During the early 1980s there were regular protests in the UK against nuclear weapons accompanied by intense debates about the morality and credibility of deterrence. Most memorable was the Woman’s Peace Camp outside the RAF base at Greenham Common where cruise missiles were to be based. On 1 April 1983 a 14-mile chain was formed by some 70,000 protesters from Greenham to the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston and on to the ordnance factory at Burghfield. The camp remained in placed until 2000, long after the cruise missiles had left but with residents still protesting against the UK’s Trident programme.
A very lucid analysis which deserves wide circulation, especially to those who saw its inadequate treatment in the film "Oppenheimer". Michael Quinlan was a great public servant and as charming as he was serious. But the tortured prose he used in his attempt to produce a satisfactory ethical justification for mutual nuclear destruction shows he may well have realised the extent of his failure.
Great thinking about the moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas of the use of nuclear weapons. What I think you show, Lawrence, is the futility of trying to place such horrific death and destruction into a “nice and neat legal framework.” I think you get it right in the end that MAD provides the best deterrent to nuclear use, otherwise somebody will find a way to justify using nuclear weapons which would eventually get out of control and lead to a MAD scenario being more, and not less likely.
As an economist by training, one can easily place MAD into a game theoretic paradigm. The best response function to being attacked is to mete out the same of greater punishment. On the other hand, assuming all players are rational, the benefits of not using nuclear weapons far outweighs their use. This is the current and ongoing equilibrium of the repeated game. The cost of deviating from this equilibrium and incurring MAD are simply too great.
The big assumption here is that all players are “rational” and does not account for non-state actors getting ahold of nuclear weapons and using them…who does one retaliate against? That is the biggest challenge going forward: ensuring non-state actors do not possess nuclear weapons and why non-proliferation still matters.
Well all of this has to be set against Russian nuclear strategy. This envisages a lower threshold for first use. This is reflected by a preponderance of different types of weapon in strength and delivery mechanisms. Russia has the largest number of warheads which number over 5000 (UK has a small fraction of this and l believe no tactical versions). Part of their policy is based on a limited first use followed by a row back on further use (escalate to deescalate). Use is also referenced by the type, scale and risk characteristics of the conflict. So tanks approaching Moscow is different from losing control of a couple of fields in the Donbas. The adherents of escalate to deescalate include a number of prominent Russians and many pundits on Russian TV debate and news shows.
As we know Putin has made threats, initially in 2022, to deter any action or response from NATO. This (partially) failed and NATO made a series of calibrated responses. China also made clear that the use of and implicit threats to use these weapons garners no support from them. Some back channels conversations have also occurred with senior NATO representatives, in which the same message was presumably delivered. Putin has been more measured in his comments since.
Putin’s Russia likes to believe it is a “great power”. It’s not. That would be clear to the Kremlin on any number of measures of comparison. So to compensate for that they put great store on the number of warheads they have, the variety of choices to deliver them to an opponent (the latest might be from Space) and improved speed of delivery. Compared to their western adversaries, they also have a high tolerance for massive civilian casualties and we should know this. A further benefit is that the decision to make use of these is oblique and concentrated in a decision making top elite, some of whose members are basically plein dotty. All of which gives them leverage against any actor who opposes them.
Personally l think this is a horrific state of affairs. Living under this threat again is unpleasant but l sleep easier because the Royal Navy SSBN’s are right now somewhere getting lost and ready to strike if ordered to do so. They are capable of delivering unimaginable amounts of destructive power. You really don’t need many to do this and it’s not a numbers game. That focuses Kremlins minds on the risks. I like that.
One of those interminable TV shows in 2023 was in a UK bashing mode over something which had incurred their displeasure. As they all bounced off each other in ever more hatred and vitriol it fell on one of them (Russian MP) to call for our obliteration. The others all seemed delighted with the idea but not one participant who went ‘off script’ & challenged it and the proposer fell on him like a wolf. After an angry discourse on this and having lost his temper he demanded to know why in Gods name he could not support eliminating a tiresome western country which opposes Russian power. “I have a son and so do you. Is it worth killing them over this because the British have that power, it’s not controlled by the Americans.” They all fell silent and the moderate said let’s take a break.
I am totally in favour of nuclear arms control but when such weapons are in the hands of nation States that do not share our values and; seek to extend their power over us and; the control of the use of these weapons lies with a small number of unaccountable people or a single dictator; l sleep easier under our capabilities to retaliate under a use policy of ambiguity and no first use. This concentrates minds. We are not in the tit for tat game of little nukes and running up and down some illusionary nuke ladder. Just don’t use them messaging is better. Because if you let the nuclear genie out of the bottle, then you will not be able to control and predict outcome’s any better than my Aunt Doris.
As always, you have got on to something important.
From my American perspective and mindful of your own recent allusion to Raymond Aron's observation that strategic thought "draws its inspiration from each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose," Quinlan addressed the particular problem of NATO facing a WP with immense material and manpower advantages in waging war. In dealing with the role of nuclear weapons in this situation, Quinlan really captured the pervasive importance of nuclear escalatory risk in deterring NATO/WP war not just NATO/WP nuclear war. In a draft of his paper "NATO Nuclear Deterrence Concepts" he sent out in 1987, he says "..there is no way of reducing to zero the risk of it continuing if it once starts; and secondly that it starts with the first bullet, not just the first atomic shell." (in Tanya Ogilvie-White, On Nuclear Deterrence, p.68) This opinion underlay his thinking rejecting no-first-use declarations, embracing flexible response, and modernizing intermediate nuclear forces among others.
Interestingly, the paper was sent to Albert Wohlstetter whose own The Delicate Balance of Terror in 1959 fixated American thinking on the nuclear bolt-from-the-blue in a way that complicated American thinking about the more likely routes to nuclear war and how nuclear programs increased or decreased their likelihood. We have never really shed the fixation.
Quinlan appreciated the complexities of both that time and place and the complexities of the post-Cold War. It may be that great power relations may relax in the future, but that may not mean nuclear weapons have no place. In that world, it may still be the case that making the world safer for conventional warfare is not making a safer world. With any luck, we may have officials with the discipline and insight of MIchael Quinlan.
Super analysis. Just for fun, though, your hints around Quinlan's moral superiority may have stirred something in the ether. Here he is in today's newspapers lying to parliament over vast bribes every historian knows he sanctioned. And while he is certainly one of the UK's most important (and cited) post war civil servants, his intellectual effort to keep nuclear weapon moral reasoning intact in some form is characterised at its crux by professional dissembling. To be fair, the lying and dissembling were part of his job. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
Lawrie: Excellent! Very cogent. Just 3 comments: (1) In his classic text on "Just and Unjust Wars," Michael Walzer argues that the "supreme emergency" which the UK faced in WWII from 1939-1942 (when it was fighting alone) no longer held from 1942-1945, and the "terror bombing" of German cities could no longer be judged "just." (2) during the great debate in the US over nuclear deterrence during the first Reagan term, a key development that helped blunt the "nuclear freeze" movement was the finding by the US Catholic Bishops, led by Cardinal Bernadin, that MAD could just - but only just - be rationalized as "moral." (3) on the eve of his decision to fully invade Ukraine in February 2022 and reinforce that brutal and illegal aggression with a range of nuclear use threats, Putin had the audacity to sign, with the other four P-5 leaders, a public statement avowing that "a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought."
A very lucid analysis which deserves wide circulation, especially to those who saw its inadequate treatment in the film "Oppenheimer". Michael Quinlan was a great public servant and as charming as he was serious. But the tortured prose he used in his attempt to produce a satisfactory ethical justification for mutual nuclear destruction shows he may well have realised the extent of his failure.
Great thinking about the moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas of the use of nuclear weapons. What I think you show, Lawrence, is the futility of trying to place such horrific death and destruction into a “nice and neat legal framework.” I think you get it right in the end that MAD provides the best deterrent to nuclear use, otherwise somebody will find a way to justify using nuclear weapons which would eventually get out of control and lead to a MAD scenario being more, and not less likely.
As an economist by training, one can easily place MAD into a game theoretic paradigm. The best response function to being attacked is to mete out the same of greater punishment. On the other hand, assuming all players are rational, the benefits of not using nuclear weapons far outweighs their use. This is the current and ongoing equilibrium of the repeated game. The cost of deviating from this equilibrium and incurring MAD are simply too great.
The big assumption here is that all players are “rational” and does not account for non-state actors getting ahold of nuclear weapons and using them…who does one retaliate against? That is the biggest challenge going forward: ensuring non-state actors do not possess nuclear weapons and why non-proliferation still matters.
Well all of this has to be set against Russian nuclear strategy. This envisages a lower threshold for first use. This is reflected by a preponderance of different types of weapon in strength and delivery mechanisms. Russia has the largest number of warheads which number over 5000 (UK has a small fraction of this and l believe no tactical versions). Part of their policy is based on a limited first use followed by a row back on further use (escalate to deescalate). Use is also referenced by the type, scale and risk characteristics of the conflict. So tanks approaching Moscow is different from losing control of a couple of fields in the Donbas. The adherents of escalate to deescalate include a number of prominent Russians and many pundits on Russian TV debate and news shows.
As we know Putin has made threats, initially in 2022, to deter any action or response from NATO. This (partially) failed and NATO made a series of calibrated responses. China also made clear that the use of and implicit threats to use these weapons garners no support from them. Some back channels conversations have also occurred with senior NATO representatives, in which the same message was presumably delivered. Putin has been more measured in his comments since.
Putin’s Russia likes to believe it is a “great power”. It’s not. That would be clear to the Kremlin on any number of measures of comparison. So to compensate for that they put great store on the number of warheads they have, the variety of choices to deliver them to an opponent (the latest might be from Space) and improved speed of delivery. Compared to their western adversaries, they also have a high tolerance for massive civilian casualties and we should know this. A further benefit is that the decision to make use of these is oblique and concentrated in a decision making top elite, some of whose members are basically plein dotty. All of which gives them leverage against any actor who opposes them.
Personally l think this is a horrific state of affairs. Living under this threat again is unpleasant but l sleep easier because the Royal Navy SSBN’s are right now somewhere getting lost and ready to strike if ordered to do so. They are capable of delivering unimaginable amounts of destructive power. You really don’t need many to do this and it’s not a numbers game. That focuses Kremlins minds on the risks. I like that.
One of those interminable TV shows in 2023 was in a UK bashing mode over something which had incurred their displeasure. As they all bounced off each other in ever more hatred and vitriol it fell on one of them (Russian MP) to call for our obliteration. The others all seemed delighted with the idea but not one participant who went ‘off script’ & challenged it and the proposer fell on him like a wolf. After an angry discourse on this and having lost his temper he demanded to know why in Gods name he could not support eliminating a tiresome western country which opposes Russian power. “I have a son and so do you. Is it worth killing them over this because the British have that power, it’s not controlled by the Americans.” They all fell silent and the moderate said let’s take a break.
I am totally in favour of nuclear arms control but when such weapons are in the hands of nation States that do not share our values and; seek to extend their power over us and; the control of the use of these weapons lies with a small number of unaccountable people or a single dictator; l sleep easier under our capabilities to retaliate under a use policy of ambiguity and no first use. This concentrates minds. We are not in the tit for tat game of little nukes and running up and down some illusionary nuke ladder. Just don’t use them messaging is better. Because if you let the nuclear genie out of the bottle, then you will not be able to control and predict outcome’s any better than my Aunt Doris.
Mr Quinlan got it right for me.
Typo: Genera -> General
As always, you have got on to something important.
From my American perspective and mindful of your own recent allusion to Raymond Aron's observation that strategic thought "draws its inspiration from each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose," Quinlan addressed the particular problem of NATO facing a WP with immense material and manpower advantages in waging war. In dealing with the role of nuclear weapons in this situation, Quinlan really captured the pervasive importance of nuclear escalatory risk in deterring NATO/WP war not just NATO/WP nuclear war. In a draft of his paper "NATO Nuclear Deterrence Concepts" he sent out in 1987, he says "..there is no way of reducing to zero the risk of it continuing if it once starts; and secondly that it starts with the first bullet, not just the first atomic shell." (in Tanya Ogilvie-White, On Nuclear Deterrence, p.68) This opinion underlay his thinking rejecting no-first-use declarations, embracing flexible response, and modernizing intermediate nuclear forces among others.
Interestingly, the paper was sent to Albert Wohlstetter whose own The Delicate Balance of Terror in 1959 fixated American thinking on the nuclear bolt-from-the-blue in a way that complicated American thinking about the more likely routes to nuclear war and how nuclear programs increased or decreased their likelihood. We have never really shed the fixation.
Quinlan appreciated the complexities of both that time and place and the complexities of the post-Cold War. It may be that great power relations may relax in the future, but that may not mean nuclear weapons have no place. In that world, it may still be the case that making the world safer for conventional warfare is not making a safer world. With any luck, we may have officials with the discipline and insight of MIchael Quinlan.
Super analysis. Just for fun, though, your hints around Quinlan's moral superiority may have stirred something in the ether. Here he is in today's newspapers lying to parliament over vast bribes every historian knows he sanctioned. And while he is certainly one of the UK's most important (and cited) post war civil servants, his intellectual effort to keep nuclear weapon moral reasoning intact in some form is characterised at its crux by professional dissembling. To be fair, the lying and dissembling were part of his job. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
Lawrie: Excellent! Very cogent. Just 3 comments: (1) In his classic text on "Just and Unjust Wars," Michael Walzer argues that the "supreme emergency" which the UK faced in WWII from 1939-1942 (when it was fighting alone) no longer held from 1942-1945, and the "terror bombing" of German cities could no longer be judged "just." (2) during the great debate in the US over nuclear deterrence during the first Reagan term, a key development that helped blunt the "nuclear freeze" movement was the finding by the US Catholic Bishops, led by Cardinal Bernadin, that MAD could just - but only just - be rationalized as "moral." (3) on the eve of his decision to fully invade Ukraine in February 2022 and reinforce that brutal and illegal aggression with a range of nuclear use threats, Putin had the audacity to sign, with the other four P-5 leaders, a public statement avowing that "a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought."
Query whether Dresden wasn’t greater in terms of deaths? Hamburg not far behind.