Building on Kursk

Can Ukraine and the US agree on a plan?

A damaged statue of Lenin in Sudza, Kursk, now controlled by Ukraine. (Photo by YAN DOBRONOSOV/AFP via Getty Images).

In my previous post I described the Ukrainian move into Kursk as intended to shift the narrative around the war. Prior to the invasion the view was that Ukraine was on the defensive, making Russian advances as painful as possible without actually stopping them, and so looking for other ways to hurt Russia. The core strategy was to hang on until Russia’s losses reached the point where its offensives petered out and its leadership started to look for a way out. The advantage of the Kursk operation was that it showed that Ukraine could take military initiative and as a result make serious gains while catching Moscow by surprise.

On  27 August, three weeks after the start of the incursion, President Zelensky and his Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi provided an update on its progress and what they hope to achieve. According to Syrskyi, Ukraine now controls 1,294 square kilometers and 100 settlements. He reported that 594 Russian soldiers have been captured. More importantly, in terms of the desire to encourage Russia to move troops out of Ukraine to deal with the Kursk situation, he spoke of the redirection of about 30,000 troops from other sectors to Kursk, adding that ‘this number is growing.’ The number required for a Russian counter-offensive in Kursk is assessed to be around 50,000. Yet, as was anticipated, Russia still persists with its dogged advance in the Pokrovsk sector. This is its top priority, to which it has assigned its most combat-ready units.

In his remarks Zelensky claimed that the Russian advance was slowing but did not hide the tough time facing those defending this crucial sector. He warned that the assault would be like last year’s on Bakhmut. If the Russians decide they really need it, they

‘will throw 50,000-60,000 people there. You will see it. You will understand these numbers very soon... There must be tricks. We are not bigger than Russia.’

He did not claim that the Russians could be stopped in their tracks, or that Pokrovsk could be defended indefinitely, although efforts are being made to stabilize the situation. He was however confident that Russian forces could be prevented from occupying all of Donetsk, which is their objective. (This also appears to be the assessment of the Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies; nonetheless a number of Ukrainian analysts are very anxious about recent Russian gains). Zelensky also observed that Putin appeared to care more about capturing a Ukrainian city that he had likely never heard of rather than defending his own territories. Lastly, he emphasized the Kursk incursion’s value in making it harder for the Russians to launch any more invasions of their own into Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. Ukraine was creating a buffer zone inside Russian territory. As if to reinforce this point Ukrainian forces have been pushing to get a foothold in Russia’s Belgorad oblast.

Zelensky also made a point of relating the incursion to Ukraine's second peace summit, planned for November. It is one of ‘the stages to end the war.’ Although this suggests creating a bargaining chip to be deployed in eventual talks with Vladimir Putin, that is not what he has in mind. Instead his peace plan, perhaps designed in the same spirit as Putin’s peace plan, is really about how to achieve a victory.

‘The Kursk operation is not related to any of the points of (Ukraine's) peace formula. Is the Kursk operation connected to the second peace summit? Yes, it is. Because the Kursk operation is one of the points of Ukraine's victory plan.’

This plan, to be presented to the Biden administration during September, involves four steps of which Kursk is just one . The others involve Ukraine's participation in the global security infrastructure (that is membership of NATO or some equivalent arrangement), diplomatic pressure on Russia to end the war, and an economic aspect.

Attacks on Infrastructure

Zelensky is surely right that Ukraine cannot solely rely on military moves to get Russian troops out of his country. But the economic aspect also seems ambitious. After all his new conference came just after a series of relentless attacks involving hundreds of drones and missiles on Ukrainian civil society, and in particular on its critical infrastructure.

On the morning of 26 August, in one of the largest attacks of the war, 15 Ukrainian regions were attacked by drones, cruise missiles and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. Ukraine’s Air Force claimed to have shot down or electronically disabled 201 of the 236 missiles and drones. The next day came yet another attack, on a smaller scale but still substantial. This time Ukraine claims to have shot down 60 out of 81 drones and five out of ten missiles. There were significant civilian casualties on both days.

These attacks were expected. Air raids of this sort were regular during the spring and early summer. There was then a marked lull over the summer, which suggested stockpiling for a very large attack (see the figures compiled by John Ridge). There are three reasons for the attack now. The first is that this is the Kremlin’s way of celebrating Ukraine’s Independence Day (25 August). Second, that it is frustrated by Ukraine’s initiatives of recent weeks – both the move into Kursk and its strikes against a variety of high-value targets within Russia – and it has been looking for ways to hit back. Third, and more important, for this is more than just lashing out, it is part of a long campaign, as the Russian military confirmed, against ‘important energy infrastructure’.

Russia’s aim is to make life as miserable as possible for ordinary Ukrainians over the coming months and into winter, not just as punishment for their resistance and resilience but to make it difficult for them to stay. Russia wants hundreds of thousands to leave their homes, perhaps creating yet another refugee crisis in neighbouring European countries.

Before the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s domestic energy production was about 55 gigawatts of electricity. In the later months of 2022, the electrical distribution grid was badly damaged because of incessant Russian strikes but then during 2023 it was repaired. Nonetheless vital installations were still taken out of the system: the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power plant was taken offline and the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Dam was also damaged. Earlier this year strikes were directed against thermal and hydroelectric power plants which are hard and expensive to fix or replace. The Financial Times reported last June that energy production was now below 20GW, less than half of prewar levels. This led to rolling blackouts, and injunctions to individuals and organisations to save power by every means possible. The paper quoted one official saying ‘We should prepare for life in the cold and the dark’ with another adding, ‘This is our new normal.’

According to Time Magazine by early August, over 9 gigawatts of power generation had been taken out since March. The largest hydroelectric plant, the Dnipro station, has been rendered inoperable while every single thermal (coal and natural gas burning) plant has been hit. Of the original 13 no more than two were still operational.

The impact of the latest attacks are still being clarified. Blackouts were introduced as much as a precaution as a consequence. At the same forum where Zelensky and Syrskyi were speaking Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal reported that the energy infrastructure suffered less damage from the latest attacks than feared;

"Yesterday, Russia attacked our power distribution substations with missiles for the first time. The facilities were targeted by tens of cluster missiles, but we lost a relatively small amount of equipment during that attack. All due to the (heightened) protection of the facilities because of ‘the protection systems implemented on power distribution substations’

This still leaves Ukraine coping with a significant energy deficit. Some relief can be found by increasing imports of EU electricity from 1.7GW to 2.4GW. More gas-fired energy plants are being brought online. The aim is to set up a more decentralised energy system, increasing the use of solar panels and wind turbines.  In addition, private generators are being used throughout the country. To give the system a chance to recover it is necessary to improve air defences and, where possible, strike the Russian bases from where their aircraft fly.  This is where Kyiv needs more help from its western partners. The recent attacks won’t be the last.

The Need for Long-range Systems

In a statement on 26 August President Biden condemned that day’s attack and added that the coalition of Ukraine’s supporters:

‘is providing Ukraine with critically needed military equipment, including air defense systems and interceptors. As I announced at the NATO Summit in July, the United States and our allies have provided Ukraine with the equipment for five additional strategic air defense systems, and I have re-prioritized U.S. air defense exports so they are sent to Ukraine first. The United States also is surging energy equipment to Ukraine to repair its systems and strengthen the resilience of Ukraine’s energy grid.’

Unfortunately the promised strategic air defence systems are only starting to arrive. Hopefully the urgency of the current situation will speed things up. Another disclosure from Zelensky was that Ukrainian F-16s, the first of which arrived early in August, were employed defending against the attacks of 26 August and had shot down some missiles and drones. He added, ‘we don't have many of them, and we still need to train pilots.’ (Some ten have reportedly been received so far, with 79 in total expected from a number of European countries).

Absent from Biden’s statement, was any mention of what might be done to prevent Russian aircraft taking off to launch their missiles. His Administration’s refusal to allow the long-range systems it has provided to be used to strike targets well inside Russian territory has long been a source of immense frustration in Kyiv. The prohibition extends to non-US systems which have US components, such as the UK Storm Shadow (French Scalp) cruise missile. Neither London nor Paris objects to their use to target Russian air bases but they need consent from Washington.

There are three levels to this debate. The first is one about the availability of both systems and targets. Essentially are there enough of the relevant bases in range and is this the best use of a scarce resource? The second level is the ‘fear of escalation’, the assumption that there is a point beyond which Russia must not be pushed lest it moves in desperation to nuclear use of some kind. The third, is whether the US and other NATO countries fear jeopardising relations with Russia to the point that they are unable either to play a useful role in brokering an eventual peace settlement or recasting the European security system once this war is over.

This third level achieved some prominence recently when a story in Politico reported that some officials had ‘told the Ukrainians that the U.S. will eventually want to reset relations with Moscow and lifting the restrictions could upend those efforts.’ After this attracted many adverse comments, with regular references to ‘appeasement’, the Biden Administration said that this notion of a reset was ‘utterly unreflective of the White House's thinking.’ In practice, so long as President Putin is in the Kremlin it is hard to see how anything approaching normal diplomatic relations is possible with Russia. There may be communications to limit the repercussions of the war or even to make arrangements for winding it down, but the divorce has been too messy and acrimonious for there to be any reconciliation.

Putin is also in no mood to forgive and forget. He regularly blames NATO for his inability to bring the war to a successful conclusion and presents Ukraine as an instrument of Western foreign policy. On this basis he argues that peace depends on Russia-US talks in the first instance, to which the US cannot agree. Even a returning President Trump would not be able to go back to pre-invasion relations.

The second level, involving worries about escalation, has become a familiar part of the debate. The issue has not gone away, not least because the Russians keep on bringing it up, but so many of their ‘red lines’ have now been crossed that the issue is losing its force. (Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov chipped in by describing Ukraine's demand to be allowed to strike deep into Russia with Western weapons amounted to blackmail, adding that Russia is ‘adjusting’ its nuclear weapons doctrine, and Western nuclear powers should not be ‘playing with fire.’)

As was seen with the Kursk incursion, when something bad happens the instinct in Moscow is to play it down rather than up, because they do not wish to give the impression of events moving out of their control. A frustrated Zelensky has dismissed:

‘The whole naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia, which dominated the assessment of the war by some partners, has crumbled these days somewhere near Sudzha [in the Kursk sector].’

Ukraine is routinely attacking big targets well inside Russia with its own systems and the US has already agreed that its systems can be used to defend against Russian troop movements that directly threaten Ukrainian forces. It is not a very large step to say that it can also attack any Russian forces that are being used to attack Ukraine.

My view remains that the only real red line in all of this is NATO countries deciding to fight directly with Ukrainians against Russian forces. Even in those circumstances it is not clear how Moscow would respond, as nuclear use would still make little strategic sense. It is, however, understandable that this is not a proposition that NATO governments want to test. There are still ways that this line could be blurred. Zelensky has also been pressing for neighbouring NATO countries, such as Poland, to use their air defences against Russian aircraft, drones and missiles when they pass close to their airspace attacking targets in Ukraine.

The Administration’s stance is often characterised as being ready to prevent Ukrainian losing the war but not being prepared to let it win. And perhaps this is why Kyiv is bundling together its requests to Washington as a package designed to achieve victory and not just one-off measures to ease difficult situations.  Relaxing the restrictions on long-range strikes would not be by itself a war-winning move, but it might help move the dial in Ukraine’s favour and at least providing some relief from the deadly attacks being experienced by Ukraine.

In his own address after the attacks on 26 August Zelensky concluded with a strong plea:

‘There should be no restrictions on the range of weapons for Ukraine, while terrorists have no such restrictions. Defenders of life should face no restrictions on weapons, while Russia uses all kinds of its own weapons, as well as “Shahed” drones and ballistic missiles from North Korea. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other partners have the power to help us stop terror. We need decisions.’

John Kirby, Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the NSC , acknowledged in response that Zelenskyy had made these calls before both privately and publicly, and this was not surprising when his country was under attack. He added: ‘But as I've said many, many times, we'll keep the conversations with the Ukrainians going, but we're going to keep it private.’

The conversation are continuing as top Ukrainian officials are reported to be visiting Washington with a list of targets that could usefully be hit inside Russia. This is an attempt to move beyond the issue of principle to that of practicality. What difference would it make if the restrictions were relaxed further? This reflects a shift in the Administration’s argument. It is now less about escalation and more about its view that not only can Ukraine can win without mounting long-range attacks but that even if they could be mounted, they would not be as useful as Ukraine thinks they would be. Their supplies of ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile Systems) are quite modest, and the US stockpile is limited. Those that Ukraine possesses are already being used – effectively – for an offensive directed against targets in Crimea (about which the Administration has been relaxed because it does not consider Crimea part of Russia, although of course Russia does).

At the same time many of the Russian assets have been moved out of reach. This is not, however, an argument against denying Ukraine the capability. If Russian aircraft must be moved further away from Ukraine to be safe then that helps as it means that they would need to be in the air longer and give Ukrainian defences more time to prepare.

While this argument rumbles on, another $125 million military assistance package is being prepared by the US. This includes howitzer and artillery ammunition, ambulances and medical equipment, antitank missiles, drones and ammunition, and is largely geared to the fight in eastern Ukraine. The Administration still appears squeamish about anything that Ukraine is doing on Russian territory. Partly this is misgivings about the danger of Ukrainian forces getting overstretched.  The Washington Post quoted an official as saying ‘I don’t foresee the United States helping or providing assistance in intel sharing that would enable the further taking of sovereign Russian territory.’ Yet the New York Times suggests that Western intelligence (possibly not including the US?) was provided to help the Ukrainians locate Russian troops. There are some indications that the success of the operation thus far has persuaded the administration to see how it can help the Ukrainians ‘dig in and defend themselves’ when working out how large a buffer zone they wish to protect.

Ukraine’s Response

Instead of waiting for the Americans to change their minds, Ukraine has been developing its own means of attacking a wide range of targets in Russia. Zelensky also revealed on Tuesday that Ukraine has developed its own ballistic missile which has now been successfully tested. Earlier in August he unveiled a long-range-missile-cum-drone, named the Palianytsia. To get a flavour of what Ukraine is trying to achieve with this weapons, which has already been used, watch this video.

On 22 August Marinovka military airfield in Russia’s Volgograd region, about 180 miles from the Ukrainian border, was hit with long-range drones. According to one Russian source, no operational aircraft were hit (they had flown away before the strike) but some non-operational aircraft, lacking spare parts, were damaged, along with shelters at the airfield. In one of these shelters ammunition was stored leading to significant damage.

Ukraine’s economic targets for their long-range strikes are different from Russia’s. For much of this year they have been hitting Russia’s oil industry. A drone strike on Proletarsk oil storage facility in the southern Rostov region of Russia on 18 August caused a giant blaze that Russian firefighters failed to put out, so that it spread, leading the authorities to declare a state of emergency. Another oil depot was attacked in the Kirov region by drones, some 1150 km away from Ukraine, demonstrating again the increasing range of Ukrainian drones and the vulnerability of oil facilities as targets.

The other objective is to isolate Crimea. On 22 August a fire was caused at the Black Sea port of Kavkaz, the main ferry terminal connecting Russia with Crimea,  when a large cargo ferry carrying fuel was struck by a Neptune missile. The bridge linking Crimea to Russia over the Kerch Strait was partly damaged some time ago. This is causing real logistical problems for Russia in its efforts to keep Crimea supplied let alone be of value to its war effort.

The challenge for Ukraine if it wants to demonstrate that it has a strategy for victory is to pull these threads together and show how they add up to a coherent whole. The conversations between Ukrainian and American officials need to be candid, so that the former do not feel patronised and the latter do not feel taken for granted. Ukraine cannot win without the US and its many other partners. It is important to recognise the commitment that has already been shown in supporting Ukraine as it resists Russian aggression. It is also important to recognise that their interests will not always be in alignment. Washington will always put some limits on what it is prepared to do for Kyiv and Kyiv will bristle at times at Washington’s advice. But they do need to agree on a strategy that they can both explain and justify, and that has some chance of success.