civil wars, the PRIO also observed that ‘over the past decade, civil conflicts have become increasingly internationalized.’ [That is, ‘one or more third-party governments are involved in the conflict through contributing or deploying combat personnel in support of the objective of either side.’]

In a 2022 study the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) used PRIO and other sources to provide an overview of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Below one can see the trends since the end of the Cold War, including the growing importance of the internationalisation of the conflicts. (This is from before the current Sudan conflict).

It is this internationalisation that provides one of the most important features of the Sudan War. While it confirms the waning influence of the great powers and the United Nations when it comes to efforts to sort out these conflicts it also shows the growing importance of regional powers, notably the UAE.

At some point one or both parties will tire of the fighting or the humanitarian situation will become so desperate and urgent that international demands for action become more incessant and serious. When that moment comes the temptation will be to deal with the immediate emergency and cobble together some fragile power-sharing agreement even though that may not last long. If the fighting can be stopped a much more sustained and focused international effort will be needed to introduce far-reaching reforms. At the moment the ‘internationalisation’ of such conflicts is seen as an aggravating factor, but it is the local powers that will be first to feel the consequences if the war is allowed to generate increasing chaos. The local powers will resist being told what to do by the North Americans and Europeans but in the end they may have to accept responsibility for a situation they have helped to create.