A Ukrainian soldier shows off a HIMARS multiple rocket launcher - part of the package of US military aid (Photo by Anastasia Vlasova for The Washington Post via Getty Images)
Thanks as always for making a complex, and therefore even more worrying situation clearer. We all need to remain engaged with the evolving nature of this conflict, but it also helps to have some idea of possible outcomes in mind if one is not a military specialist.
As usual, a very thoughtful analysis Lawrence. When it comes to negotiations (who knows when) a key matter not often discussed is that of reparations. Russis owes hundreds of billions for all the damage and death it inflicted, and the sanctions can remain in place forever until they pay, but this all will need to be negotiated and it could make even the prospects of negotiations difficult for the Russians to contemplate.
A good analysis. But it, sadly, lacks two components:
the first is the outcome of the economic standoff between Russia and the West which does not look bvious at all, Russia seems to be able to weather sanctions much better *in the short run* than expected while the West, especially Western Europe, is facing a possible crisis that could turn into a depression if Russia cuts its energy shipments. This will not necessarily help Russia win on the battlefield in Ukraine, though, but it could make life harder for Ukraine and possibly force it to accept disadvantageous peace terms. In this sense, time is working for Russia, as long as it can prevent Ukrainian counteroffensives from succeeding. On the other hand, the longer the war drags on, the likelier unrest is to break out in Russia, especially in the ethnic republics. In that sense, time is not on Russia's side and parts of the Russian power elite are deeply aware of it.
Which leads us to the second factor which you do not pay attention to: the possibility of dramatic escalation. The current Russian leadership, as long as it is not deposed, is unlikely to accept defeat and to retreat, assuming this would result in their downfall. But since the longer the war goes on, the likelier the possibility of total defeat will become. Russia will, in my view, try to conduct a general mobilization pretty soon, possibly after bloody false flag operations blamed on Ukraine and/or NATO. Another option which should not be discarded would be to turn to WMDs, that is, above all, (tactical) nukes. This could, then, very fast lead to a global nuclear war.
I think Russia using its fossil fuels & Ukraine's/their own grain as a weapon is tactically entirely sensible for them, given that together they really represent Russia's only economic levers, but strategically suicidal. It can only accelerate a green transition in Europe, & supply diversification, & reverse an energy dependence that Russia has worked diligently over decades to bolster, giving it soft power it really wouldn't otherwise have, that it could have continued to wield almost indefinitely absent going full on imperial conquest in Ukraine, & probably to the effect of delaying the aforementioned green transition in Europe as well - something that's an existential economic threat to Russia in the medium to long term anyway. Using the global food supply as a weapon, provoking famine in half the developing world, is certainly going to get people's attention, but they probably aren't going to think 'This regime is prepared to starve a million people to death to get his way, let's give it perpetual unearned control over these resources', are they.
If Putin is prepared to escalate into a full mobilisation to try to defeat Ukraine, you have to ask, what are they going to ride into battle in & fight with, given that the huge parks of tanks & kit that were once supposed to equip a fully mobilised soviet force have turned out by now to be mostly full of rusty junk that has been looted for parts over the last 2 decades, sold on the black market to keep NCOs in vodka & their officers in Mercedes?
Leaving aside the destabilising impact of a full mobilisation in Russia, & the likely extra demands it might make on internal security manpower, & the incredibly long lead time involved in turning unwilling civilians into useful & motivated soldiers, starting with the fact that Russia does not have any training infrastructure at all to perform that task & would need to create it before it could start to train more than a tiny handful of soldiers, not to mention the antique & poorly/unmaintained kit & weapons they are likely to be given to fight with, a Russian mobilisation could break Russia economically & politically, & the... say... 9 month lead time before it could supply anything to the war effort except target practice for the Ukrainians seems like it would give them plenty of opportunity to respond, not least because various NATO countries are falling over themselves to train Ukrainian troops up, meaning that Ukraine's existing training pipeline is now in principle fatter than the fattest firehose, & Ukraine could presumably out match them in mobilising on the same scale with well trained, well motivated troops available well before the first shoddily trained poorly motivated Russians appear on the battlefield.
WMD are the wildcard, but if Putin is prepared to go there, he already knows he has lost & mother Russia will cease to exist because nobody wins a nuclear war & _everybody_ ceases to exist...
The "green energy transition" in Europe is, if anything, a long-term project that will take many years to complete. Some say this is ideology and can never be achieved without nuclear power as a backup. The output of the ageing French nuclear power stations is currently at a 34(!) year low, as many reactors are undergoing maintenance and repairs after cracks were discovered. Germany has three remaining nuclear power plants that are still operational, they are slated to be taken offline at the end of 2022.
Building a new nuclear power plant realistically takes up to ten years, go and google to find how the French have been doing in this field. There is absolutely no easy fix to Europe's energy troubles, and the number of people who are beginning to realise that the decision to boycott Russian oil and partly gas will cost them dearly is growing with each passing month. The Russian Army may be struggling in Ukraine but as a matter of fact Europe and especially Germany can simply not afford to do without cheap Russian gas and commodities if its industry is to remain competitive.
You can't afford an extremely old demographic, generous welfare states, continuing mass immigration of often unemployable young males from the Middle East & Africa, Covid lockdowns and restrictions and add much higher energy costs on top of this mix. This structure simply won't hold, at some point there will be seismic shifts in the political system.
Can Russia be presented as the bogey man who is responsible for the problems that will manifest themselves rather sooner than later? I am not sure, many people are incredibly gullible, but if I were a politician in Europe I would definitely not bet on it.
Europe will take mitigating actions - floating LPG terminals, nuclear plants given reprieves, windfarms & solar being built rapidly. Your point about this probably being pretty is well made, but nothing about it gets better if Europe surrenders, it means they face the same issues when Russia rolls over Moldova & Georgia. And giving Putin control of the global food supply after he has demonstrated his willingness to inflict famine on millions to impose his will on Europe would make it far worse. In short, the worse it is, the more important it is shown to be that they do it anyway, because if they don't, next time (and there will be a next time) it will be worse, the stakes will be higher & Russia will have had a chance to grow its military power with european wealth.
This analysis, though interesting, is lacking in geo-strategic depth. I agree with those who point out that Europe is in a precarious situation, due to its energy needs and the prospect of gas and electricity shortages. People who argue this will be overcome with expensive natural gas from the US, Canada and Qatar as well as wind and solar power have no understanding of how deeply destructive Germany's energy policy has been since 2011 and that there is no easy fix for this.
Irrespective of whether or not we are going to see gas shortages and power outages on the continent this winter, European industry will suffer enormously if the EU decides to continue its boycott on Russian oil and its partial boycott on Russian gas. European political leaders will come under increasing pressure to support some form of agreement with Russia. Unemployment and poverty will rise steeply, and so will the likelihood of social unrest. If a major, nation-wide power outage were to occur and to last more than two days in France and/or Germany, then all bets are off. One things is certain: Ukraine will be the least of problems European politicians will have to address in the wake of such a disaster.
With the right weapons (and training) the Ukrainians will almost definitely win. And Russia is on the ropes already with NO reserves or allies willing to supply them with anything. Sheeit, they haven’t even called it a war yet, bc they are afraid of domestic backlash. Weak.
Short answer- no. Not while Putin lives. In the long run- possibly, depending upon diplomacy with the next Russian leader. The question is how much death, destruction and economic calamity should be suffered between now and then.
An excellent piece, the balancing point is that NATO, particularly European NATO, resources notably ammunition and people (recruitment and retention) are in a similar state. The danger is that a cease fire in Ukraine will be taken as confirmation of NATO power, when it has actually revealed that European NATO nations are unable Le got defend themselves. If Russia is held in Ukraine or hopefully repelled it does not relieve European NATO nations from well structured investment in defence capabilities, particularly in the land domain. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a wake up call - European NATO nations should not answer and then go back to sleep.
Not yet clear. The possibility of Ukrainian victory should not be dismissed. Hundreds of thousands lives lost, enormous destruction, for a right to be a NATO member.
All other Ukrainian goals could have been achieved through neutrality. But at the price of neutrality.
Very interesting analysis.
A moment may come when negotiations will be possible, but not until the question, is it possible to win a proxy war against Russia with a help of economic sanctions has been answered.
If the West can win, there is no need for negotiations.
Personally, I look for the Ukranians to surprise the Russians with a deep thrust into any One of a number of soft spots, headed for the Crimean peninsula.
I am still just not sure how committed the west is to living up to its public rhetoric- do the western stakeholders have a plan to win with Ukraine or are we being reactive and giving the right equipment but not in the numbers or timings to win. I guess there is a scenario whereby the west gives just enough to win, but without completely overwhelming the Russians and consequences of doing so. The geopolitical and economic landscapes are dependent on how this battle may be won , not just the win.
Thank you for a really thoughtful analysis Lawrence. However, I'm afraid I don't agree with a number of your conclusions.
I lived in Moscow in the 90s and 00s and was struck then by the Russian tendency to deploy "provokatsiya" to alienate and initate conflict with outsiders. An example of this was the regime's bombing of the apartment buildings in Moscow to provoke the war in Chechnya.
The alienation of the west and the subsequent sanctions have massively benefited Putin because it got rid of western corporations - BP, the banks, Facebook etc and helped him achieve a tighter grip on power. The void left by these companies and financial systems will be filled discreetly by China, India other "neutral" countries. Russia has turned slowly to face East and the sheer geographical size of Russia (often overlooked in favour of simple measurements of power such as GDP) means that they can play the long game, secure in the fact they have China as their "kreesha" (roof).
My own guess is that Russia will simply take over the whole of Ukraine over a few years snd then start on the Baltic states. This will, I fear, be coupled with continued social and political disruption tactics (as seen, for example, in the interference in Brexit and the attempted corruption of the Conservative Party in the UK).
I love the Russian people, (I'm married to a Russian) and many aspects of its culture but I fear what's coming. Have a watch of the last 3 films by the great Russian film director Andrey Zvyagintzev if you want an idea of the recent decay of Russian civil society, moral vaccum and endemic political corruption.
You have some interesting points but I do not understand how you came to the guess that that "Russia will simply take over the whole of Ukraine over a few years and then start on the Baltic states" - how? Could you give us some plausible scenario?
Where will Russia get the manpower, weapons and money to do it? Even if they turn to China and India, they will still be bleeding money, because India and China both a) need the West more than they need Russia so they will probably tread lightly and b) can now get everything Russian cheap because they will not have to compete with the West; they have no reason to pay the prices the West was paying so Russia will profit a lot less. Also, the infrastructure is not there (it will take years to replace pipelines to EU with the same capacity directed the other way). Also, while China is technologically much more advanced than Russia, they still cannot easily replace all western stuff (German machinery).
And when you are talking about Baltic states... they are NATO so this would open a whole new can of worms. I am not saying it could not happen, but if you are saying that your guess is it will happen, I would really like to know how it could happen.
Thank you for a great analysis. Good to hear both sides, and the problems that both face, without the hullabaloo.
The key thing that you pickup on is how long will the west carry on supporting Ukraine?. I fear that the west does have a short memory, even now things like covid on the oncrease, cost of living is more important.
Really believe that if Russia, no the leadship, not the people, is not stopped then, 4, 5 years time, it will happen again. This time it could be Poland, or the Batics..but its back to the short term memory of the west.
If Russia Thought It could get away with it, then Yes.
Lots of reasons, Historically Poland, and the Baltics were always in the Influence of Russia/USSR and Putin feels robbed at the breakup of the USSR. Also Article 5 of NATO only says the following
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking . . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area
Its the "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force", is the get out clause of some NATO countries, eg Germany.......
Anyway, I think at the moment Putin has his hands full in Ukraine, But 4 years later????
I am not sure if he is ill, but certainly he is doing this for his legacy. Agreed that what comes next is important , but I think it maybe more of a nationalist leader than Putin. And tgat still spells trouble..
Thanks as always for making a complex, and therefore even more worrying situation clearer. We all need to remain engaged with the evolving nature of this conflict, but it also helps to have some idea of possible outcomes in mind if one is not a military specialist.
As usual, a very thoughtful analysis Lawrence. When it comes to negotiations (who knows when) a key matter not often discussed is that of reparations. Russis owes hundreds of billions for all the damage and death it inflicted, and the sanctions can remain in place forever until they pay, but this all will need to be negotiated and it could make even the prospects of negotiations difficult for the Russians to contemplate.
A good analysis. But it, sadly, lacks two components:
the first is the outcome of the economic standoff between Russia and the West which does not look bvious at all, Russia seems to be able to weather sanctions much better *in the short run* than expected while the West, especially Western Europe, is facing a possible crisis that could turn into a depression if Russia cuts its energy shipments. This will not necessarily help Russia win on the battlefield in Ukraine, though, but it could make life harder for Ukraine and possibly force it to accept disadvantageous peace terms. In this sense, time is working for Russia, as long as it can prevent Ukrainian counteroffensives from succeeding. On the other hand, the longer the war drags on, the likelier unrest is to break out in Russia, especially in the ethnic republics. In that sense, time is not on Russia's side and parts of the Russian power elite are deeply aware of it.
Which leads us to the second factor which you do not pay attention to: the possibility of dramatic escalation. The current Russian leadership, as long as it is not deposed, is unlikely to accept defeat and to retreat, assuming this would result in their downfall. But since the longer the war goes on, the likelier the possibility of total defeat will become. Russia will, in my view, try to conduct a general mobilization pretty soon, possibly after bloody false flag operations blamed on Ukraine and/or NATO. Another option which should not be discarded would be to turn to WMDs, that is, above all, (tactical) nukes. This could, then, very fast lead to a global nuclear war.
I think Russia using its fossil fuels & Ukraine's/their own grain as a weapon is tactically entirely sensible for them, given that together they really represent Russia's only economic levers, but strategically suicidal. It can only accelerate a green transition in Europe, & supply diversification, & reverse an energy dependence that Russia has worked diligently over decades to bolster, giving it soft power it really wouldn't otherwise have, that it could have continued to wield almost indefinitely absent going full on imperial conquest in Ukraine, & probably to the effect of delaying the aforementioned green transition in Europe as well - something that's an existential economic threat to Russia in the medium to long term anyway. Using the global food supply as a weapon, provoking famine in half the developing world, is certainly going to get people's attention, but they probably aren't going to think 'This regime is prepared to starve a million people to death to get his way, let's give it perpetual unearned control over these resources', are they.
If Putin is prepared to escalate into a full mobilisation to try to defeat Ukraine, you have to ask, what are they going to ride into battle in & fight with, given that the huge parks of tanks & kit that were once supposed to equip a fully mobilised soviet force have turned out by now to be mostly full of rusty junk that has been looted for parts over the last 2 decades, sold on the black market to keep NCOs in vodka & their officers in Mercedes?
Leaving aside the destabilising impact of a full mobilisation in Russia, & the likely extra demands it might make on internal security manpower, & the incredibly long lead time involved in turning unwilling civilians into useful & motivated soldiers, starting with the fact that Russia does not have any training infrastructure at all to perform that task & would need to create it before it could start to train more than a tiny handful of soldiers, not to mention the antique & poorly/unmaintained kit & weapons they are likely to be given to fight with, a Russian mobilisation could break Russia economically & politically, & the... say... 9 month lead time before it could supply anything to the war effort except target practice for the Ukrainians seems like it would give them plenty of opportunity to respond, not least because various NATO countries are falling over themselves to train Ukrainian troops up, meaning that Ukraine's existing training pipeline is now in principle fatter than the fattest firehose, & Ukraine could presumably out match them in mobilising on the same scale with well trained, well motivated troops available well before the first shoddily trained poorly motivated Russians appear on the battlefield.
WMD are the wildcard, but if Putin is prepared to go there, he already knows he has lost & mother Russia will cease to exist because nobody wins a nuclear war & _everybody_ ceases to exist...
The "green energy transition" in Europe is, if anything, a long-term project that will take many years to complete. Some say this is ideology and can never be achieved without nuclear power as a backup. The output of the ageing French nuclear power stations is currently at a 34(!) year low, as many reactors are undergoing maintenance and repairs after cracks were discovered. Germany has three remaining nuclear power plants that are still operational, they are slated to be taken offline at the end of 2022.
Building a new nuclear power plant realistically takes up to ten years, go and google to find how the French have been doing in this field. There is absolutely no easy fix to Europe's energy troubles, and the number of people who are beginning to realise that the decision to boycott Russian oil and partly gas will cost them dearly is growing with each passing month. The Russian Army may be struggling in Ukraine but as a matter of fact Europe and especially Germany can simply not afford to do without cheap Russian gas and commodities if its industry is to remain competitive.
You can't afford an extremely old demographic, generous welfare states, continuing mass immigration of often unemployable young males from the Middle East & Africa, Covid lockdowns and restrictions and add much higher energy costs on top of this mix. This structure simply won't hold, at some point there will be seismic shifts in the political system.
Can Russia be presented as the bogey man who is responsible for the problems that will manifest themselves rather sooner than later? I am not sure, many people are incredibly gullible, but if I were a politician in Europe I would definitely not bet on it.
Europe will take mitigating actions - floating LPG terminals, nuclear plants given reprieves, windfarms & solar being built rapidly. Your point about this probably being pretty is well made, but nothing about it gets better if Europe surrenders, it means they face the same issues when Russia rolls over Moldova & Georgia. And giving Putin control of the global food supply after he has demonstrated his willingness to inflict famine on millions to impose his will on Europe would make it far worse. In short, the worse it is, the more important it is shown to be that they do it anyway, because if they don't, next time (and there will be a next time) it will be worse, the stakes will be higher & Russia will have had a chance to grow its military power with european wealth.
This analysis, though interesting, is lacking in geo-strategic depth. I agree with those who point out that Europe is in a precarious situation, due to its energy needs and the prospect of gas and electricity shortages. People who argue this will be overcome with expensive natural gas from the US, Canada and Qatar as well as wind and solar power have no understanding of how deeply destructive Germany's energy policy has been since 2011 and that there is no easy fix for this.
Irrespective of whether or not we are going to see gas shortages and power outages on the continent this winter, European industry will suffer enormously if the EU decides to continue its boycott on Russian oil and its partial boycott on Russian gas. European political leaders will come under increasing pressure to support some form of agreement with Russia. Unemployment and poverty will rise steeply, and so will the likelihood of social unrest. If a major, nation-wide power outage were to occur and to last more than two days in France and/or Germany, then all bets are off. One things is certain: Ukraine will be the least of problems European politicians will have to address in the wake of such a disaster.
Thanks -- I'm unsure of the meaning of 'po' in this sentence:
The military prospect for the Russians po, therefore, is of a juddering, stuttering conflict lasting for some time without a definitive conclusion.
With the right weapons (and training) the Ukrainians will almost definitely win. And Russia is on the ropes already with NO reserves or allies willing to supply them with anything. Sheeit, they haven’t even called it a war yet, bc they are afraid of domestic backlash. Weak.
Short answer- no. Not while Putin lives. In the long run- possibly, depending upon diplomacy with the next Russian leader. The question is how much death, destruction and economic calamity should be suffered between now and then.
Thanks for another clear and easy-to-understand perspective on this conflict.
Great piece!
An excellent piece, the balancing point is that NATO, particularly European NATO, resources notably ammunition and people (recruitment and retention) are in a similar state. The danger is that a cease fire in Ukraine will be taken as confirmation of NATO power, when it has actually revealed that European NATO nations are unable Le got defend themselves. If Russia is held in Ukraine or hopefully repelled it does not relieve European NATO nations from well structured investment in defence capabilities, particularly in the land domain. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a wake up call - European NATO nations should not answer and then go back to sleep.
Not yet clear. The possibility of Ukrainian victory should not be dismissed. Hundreds of thousands lives lost, enormous destruction, for a right to be a NATO member.
All other Ukrainian goals could have been achieved through neutrality. But at the price of neutrality.
Very interesting analysis.
A moment may come when negotiations will be possible, but not until the question, is it possible to win a proxy war against Russia with a help of economic sanctions has been answered.
If the West can win, there is no need for negotiations.
Personally, I look for the Ukranians to surprise the Russians with a deep thrust into any One of a number of soft spots, headed for the Crimean peninsula.
Excellent analysis. Thank you.
I am still just not sure how committed the west is to living up to its public rhetoric- do the western stakeholders have a plan to win with Ukraine or are we being reactive and giving the right equipment but not in the numbers or timings to win. I guess there is a scenario whereby the west gives just enough to win, but without completely overwhelming the Russians and consequences of doing so. The geopolitical and economic landscapes are dependent on how this battle may be won , not just the win.
Thank you for a really thoughtful analysis Lawrence. However, I'm afraid I don't agree with a number of your conclusions.
I lived in Moscow in the 90s and 00s and was struck then by the Russian tendency to deploy "provokatsiya" to alienate and initate conflict with outsiders. An example of this was the regime's bombing of the apartment buildings in Moscow to provoke the war in Chechnya.
The alienation of the west and the subsequent sanctions have massively benefited Putin because it got rid of western corporations - BP, the banks, Facebook etc and helped him achieve a tighter grip on power. The void left by these companies and financial systems will be filled discreetly by China, India other "neutral" countries. Russia has turned slowly to face East and the sheer geographical size of Russia (often overlooked in favour of simple measurements of power such as GDP) means that they can play the long game, secure in the fact they have China as their "kreesha" (roof).
My own guess is that Russia will simply take over the whole of Ukraine over a few years snd then start on the Baltic states. This will, I fear, be coupled with continued social and political disruption tactics (as seen, for example, in the interference in Brexit and the attempted corruption of the Conservative Party in the UK).
I love the Russian people, (I'm married to a Russian) and many aspects of its culture but I fear what's coming. Have a watch of the last 3 films by the great Russian film director Andrey Zvyagintzev if you want an idea of the recent decay of Russian civil society, moral vaccum and endemic political corruption.
You have some interesting points but I do not understand how you came to the guess that that "Russia will simply take over the whole of Ukraine over a few years and then start on the Baltic states" - how? Could you give us some plausible scenario?
Where will Russia get the manpower, weapons and money to do it? Even if they turn to China and India, they will still be bleeding money, because India and China both a) need the West more than they need Russia so they will probably tread lightly and b) can now get everything Russian cheap because they will not have to compete with the West; they have no reason to pay the prices the West was paying so Russia will profit a lot less. Also, the infrastructure is not there (it will take years to replace pipelines to EU with the same capacity directed the other way). Also, while China is technologically much more advanced than Russia, they still cannot easily replace all western stuff (German machinery).
And when you are talking about Baltic states... they are NATO so this would open a whole new can of worms. I am not saying it could not happen, but if you are saying that your guess is it will happen, I would really like to know how it could happen.
Yep. That's how I look at it.
Thank you for a great analysis. Good to hear both sides, and the problems that both face, without the hullabaloo.
The key thing that you pickup on is how long will the west carry on supporting Ukraine?. I fear that the west does have a short memory, even now things like covid on the oncrease, cost of living is more important.
Really believe that if Russia, no the leadship, not the people, is not stopped then, 4, 5 years time, it will happen again. This time it could be Poland, or the Batics..but its back to the short term memory of the west.
They surely won't attack a country in NATO?
If Russia Thought It could get away with it, then Yes.
Lots of reasons, Historically Poland, and the Baltics were always in the Influence of Russia/USSR and Putin feels robbed at the breakup of the USSR. Also Article 5 of NATO only says the following
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking . . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area
Its the "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force", is the get out clause of some NATO countries, eg Germany.......
Anyway, I think at the moment Putin has his hands full in Ukraine, But 4 years later????
Maybe the odd country would try to find a loop hole, but pretty sure Nato as a whole would come down pretty hard if one of them were attacked.
I would hope so too.
In four years' time he will be before his maker. That's why he is doing this now. The question is who and what comes next.
I am not sure if he is ill, but certainly he is doing this for his legacy. Agreed that what comes next is important , but I think it maybe more of a nationalist leader than Putin. And tgat still spells trouble..
Really hope I am wrong thou