Your analysis throughout the war has been and continues to be outstanding. An excellent, albeit somber read about the current situation. There was a long period where it felt that little was happening before the dramatic gains Ukraine made in the Kharkiv region in September. I really hope a similar dramatic series of manoeuvres and gains is possible in the near future to illustrate to the Russian public the futility of the situation and cause unrest/pressure on Putin. One thing is for sure we must keep supporting Ukraine to help them achieve it.
This makes for grim reading. In so far as you can be sure of anything in diplomacy there is no chance of peace settlement. The gulf between the two sides is enormous and I can’t detect a scrap of willingness in either leader to bridge it. It is clear Russia cannot achieve any war aims but will try to hold onto its ill-gotten gains for as long as possible and will willingly sacrifice men and treasure indefinitely to this end. The only prospect of an end of the war will be if Ukraine manages to eject the Russians from its territory. That will take some doing. While the Ukrainians have exceeded expectations most would be surprised if they could do it quickly. I fear a long grinding war of attrition unless Russian morale completely collapses. That’s possible but I fear it’d be foolish to set one’s heart on it.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) campaign assessment dated 22nd November gives a link to the twitter account of the Ukrainian Minister of Defence Reznikov who sets out an assessment of Russian ballistic/cruise missile strength, as at 18th November. Excluding the S300 for the moment, Russia began with about 3,200 missiles. It has manufactured about 660 since February. Of the total of 3,860, it has nearly 1500 left. This gives, overall, a remaining strength of 28%. However, nearly 7,000 S300 remain, 87%, though these are surface to air missiles some of which have been adapted for non-precision surface-to-surface use.
This overall picture leads to the ISW assessments that:
"The Russian military has significantly depleted its arsenal of high-precision missiles but will likely still be able to attack Ukrainian critical infrastructure at scale in the near term."
and:
"The Russian military is likely experiencing problems in replenishing its arsenal of high-precision weapons systems."
This is followed by a suggestion that Russia is experiencing difficulties in obtaining ballistic missiles from Iran.
However, as Professor Freedman states, there is no alternative to keeping up the military pressure. But this does not mean NATO just doing more of the same but ramping up the pressure on Russia, wherever possible. Clearly, air defence remains a priority.
(The items in inverted comments are direct quotes from the ISW's assessment.)
My current concept of the battlespace is an almost-contiguous front, along which the Ukrainians are conducting a force-directed offensive. Corroding Russian combat power works. It worked in Kherson and it is working in Luhansk.
Artillery war has a history: I look at the map of Russian "progress" around Bakhmut and see a fire sack filling up with Russians. Mobilization simply slowed the rate at which drones, guns, rockets, and everything else reduces the number of Russians, and Ukraine is killing Russians at a faster rate on the battlefield than Russia is killing Ukrainians.
The mathematics of Lanchester's square are unyielding. Collapse can be local or general, but generally comes all of a sudden.
I hope you're right Matt but taking Kherson was helped enormously by a whopping wide river making the Russians hopelessly vulnerable when HIMAS destroyed the bridges.
Fun fact, M30 series rockets were invented to target bridges, open-air ammo dumps, headquarters, and other high value targets anticipated in the Fulda Gap.
Thank you for a challenging and thought provoking analysis. It prompts me to propose a naïve perhaps counter-factual question:
If it is now primarily a war of attrition, what are the parameters of a war of attrition? Destruction of economy and society are rational war objectives (however illegitimate the means); consequences are not simple and linear – for example determination to resist may increase, but is there a tipping point of exhaustion or social disintegration where this might reverse? Are we moving into a new phase of war in which the extent of destruction inflicted on the opposing society as a whole is more decisive than particular battlefields and territory (where victory seems impossible for each side)?
In which case the issue is not whether Putin is prepared to concede failure, or whether he gets sadistic pleasure from the hurt he can cause, but what are his possible war aims at this different level, and what are his prospects of attaining them? They would seem to be more profound and existential than gaining concessions from Ukraine. Is the Russian military-industrial economy capable of inflicting a sufficient level of socio-economic destruction on Ukraine and can the West sustain Ukraine in a prolonged existential conflict like this?
The history of wars suggest that making civilians suffer doesn't cause them to rise up against the government or cause the troops to give up. To take an obvious example the German population suffered terribly in World War 2 but the German army had to be defeated. I think the Ukrainians are every bit as determined as the German's were - especially given the fact that they're presently winning.
Excellent analysis. Would be interested to hear your assessment of the role of the multilateral institutions - UN, OSCE, IMF, WB - as well as NATO, G7, G20 (pre- and post war).
A key element in this situation is surely the Russian generals. They might have gone into this expecting glory, medals etc. but they cannot have that expectation now. They have seen their best troops killed and injured and their most modern equipment destroyed. High quality officers and NCOs will be trying to get out one way or another. Military leaders are probably trying to keep the best units out of harms way and using recent draftees as cannon fodder.
Putin has no incentive to end the war or compromise in any way since he will not be able to legitimately claim a major victory. The generals top interest now is surely preserving what is left of their best units.
Does all this not suggest a military coup as both a possibility and the only way to safely get rid of Putin? Since Russia faces no serious threat to its own security a less aggressive foreign policy should offer generals and admirals a good life without too much aggravation or worry.
I'm no expert on Russian internal security but I recon Putin would be well aware of these dangers and taken steps to reduce them. That's much more part of his skill set then directing military matters. Still one can but hope!
Thanks for your reply. You are right but the problem he might have is that he does need to have some experienced and competent commanders. The coup against Hitler came from some of the senior military people when they realised they were losing the war - it nearly worked. I wonder if Biden or the CIA aren't gently and secretly planting the idea in some minds - or perhaps they should be.
Thorough analyses painting a slightly less hopeful picture than i had previously realized, i enjoyed it immensely, it seems for all Ukraines military ability we are entering a long attritional phase of the war, the west must continue it's support until it reaches a conclusion acceptable to Ukraine, Russia must not win, the future of European peace might well be at stake.
Excellent piece, Thankyou
Very informative and useful to have all the key points in one place and clearly defined
Thankyou
Your analysis throughout the war has been and continues to be outstanding. An excellent, albeit somber read about the current situation. There was a long period where it felt that little was happening before the dramatic gains Ukraine made in the Kharkiv region in September. I really hope a similar dramatic series of manoeuvres and gains is possible in the near future to illustrate to the Russian public the futility of the situation and cause unrest/pressure on Putin. One thing is for sure we must keep supporting Ukraine to help them achieve it.
This makes for grim reading. In so far as you can be sure of anything in diplomacy there is no chance of peace settlement. The gulf between the two sides is enormous and I can’t detect a scrap of willingness in either leader to bridge it. It is clear Russia cannot achieve any war aims but will try to hold onto its ill-gotten gains for as long as possible and will willingly sacrifice men and treasure indefinitely to this end. The only prospect of an end of the war will be if Ukraine manages to eject the Russians from its territory. That will take some doing. While the Ukrainians have exceeded expectations most would be surprised if they could do it quickly. I fear a long grinding war of attrition unless Russian morale completely collapses. That’s possible but I fear it’d be foolish to set one’s heart on it.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) campaign assessment dated 22nd November gives a link to the twitter account of the Ukrainian Minister of Defence Reznikov who sets out an assessment of Russian ballistic/cruise missile strength, as at 18th November. Excluding the S300 for the moment, Russia began with about 3,200 missiles. It has manufactured about 660 since February. Of the total of 3,860, it has nearly 1500 left. This gives, overall, a remaining strength of 28%. However, nearly 7,000 S300 remain, 87%, though these are surface to air missiles some of which have been adapted for non-precision surface-to-surface use.
This overall picture leads to the ISW assessments that:
"The Russian military has significantly depleted its arsenal of high-precision missiles but will likely still be able to attack Ukrainian critical infrastructure at scale in the near term."
and:
"The Russian military is likely experiencing problems in replenishing its arsenal of high-precision weapons systems."
This is followed by a suggestion that Russia is experiencing difficulties in obtaining ballistic missiles from Iran.
However, as Professor Freedman states, there is no alternative to keeping up the military pressure. But this does not mean NATO just doing more of the same but ramping up the pressure on Russia, wherever possible. Clearly, air defence remains a priority.
(The items in inverted comments are direct quotes from the ISW's assessment.)
I value your analysis. Thank you.
General Winter favors the prepared.
My current concept of the battlespace is an almost-contiguous front, along which the Ukrainians are conducting a force-directed offensive. Corroding Russian combat power works. It worked in Kherson and it is working in Luhansk.
Artillery war has a history: I look at the map of Russian "progress" around Bakhmut and see a fire sack filling up with Russians. Mobilization simply slowed the rate at which drones, guns, rockets, and everything else reduces the number of Russians, and Ukraine is killing Russians at a faster rate on the battlefield than Russia is killing Ukrainians.
The mathematics of Lanchester's square are unyielding. Collapse can be local or general, but generally comes all of a sudden.
I hope you're right Matt but taking Kherson was helped enormously by a whopping wide river making the Russians hopelessly vulnerable when HIMAS destroyed the bridges.
Fun fact, M30 series rockets were invented to target bridges, open-air ammo dumps, headquarters, and other high value targets anticipated in the Fulda Gap.
Thank you for a challenging and thought provoking analysis. It prompts me to propose a naïve perhaps counter-factual question:
If it is now primarily a war of attrition, what are the parameters of a war of attrition? Destruction of economy and society are rational war objectives (however illegitimate the means); consequences are not simple and linear – for example determination to resist may increase, but is there a tipping point of exhaustion or social disintegration where this might reverse? Are we moving into a new phase of war in which the extent of destruction inflicted on the opposing society as a whole is more decisive than particular battlefields and territory (where victory seems impossible for each side)?
In which case the issue is not whether Putin is prepared to concede failure, or whether he gets sadistic pleasure from the hurt he can cause, but what are his possible war aims at this different level, and what are his prospects of attaining them? They would seem to be more profound and existential than gaining concessions from Ukraine. Is the Russian military-industrial economy capable of inflicting a sufficient level of socio-economic destruction on Ukraine and can the West sustain Ukraine in a prolonged existential conflict like this?
The history of wars suggest that making civilians suffer doesn't cause them to rise up against the government or cause the troops to give up. To take an obvious example the German population suffered terribly in World War 2 but the German army had to be defeated. I think the Ukrainians are every bit as determined as the German's were - especially given the fact that they're presently winning.
Last year, Russia was "a gas station with nuclear weapons".
Now it's The Black Knight with nuclear weapons.
Excellent analysis. Would be interested to hear your assessment of the role of the multilateral institutions - UN, OSCE, IMF, WB - as well as NATO, G7, G20 (pre- and post war).
Excellent article with evidence.
A key element in this situation is surely the Russian generals. They might have gone into this expecting glory, medals etc. but they cannot have that expectation now. They have seen their best troops killed and injured and their most modern equipment destroyed. High quality officers and NCOs will be trying to get out one way or another. Military leaders are probably trying to keep the best units out of harms way and using recent draftees as cannon fodder.
Putin has no incentive to end the war or compromise in any way since he will not be able to legitimately claim a major victory. The generals top interest now is surely preserving what is left of their best units.
Does all this not suggest a military coup as both a possibility and the only way to safely get rid of Putin? Since Russia faces no serious threat to its own security a less aggressive foreign policy should offer generals and admirals a good life without too much aggravation or worry.
I'm no expert on Russian internal security but I recon Putin would be well aware of these dangers and taken steps to reduce them. That's much more part of his skill set then directing military matters. Still one can but hope!
Thanks for your reply. You are right but the problem he might have is that he does need to have some experienced and competent commanders. The coup against Hitler came from some of the senior military people when they realised they were losing the war - it nearly worked. I wonder if Biden or the CIA aren't gently and secretly planting the idea in some minds - or perhaps they should be.
Thorough analyses painting a slightly less hopeful picture than i had previously realized, i enjoyed it immensely, it seems for all Ukraines military ability we are entering a long attritional phase of the war, the west must continue it's support until it reaches a conclusion acceptable to Ukraine, Russia must not win, the future of European peace might well be at stake.