The leaders of NATO and member countries get ready for the official photo at the March 24th summit in Brussels (Photo by JOHN THYS/AFP via Getty Images)
Thank you for these posts, which continue to shed welcome light on the geopolitical and military ins and outs of a complex and evolving situation.
A question: is it possible that Russia's humiliation on the battlefield could prompt Putin and his cadre to invest money and effort in revitalising the country's armed forces, so that NATO could in fact be left facing the prospect of a strengthened Russian military in the medium term?
"is it possible that Russia's humiliation on the battlefield could prompt Putin and his cadre to invest money and effort in revitalising the country's armed forces, so that NATO could in fact be left facing the prospect of a strengthened Russian military in the medium term?"
With a shrinking economy it will be hard for Putin even to maintain previous level in absolute numbers. An substantial increase looks very unlikely.
However, the more interesting question is whether the issues of the Russian army can be solved by more spending. If the Russian "military culture" is the issue a change will take very long.
I think the importance of a 'shrinking economy' is under-played. Russia is losing most of it's best troops and equipment and will soon have to re-create one. That takes time and expense and even if the sanction regime weakens the Russian economy - which was never strong will be much weaker for some time. The purpose of sanctions is not so much to make an aggressive gambler like Putin abstain from fighting, but to make it nearly impossible to raise and equip a new one or engage in a lengthy costly occupation. When it comes to survival the Ukrainians are in for the long haul and the impact of sanctions will keep on 'giving' for a very long time.
Your point about Russia's shrinking economy is valid. However, if Putin decided that revitalising the military was personally important to him, there's more than enough black cash washing around back channels that he could draw on to finance it.
Regarding culture change, you're right: it takes a long time.
"However, if Putin decided that revitalising the military was personally important to him, there's more than enough black cash washing around back channels that he could draw on to finance it."
It depends on the timeframe. E.g. Russian tanks are surprisingly weak against relatively cheap western ATGMs and prone to complete losses due to secondary explosions as result of design issues which affects all derivatives of T-64 and T-72. Russia has either to add expensive defense systems or to produce completely new tanks. At which rate can this be done? It looks like 200 tanks per year at best.
Then the same issue in case of IFVs.
Then comes the much too low numbers of infantry, even better pay will not attract much more long serving men.
That would require an absolute ton of black cash. I suppose it comes down to how much/how willing China is to subsidize Russia (if at all). Without China spending money (or simply giving Russia military hardware), Russia is not going to have much of a military close to NATO level for a long time. A large part of its current army is getting destroyed in Ukraine, and economically, Russia is essentially 2 Irans. The odds of Russia imploding/falling in to civil war in the future are greater than Russia being able to launch a successful invasion of Ukraine or any current NATO country in the near future.
Russia may still have the capability to successfully invade Georgia or engage in adventures in Central Asia or the Middle East, though.
"The alliance had a near-death experience when Donald Trump was President. Trump disliked alliances in general and NATO in particular" - This fails to understand Trump and his art of the deal style. He suggested he would walk away from NATO because Germany and many other countries were taking USA, UK & the Baltics for a ride by not spending the 2% agreed. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vpwkdmwui3k&t=5s & https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eupg0-vjdHQ) Trump wasn't intending doing this he just wanted to jolt the Germans et al into action. Trump has been proved so right about this and Merkel & Schroeder's disastrous legacy lives on. " If NATO members had listened to Trump instead of their smug indifference then Putin would not have invaded. On Trump's relationship with Russia, the lies from the Clinton false files basically stifled his dealing with Russia and for that she and many others should go to prison.
Well Trump has been attacked for this, his tactless push to get more countries to pay 2% of GDP for defense was in fact successful. When he took office in early 2017 only three NATO countries were doing this – – and two of those were the US and Canada! By 2020 the number of NATO countries spending 2% of GDP on defense had risen substantially—from 3 to 10. I would call that a pretty successful diplomatic move.
I would have thought an indefinite conclusion and a "messy ceasefire" was not merely possible but by far the most likely. The Russians have temporarily given up trying to take Kyiv and it's by no means clear it has the resources and competence to pull off a successful offensive in the Donbass. An anti-Russian regime in Kyiv is a certainty in the foreseeable future so Putin and the Russians certainly haven't won. Even if given heavy weapons it's not clear the Ukrainians could expel Russia to its Jan 2022 borders. A fraction of the firepower left to the Russians would inflict heavy casualties and men with low morale may not feel like attacking but they probably feel like shooting back at attackers if it seems the best way of staying alive. Ukraine can't absorb heavy casualties as easily as Russia can. I'd suggest the best plan for Ukraine to win is to set about making the occupation of any conquered section of Ukraine too expensive and painful for the Russians to want to remain. Putin won't be in power forever.
there's also the question of morale which is hard to quantify, and yet one of the key components. Allegedly 20-40% of Russian soldiers already withdrawn from the north try very hard not to go back to the grinder (and it's not like the rest of them can't wait). Russians already have a severe shortage of truck drivers, and while re-supply lines are much shorter in Donbass, those runs still have to be made. Army drivers are not well-paid (or respected) and it's known to be a 'suicide job', for obvious reasons, so no takers, possibly forcing the use of conscripts again, which again, raises the issue of morale (and experience). The issue of whether you dig in and shoot back to stay alive or whether you drop the gun and run for your live... obviously not a simple either or. Though you're more likely to shoot back, if only in desperation, when defending your home. If Ukrainians manage, somehow, to hit the famous Russian artillery firing from 'safe' distance, and more than just as a one-off event, they might advance. But then, there's aviation and long-distance... options, that the Russians still have, and Ukrainians don't. Ultimately, including the tactical nukes.
Hi Adam. I hope you're right but I'd like to know where you got your information about the shortage of truck drivers and high rates of refusal to return to the fight. It sounds likely. Come to think of it does anyone with military expertise know how 'recoverable' the low morale of Russian soldiers might be? At least the new batches won't be annoyed about being lied to that they're in for a 'peace keeping' mission with grateful Ukrainians waiting with flowers.
With regards to the hitting Russian artillery from a safe distance I suspect the 'kamikaze' Switchblade' drones might come in handy. Look them up in Wikipedia.
1. re. refusal rates and truck drivers: from a daily update (not the only one) on youtube, based on open sources, but it's only in Russian (Conflict Intelligence Team) https://www.youtube.com/c/MackNack/videos
Disclaimer: I can't verify their credibility (other that they meet fairly recognizeable speakers in other vids), plus they're 'anti-regime' (thus potential bias), and on screen, well, they 'don't look the part'. Nevertheless, they _appear_ credible to me, particularly with their careful wording and assessment of what has happened, based on what they have seen from those sources, rather than repeating and relying on other people's assessment (which is what I'm doing here, by the way). They claim to use various open sources, i.e. social media (Russian vk accounts associated with Russian military personnel) and other sources, possibly hacked / leaked / exposed, e.g. a database of Russian railway, which apparently _still_ makes it possible to track Russian troop movements (presumably cross-referenced with social media snaps/vids with unit markings). But, thinking about it now, while they sound credible, I can't visualize, how you can _reliably_ quantify that figure of 20 - 40% of 'refuseniks', though I had an impression he was aware of this issue, hesitated, and consciously under-quoted. On drivers, they quoted info from Russian voyenkomats (draft offices), in the Far East, if I remember, presumably cross-referenced with comments from Russian social media accounts. Their conclusion was that the search for drivers and comments meant the shortages would not be met, therefore conscripts would be required to fill the gaps (which goes back to the issue of training, experience and morale of course). Regardless of their reliability though, there are some conclusions about the morale, which is obvious even to armchair generals like myself. I mean, imagine this: your unit's been out in the cold and misery for a few months (since late 2021 at least), then you get into a _real_ war - no flowers! Instead you get harassed by partisans, drones and artillery, this can happen any time, 24/7. You suffer deaths of close comrades, experience lack of command, discipline and general... direction and purpose. You don't fight for your home and your family, you see that political officers lied to you because those you 'liberate', simply hate you and wish you dead. Instead of victory parade in Nazi capital (Kyiv), only 20 km away, you get to retreat in haste, often in chaos, leaving behind your dead friends on the roadside (if you still care, by that point). Sure, you might have 'liberated' an ipad or a hardly used push bike for your nephew (authentic cases), but then you find out, you've been framed! - here's you, on post office cctv in Belarus, posting the spoils of war, and here's your details including home address plastered all over the internets, here's your girlfriend, / wife / mother harassed on the phone by anonymous callers about 'looted goods'. And now you're 'offered' to go back for more of the same, and you know it's 'the same', because you've been there, done that.
p.s. I have seen, but only one or two, photos of Russian military booklet, with a large stamp, something to the effect of a 'dishonorary discharge' for refusal to go back to continue with the 'special operation'. Sure, the punishment is severe, they lose their army flats, loans, obviously well-paid or at least stable 'job' and high esteem, but they know they got away with it - alive. I don't see how the rest that have not refused, would feel exactly optimistic and eager (with exception of psychos, etc., but these are relatively few), and that's not a good start for an 'offensive'. Never mind their influence on the fresh troops.
2. re. switchblades. I'm aware, but I doubt they're a silver bullet. There's alrady a report, though unverified, on social media, of one, unsuccessful strike against Russian tanks, somewhere in East Ukraine. This (failure) was interesting, because, as I understood it, once you lock it on the target, you might just as well claim a '100% kill'. Possibly they used the lighter type, designed against trucks, light armour, etc, which can't take out an mtb? Somehow, I doubt it's that simple, apparently US trained ukr-us soldiers back in the US prior to delivery. Possibly though, as loiter time is limited (10 min?), they had to go for any target, regardless. Larger ones (600s) stay in the air longer, some 40km range, and 'proper' anti-mtb head. But 40km is not exactly 'long' range with enough buffer time to 'hunt' for artillery. Plus, original announcements mentioned very low numbers (100?) delivered, though this might have been purposeful misinformation. Ukrainians asked for more advanced, precise, rocket artillery. In the meantime [sorry, I deleted the rest, there's a good reason you might guess]
All that said, I'm still concerned that, if / when Russians start losing badly, Vlad will nuke a city to re-open negotations, or at least stop losing. I don't see what Ukraine and the West would / will do then. There are some options floated publicly, but not by those close enough to decision-making circles. They, naturally, keep shtum.
Thanks for the reply, Adam. It cheered me to read it. Morale is extremely important and terribly hard to get a good read on it. Thinking about it, Russia has no way of achieving success without turning their morale around (though even if they did they could still lose - in many respects they appear to be incompetent). If I was a Russian general I wouldn't know how I could turn it round with this bunch of soldiers, and may be thinking of holding the line and hoping for more robust fighting spirit with the next batch of suckers.
I don't think there's _any_ way to turn the morale round, not realistically, not in this... 'context'. There's another moral de-booster: the coffins and funerals combined with social media, i.e. this news travels. Deaths and even lack of information about your loved ones, traditionally tell the Russians the same story: the State tries to hide the news, the State lies to you, ergo, they're most likely dead. This is past experience, but fresh, Afghanistan, Czechnya, the sinking of Kursk, and Ukraine's no different. Look at how they kept (mis)handling the sinking of Moskva, and now, doing the same, re. the fate of Moskva crew. The longer they let speculations run wild, the more they confirm Russians' paranoia: the State is lying to us again, only those 100+ crew on vid have survived. So, ironically, by being so paranoid about losing face, hence constant secrecy, the Russian state is actively undermining their own cause. That said, it's not a uniquely Russian approach, many state-related fiascos and disasters around the world have seen identical reaction from authorities.
Interestingly, Ukrainians don't seem to suffer from the same effect, probably because their authorities and military keep a very tight lid on their own failures and internal in-fighting, though some of it, around relief of Mariupol, comes up to the surface. But in general, it's easier for them because they're galvanised and focused around a clear goal, time for back-stabbing will come later. Issue of morale is quite interesting, because instinctively, it seems to play a part, but at the same time it's impossible to qualify, what part exactly, other, that, perhaps, 'a great part'.
But then, this is about a battlefield and a military resolution only. The wider, deeper problem though, is about Russia and the Russians, in general. Short or long, this war is not likely to understand that 'they're in the wrong'. With Germany and Japan they only got there, because they suffered, badly, and even then it took a long time. No such venue for Russia in current context.
Hi Adam. Your comments on the effect of deceiving the public about casualties are important and given time will reduce the pubic support for the war - perhaps even start an anti-war movement. But it probably won't effect the morale of the soldiers on the front line.
I think the next batch of soldiers may fight better because at least they won't be lied to that they're heading for a walk in the park, to help grateful Ukrainians. That decision probably destroyed the morale of the first lot of fighters. The next batch's morale will have to be destroyed in the more 'traditional' way-experiencing casualties with minimum success in a cause they may not particularly care about. That takes time and some doing on the Ukrainian's part . Of course given the way the war is going they may very well have these experiences in short order.
I agree 100% with your comparison with Nazi Germany and Japan. I don't think Russians are lose badly enough to realize their government/politics/society needs radical reform. That realization may take decades of misrule and may result in wide-spread apathy and despair rather than causing a society to make necessary and unpleasant reforms. It's very hard to be optimistic about Russia going anywhere but down in the next 30 years.
"Even if given heavy weapons it's not clear the Ukrainians could expel Russia to its Jan 2022 borders. A fraction of the firepower left to the Russians would inflict heavy casualties and men with low morale may not feel like attacking but they probably feel like shooting back at attackers if it seems the best way of staying alive. Ukraine can't absorb heavy casualties as easily as Russia can."
That is debateable or wrong: The strength of the Ukrainian army is now higher than the number of Russian soldiers in and around Ukraine, and Ukraine has in addition some good TDFs. The issue are heavy weapons.
"Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. They appear to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war."
Thanks for the info Olaf though I did say 'it is not clear' that the Ukrainians could expel the Russians with heavy weapons. My understanding is that major offensives are a whole lot harder and more costly than what's been happening up to now. Still you may be right about the Ukrainians being more able to take losses. The Russians are too light on infantry as it is and have lost heavily. If they don't order mass mobilization they could well and truly run out of soldiers, especially ones who want to fight. I sure hope Olaf and the Dupuy institute are right.
One understanding of Russia (or Soviet Union as it was then), that I took away years ago from a university political science course was that Russia over the centuries had a pattern of coming close to Western Europe and then inevitably pull away. I don't recall what the professor of the class or the author of the book concluded from that observation other than it has lead to war on the continent and terror inside Russia.
Over the past 10 years or so Russia has been a feature in the news from the Syrian war, election interference to troll farms directing social media discourse. The Russian regime was rejecting the Western welcome mat while opening their bank accounts for Western money to pour in. The West thought it was winning. The reality is that the West is more vulnerable to the lure of strong men and kleptocracy than Russia (and other authoritarian countries) is to our open societies and pretty transparent institutions where deep states do not thrive.
Can Russia and the West ever truly be united. The US and Europe seem more likely to let Russia continue to chip away at its sovereignty than the West is likely to change Russia. NATO may make Europe feel safe, but Russia has already penetrated its borders. Can the West take control of the anti-democratic forces fed by Russian propaganda and pro-Russian operatives without sacrificing democracy. Ukraine is a wake up call for the West to see reality and to admit that shopping is not the antidote to totalitarianism. Fight now or fight later but a fight there is going to be.
You write that, ‘The Russian regime was rejecting the Western welcome mat…’.
I think this is partly the issue - there was no Western welcome mat. Pre-(approx) 2005-2007, Russia really did nothing on the international stage that anyone, let alone the Western powers, could deem aggressive, anti-western, or destabilising. Remember that Putin had been in power since 2000, five to seven years! On the contrary, Russia was actively ‘looking’ for that Welcome Mat. (n.b. this doesn’t necessarily apply to domestic Russian policy). The NATO expansion contrary to prior assurances, dubious actions in the former communist Yugoslavia, rejection as a potential NATO member and rejection as a potential EU member (despite the increasing list of former Soviet states being welcomed in), and of course, the Wolfowitz Doctrine, etc.
It seems at this point, 2006/7 that Putin’s Russia stops looking for the welcome mat and starts to see the U.S.A. and allies as the aggressors, bullies if you like, in need of push back.
I certainly hope Russia and the West can be united, but after the post-Cold War missteps, I don’t think it will be with Putin, the current Russian state (all former Soviet) politicians/diplomats, or in the short term. We must look to a younger generation of future Russian politicians and diplomats 20 or 30 years from now. In the meantime let us hope for as much peace as possible.
As NATO countries wish to send weapons to Ukraine, one concern was raised was the risk of a full embarrassing defeat causes Putin to reach for his nuclear or chemical and biological weapons. One way to avoid this would be by managing the flow of weapons and slowing down if necessary. This would cause more civil deaths amongst other consequences. So would this be any significant part of NATO or the UK, decisions as to when to supply arms?
I can’t help but feel that the foundations for the current situation in Ukraine were laid down during the 1990’s with the fall of the Soviet Union and the series of somewhat dubious responses from the West (mainly U.S. driven policy).
Although the James Baker / Mikhail Gorbachev negotiations of 1990 did not expressly promise NATO non-expansion (as Gorbachev has admitted) the 1993 NATO expansion discussions for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were unnecessarily provocative and, as Gorbachev stated, ‘definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990’.
If this was not enough, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 made clear the Russian mindset and the dangers of NATO expansion - probably why Mrs Merkel blocked the U.S. proposal for Ukrainian membership, as you mention above.
Let us also not overlook the geography of the region. NATO, although greatly expanded is still largely to the west of the Carpathians, a natural obstacle to invasion, natural defence giving strategic advantage and allowing concentration of forces to possible aggression. Barring the pocket of the Pripyat marshes on the Belarusian/Ukrainian border, and crossing the Dnipr river the rest is surely a largely open front?
Beyond this, let us look at what the West was offering Russia as a lesson in trust…. We have the 1991 UNSC Resolution 713 arms embargo on the former Yugoslav Republic. A resolution that France and the Clinton administration broke fairly clearly. The United States was actively involved in the preparation, monitoring and initiation of Operation Storm: the green light from President Clinton was passed on by the US military attache in Zagreb, and the operations were transmitted in real time to the Pentagon. An operation dependent on the U.S. Administration, with U.S. ‘operators’ on the ground in Croatian army uniform, that led to the ethnic cleansing of approx. 200,000 Serbs and the subsequent deaths of an estimated 20,000 Serbs (there has been much rotten about this episode from individual’s opinion the ground, EU monitors (that’s another story of duplicity), Human Rights Watch etc)- one of the first of a ghastly series of major atrocities in the Western Balkans by all sides. The U.N., widely seen as a vehicle for the U.S., took no action and the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia appears a whitewash.
Let us now also consider the background picture to this - the widely published/reported Wolfowitz Doctrine (1992). Why on earth would Russia have trust in the West?
Now just so people don’t assume I’m a Russia apologist, let us also not forget the Budapest Memorandum (1994). Even if, and I say ‘if’, the West drove the spirit of discussions on NATO expansion - an oft’ used trope used in Russia’s aggressive rhetoric - let us not equally forget Russia’s blatant and clear breach of the Budapest Memoradum guaranteeing Ukriane’s security, borders and Sovereignty in the 2014 annexation of Crimea.
The situation is now a grisly semi-proxy war between NATO and Russia, with the Ukrainians yet again, in a historical meat grinder due too Russia’s abhorrent total warfare doctrine. It is difficult to predict where this might end… One must assume (at this time) that Russia will want to drive a solid and robust land corridor from Kharkiv through Luhansk, Donetsk, Mariupol to the Crimean peninsula. Hold this land either by negotiated settlement or force. The devastated Ukraine little able to offer economic threat thereafter. A messy, occupied, but not controlled, area would not suit Russia or it’s purse, so I would suspect more major atrocities inflicted on the local population - ethnic cleansing.
The difficulty is predicting it’s outcome is driven by the political landscape - what’s is really going on in Russia politically? The Biden administration has handled this better that the withdrawal from Afghanistan, but still appears somewhat slow and unsteady. The EU is still riven with splits, political infighting, looming elections to name a few.
So after all this, looking forward I struggle to see where this might end, except in yet more dire human tragedy and horror. Looking back I still cant lose sight of the poor decisions of the 1990’s.
Thank you for your insights, very much appreciated.
It probably ends in a messy stalemate like the Korean War. I'm doubtful that Russia can hold on to any landbridge in Ukraine, but the UA probably won't be able to push the Russians out of all of what was Ukraine at independence. Russia almost certainly will keep Crimea and very likely at least part of the Donbas.
It may have been possible to not end up with the current tragedy but it would have been very unlikely. Basically, a Marshall Plan for Russia would have needed to have been launched when the USSR collapsed and all the Soviet leadership replaced (like Germany after 1945). Russia after the collapse of the USSR was like Germany after WWI: A country that still thought of itself as a great power but humiliated yet actually wasn't devastated on its own land and conquered by war brought upon by its own imperial ambitions (so easy for many citizens to believe in the old national myths, blame outsiders, and think it didn't actually have to change). In such an environment, the rise of a Hitler/Putin seems almost inevitable.
So what is most likely to happen? A mirror image of the Korean War kicking off Cold War 2. Now, the proxy war that kicks off the cold war starts in the West of Eurasia rather than the East. Now Russia is the junior partner fighting in the proxy war rather than China. I wouldn't be surprised if Russia underwent all the craziness and tragedy that Red China underwent after 1950 either (Great Leap Forward, massive famine, and Cultural Revolution).
We may even see the Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization form just as NATO did.
I think you may well be correct Richard, and it certainly is messy at the moment isn’t it?
The politics drives this (as it should). What the UA can or cannot do is very largely driven by logistics and the ‘political will’ from NATO states acting unilaterally - U.S., U.K., Poland, Czech Republic etc. - to supply weapons of increasing technological advancement and calibre.
I think the Cold War 2.0 started pre-2008, before the mistake of the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit communique with regard to Georgia and Ukraine. What I find so disheartening is the dogmatic pursuit of the Wolfowitz Doctrine (even if dressed up by another name) but each subsequent U.S. administration since Clinton (it certainly prevented even the mere thought of anything remotely looking in the least bit like a Marshall Plan). Foreign policy has not been the place to look for the best in the great nation of the U.S.A.
Apart form the obvious current human tragedy in Ukraine, the disaster is the geopolitical failure to see the need for Russia as a partner in countering the inexorable rise of China. China is the no.1 strategic threat to libertarian, democracy loving Western nations. Not having Russia as a partner in this task is foolhardy beyond belief.
Unfortunately, with Putin having gone ‘full tonto’, as Ben Wallace put it, - rape, murder, torture, ethnic cleansing if not genocide - there is no room for Putin to come back. I fear at least another decade of lost opportunity with Russia here. North America and Europe along with a partner in Russia would have been a formidable foe, even for a hugely populated and economically powerful China. We, therefore, certainly don’t need another Korean War stalemate in Ukraine to hinder a potential future rapprochement with the Russian people.
For now though, the immediate priority is to find some negotiating ground to stop the slaughter (although the current Western rhetoric and media don’t make me particularly optimistic on this front).
re. Western 'mistake' of offering Ukraine future NATO membership, so consider the alternative: the West did _not_ offer that membership. What then? Methinks, Ukraine moving, very much, towards becoming where / what Belarus is today.
Well, of course, you may well be absolutely correct Adam.
It’s all (sadly) hypothetical at this point and I absolutely assume my reasoning and predictions with hindsight are still error strewn!
If I may lay out my reasoning for the ‘mistake’ of the 2008 NATO Bucharest communique - and again, due to this forum, leave out a great deal. Don’t want to go back to 1994 and the Nuclear NPT (Budapest Memorandum).
Background - in 2007 the Ukrainian’s began negotiating an Association Agreement with the European Union, and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). To Russia, the biggest trading partner to Ukraine, one can only imagine this was a worry. EU companies would directly compete with Russian ones and Russia would do doubt lose out both economically and politically. Move on one president and a few years and the gov’t is in a hole. Voters want to lean toward Europe, gov’t debt interest payments due (which can’t be serviced due to corruption). The move to the DCFTA, whilst positive in the long term, will cost Ukraine economically in the short term, the debt can’t be serviced - the (corrupt) gov’t will be out of a job very quickly!! The Ukrainian Gov’t are lent a lifeline from Putin - end progress on the EU AA and DCFTA and take the finance from Russia.
Even at this point Putin is offering a tripartite trade agreement as a compromise - EU-Ukraine-Russia. Europe still in Ukraine! In other words, we did not need to inflame the situation further with the NATO Bucharest communique. The Ukrainian tilt to Europe was already there, European trade was within arms reach and would have amply competed with Russia, all without Russia feeling it needed to enact it’s own Monroe Doctrine. Putin was still looking for trade compromise.
Ultimately there follows the Maidan uprising, the then president fleeing the country etc. But Ukraine was already in large part already psychologically heading West, Russia would allow it, with conditions. We should also not forget at this point that western Ukraine is already very European in nature and Eastern Ukraine is already very Russian (linguistically, economically, by marriage etc). But the U.S. insistence on the NATO references to Ukraine and Georgia, it was just too much. And Putin responds with the incursion into South Ossetia (Georgia) in response. The German and French veto on Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO was the counter to the U.S. ‘Wolfowitz’ mentality.
Who knows, if the West had been more open to compromise on trade and politics on Russia’s doorstep (Russia’s Monroe) then, just perhaps, Ukraine may not be in the utter, sickening misery it is today. This is all why I personally don’t believe it would have ended up as another Belarus (for the record I don’t think Belarus can really be compared to Ukraine, politically or economically).
All this is just a personal opinion based on viewing the events as they happened and with a large dose of hindsight. As I said above, I believe it’s a strategic mistake of the first order. China is the strategic threat, Russia (a declining economic power) should have been a partner, not another adversary on a second front. It’s too late now. It will be many years of lost opportunities before any rapprochement can take place. What will China have done by then? Regardless, the moral compass now needs to focus laser-like on a negotiated and lasting peace in Ukraine - however bitter the pill may be for both sides.
Yes, I fully take your point on Putin, and of course we know so little about Putin and his internal political issues during these times (pre-2008). This is all to a large degree a great imponderable.
I guess the thrust of my point is that pre-2007, I believe, all the signs were there that Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Russia was both willing and actively looking to ‘lean Westward’ to some degree also - offering the U.S. help immediately post 9/11; assisting with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan when the first U.S. troops went in; facilitating forward logistics bases through a number of the former Soviet, Central Asian “ ‘stan’s “; tentatively looking at EU trade agreements and NATO co-operation, etc, etc.
All this engagement and messaging stopped and went into reverse in 2007 - disengagement, wall building and, ultimately, confrontation. Putin’s Russia had had enough… and we are where we are today as a result of this failed U.S. foreign policy, and to a lesser degree (but sharing culpability) failed European foreign policy, towards Russia.
I admit this line of thought may be in a minority? (certainly with the current mood over Ukraine and the grotesque abuses.)
Thank you for these posts, which continue to shed welcome light on the geopolitical and military ins and outs of a complex and evolving situation.
A question: is it possible that Russia's humiliation on the battlefield could prompt Putin and his cadre to invest money and effort in revitalising the country's armed forces, so that NATO could in fact be left facing the prospect of a strengthened Russian military in the medium term?
"is it possible that Russia's humiliation on the battlefield could prompt Putin and his cadre to invest money and effort in revitalising the country's armed forces, so that NATO could in fact be left facing the prospect of a strengthened Russian military in the medium term?"
With a shrinking economy it will be hard for Putin even to maintain previous level in absolute numbers. An substantial increase looks very unlikely.
However, the more interesting question is whether the issues of the Russian army can be solved by more spending. If the Russian "military culture" is the issue a change will take very long.
I think the importance of a 'shrinking economy' is under-played. Russia is losing most of it's best troops and equipment and will soon have to re-create one. That takes time and expense and even if the sanction regime weakens the Russian economy - which was never strong will be much weaker for some time. The purpose of sanctions is not so much to make an aggressive gambler like Putin abstain from fighting, but to make it nearly impossible to raise and equip a new one or engage in a lengthy costly occupation. When it comes to survival the Ukrainians are in for the long haul and the impact of sanctions will keep on 'giving' for a very long time.
Your point about Russia's shrinking economy is valid. However, if Putin decided that revitalising the military was personally important to him, there's more than enough black cash washing around back channels that he could draw on to finance it.
Regarding culture change, you're right: it takes a long time.
"However, if Putin decided that revitalising the military was personally important to him, there's more than enough black cash washing around back channels that he could draw on to finance it."
It depends on the timeframe. E.g. Russian tanks are surprisingly weak against relatively cheap western ATGMs and prone to complete losses due to secondary explosions as result of design issues which affects all derivatives of T-64 and T-72. Russia has either to add expensive defense systems or to produce completely new tanks. At which rate can this be done? It looks like 200 tanks per year at best.
Then the same issue in case of IFVs.
Then comes the much too low numbers of infantry, even better pay will not attract much more long serving men.
That would require an absolute ton of black cash. I suppose it comes down to how much/how willing China is to subsidize Russia (if at all). Without China spending money (or simply giving Russia military hardware), Russia is not going to have much of a military close to NATO level for a long time. A large part of its current army is getting destroyed in Ukraine, and economically, Russia is essentially 2 Irans. The odds of Russia imploding/falling in to civil war in the future are greater than Russia being able to launch a successful invasion of Ukraine or any current NATO country in the near future.
Russia may still have the capability to successfully invade Georgia or engage in adventures in Central Asia or the Middle East, though.
You may be right about Russia's military capability, but I think the odds of the country "imploding/falling in to civil war" are very, very long.
"The alliance had a near-death experience when Donald Trump was President. Trump disliked alliances in general and NATO in particular" - This fails to understand Trump and his art of the deal style. He suggested he would walk away from NATO because Germany and many other countries were taking USA, UK & the Baltics for a ride by not spending the 2% agreed. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vpwkdmwui3k&t=5s & https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eupg0-vjdHQ) Trump wasn't intending doing this he just wanted to jolt the Germans et al into action. Trump has been proved so right about this and Merkel & Schroeder's disastrous legacy lives on. " If NATO members had listened to Trump instead of their smug indifference then Putin would not have invaded. On Trump's relationship with Russia, the lies from the Clinton false files basically stifled his dealing with Russia and for that she and many others should go to prison.
Well Trump has been attacked for this, his tactless push to get more countries to pay 2% of GDP for defense was in fact successful. When he took office in early 2017 only three NATO countries were doing this – – and two of those were the US and Canada! By 2020 the number of NATO countries spending 2% of GDP on defense had risen substantially—from 3 to 10. I would call that a pretty successful diplomatic move.
I would have thought an indefinite conclusion and a "messy ceasefire" was not merely possible but by far the most likely. The Russians have temporarily given up trying to take Kyiv and it's by no means clear it has the resources and competence to pull off a successful offensive in the Donbass. An anti-Russian regime in Kyiv is a certainty in the foreseeable future so Putin and the Russians certainly haven't won. Even if given heavy weapons it's not clear the Ukrainians could expel Russia to its Jan 2022 borders. A fraction of the firepower left to the Russians would inflict heavy casualties and men with low morale may not feel like attacking but they probably feel like shooting back at attackers if it seems the best way of staying alive. Ukraine can't absorb heavy casualties as easily as Russia can. I'd suggest the best plan for Ukraine to win is to set about making the occupation of any conquered section of Ukraine too expensive and painful for the Russians to want to remain. Putin won't be in power forever.
there's also the question of morale which is hard to quantify, and yet one of the key components. Allegedly 20-40% of Russian soldiers already withdrawn from the north try very hard not to go back to the grinder (and it's not like the rest of them can't wait). Russians already have a severe shortage of truck drivers, and while re-supply lines are much shorter in Donbass, those runs still have to be made. Army drivers are not well-paid (or respected) and it's known to be a 'suicide job', for obvious reasons, so no takers, possibly forcing the use of conscripts again, which again, raises the issue of morale (and experience). The issue of whether you dig in and shoot back to stay alive or whether you drop the gun and run for your live... obviously not a simple either or. Though you're more likely to shoot back, if only in desperation, when defending your home. If Ukrainians manage, somehow, to hit the famous Russian artillery firing from 'safe' distance, and more than just as a one-off event, they might advance. But then, there's aviation and long-distance... options, that the Russians still have, and Ukrainians don't. Ultimately, including the tactical nukes.
Hi Adam. I hope you're right but I'd like to know where you got your information about the shortage of truck drivers and high rates of refusal to return to the fight. It sounds likely. Come to think of it does anyone with military expertise know how 'recoverable' the low morale of Russian soldiers might be? At least the new batches won't be annoyed about being lied to that they're in for a 'peace keeping' mission with grateful Ukrainians waiting with flowers.
With regards to the hitting Russian artillery from a safe distance I suspect the 'kamikaze' Switchblade' drones might come in handy. Look them up in Wikipedia.
1. re. refusal rates and truck drivers: from a daily update (not the only one) on youtube, based on open sources, but it's only in Russian (Conflict Intelligence Team) https://www.youtube.com/c/MackNack/videos
Disclaimer: I can't verify their credibility (other that they meet fairly recognizeable speakers in other vids), plus they're 'anti-regime' (thus potential bias), and on screen, well, they 'don't look the part'. Nevertheless, they _appear_ credible to me, particularly with their careful wording and assessment of what has happened, based on what they have seen from those sources, rather than repeating and relying on other people's assessment (which is what I'm doing here, by the way). They claim to use various open sources, i.e. social media (Russian vk accounts associated with Russian military personnel) and other sources, possibly hacked / leaked / exposed, e.g. a database of Russian railway, which apparently _still_ makes it possible to track Russian troop movements (presumably cross-referenced with social media snaps/vids with unit markings). But, thinking about it now, while they sound credible, I can't visualize, how you can _reliably_ quantify that figure of 20 - 40% of 'refuseniks', though I had an impression he was aware of this issue, hesitated, and consciously under-quoted. On drivers, they quoted info from Russian voyenkomats (draft offices), in the Far East, if I remember, presumably cross-referenced with comments from Russian social media accounts. Their conclusion was that the search for drivers and comments meant the shortages would not be met, therefore conscripts would be required to fill the gaps (which goes back to the issue of training, experience and morale of course). Regardless of their reliability though, there are some conclusions about the morale, which is obvious even to armchair generals like myself. I mean, imagine this: your unit's been out in the cold and misery for a few months (since late 2021 at least), then you get into a _real_ war - no flowers! Instead you get harassed by partisans, drones and artillery, this can happen any time, 24/7. You suffer deaths of close comrades, experience lack of command, discipline and general... direction and purpose. You don't fight for your home and your family, you see that political officers lied to you because those you 'liberate', simply hate you and wish you dead. Instead of victory parade in Nazi capital (Kyiv), only 20 km away, you get to retreat in haste, often in chaos, leaving behind your dead friends on the roadside (if you still care, by that point). Sure, you might have 'liberated' an ipad or a hardly used push bike for your nephew (authentic cases), but then you find out, you've been framed! - here's you, on post office cctv in Belarus, posting the spoils of war, and here's your details including home address plastered all over the internets, here's your girlfriend, / wife / mother harassed on the phone by anonymous callers about 'looted goods'. And now you're 'offered' to go back for more of the same, and you know it's 'the same', because you've been there, done that.
p.s. I have seen, but only one or two, photos of Russian military booklet, with a large stamp, something to the effect of a 'dishonorary discharge' for refusal to go back to continue with the 'special operation'. Sure, the punishment is severe, they lose their army flats, loans, obviously well-paid or at least stable 'job' and high esteem, but they know they got away with it - alive. I don't see how the rest that have not refused, would feel exactly optimistic and eager (with exception of psychos, etc., but these are relatively few), and that's not a good start for an 'offensive'. Never mind their influence on the fresh troops.
2. re. switchblades. I'm aware, but I doubt they're a silver bullet. There's alrady a report, though unverified, on social media, of one, unsuccessful strike against Russian tanks, somewhere in East Ukraine. This (failure) was interesting, because, as I understood it, once you lock it on the target, you might just as well claim a '100% kill'. Possibly they used the lighter type, designed against trucks, light armour, etc, which can't take out an mtb? Somehow, I doubt it's that simple, apparently US trained ukr-us soldiers back in the US prior to delivery. Possibly though, as loiter time is limited (10 min?), they had to go for any target, regardless. Larger ones (600s) stay in the air longer, some 40km range, and 'proper' anti-mtb head. But 40km is not exactly 'long' range with enough buffer time to 'hunt' for artillery. Plus, original announcements mentioned very low numbers (100?) delivered, though this might have been purposeful misinformation. Ukrainians asked for more advanced, precise, rocket artillery. In the meantime [sorry, I deleted the rest, there's a good reason you might guess]
All that said, I'm still concerned that, if / when Russians start losing badly, Vlad will nuke a city to re-open negotations, or at least stop losing. I don't see what Ukraine and the West would / will do then. There are some options floated publicly, but not by those close enough to decision-making circles. They, naturally, keep shtum.
Thanks for the reply, Adam. It cheered me to read it. Morale is extremely important and terribly hard to get a good read on it. Thinking about it, Russia has no way of achieving success without turning their morale around (though even if they did they could still lose - in many respects they appear to be incompetent). If I was a Russian general I wouldn't know how I could turn it round with this bunch of soldiers, and may be thinking of holding the line and hoping for more robust fighting spirit with the next batch of suckers.
I don't think there's _any_ way to turn the morale round, not realistically, not in this... 'context'. There's another moral de-booster: the coffins and funerals combined with social media, i.e. this news travels. Deaths and even lack of information about your loved ones, traditionally tell the Russians the same story: the State tries to hide the news, the State lies to you, ergo, they're most likely dead. This is past experience, but fresh, Afghanistan, Czechnya, the sinking of Kursk, and Ukraine's no different. Look at how they kept (mis)handling the sinking of Moskva, and now, doing the same, re. the fate of Moskva crew. The longer they let speculations run wild, the more they confirm Russians' paranoia: the State is lying to us again, only those 100+ crew on vid have survived. So, ironically, by being so paranoid about losing face, hence constant secrecy, the Russian state is actively undermining their own cause. That said, it's not a uniquely Russian approach, many state-related fiascos and disasters around the world have seen identical reaction from authorities.
Interestingly, Ukrainians don't seem to suffer from the same effect, probably because their authorities and military keep a very tight lid on their own failures and internal in-fighting, though some of it, around relief of Mariupol, comes up to the surface. But in general, it's easier for them because they're galvanised and focused around a clear goal, time for back-stabbing will come later. Issue of morale is quite interesting, because instinctively, it seems to play a part, but at the same time it's impossible to qualify, what part exactly, other, that, perhaps, 'a great part'.
But then, this is about a battlefield and a military resolution only. The wider, deeper problem though, is about Russia and the Russians, in general. Short or long, this war is not likely to understand that 'they're in the wrong'. With Germany and Japan they only got there, because they suffered, badly, and even then it took a long time. No such venue for Russia in current context.
Hi Adam. Your comments on the effect of deceiving the public about casualties are important and given time will reduce the pubic support for the war - perhaps even start an anti-war movement. But it probably won't effect the morale of the soldiers on the front line.
I think the next batch of soldiers may fight better because at least they won't be lied to that they're heading for a walk in the park, to help grateful Ukrainians. That decision probably destroyed the morale of the first lot of fighters. The next batch's morale will have to be destroyed in the more 'traditional' way-experiencing casualties with minimum success in a cause they may not particularly care about. That takes time and some doing on the Ukrainian's part . Of course given the way the war is going they may very well have these experiences in short order.
I agree 100% with your comparison with Nazi Germany and Japan. I don't think Russians are lose badly enough to realize their government/politics/society needs radical reform. That realization may take decades of misrule and may result in wide-spread apathy and despair rather than causing a society to make necessary and unpleasant reforms. It's very hard to be optimistic about Russia going anywhere but down in the next 30 years.
"Even if given heavy weapons it's not clear the Ukrainians could expel Russia to its Jan 2022 borders. A fraction of the firepower left to the Russians would inflict heavy casualties and men with low morale may not feel like attacking but they probably feel like shooting back at attackers if it seems the best way of staying alive. Ukraine can't absorb heavy casualties as easily as Russia can."
That is debateable or wrong: The strength of the Ukrainian army is now higher than the number of Russian soldiers in and around Ukraine, and Ukraine has in addition some good TDFs. The issue are heavy weapons.
From Dupuy Institute (http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2022/04/13/the-russo-ukrainian-war-of-2022-day-49-ground-actions/):
"Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. They appear to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war."
Thanks for the info Olaf though I did say 'it is not clear' that the Ukrainians could expel the Russians with heavy weapons. My understanding is that major offensives are a whole lot harder and more costly than what's been happening up to now. Still you may be right about the Ukrainians being more able to take losses. The Russians are too light on infantry as it is and have lost heavily. If they don't order mass mobilization they could well and truly run out of soldiers, especially ones who want to fight. I sure hope Olaf and the Dupuy institute are right.
At this point, what are your definitions of "victory" and "defeat"?
One understanding of Russia (or Soviet Union as it was then), that I took away years ago from a university political science course was that Russia over the centuries had a pattern of coming close to Western Europe and then inevitably pull away. I don't recall what the professor of the class or the author of the book concluded from that observation other than it has lead to war on the continent and terror inside Russia.
Over the past 10 years or so Russia has been a feature in the news from the Syrian war, election interference to troll farms directing social media discourse. The Russian regime was rejecting the Western welcome mat while opening their bank accounts for Western money to pour in. The West thought it was winning. The reality is that the West is more vulnerable to the lure of strong men and kleptocracy than Russia (and other authoritarian countries) is to our open societies and pretty transparent institutions where deep states do not thrive.
Can Russia and the West ever truly be united. The US and Europe seem more likely to let Russia continue to chip away at its sovereignty than the West is likely to change Russia. NATO may make Europe feel safe, but Russia has already penetrated its borders. Can the West take control of the anti-democratic forces fed by Russian propaganda and pro-Russian operatives without sacrificing democracy. Ukraine is a wake up call for the West to see reality and to admit that shopping is not the antidote to totalitarianism. Fight now or fight later but a fight there is going to be.
Hello Margaret,
You write that, ‘The Russian regime was rejecting the Western welcome mat…’.
I think this is partly the issue - there was no Western welcome mat. Pre-(approx) 2005-2007, Russia really did nothing on the international stage that anyone, let alone the Western powers, could deem aggressive, anti-western, or destabilising. Remember that Putin had been in power since 2000, five to seven years! On the contrary, Russia was actively ‘looking’ for that Welcome Mat. (n.b. this doesn’t necessarily apply to domestic Russian policy). The NATO expansion contrary to prior assurances, dubious actions in the former communist Yugoslavia, rejection as a potential NATO member and rejection as a potential EU member (despite the increasing list of former Soviet states being welcomed in), and of course, the Wolfowitz Doctrine, etc.
It seems at this point, 2006/7 that Putin’s Russia stops looking for the welcome mat and starts to see the U.S.A. and allies as the aggressors, bullies if you like, in need of push back.
I certainly hope Russia and the West can be united, but after the post-Cold War missteps, I don’t think it will be with Putin, the current Russian state (all former Soviet) politicians/diplomats, or in the short term. We must look to a younger generation of future Russian politicians and diplomats 20 or 30 years from now. In the meantime let us hope for as much peace as possible.
Cordially,
As NATO countries wish to send weapons to Ukraine, one concern was raised was the risk of a full embarrassing defeat causes Putin to reach for his nuclear or chemical and biological weapons. One way to avoid this would be by managing the flow of weapons and slowing down if necessary. This would cause more civil deaths amongst other consequences. So would this be any significant part of NATO or the UK, decisions as to when to supply arms?
I can’t help but feel that the foundations for the current situation in Ukraine were laid down during the 1990’s with the fall of the Soviet Union and the series of somewhat dubious responses from the West (mainly U.S. driven policy).
Although the James Baker / Mikhail Gorbachev negotiations of 1990 did not expressly promise NATO non-expansion (as Gorbachev has admitted) the 1993 NATO expansion discussions for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were unnecessarily provocative and, as Gorbachev stated, ‘definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990’.
If this was not enough, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 made clear the Russian mindset and the dangers of NATO expansion - probably why Mrs Merkel blocked the U.S. proposal for Ukrainian membership, as you mention above.
Let us also not overlook the geography of the region. NATO, although greatly expanded is still largely to the west of the Carpathians, a natural obstacle to invasion, natural defence giving strategic advantage and allowing concentration of forces to possible aggression. Barring the pocket of the Pripyat marshes on the Belarusian/Ukrainian border, and crossing the Dnipr river the rest is surely a largely open front?
Beyond this, let us look at what the West was offering Russia as a lesson in trust…. We have the 1991 UNSC Resolution 713 arms embargo on the former Yugoslav Republic. A resolution that France and the Clinton administration broke fairly clearly. The United States was actively involved in the preparation, monitoring and initiation of Operation Storm: the green light from President Clinton was passed on by the US military attache in Zagreb, and the operations were transmitted in real time to the Pentagon. An operation dependent on the U.S. Administration, with U.S. ‘operators’ on the ground in Croatian army uniform, that led to the ethnic cleansing of approx. 200,000 Serbs and the subsequent deaths of an estimated 20,000 Serbs (there has been much rotten about this episode from individual’s opinion the ground, EU monitors (that’s another story of duplicity), Human Rights Watch etc)- one of the first of a ghastly series of major atrocities in the Western Balkans by all sides. The U.N., widely seen as a vehicle for the U.S., took no action and the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia appears a whitewash.
Let us now also consider the background picture to this - the widely published/reported Wolfowitz Doctrine (1992). Why on earth would Russia have trust in the West?
Now just so people don’t assume I’m a Russia apologist, let us also not forget the Budapest Memorandum (1994). Even if, and I say ‘if’, the West drove the spirit of discussions on NATO expansion - an oft’ used trope used in Russia’s aggressive rhetoric - let us not equally forget Russia’s blatant and clear breach of the Budapest Memoradum guaranteeing Ukriane’s security, borders and Sovereignty in the 2014 annexation of Crimea.
The situation is now a grisly semi-proxy war between NATO and Russia, with the Ukrainians yet again, in a historical meat grinder due too Russia’s abhorrent total warfare doctrine. It is difficult to predict where this might end… One must assume (at this time) that Russia will want to drive a solid and robust land corridor from Kharkiv through Luhansk, Donetsk, Mariupol to the Crimean peninsula. Hold this land either by negotiated settlement or force. The devastated Ukraine little able to offer economic threat thereafter. A messy, occupied, but not controlled, area would not suit Russia or it’s purse, so I would suspect more major atrocities inflicted on the local population - ethnic cleansing.
The difficulty is predicting it’s outcome is driven by the political landscape - what’s is really going on in Russia politically? The Biden administration has handled this better that the withdrawal from Afghanistan, but still appears somewhat slow and unsteady. The EU is still riven with splits, political infighting, looming elections to name a few.
So after all this, looking forward I struggle to see where this might end, except in yet more dire human tragedy and horror. Looking back I still cant lose sight of the poor decisions of the 1990’s.
Thank you for your insights, very much appreciated.
Cordially,
C
It probably ends in a messy stalemate like the Korean War. I'm doubtful that Russia can hold on to any landbridge in Ukraine, but the UA probably won't be able to push the Russians out of all of what was Ukraine at independence. Russia almost certainly will keep Crimea and very likely at least part of the Donbas.
It may have been possible to not end up with the current tragedy but it would have been very unlikely. Basically, a Marshall Plan for Russia would have needed to have been launched when the USSR collapsed and all the Soviet leadership replaced (like Germany after 1945). Russia after the collapse of the USSR was like Germany after WWI: A country that still thought of itself as a great power but humiliated yet actually wasn't devastated on its own land and conquered by war brought upon by its own imperial ambitions (so easy for many citizens to believe in the old national myths, blame outsiders, and think it didn't actually have to change). In such an environment, the rise of a Hitler/Putin seems almost inevitable.
So what is most likely to happen? A mirror image of the Korean War kicking off Cold War 2. Now, the proxy war that kicks off the cold war starts in the West of Eurasia rather than the East. Now Russia is the junior partner fighting in the proxy war rather than China. I wouldn't be surprised if Russia underwent all the craziness and tragedy that Red China underwent after 1950 either (Great Leap Forward, massive famine, and Cultural Revolution).
We may even see the Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization form just as NATO did.
I think you may well be correct Richard, and it certainly is messy at the moment isn’t it?
The politics drives this (as it should). What the UA can or cannot do is very largely driven by logistics and the ‘political will’ from NATO states acting unilaterally - U.S., U.K., Poland, Czech Republic etc. - to supply weapons of increasing technological advancement and calibre.
I think the Cold War 2.0 started pre-2008, before the mistake of the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit communique with regard to Georgia and Ukraine. What I find so disheartening is the dogmatic pursuit of the Wolfowitz Doctrine (even if dressed up by another name) but each subsequent U.S. administration since Clinton (it certainly prevented even the mere thought of anything remotely looking in the least bit like a Marshall Plan). Foreign policy has not been the place to look for the best in the great nation of the U.S.A.
Apart form the obvious current human tragedy in Ukraine, the disaster is the geopolitical failure to see the need for Russia as a partner in countering the inexorable rise of China. China is the no.1 strategic threat to libertarian, democracy loving Western nations. Not having Russia as a partner in this task is foolhardy beyond belief.
Unfortunately, with Putin having gone ‘full tonto’, as Ben Wallace put it, - rape, murder, torture, ethnic cleansing if not genocide - there is no room for Putin to come back. I fear at least another decade of lost opportunity with Russia here. North America and Europe along with a partner in Russia would have been a formidable foe, even for a hugely populated and economically powerful China. We, therefore, certainly don’t need another Korean War stalemate in Ukraine to hinder a potential future rapprochement with the Russian people.
For now though, the immediate priority is to find some negotiating ground to stop the slaughter (although the current Western rhetoric and media don’t make me particularly optimistic on this front).
re. Western 'mistake' of offering Ukraine future NATO membership, so consider the alternative: the West did _not_ offer that membership. What then? Methinks, Ukraine moving, very much, towards becoming where / what Belarus is today.
Well, of course, you may well be absolutely correct Adam.
It’s all (sadly) hypothetical at this point and I absolutely assume my reasoning and predictions with hindsight are still error strewn!
If I may lay out my reasoning for the ‘mistake’ of the 2008 NATO Bucharest communique - and again, due to this forum, leave out a great deal. Don’t want to go back to 1994 and the Nuclear NPT (Budapest Memorandum).
Background - in 2007 the Ukrainian’s began negotiating an Association Agreement with the European Union, and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). To Russia, the biggest trading partner to Ukraine, one can only imagine this was a worry. EU companies would directly compete with Russian ones and Russia would do doubt lose out both economically and politically. Move on one president and a few years and the gov’t is in a hole. Voters want to lean toward Europe, gov’t debt interest payments due (which can’t be serviced due to corruption). The move to the DCFTA, whilst positive in the long term, will cost Ukraine economically in the short term, the debt can’t be serviced - the (corrupt) gov’t will be out of a job very quickly!! The Ukrainian Gov’t are lent a lifeline from Putin - end progress on the EU AA and DCFTA and take the finance from Russia.
Even at this point Putin is offering a tripartite trade agreement as a compromise - EU-Ukraine-Russia. Europe still in Ukraine! In other words, we did not need to inflame the situation further with the NATO Bucharest communique. The Ukrainian tilt to Europe was already there, European trade was within arms reach and would have amply competed with Russia, all without Russia feeling it needed to enact it’s own Monroe Doctrine. Putin was still looking for trade compromise.
Ultimately there follows the Maidan uprising, the then president fleeing the country etc. But Ukraine was already in large part already psychologically heading West, Russia would allow it, with conditions. We should also not forget at this point that western Ukraine is already very European in nature and Eastern Ukraine is already very Russian (linguistically, economically, by marriage etc). But the U.S. insistence on the NATO references to Ukraine and Georgia, it was just too much. And Putin responds with the incursion into South Ossetia (Georgia) in response. The German and French veto on Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO was the counter to the U.S. ‘Wolfowitz’ mentality.
Who knows, if the West had been more open to compromise on trade and politics on Russia’s doorstep (Russia’s Monroe) then, just perhaps, Ukraine may not be in the utter, sickening misery it is today. This is all why I personally don’t believe it would have ended up as another Belarus (for the record I don’t think Belarus can really be compared to Ukraine, politically or economically).
All this is just a personal opinion based on viewing the events as they happened and with a large dose of hindsight. As I said above, I believe it’s a strategic mistake of the first order. China is the strategic threat, Russia (a declining economic power) should have been a partner, not another adversary on a second front. It’s too late now. It will be many years of lost opportunities before any rapprochement can take place. What will China have done by then? Regardless, the moral compass now needs to focus laser-like on a negotiated and lasting peace in Ukraine - however bitter the pill may be for both sides.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond.
C
Remember that Putin has agency too. Would Putin really have let Ukraine move westward? More conjecture. I personally doubt it.
Yes, I fully take your point on Putin, and of course we know so little about Putin and his internal political issues during these times (pre-2008). This is all to a large degree a great imponderable.
I guess the thrust of my point is that pre-2007, I believe, all the signs were there that Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Russia was both willing and actively looking to ‘lean Westward’ to some degree also - offering the U.S. help immediately post 9/11; assisting with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan when the first U.S. troops went in; facilitating forward logistics bases through a number of the former Soviet, Central Asian “ ‘stan’s “; tentatively looking at EU trade agreements and NATO co-operation, etc, etc.
All this engagement and messaging stopped and went into reverse in 2007 - disengagement, wall building and, ultimately, confrontation. Putin’s Russia had had enough… and we are where we are today as a result of this failed U.S. foreign policy, and to a lesser degree (but sharing culpability) failed European foreign policy, towards Russia.
I admit this line of thought may be in a minority? (certainly with the current mood over Ukraine and the grotesque abuses.)
Regards,
C