Professor Freedman, your comment about instructors reminded me about comments I recall from earlier in the war (I am not sure if these were in your posts) about a shortage of junior officers in the Russian army and the lack of initiative shown by Russian NCOs, the latter I understood to be a structural feature of the Russian army. Therefore, it is not only a matter of the training of the new recruits but also, once they have joined their (old or new) formations, how they will be employed in the fighting and how they will be led.
What I appreciate about these posts, apart from their analytical lucidity, is that they don't lose sight (as some pundits sometimes do) of the awful tragedy being forced on Ukraine by Putin and his clique, and also on Russia itself. All these men being shoved into the front line to kill and be killed for the sake of war aims which are cruel beyond reason and likely to prove unachievable for Russia.
If one were grasping for parallels, Mussolini's disastrous invasion of Greece in 1940 comes to mind though, in this case, there's no stronger military power willing to bail Putin out.
Thanks for another thought provoking and informative piece. My feeling is that the Russians are determined not to admit defeat and so they are doing a poorly done mobilization in the hope something positive may come with time. I'm not at all sure they have a reasoned plan so that mere time will come to their advantage because of cunning strategems on their part. It's more a matter of putting off the desperate day for later and hoping that perhaps it will never come. But hope is not a strategy and looking at the geo-political efforts of the Kremlin regime up to now they have hardly been more cunning an effective than their military campaigning. Russia is isolated, NATO has a new lease of life and even if Ukraine's backers tried hard to get Ukraine to make concessions (by no means certain) I can't see the Ukrainians giving Russia or it's wavering allies much joy.
> If Russia is responsible for these mystery explosions, and it is hard to think who else it could be
A cynic might suspect it was the US, to put the pipelines physically out of action pro temp and thus prevent the EU compromising on sanctions by reaching a deal with Russia to restore the gas flow.
A little remark -, please, change Ukraine on Russia in "The rushed referendums with their unavoidably absurd and uniform 98% majority support for joining Ukraine..."
"The rushed referendums with their unavoidably absurd and uniform 98% majority support for joining Ukraine, also adds to the sense of desperation in the Kremlin."
What to do with those seeking to escape mobilisation?
I can anticipate the reaction from states who suffered Stalins re-conquest of eastern Europe, (although that seems to me, to be a mistake,) they will understandably be unsympathetic. There will be undoubtedly nefarious actors just in case public opinion can be mediated enough to accommodate them.
Is a blanket refusal the best way?
Force the issue back into Russia.
I'm tempted to say yes, but curious as to your thoughts.
As they have discovered to their cost, the terrain is too flat and open for armoured offensives.
I keep reading this yet when one considers the German-Russian battles from 1941-3 in Ukraine fighting continued throughout the fall and winter (the Crimea was taken (except for Sevastopol) in October-December 1941 and Operation Uranus (the Soviet attack on Stalingrad) took place in November of 1942 and continued throughout the winter (until the spring thaw). While there are certainly new ant-tank weapons available now there was close air support during WWII, which is not available now. The only thing I can think of is that there are insufficient tanks to conduct the large armoured offensives, not that the terrain is too flat. In fact, in Khruschev's memoirs, he complained that before the outbreak of the Russian-German war the world press would write that the Ukraine was a "tankodrome"--that is, ideally suited for rapid armoured advances.
Thorough, insightful and very clear. Thank you, Prof. Freedman. I found your point of russia using a tactical nuclear weapon on “its own territory” (ie., newly annexed) particularly intriguing. Kremlin trying to create a ‘new twist’ on use of nukes, perhaps.
Wonderful writing and analysis - as always! Thanks a lot. In particular, I like your and Watling's point about Putin's long-term option of creating new formations as a warning against complacency on behalf of Ukraine or ourselves. I also sense that you're absolutely right when arguing that the hard test of Putin's mobilisation drive will be not take place in Russia but at the front, where disgruntled soldiers will be joined by newcomers and with few leading officers around. Risky business indeed!
My perception of this conflict is that it is a proxy war fought with western arms and Ukrainian lives (Putin as said as much himself). It is not as though pre-war Ukraine was a model democracy.
The potential gains to Russia appear to be trivial and yet the costs are huge. As Obama said at the start, Putin bet the farm on this and now all he can think to do is to carry on raising the stakes.
And what he has done is demonstrate to other potential aggressors (dare I suggest China?) how ineffective his armed forces are.
Could it be that he will wake up one day and recognise that far from being the player he is the one who has been played?
Exactly right. Leadership at all levels is a problem.
Professor Freedman, your comment about instructors reminded me about comments I recall from earlier in the war (I am not sure if these were in your posts) about a shortage of junior officers in the Russian army and the lack of initiative shown by Russian NCOs, the latter I understood to be a structural feature of the Russian army. Therefore, it is not only a matter of the training of the new recruits but also, once they have joined their (old or new) formations, how they will be employed in the fighting and how they will be led.
What I appreciate about these posts, apart from their analytical lucidity, is that they don't lose sight (as some pundits sometimes do) of the awful tragedy being forced on Ukraine by Putin and his clique, and also on Russia itself. All these men being shoved into the front line to kill and be killed for the sake of war aims which are cruel beyond reason and likely to prove unachievable for Russia.
If one were grasping for parallels, Mussolini's disastrous invasion of Greece in 1940 comes to mind though, in this case, there's no stronger military power willing to bail Putin out.
Thanks for another thought provoking and informative piece. My feeling is that the Russians are determined not to admit defeat and so they are doing a poorly done mobilization in the hope something positive may come with time. I'm not at all sure they have a reasoned plan so that mere time will come to their advantage because of cunning strategems on their part. It's more a matter of putting off the desperate day for later and hoping that perhaps it will never come. But hope is not a strategy and looking at the geo-political efforts of the Kremlin regime up to now they have hardly been more cunning an effective than their military campaigning. Russia is isolated, NATO has a new lease of life and even if Ukraine's backers tried hard to get Ukraine to make concessions (by no means certain) I can't see the Ukrainians giving Russia or it's wavering allies much joy.
> If Russia is responsible for these mystery explosions, and it is hard to think who else it could be
A cynic might suspect it was the US, to put the pipelines physically out of action pro temp and thus prevent the EU compromising on sanctions by reaching a deal with Russia to restore the gas flow.
A little remark -, please, change Ukraine on Russia in "The rushed referendums with their unavoidably absurd and uniform 98% majority support for joining Ukraine..."
"The rushed referendums with their unavoidably absurd and uniform 98% majority support for joining Ukraine, also adds to the sense of desperation in the Kremlin."
support for joining Russia (?)
'This all began with a cry of "enough with rotten meat."'
May it be so.
Bravo.
What to do with those seeking to escape mobilisation?
I can anticipate the reaction from states who suffered Stalins re-conquest of eastern Europe, (although that seems to me, to be a mistake,) they will understandably be unsympathetic. There will be undoubtedly nefarious actors just in case public opinion can be mediated enough to accommodate them.
Is a blanket refusal the best way?
Force the issue back into Russia.
I'm tempted to say yes, but curious as to your thoughts.
As they have discovered to their cost, the terrain is too flat and open for armoured offensives.
I keep reading this yet when one considers the German-Russian battles from 1941-3 in Ukraine fighting continued throughout the fall and winter (the Crimea was taken (except for Sevastopol) in October-December 1941 and Operation Uranus (the Soviet attack on Stalingrad) took place in November of 1942 and continued throughout the winter (until the spring thaw). While there are certainly new ant-tank weapons available now there was close air support during WWII, which is not available now. The only thing I can think of is that there are insufficient tanks to conduct the large armoured offensives, not that the terrain is too flat. In fact, in Khruschev's memoirs, he complained that before the outbreak of the Russian-German war the world press would write that the Ukraine was a "tankodrome"--that is, ideally suited for rapid armoured advances.
Thorough, insightful and very clear. Thank you, Prof. Freedman. I found your point of russia using a tactical nuclear weapon on “its own territory” (ie., newly annexed) particularly intriguing. Kremlin trying to create a ‘new twist’ on use of nukes, perhaps.
Wonderful writing and analysis - as always! Thanks a lot. In particular, I like your and Watling's point about Putin's long-term option of creating new formations as a warning against complacency on behalf of Ukraine or ourselves. I also sense that you're absolutely right when arguing that the hard test of Putin's mobilisation drive will be not take place in Russia but at the front, where disgruntled soldiers will be joined by newcomers and with few leading officers around. Risky business indeed!
Mette Skak, Aarhus University, Denmark.
My perception of this conflict is that it is a proxy war fought with western arms and Ukrainian lives (Putin as said as much himself). It is not as though pre-war Ukraine was a model democracy.
The potential gains to Russia appear to be trivial and yet the costs are huge. As Obama said at the start, Putin bet the farm on this and now all he can think to do is to carry on raising the stakes.
And what he has done is demonstrate to other potential aggressors (dare I suggest China?) how ineffective his armed forces are.
Could it be that he will wake up one day and recognise that far from being the player he is the one who has been played?
Of all the sources and commentaries on the war, your analysis is the most thorough and thoughtful. Thanks!