Sam has already published his annual self-assessment and this is mine. Although I have written about the Gaza War, and will return to that early in the new year, this piece focuses on the Russo-Ukraine War. This is not only because of the amount I wrote on the topic but also because the question of the expectations surrounding this war has become an issue in itself. Has an optimism bias pervaded the commentariat? Did pro-Ukrainian sympathies lead to playing down Russia’s inherent strengths and failing to appreciate Ukraine’s vulnerabilities?
The original sins of 2022 were the West allowing Russia to withdraw over 20,000 quality troops and over 2,000 pieces of matériel across the Dnipro unchallenged and then allowing Surovikin to build the Scholz-Biden line of massively mined field fortifications from October onwards, with even us humble civilians looking at ever new satellite images, week by week, month by month, in bewilderment. Then, Russia was also allowed to destroy the Kakhovka dam unchallenged, severely crippling Ukrainian industry and agriculture in the south for years to come.
"What struck me in a quick post-mortem was the passivity of the population." Now that is surprising, with Muscovy/Russia looking back on approximately 800 years of slave mentality, nihilism and fatalism. Western thinking did and does not apply.
Jack Watling has Russia's shell-firing ratio 10,000 : 2,000 for Ukraine. In war, without production, everything is nothing. Yet politicians seem utterly incapable to understand what's known as the critical path in any endeavour. When the Kiel Institute showed that the already lackluster Western matériel deliveries basically came to a halt in March 2023, it became obvious that the West prefers to throw Ukraine under the bus to Minsk III and subsequent annihilation. Maybe a rest-Ukraine, a Republic of Lviv, will be all that is left, something the mollycoddled West can then lovingly care for humanitarily.
Excuse my sarcasm, but the West's angst ridden incrementalism and dithering, rewarding Putin once again (after Georgia, Ukraine I, Syria and now Ukraine II), is almost impossible to bear.
I remain an optimist and have been from the start. If the USA can't defeat the Vietcong and North Vietnam, Soviet Union cut and run from Afghanistan (no surprises there). If Russia, essentially a gangster state, can survive the harrying of their forces, I will be amazed. Power is represented by far more than the number of troops and weaponry that the state can muster as other commentators have said many times in describing this war.
It's a tremendous pleasure to read this article, like all your others. Thank you. One thing which strikes me in all of this is that since we have so little knowledge of Putin's political strength or weakness within Russia, it's perfectly possible that he is unassailable. He may not simply have weathered the Prigozhin episode, but instead let the latter's rivals do the obvious. In that way, rather than representing a challenge, the whole course of events might simply have represented the status quo. I do worry that much of the reportage talks of Putin, rather than Russia, as if we can take for granted that Putin is somehow out on a limb. The wider media reportage, too, often suffers from an unhelpful one-sidedness which hampers understanding. I simply don't think sources like the Guardian, New York Times, CNN et al can be trusted to give a decent analysis; they seem too invested in the outcome they'd like to see. It seems plausible, too, that Russia/Putin will be prepared to at least threaten the use of tactical nuclear warheads if wholesale defeat seems possible; particularly in respect of Crimea. I am not convinced that the West wants politicians from border and Scandinavian states to lead us into that scenario. And while I do not doubt your wisdom on the 'stalemate' point, I am increasingly moving towards the view that the Ukrainian people will not tolerate the sacrifice for much longer. A frozen conflict might be the most realistic prospect, with lines drawn along present statuses, hostilities mainly stopped and possible Ukrainian membership of Western institutions dependent on accepting a de facto partition.
Your interpretation of Sergei Karaganov’s piece is scary, still. The final victory flees against the horizon. It will be a long and vain battle for Russia.
“.. but did much happen that would surprise a regular reader of these posts” — shouldn’t that be “.. but not much did happen that would surprise a regular reader of these posts.”?
I disagree on one point - your “stalemate v deadlock” has gained some traction in recent weeks. I have seen several references to the term in preference to ‘stalemate’. There does seem to a general recalibration of strategy as well in some other commentaries. Revolving around 2024 being a time to frustrate the Kremlin while Ukr builds strength and capability. By 2025 Putin is not going to be in a good place (l make no presumption about a Trump win or what he would do with it - all very unclear), unless he wins decisively or gets a pretty good deal close to his maximalist aims. Since that is my view of what strategy should look like, l have inherent bias for looking to see if that approach is indeed the one under discussion by the influencers and decision makers. I discern that is getting some bandwidth in the influencers. We shall see if it can carry into the decision making political arena.
Good to see a sober review, much appreciated.
The original sins of 2022 were the West allowing Russia to withdraw over 20,000 quality troops and over 2,000 pieces of matériel across the Dnipro unchallenged and then allowing Surovikin to build the Scholz-Biden line of massively mined field fortifications from October onwards, with even us humble civilians looking at ever new satellite images, week by week, month by month, in bewilderment. Then, Russia was also allowed to destroy the Kakhovka dam unchallenged, severely crippling Ukrainian industry and agriculture in the south for years to come.
"What struck me in a quick post-mortem was the passivity of the population." Now that is surprising, with Muscovy/Russia looking back on approximately 800 years of slave mentality, nihilism and fatalism. Western thinking did and does not apply.
Jack Watling has Russia's shell-firing ratio 10,000 : 2,000 for Ukraine. In war, without production, everything is nothing. Yet politicians seem utterly incapable to understand what's known as the critical path in any endeavour. When the Kiel Institute showed that the already lackluster Western matériel deliveries basically came to a halt in March 2023, it became obvious that the West prefers to throw Ukraine under the bus to Minsk III and subsequent annihilation. Maybe a rest-Ukraine, a Republic of Lviv, will be all that is left, something the mollycoddled West can then lovingly care for humanitarily.
Excuse my sarcasm, but the West's angst ridden incrementalism and dithering, rewarding Putin once again (after Georgia, Ukraine I, Syria and now Ukraine II), is almost impossible to bear.
I remain an optimist and have been from the start. If the USA can't defeat the Vietcong and North Vietnam, Soviet Union cut and run from Afghanistan (no surprises there). If Russia, essentially a gangster state, can survive the harrying of their forces, I will be amazed. Power is represented by far more than the number of troops and weaponry that the state can muster as other commentators have said many times in describing this war.
At 71, Putin is already well past average life expectancy for a Russian man.
Do despots like him ever have a clear personal goal in their later years?
If so, what might Putin's be?
It's hard to believe he likes the idea of going to his grave still scrabbling for bits of charred wasteland in Donetsk.
It's a tremendous pleasure to read this article, like all your others. Thank you. One thing which strikes me in all of this is that since we have so little knowledge of Putin's political strength or weakness within Russia, it's perfectly possible that he is unassailable. He may not simply have weathered the Prigozhin episode, but instead let the latter's rivals do the obvious. In that way, rather than representing a challenge, the whole course of events might simply have represented the status quo. I do worry that much of the reportage talks of Putin, rather than Russia, as if we can take for granted that Putin is somehow out on a limb. The wider media reportage, too, often suffers from an unhelpful one-sidedness which hampers understanding. I simply don't think sources like the Guardian, New York Times, CNN et al can be trusted to give a decent analysis; they seem too invested in the outcome they'd like to see. It seems plausible, too, that Russia/Putin will be prepared to at least threaten the use of tactical nuclear warheads if wholesale defeat seems possible; particularly in respect of Crimea. I am not convinced that the West wants politicians from border and Scandinavian states to lead us into that scenario. And while I do not doubt your wisdom on the 'stalemate' point, I am increasingly moving towards the view that the Ukrainian people will not tolerate the sacrifice for much longer. A frozen conflict might be the most realistic prospect, with lines drawn along present statuses, hostilities mainly stopped and possible Ukrainian membership of Western institutions dependent on accepting a de facto partition.
Your interpretation of Sergei Karaganov’s piece is scary, still. The final victory flees against the horizon. It will be a long and vain battle for Russia.
“.. but did much happen that would surprise a regular reader of these posts” — shouldn’t that be “.. but not much did happen that would surprise a regular reader of these posts.”?
I disagree on one point - your “stalemate v deadlock” has gained some traction in recent weeks. I have seen several references to the term in preference to ‘stalemate’. There does seem to a general recalibration of strategy as well in some other commentaries. Revolving around 2024 being a time to frustrate the Kremlin while Ukr builds strength and capability. By 2025 Putin is not going to be in a good place (l make no presumption about a Trump win or what he would do with it - all very unclear), unless he wins decisively or gets a pretty good deal close to his maximalist aims. Since that is my view of what strategy should look like, l have inherent bias for looking to see if that approach is indeed the one under discussion by the influencers and decision makers. I discern that is getting some bandwidth in the influencers. We shall see if it can carry into the decision making political arena.