This week sees an intensive period of diplomacy intended to head off the military offensive that Russia has been threatening to launch against Ukraine since late last year. After today’s bilateral in Geneva between the US and Russia, NATO countries will meet in Brussels with Russia on Wednesday, followed the next day by a gathering in Vienna of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which includes all European countries.
It is difficult to work out whether addressing legitimate Russian grievances re. the breaking of James Baker's promise to expand NATO eastwards (Sarotte's work) by the federalisation and 'Finlandisation' of Ukraine would simply open up a vacuum for Russia to expand control (which Kazakhstan underlines) or whether a grand bargain of refusing further NATO expansion for more political rights for Russian speakers and a pledge on Ukrainian (and Georgian) neutrality would solve a problem that could be a great achievement for an American President. I lean towards the latter as polls in Eastern Ukraine rejected Russian annexation in favour of a more federal structure and Russia wouldn't be able to hold that ground permanently without cost (as you point out). On that basis why shouldn't a US president try to strike a grand deal which guarantees Ukrainian and Georgian neutrality and federalism (in the EU but never in NATO? Part of some new joint security arrangement with Russia and West in it?)
Certainly most seasoned Russia watchers (such as Jack Matlock) are highly critical of Western expansionism into Russia's sphere of influence without respect for Russia's legitimate security interests (if Russia had forces in Mexico, the US might be peeved!), and Ukrainian nationalists are not all liberal democrats and seem to have maximalist demands of their own which don't respect the many nations within Ukraine.... Perhaps worth acknowledging legitimate interests in order to undermine illegitimate aspirations...?
I suppose the final point is whether Putin actually wants this problem to be solved. Railing against the West and playing the hard man is a useful card to play to consolidate public opinion at home which has been on somewhat dodgier ground recently with Navalny.... A grand gesture of mutual interest recognition could show this game for what it is which is domestic signaling...
The possible Western response such as extreme sanctions, will clearly hit Russia in the long term
But in the short term, how worried are Western leaders about a Russian counter-response of cutting of their natural gas supplies to Europe? And how worried should they be?
Agree with all this. But also worth considering, perhaps, Russian anxieties about China? Not an entirely separate issue.
It is difficult to work out whether addressing legitimate Russian grievances re. the breaking of James Baker's promise to expand NATO eastwards (Sarotte's work) by the federalisation and 'Finlandisation' of Ukraine would simply open up a vacuum for Russia to expand control (which Kazakhstan underlines) or whether a grand bargain of refusing further NATO expansion for more political rights for Russian speakers and a pledge on Ukrainian (and Georgian) neutrality would solve a problem that could be a great achievement for an American President. I lean towards the latter as polls in Eastern Ukraine rejected Russian annexation in favour of a more federal structure and Russia wouldn't be able to hold that ground permanently without cost (as you point out). On that basis why shouldn't a US president try to strike a grand deal which guarantees Ukrainian and Georgian neutrality and federalism (in the EU but never in NATO? Part of some new joint security arrangement with Russia and West in it?)
Certainly most seasoned Russia watchers (such as Jack Matlock) are highly critical of Western expansionism into Russia's sphere of influence without respect for Russia's legitimate security interests (if Russia had forces in Mexico, the US might be peeved!), and Ukrainian nationalists are not all liberal democrats and seem to have maximalist demands of their own which don't respect the many nations within Ukraine.... Perhaps worth acknowledging legitimate interests in order to undermine illegitimate aspirations...?
I suppose the final point is whether Putin actually wants this problem to be solved. Railing against the West and playing the hard man is a useful card to play to consolidate public opinion at home which has been on somewhat dodgier ground recently with Navalny.... A grand gesture of mutual interest recognition could show this game for what it is which is domestic signaling...
Very informative.
The possible Western response such as extreme sanctions, will clearly hit Russia in the long term
But in the short term, how worried are Western leaders about a Russian counter-response of cutting of their natural gas supplies to Europe? And how worried should they be?