A collection of essays, edited by Hal Brands, and published by Johns Hopkins University press, marks the two year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
I worry about Russia’s increasing use of strategic air power in the war and the effect this could have.
A combination of Ukraine running low on air defence interceptors and increasing use of glide bombs by Russia is already having an impact.
If this worsens and the Russian Air Force are able to begin bombing freely from medium altitude in some areas this could become strategically significant.
Were Putin to be able to carve out anything approaching a ‘victory’ in Ukraine (which the above would assist with) I think he will be emboldened and his appetite for risk will go up accordingly.
All a major concern, Ben. But the front lines have really hardly moved and Russia has no answer to Ukrainian attacks on the Black Sea fleet and oil refineries, and now just recently a major defense manufacturing facility in the Urals. Putin is all in on Ukraine and has left himself totally exposed beyond that. Using a poker analogy he is holding at best a pair of deuces, and going all in hoping nobody calls his bluff…too late.
You’re right Paul the lines have hardly moved, however, I would argue this is due to a number of variables:
1) Availability of air defence interceptors
2) Manpower levels
3) Provision of artillery ammunition
4) Extent of defensive fortifications
Whilst the strikes on Russian infrastructure and the Black Sea Fleet are significant this remains primarily a land war. I think part of the problem is people in the West, most notably policymakers, not grasping the urgency of the current situation and in some cases perceiving there to be an effective ‘stalemate’ on the front lines.
If the variables I have listed change not in Ukraine’s favour (which it appears at the moment for at least three of them is the case) then sadly I think there could be an operational breakthrough at some stage by Russia and we could see those lines change quite quickly.
I cannot disagree with your concerns, Ben. In the end, it is about control of land within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders, and thus in the end it is a land war. And yes, if things do not change in Ukraine’s favor on the four items you cite, a “breakthrough” is possible. But with the rapid detection to destruction time, and the use of FPV in place of arty, Ukraine is making the most of what they have and thus making up for the other deficiencies that are increasingly glaring.
Still, I am of the opinion that the campaign against Russian logistics and key industrial sites and the Black Sea fleet, is a key to ultimately winning the land war. In this respect, Ukraine is setting the stage for retaking their land and is quite successful to this point.
The key event will be whether Mike Johnson will allow a vote in the house to fund more arms to Ukraine. In the end, that is the lynchpin. The longer it is delayed, the more likely your concerns come to fruition.
Excellent piece Lawrence! Great analogy between Stalin not heeding warnings about an imminent German attack and Putin today. Although, if reports are accurate, there was another planned attack foiled by ISIS several days before Crocus City Hall.
Excellent analysis and insight, but is this only about Putin? Suppose he passed away tomorrow? Would much change? I wonder whether the factors that led to the invasion of Ukraine were more systemic and objective factors, which also cohered with Putin's personal "vision" of what "had to be done" there. Is there not some risk in personalizing the etiology of political events that we may be missing something important?
Thank you against for shining a light on the strategies and politics.
As a follower of other substacks that write almost exclusively about the more technical aspects of the fighting and materiel- I find it worrying that the sophistication of NATO doesn’t seem to have answers to the air campaign being waged by Russia. In particular the range capabilities of air launched missiles etc seems to be beyond the range of US interceptors, even if they were being used which so far they haven’t been. What does amaze impress me is the Ukraine ability to quickly devise alternative strategies and tactics. Defending your homeland makes a big difference.
I would also quibble with Kathleen Webber’s view on the time taken for the Chinese and Vietnamese to win their wars. These were civil wars essentially. Ukraine may have been part of the Soviet Union but is now very much its own country.
Fanatic, and also psychopath (defined by Merriam Webster as egocentric, antisocial, lacking remorse and empathy for others and often with criminal tendencies: Putin ticks each box).
If Putin fell under a bus tomorrow and was succeeded by one of his close associates, what would change? Not the system of internal control (that will need a generational change of leadership); but a different autocrat (perhaps in a more collective leadership group) would have the option of doing a cost/benefit analysis of the war, blaming it on Putin, and seeking to extricate Russia. If he could do that without surrendering Crimea, it would be a popular decision. Not a certainty, but a possibility. But, alas, is there a bus that would dare to run over Putin?
I disagree a bit with that. In my view Putin is sociopathic. He has considerable empathic skills, ‘he can read a room’ as they say. Like an actor he (generally) responds to each situation and delivers the appropriate response, meeting audience needs while getting his messages across. He cares for no one outside a chosen group, the rest of humanity is merely background. All classic sociopath traits. Many Apex leaders in business and politics have to varying degrees the same traits. Unshackled by any controls, accountability or feedback he is very dangerous. He is likely to get worse. In short a highly skilled political leader with untrammelled power and no moral compass. Lawrence is also adding to that trait list and that makes me very uncomfortable.
Of course, Putin hoped that he would be in Kiev in three days. He was not the only one who thought he would be.
But now that his first aspiration has been frustrated, this is only a reason for a manly man to continue undaunted. It took the Chinese Communist Party three decades to gain control in China, and it took the Vietnamese Communist Party even more decades to gain control of all of Vietnam. This kind of level of persistence is regarded in some circles as heroic rather than fanatic.
Putin wants to get onto the Mount Rushmore of Russian history alongside Ivan, Peter, and Catherine. Moderation doesn't get you there. He wants to bend the arc of history dramatically in Russia.
Frankly, the deaths don't bother him at all. Christianity, which I personally embrace, does have a concept of martyrdom and crusading that Putin invokes to justify any number of deaths. He also makes sure that most of the cannon fodder are drawn from non-Russians whom nobody gives a damn about anyway.
Also, I think Putin has some rational reasons to think that he can win in the VERY long run. Below is a comment I wrote in reaction to the Ukrainian bombing of the Shaheed Missile Factory.
"Recently, Putin thought Ukraine War was tipping in his direction—Western support was weakening, and he would win if he simply continued his present course. Indeed, Putin recently said, “Why shouldn't I negotiate when I'm winning?”
BUT if Ukraine can keep up successful attacks on industrial war production, Putin may have to recalculate.
But I do not think that this would lead to a nuclear escalation. Putin uses nuclear saber rattling to keep Western support for Ukraine muted. There is incontrovertible evidence that XI has told Putin he must not use nukes. This is what the China expert Graham Allison recently said on the subject.
Allison: "So, was it a real serious threat when Putin began talking about conducting tactical nuclear weapon strikes on Ukraine back in October, November 2022 after the invasion? But then, once installed, the American intelligence community concluded the chance was about fifty-fifty. So, there's about a 50% chance that Putin would have conducted nuclear strikes. The Chinese intelligence community, I don't know what they could have put it. But in any case, they thought about this in a collaborative action between both the U.S. and China. Xi Jinping then issued a public warning saying, "We oppose any threat or use of nuclear weapons". And before he made such a public statement - this was when Chancellor Scholz was [in China] in November of 2022. [Xi] obviously called Putin, with whom he has a very close relationship, and said, I've thought about this; I think this is not a good idea, not a good idea for China."
I agree. I don't think he will use nukes. I'm not sure that Allison is bets judge on this issue however. He told me definitely in May 2022 that Putin was bound to use nukes.
Since the full-scale invasion, Allison has spoken and written regularly on the risk of nuclear escalation in Ukraine often seeking to extract lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Personally, I think he fails to sufficiently acknowledge the historical specificity of the current crisis, not least the differences between Khrushchev and Putin. Most importantly, the former was looking for an off-ramp the latter is not.
As you can see from the comment I quoted, Allison believed in 2020 that the US evaluation was a 50/50 probability for Putin using tactical nukes.
His recent thinking about China has evolved quite a bit from 2022. Primarily due to weakening Chinese economics, I think he sees them as much less geopolitically and militarily ambitious, but they are doubtless working on weapons development as fast as they can. The emphasis now is on rebuilding the economy which is in serious disarray.
Actually your (excellent) piece showed a clear obsessive character, a disregard for (unintended) outcomes and doubling down with each failure. In the face of further strategic failure, which might become clear if Ukr survives 2024, what else is left? Like a losing gambler, he may go all in and undertake a performative nuclear act. Furthermore l suspect that US policy advisors are deliberately following a cautious path of escalation management because they fear Putin becoming trapped in his own psychosis. The closer we get to the end game the more dangerous this will get methinks.
Is there a point where an authoritarian like him would use them? For example, should it look like the Ukrainians are about to kick Russia out of Zaporizhia and Kherson might not Putin's cognitive dissonance be shattered and he'd switch from 'I'm winning the war' to 'time to stop losing the war before my strongman image is undermined'?
I was somewhat surprised that Russia would let the world see how they had treated their first suspects. They definitely were tortured and beat up. I think one of them was unconscious and on a gurney.
I worry about Russia’s increasing use of strategic air power in the war and the effect this could have.
A combination of Ukraine running low on air defence interceptors and increasing use of glide bombs by Russia is already having an impact.
If this worsens and the Russian Air Force are able to begin bombing freely from medium altitude in some areas this could become strategically significant.
Were Putin to be able to carve out anything approaching a ‘victory’ in Ukraine (which the above would assist with) I think he will be emboldened and his appetite for risk will go up accordingly.
So much depends upon the resumption of US aid and the actions of Speaker 'Hasten the Rapture' Johnson.
I agree Martin. Whilst Europe should be capable of filling the gap sadly I don’t think that is the case at present.
All a major concern, Ben. But the front lines have really hardly moved and Russia has no answer to Ukrainian attacks on the Black Sea fleet and oil refineries, and now just recently a major defense manufacturing facility in the Urals. Putin is all in on Ukraine and has left himself totally exposed beyond that. Using a poker analogy he is holding at best a pair of deuces, and going all in hoping nobody calls his bluff…too late.
You’re right Paul the lines have hardly moved, however, I would argue this is due to a number of variables:
1) Availability of air defence interceptors
2) Manpower levels
3) Provision of artillery ammunition
4) Extent of defensive fortifications
Whilst the strikes on Russian infrastructure and the Black Sea Fleet are significant this remains primarily a land war. I think part of the problem is people in the West, most notably policymakers, not grasping the urgency of the current situation and in some cases perceiving there to be an effective ‘stalemate’ on the front lines.
If the variables I have listed change not in Ukraine’s favour (which it appears at the moment for at least three of them is the case) then sadly I think there could be an operational breakthrough at some stage by Russia and we could see those lines change quite quickly.
I cannot disagree with your concerns, Ben. In the end, it is about control of land within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders, and thus in the end it is a land war. And yes, if things do not change in Ukraine’s favor on the four items you cite, a “breakthrough” is possible. But with the rapid detection to destruction time, and the use of FPV in place of arty, Ukraine is making the most of what they have and thus making up for the other deficiencies that are increasingly glaring.
Still, I am of the opinion that the campaign against Russian logistics and key industrial sites and the Black Sea fleet, is a key to ultimately winning the land war. In this respect, Ukraine is setting the stage for retaking their land and is quite successful to this point.
The key event will be whether Mike Johnson will allow a vote in the house to fund more arms to Ukraine. In the end, that is the lynchpin. The longer it is delayed, the more likely your concerns come to fruition.
A sobering read…
https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-great-risk-front-line-collapse-war-russia/
Sobering indeed. Now I need a drink (pun intended) after reading this piece. Thanks for pointing this out, Ben.
Excellent piece Lawrence! Great analogy between Stalin not heeding warnings about an imminent German attack and Putin today. Although, if reports are accurate, there was another planned attack foiled by ISIS several days before Crocus City Hall.
Thanks. I think they were jumpy before Presidential election and so on guard. Guard slipped after 17 March.
Good point.
Excellent analysis and insight, but is this only about Putin? Suppose he passed away tomorrow? Would much change? I wonder whether the factors that led to the invasion of Ukraine were more systemic and objective factors, which also cohered with Putin's personal "vision" of what "had to be done" there. Is there not some risk in personalizing the etiology of political events that we may be missing something important?
Thank you against for shining a light on the strategies and politics.
As a follower of other substacks that write almost exclusively about the more technical aspects of the fighting and materiel- I find it worrying that the sophistication of NATO doesn’t seem to have answers to the air campaign being waged by Russia. In particular the range capabilities of air launched missiles etc seems to be beyond the range of US interceptors, even if they were being used which so far they haven’t been. What does amaze impress me is the Ukraine ability to quickly devise alternative strategies and tactics. Defending your homeland makes a big difference.
I would also quibble with Kathleen Webber’s view on the time taken for the Chinese and Vietnamese to win their wars. These were civil wars essentially. Ukraine may have been part of the Soviet Union but is now very much its own country.
Fanatic, and also psychopath (defined by Merriam Webster as egocentric, antisocial, lacking remorse and empathy for others and often with criminal tendencies: Putin ticks each box).
If Putin fell under a bus tomorrow and was succeeded by one of his close associates, what would change? Not the system of internal control (that will need a generational change of leadership); but a different autocrat (perhaps in a more collective leadership group) would have the option of doing a cost/benefit analysis of the war, blaming it on Putin, and seeking to extricate Russia. If he could do that without surrendering Crimea, it would be a popular decision. Not a certainty, but a possibility. But, alas, is there a bus that would dare to run over Putin?
I disagree a bit with that. In my view Putin is sociopathic. He has considerable empathic skills, ‘he can read a room’ as they say. Like an actor he (generally) responds to each situation and delivers the appropriate response, meeting audience needs while getting his messages across. He cares for no one outside a chosen group, the rest of humanity is merely background. All classic sociopath traits. Many Apex leaders in business and politics have to varying degrees the same traits. Unshackled by any controls, accountability or feedback he is very dangerous. He is likely to get worse. In short a highly skilled political leader with untrammelled power and no moral compass. Lawrence is also adding to that trait list and that makes me very uncomfortable.
Of course, Putin hoped that he would be in Kiev in three days. He was not the only one who thought he would be.
But now that his first aspiration has been frustrated, this is only a reason for a manly man to continue undaunted. It took the Chinese Communist Party three decades to gain control in China, and it took the Vietnamese Communist Party even more decades to gain control of all of Vietnam. This kind of level of persistence is regarded in some circles as heroic rather than fanatic.
Putin wants to get onto the Mount Rushmore of Russian history alongside Ivan, Peter, and Catherine. Moderation doesn't get you there. He wants to bend the arc of history dramatically in Russia.
Frankly, the deaths don't bother him at all. Christianity, which I personally embrace, does have a concept of martyrdom and crusading that Putin invokes to justify any number of deaths. He also makes sure that most of the cannon fodder are drawn from non-Russians whom nobody gives a damn about anyway.
Also, I think Putin has some rational reasons to think that he can win in the VERY long run. Below is a comment I wrote in reaction to the Ukrainian bombing of the Shaheed Missile Factory.
"Recently, Putin thought Ukraine War was tipping in his direction—Western support was weakening, and he would win if he simply continued his present course. Indeed, Putin recently said, “Why shouldn't I negotiate when I'm winning?”
BUT if Ukraine can keep up successful attacks on industrial war production, Putin may have to recalculate.
But I do not think that this would lead to a nuclear escalation. Putin uses nuclear saber rattling to keep Western support for Ukraine muted. There is incontrovertible evidence that XI has told Putin he must not use nukes. This is what the China expert Graham Allison recently said on the subject.
Allison: "So, was it a real serious threat when Putin began talking about conducting tactical nuclear weapon strikes on Ukraine back in October, November 2022 after the invasion? But then, once installed, the American intelligence community concluded the chance was about fifty-fifty. So, there's about a 50% chance that Putin would have conducted nuclear strikes. The Chinese intelligence community, I don't know what they could have put it. But in any case, they thought about this in a collaborative action between both the U.S. and China. Xi Jinping then issued a public warning saying, "We oppose any threat or use of nuclear weapons". And before he made such a public statement - this was when Chancellor Scholz was [in China] in November of 2022. [Xi] obviously called Putin, with whom he has a very close relationship, and said, I've thought about this; I think this is not a good idea, not a good idea for China."
https://ccgupdate.substack.com/p/henry-huiyao-wang-and-graham-allison
This does not mean, of course, that Putin won't come up with further non-nuclear escalations within the borders of Ukraine.
I agree. I don't think he will use nukes. I'm not sure that Allison is bets judge on this issue however. He told me definitely in May 2022 that Putin was bound to use nukes.
Since the full-scale invasion, Allison has spoken and written regularly on the risk of nuclear escalation in Ukraine often seeking to extract lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Personally, I think he fails to sufficiently acknowledge the historical specificity of the current crisis, not least the differences between Khrushchev and Putin. Most importantly, the former was looking for an off-ramp the latter is not.
As you can see from the comment I quoted, Allison believed in 2020 that the US evaluation was a 50/50 probability for Putin using tactical nukes.
His recent thinking about China has evolved quite a bit from 2022. Primarily due to weakening Chinese economics, I think he sees them as much less geopolitically and militarily ambitious, but they are doubtless working on weapons development as fast as they can. The emphasis now is on rebuilding the economy which is in serious disarray.
Actually your (excellent) piece showed a clear obsessive character, a disregard for (unintended) outcomes and doubling down with each failure. In the face of further strategic failure, which might become clear if Ukr survives 2024, what else is left? Like a losing gambler, he may go all in and undertake a performative nuclear act. Furthermore l suspect that US policy advisors are deliberately following a cautious path of escalation management because they fear Putin becoming trapped in his own psychosis. The closer we get to the end game the more dangerous this will get methinks.
Is there a point where an authoritarian like him would use them? For example, should it look like the Ukrainians are about to kick Russia out of Zaporizhia and Kherson might not Putin's cognitive dissonance be shattered and he'd switch from 'I'm winning the war' to 'time to stop losing the war before my strongman image is undermined'?
I was somewhat surprised that Russia would let the world see how they had treated their first suspects. They definitely were tortured and beat up. I think one of them was unconscious and on a gurney.
It's part and parcel of Putin's declaration of how non-Western he intends to be. He wants to normalize this as the proper way to treat the enemy.