Lawrence, brilliant exposition. The best example of a “stalemate” in the sense it is used today may have been Korea, for which there was no treaty ever signed. That was after the initial period of big movements back and forth across the peninsula.
What western media and many policymakers fail to understand is the “long game” or as you phrased it “the long middle” and that wars in this stage especially are fought across multiple dimensions (attrition of personnel and materiel, logistics, production, resupply, training, psychological, political, economic).
We in the west have become impatient and too singularly focused on one or thing (i.e. movement on a map) and are always wanting to have simple explanations and eschew detail.
Thank you for introducing a new German word for this situation. As an economist by training with a requisite background in game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 and later John Nash among others) a good description would be the “best response” of the opponent but the best response is only really a series of bad choices so in effect it is the least bad choice and over time the least bad choice deteriorates over time. Not a pithy explanation but seems to fit.
This war has been going on since 2014, when Putin, aided by a Quisling government in Kyiv, captured Crimea, then made a peace treaty which he had no intention of ever honoring. His intent from the outset has been to take the whole of Ukraine. Later on, he took Donetsk oblast, and then last year, he made a move to take the rest of it. This time, he faced a non-Quisling government in Kyiv, and was halted. If a peace treaty with Putin were signed, it would be but a matter of time until he tried further expansionist moves, perhaps directed at Moldova/Romania, then at the Baltic states, then Poland. Since 2007, he's been closely following the prescriptions set out in Dugin's 1997 work, Foundations of Geopolitics, using the same general tactics - "It should be noted that Dugin does not focus primarily on military means as a way of achieving Russian dominance over Eurasia; rather, he advocates a fairly sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia's will. ... Dugin emphasizes that the current Russian Federation, which appeared in 1991 from under the rubble of the USSR, is not a full-fledged state, but rather "a transitional formation in the broad and dynamic global geopolitical process" (183). The new states that have come into existence in the space of the former Soviet Union also do not, with the sole exception of Armenia, possess any markings of authentic statehood (187). Instead they represent artificial, ephemeral political constructs. ... "At the basis of the geopolitical construction
of this [Eurasian] Empire," Dugin writes, "there must be placed one fundamental principle--the
principle of 'a common enemy.' A negation of Atlanticism, a repudiation of the strategic control of the United States, and the rejection of the supremacy of economic, liberal market values--this represents the common civilizational basis, the common impulse which will prepare the way for a strong political and strategic union" (216). ... One way in which Russia will be able to turn other states against Atlanticism will be an astute use of the country's raw material riches. "In the beginning stage [of the struggle against Atlanticism]," Dugin writes, "Russia can offer its potential partners in the East and West its resources as compensation for exacerbating their relations with the U.S." (276). ... Within the United States itself, there is a need for the Russian special services and their allies "to provoke all forms of instability and separatism within the borders of the United States (it is possible to make use of the political forces of Afro-American racists)" (248). "It is especially important," Dugin adds, "to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements--extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S. It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics" (367)." https://web.archive.org/web/20160607175004/https:/www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/GWASHU_DEMO_12_1/John%20Dunlop%20Aleksandr%20Dugin's%20Foundations%20of%20Geopolitics.pdf
All of these tactics have been in play since at least 2014 if not before, and it isn't just Ukraine which hangs in the balance, it is the rest of the Western liberal order as well - if Putin can take Ukraine, it will be "do not send to ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee."
I wonder why Dugin‘s work isn‘t more widely known by western leaders? I‘d heard of him and knew of his general philosophy, but your more detailed explanation is alarming. It certainly looks as if Putin is following the Dugin playbook. Makes it even more strange and worrying that the „Realist Movement“ is a thing. I wonder if the leading „Realist“ thinkers are aware of Dugin‘s geopolitical strategy and that Putin appears to be following it.
I can't imagine that John Mearshimer is unaware of this, he's an area expert and should know, and a cursory reading of it - I'm assuming Mearshimer can read Russian - compared to events since 2007, should give him good indications that his analysis is wrong. For the likes of Tucker Carlson, Colonel MacGregor, and the rest of that ilk, my bet is that they're both ignorant and uneducable. I think that people like Matthew Ehret, Gustavo Lira, and Patrick Lancaster have thrown their lot in with Putin, much as Charles Lindbergh, Father Coughlin, and Henry Ford supported Hitler, for various reasons... some ideological, some not.
Thanks for another excellent essay explaining the current state of the war. Here's hoping that Putin "is forced to make a move which leads to a worse position" in a downward spiraling zugzwang!
Chess does not allow you to increase your assets. Which is why Adam Smith took a dim view of the game. To him, you can and do increase your assets in the real world. Warfare is about increasing your assets: reputation, grabbing land, taxpayers or resources (farmland or minerals). Warfare is a famous mother of invention of new assets: paper money, new labour (slaves, conscription or women) or new weapons. Wars end when one or both sides run out of assets or when one or both sides decide the outcome is not worth the continued investment of new assets.
Very good analysis of the game metaphors. And, yes, it’s not another Vietnam.
Or another Korea.
If I can make a recommendation - here is a comprehensive demolition by Prof. Branislav Slantchev of the voguish Korean War analogy. It’s on his blog, so I figure few will see it. Lot of lessons here about how not to draw lessons from history. Warning - print is tiny.
Lawrence, brilliant exposition. The best example of a “stalemate” in the sense it is used today may have been Korea, for which there was no treaty ever signed. That was after the initial period of big movements back and forth across the peninsula.
What western media and many policymakers fail to understand is the “long game” or as you phrased it “the long middle” and that wars in this stage especially are fought across multiple dimensions (attrition of personnel and materiel, logistics, production, resupply, training, psychological, political, economic).
We in the west have become impatient and too singularly focused on one or thing (i.e. movement on a map) and are always wanting to have simple explanations and eschew detail.
Thank you for introducing a new German word for this situation. As an economist by training with a requisite background in game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 and later John Nash among others) a good description would be the “best response” of the opponent but the best response is only really a series of bad choices so in effect it is the least bad choice and over time the least bad choice deteriorates over time. Not a pithy explanation but seems to fit.
Following the Barbie review, we should all now clamour for Lawrence Freedman to review chess matches and poker games.
This war has been going on since 2014, when Putin, aided by a Quisling government in Kyiv, captured Crimea, then made a peace treaty which he had no intention of ever honoring. His intent from the outset has been to take the whole of Ukraine. Later on, he took Donetsk oblast, and then last year, he made a move to take the rest of it. This time, he faced a non-Quisling government in Kyiv, and was halted. If a peace treaty with Putin were signed, it would be but a matter of time until he tried further expansionist moves, perhaps directed at Moldova/Romania, then at the Baltic states, then Poland. Since 2007, he's been closely following the prescriptions set out in Dugin's 1997 work, Foundations of Geopolitics, using the same general tactics - "It should be noted that Dugin does not focus primarily on military means as a way of achieving Russian dominance over Eurasia; rather, he advocates a fairly sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia's will. ... Dugin emphasizes that the current Russian Federation, which appeared in 1991 from under the rubble of the USSR, is not a full-fledged state, but rather "a transitional formation in the broad and dynamic global geopolitical process" (183). The new states that have come into existence in the space of the former Soviet Union also do not, with the sole exception of Armenia, possess any markings of authentic statehood (187). Instead they represent artificial, ephemeral political constructs. ... "At the basis of the geopolitical construction
of this [Eurasian] Empire," Dugin writes, "there must be placed one fundamental principle--the
principle of 'a common enemy.' A negation of Atlanticism, a repudiation of the strategic control of the United States, and the rejection of the supremacy of economic, liberal market values--this represents the common civilizational basis, the common impulse which will prepare the way for a strong political and strategic union" (216). ... One way in which Russia will be able to turn other states against Atlanticism will be an astute use of the country's raw material riches. "In the beginning stage [of the struggle against Atlanticism]," Dugin writes, "Russia can offer its potential partners in the East and West its resources as compensation for exacerbating their relations with the U.S." (276). ... Within the United States itself, there is a need for the Russian special services and their allies "to provoke all forms of instability and separatism within the borders of the United States (it is possible to make use of the political forces of Afro-American racists)" (248). "It is especially important," Dugin adds, "to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements--extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S. It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics" (367)." https://web.archive.org/web/20160607175004/https:/www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/GWASHU_DEMO_12_1/John%20Dunlop%20Aleksandr%20Dugin's%20Foundations%20of%20Geopolitics.pdf
All of these tactics have been in play since at least 2014 if not before, and it isn't just Ukraine which hangs in the balance, it is the rest of the Western liberal order as well - if Putin can take Ukraine, it will be "do not send to ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee."
I wonder why Dugin‘s work isn‘t more widely known by western leaders? I‘d heard of him and knew of his general philosophy, but your more detailed explanation is alarming. It certainly looks as if Putin is following the Dugin playbook. Makes it even more strange and worrying that the „Realist Movement“ is a thing. I wonder if the leading „Realist“ thinkers are aware of Dugin‘s geopolitical strategy and that Putin appears to be following it.
I can't imagine that John Mearshimer is unaware of this, he's an area expert and should know, and a cursory reading of it - I'm assuming Mearshimer can read Russian - compared to events since 2007, should give him good indications that his analysis is wrong. For the likes of Tucker Carlson, Colonel MacGregor, and the rest of that ilk, my bet is that they're both ignorant and uneducable. I think that people like Matthew Ehret, Gustavo Lira, and Patrick Lancaster have thrown their lot in with Putin, much as Charles Lindbergh, Father Coughlin, and Henry Ford supported Hitler, for various reasons... some ideological, some not.
And we talk about the power of the media today. The Cronkite / LBJ story puts that into perspective.
I agree with you totally on Ukraine. But “double down” comes from blackjack, not poker! 😂
Zugzwang blues, he's got 'em real bad / Worst dang blues Putin ever had
A brilliant piece! I hope it is being circulated as widely as possible amongst decision makers on by sides of the Atlantic.
Thanks for another excellent essay explaining the current state of the war. Here's hoping that Putin "is forced to make a move which leads to a worse position" in a downward spiraling zugzwang!
Chess does not allow you to increase your assets. Which is why Adam Smith took a dim view of the game. To him, you can and do increase your assets in the real world. Warfare is about increasing your assets: reputation, grabbing land, taxpayers or resources (farmland or minerals). Warfare is a famous mother of invention of new assets: paper money, new labour (slaves, conscription or women) or new weapons. Wars end when one or both sides run out of assets or when one or both sides decide the outcome is not worth the continued investment of new assets.
Very good analysis of the game metaphors. And, yes, it’s not another Vietnam.
Or another Korea.
If I can make a recommendation - here is a comprehensive demolition by Prof. Branislav Slantchev of the voguish Korean War analogy. It’s on his blog, so I figure few will see it. Lot of lessons here about how not to draw lessons from history. Warning - print is tiny.
https://slantchev.wordpress.com/2023/09/03/some-notes-on-the-korean-war-scenario/
Thank you very much for this piece Professor Freedman. I enjoyed reading it so much!