Among everything else, there was NO sign of General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff on the reviewing platform.
Gerasimov is not only the Chief of the General Staff, but the primary designer of the modern Victory Day extravaganza. His absence yesterday is particularly interesting in terms of the information war. Thinking about things before Victory Day, I was focused on whether General Gerasimov would show up. How accurate were reports--rumors spread by Ukraine-- of his being wounded at Izyum in late April? Well, now we have a clue. No Chief of the General Staff at the Victory Day Parade, standing next to Putin! Suggests (doesn't prove, but still...) that Gerasimov was badly wounded at izyum. Rumors said that numerous officers gathered for an inspection meeting with Gerasimov were killed or wounded in a Ukrainian artillery strike guided by drones...
The startling absence of Gerasimov yesterday seems like proof of how bad the war is going for Putin.
Thought-provoking as ever. 'The desperation to sustain the connection between the two wars reflects the singular character of the victory of 1945' is spot on, and is further proof of the unwisdom of relying on history as a guide to future action. History can and should inform decision-making, but only as a basis for dealing with what is always a new context.
Как всегда, прекрасный аналитический текст. Спасибо большое! Кстати, генерал фон Меллентин еще до 1980 года, в своих замечательных мемуарах о Второй мировой войне, написанных в Южной Африке в 50-е годы ХХ века, впервые обозначил важность использования опыта 1941-1945 годов для выработки стратегии НАТО по противостоянию с Россией. В этих мемуарах есть весьма точные наблюдения, в частности, относительно тактики русских войск и качества русских солдат (которые, на мой взгляд, столь же справедливы и для украинцев - ведь в 40-е годы ХХ века русские и украинцы воевали против Германии в рядах одной Красной Армии). В российско-украинском конфликте 2022 года многие из мемуарных оценок генерала фон Меллентина обнаружили свою неожиданную актуальность. // As always, excellent analytical text. Thanks a lot! By the way, even before 1980, General von Mellenthin, in his wonderful memoirs about World War II, written in South Africa in the 1950s, for the first time outlined the importance of using the experience of 1941-1945 to develop a NATO strategy to confront Russia. These memoirs contain very accurate observations, in particular, regarding the tactics of Russian troops and the quality of Russian soldiers (which, in my opinion, are just as true for Ukrainians - after all, in the 40s of the 20th century, Russians and Ukrainians fought against Germany in the ranks of one Red Army). In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2022, many of General von Mellenthin's memoirs found their unexpected relevance.
More than ever the need is for Russia to organise some form of Truth and Reconciliation Commission along the lines pioneered in South Africa after the fall of Apartheid. A commission made up of representative figures among both perpetrators and victims would draw up a profit-and-loss balance sheet for the 70 years of communist rule and the 30 years of post-Soviet resurgence and subsequent decline into authoritarianism. Televised public hearings involving all parties to the profit and loss should be held, bringing oppressors and oppressed face to face in a bid to achieve some form of accounting. I have no idea how this might be achieved, although the removal of Vladimir Putin and any hawkish successor would be a prerequisite. The healing process would necessarily take place over a period of several months if not years. I see no other means of breaking out of the endless cycle of creeping repression and violent upheaval.
Russia seems to endure these military humiliations ever two generations or so. You could have mentioned Russia's defeat in the Crimean War 1854-56 which was the first modern disastrous military adventure that sparked a huge reform movement. Historically, Russia's military successes have come against weakened and technically inferior opponents like the late Ottoman empire and against Austria Hungary in WWI, or when it attacked the exhausted Japanese at the end of WWII in Manchuria. And let's not forget the often overlooked, but hugely important defeat of the Red Army outside Warsaw, the "Miracle of the Vistula" in 1920.
The modern mythology of Russian military might goes back to the Cold War and NATO's hugely inflated estimates of Soviet's strength used to justify the need for NATO nuclear retaliation in the face of the Soviet juggernaut. Less politicised analyses indicated NATO would have been able to halt a Soviet advance in Europe.
Russia's military normally performs better when defending its own territory, as it did against Japan in 1939 and against Germany in 1941-45. Maybe that's the lesson they need to take to heart. Russia is just not cut out for foreign military adventures.
Without Lend Lease the Soviets would have been hard pressed to beat back the Germans as they did. And despite the Soviets eventual victory the Germans inflicted much greater casualties on the Soviets than visa versa. Soviet leaders inherited from Tsarist times an arrogant and belittling attitude toward the "masses," manifest in a barely concealed and contemptuous disregard for the well being and intelligence of the individual soldier. This is why their leaders get so very little out of their advantages in numbers and equipment. Putin treats his most valuable assets, his individual soldiers, as of no account and his individual soldiers reflect this by not making a very good account of themselves.
The psychological idea in the minds of Western planners of a Russian mass army stream-roller is an interesting one.
Clearly many minds were of this opinion during the Cold War and highlighted by events you mention here. But was it wholly deserved? What, in retrospect, I find fascinating and especially in light of current events in Ukraine, is a report from a conference held in 1980 during the Cold War - “Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine.*
The purpose of the conference with these two experienced WW2 generals was to examine their experiences with Russian forces ‘with the intent of developing insights useful in aiding understanding of the challenges NATO faced in Europe as it prepared to confront the Soviets…”. The report highlights organisational aspects, human factors and behavioural parameters important to success. As well as looking at the German experience in WW2, it also elicited from these two skilled Generals their opinions on the likely battlefield strategy and tactics that the 1980’s NATO would need using current U.S. forces deployed in West Germany.
It highlights the superiority of Auftragstaktik (Mission Command) and the manner in which small forces skilfully led can win battles against larger forces if the small force is synchronised and the large force is disorganised (is this now being seen in Ukraine…???).
If one confines oneself purely to military matters, and assumes this is a NATO proxy war with Russia, then this report seems prophetic and….. an incredibly long lasting artefact of poor Soviet/Russian doctrinal performance.
The image of the mass army steam-roller is to some degree explained by the Generals, due to the political and humanitarian dimensions of the tactical problem - limited manoeuvre in order to prevent Russians occupying areas settled by Germans (the preferred military response seems to have been a defence in depth, which this humanitarian reality prevented).
* “Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine* by General William DePuy (U.S. Army Ret.). Technical Report BDM/W-81-077-TR, McLean, VA, 19th December 1980.
Reproduced and Edited by Reiner K. Huber, Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen, December 2004.
Fascinating. Thanks for this. I have vague recollection of some of these debates from the mid-1970s when a number of analysts argued that Soviet forces could reach the channel in a few days from a standing start.
We have seen now several face-offs between NATO trained/influenced forces and Soviet/Russian trained forces. UA vs Russia, Azerbaijan vs Armenia, and before that, the US and allies vs Iraq. In all cases, the NATO side overperformed against the Soviet side.
A very salient point Richard, and one I am happy to admit I am the least qualified person to dispute!
I suppose my train of thought is more directly focused towards Auftragstaktik and, secondarily, the image of Soviet/Russian forces as a direct result - not strictly a NATO comparison per se. With the current conflagration in Ukraine, it appears, certainly to my mind, as an interesting and directly relevant comparison of ‘NATO’s translation of Auftragstaktik (in Mission Command)’, against the Russians - or the old Soviets - that the report I mentioned above is directed at. It appears as close to NATO v’s Russian/Soviet command ‘behaviour’ doctrine as the Generals’ Balck and Von Mellenthin experienced and advised on.
As I am told, the 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh War was a relatively low intensity war, which was singularly characterised by the successful use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) - nearly all battle damage was inflicted by Azeri unmanned platforms (probably co-ordinated directly by Turkish forces). By all accounts command behaviour and ground tactics of both Armenian and Azeri forces was poor - despite Turkish (NATO) training of the Azeri’s for some years. On this basis I’m not sure NATO Mission Command can be argued as playing a pivotal role. (although, notably, it was here - for the first time - that the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned drone showed it’s critical value - which was noticed in NATO - and as we are currently seeing in Ukraine, and (Israeli) loitering munitions, also being seen in Ukraine.)
Similarly with Gulf War 1/2, in the Iraqi army, C2 and command behaviour doctrine (if it in fact had formal behaviour doctrine - I don’t believe it did?) there were significant differences to Russian structure and doctrine. The singular peculiarity and varying capabilities differ here - of the leader, the command structure peculiarities, the training, forced conscription of dissenting sections of the population, etc, make the comparison difficult at best. And this, all without considering the chasm in weaponry between the two sides.
Yet Ukraine, post-2014, has undergone a root and branch transformation in both it’s military structure and doctrines, from top to bottom - the Defence Ministry, command staff, officers, NCO’s. The U.K.’s Op Orbital, from 2015, included Mission Command training (so I read). As well as similar training from the U.S., Canada etc. This is no less than a wholsesale switch from old Soviet doctrine to Mission Command doctrine.
So the comparison with the report by Generals’ Balck and von Mellenthin becomes more obvious and striking - a modern facsimile of the belligerents in WW2 - one Soviet trained, one trained in the NATO variant of auftragstaktik, both using a full suite of advanced weaponry, one small but synchronised and co-ordinated, one centrally directed and disorganised. Please don’t assume I believe Ukrainian forces are displaying a carbon copy of NATO Mission Command doctrine, but the apparent speed with which the Ukrainian forces are apparently utilising NATO’s directed ISR at the battle front is very impressive.
However, as I indicated at the start, what do I know !
Another good article. I regret I only discovered the writer in the latter third of his career. I've no doubt missed a lot of gems. Please keep writing mate!
I'm inclined to think that Russia would be better off with a humiliating defeat leading to a return to the Jan 2022 boundaries. However, painful that would at least staunch the bleeding. The cumulative effect of years of military attrition, severe sanctions and near pariah status will be considerable if not massive. And this could go on for years and years. Russia is on a train that is leading slowly but surely towards becoming an 'advanced' 3rd World Country minus any respect or sympathy that such countries sometimes get.
Among everything else, there was NO sign of General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff on the reviewing platform.
Gerasimov is not only the Chief of the General Staff, but the primary designer of the modern Victory Day extravaganza. His absence yesterday is particularly interesting in terms of the information war. Thinking about things before Victory Day, I was focused on whether General Gerasimov would show up. How accurate were reports--rumors spread by Ukraine-- of his being wounded at Izyum in late April? Well, now we have a clue. No Chief of the General Staff at the Victory Day Parade, standing next to Putin! Suggests (doesn't prove, but still...) that Gerasimov was badly wounded at izyum. Rumors said that numerous officers gathered for an inspection meeting with Gerasimov were killed or wounded in a Ukrainian artillery strike guided by drones...
The startling absence of Gerasimov yesterday seems like proof of how bad the war is going for Putin.
Thought-provoking as ever. 'The desperation to sustain the connection between the two wars reflects the singular character of the victory of 1945' is spot on, and is further proof of the unwisdom of relying on history as a guide to future action. History can and should inform decision-making, but only as a basis for dealing with what is always a new context.
Как всегда, прекрасный аналитический текст. Спасибо большое! Кстати, генерал фон Меллентин еще до 1980 года, в своих замечательных мемуарах о Второй мировой войне, написанных в Южной Африке в 50-е годы ХХ века, впервые обозначил важность использования опыта 1941-1945 годов для выработки стратегии НАТО по противостоянию с Россией. В этих мемуарах есть весьма точные наблюдения, в частности, относительно тактики русских войск и качества русских солдат (которые, на мой взгляд, столь же справедливы и для украинцев - ведь в 40-е годы ХХ века русские и украинцы воевали против Германии в рядах одной Красной Армии). В российско-украинском конфликте 2022 года многие из мемуарных оценок генерала фон Меллентина обнаружили свою неожиданную актуальность. // As always, excellent analytical text. Thanks a lot! By the way, even before 1980, General von Mellenthin, in his wonderful memoirs about World War II, written in South Africa in the 1950s, for the first time outlined the importance of using the experience of 1941-1945 to develop a NATO strategy to confront Russia. These memoirs contain very accurate observations, in particular, regarding the tactics of Russian troops and the quality of Russian soldiers (which, in my opinion, are just as true for Ukrainians - after all, in the 40s of the 20th century, Russians and Ukrainians fought against Germany in the ranks of one Red Army). In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2022, many of General von Mellenthin's memoirs found their unexpected relevance.
More than ever the need is for Russia to organise some form of Truth and Reconciliation Commission along the lines pioneered in South Africa after the fall of Apartheid. A commission made up of representative figures among both perpetrators and victims would draw up a profit-and-loss balance sheet for the 70 years of communist rule and the 30 years of post-Soviet resurgence and subsequent decline into authoritarianism. Televised public hearings involving all parties to the profit and loss should be held, bringing oppressors and oppressed face to face in a bid to achieve some form of accounting. I have no idea how this might be achieved, although the removal of Vladimir Putin and any hawkish successor would be a prerequisite. The healing process would necessarily take place over a period of several months if not years. I see no other means of breaking out of the endless cycle of creeping repression and violent upheaval.
Russia seems to endure these military humiliations ever two generations or so. You could have mentioned Russia's defeat in the Crimean War 1854-56 which was the first modern disastrous military adventure that sparked a huge reform movement. Historically, Russia's military successes have come against weakened and technically inferior opponents like the late Ottoman empire and against Austria Hungary in WWI, or when it attacked the exhausted Japanese at the end of WWII in Manchuria. And let's not forget the often overlooked, but hugely important defeat of the Red Army outside Warsaw, the "Miracle of the Vistula" in 1920.
The modern mythology of Russian military might goes back to the Cold War and NATO's hugely inflated estimates of Soviet's strength used to justify the need for NATO nuclear retaliation in the face of the Soviet juggernaut. Less politicised analyses indicated NATO would have been able to halt a Soviet advance in Europe.
Russia's military normally performs better when defending its own territory, as it did against Japan in 1939 and against Germany in 1941-45. Maybe that's the lesson they need to take to heart. Russia is just not cut out for foreign military adventures.
Without Lend Lease the Soviets would have been hard pressed to beat back the Germans as they did. And despite the Soviets eventual victory the Germans inflicted much greater casualties on the Soviets than visa versa. Soviet leaders inherited from Tsarist times an arrogant and belittling attitude toward the "masses," manifest in a barely concealed and contemptuous disregard for the well being and intelligence of the individual soldier. This is why their leaders get so very little out of their advantages in numbers and equipment. Putin treats his most valuable assets, his individual soldiers, as of no account and his individual soldiers reflect this by not making a very good account of themselves.
The psychological idea in the minds of Western planners of a Russian mass army stream-roller is an interesting one.
Clearly many minds were of this opinion during the Cold War and highlighted by events you mention here. But was it wholly deserved? What, in retrospect, I find fascinating and especially in light of current events in Ukraine, is a report from a conference held in 1980 during the Cold War - “Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine.*
The purpose of the conference with these two experienced WW2 generals was to examine their experiences with Russian forces ‘with the intent of developing insights useful in aiding understanding of the challenges NATO faced in Europe as it prepared to confront the Soviets…”. The report highlights organisational aspects, human factors and behavioural parameters important to success. As well as looking at the German experience in WW2, it also elicited from these two skilled Generals their opinions on the likely battlefield strategy and tactics that the 1980’s NATO would need using current U.S. forces deployed in West Germany.
It highlights the superiority of Auftragstaktik (Mission Command) and the manner in which small forces skilfully led can win battles against larger forces if the small force is synchronised and the large force is disorganised (is this now being seen in Ukraine…???).
If one confines oneself purely to military matters, and assumes this is a NATO proxy war with Russia, then this report seems prophetic and….. an incredibly long lasting artefact of poor Soviet/Russian doctrinal performance.
The image of the mass army steam-roller is to some degree explained by the Generals, due to the political and humanitarian dimensions of the tactical problem - limited manoeuvre in order to prevent Russians occupying areas settled by Germans (the preferred military response seems to have been a defence in depth, which this humanitarian reality prevented).
* “Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine* by General William DePuy (U.S. Army Ret.). Technical Report BDM/W-81-077-TR, McLean, VA, 19th December 1980.
Reproduced and Edited by Reiner K. Huber, Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen, December 2004.
Fascinating. Thanks for this. I have vague recollection of some of these debates from the mid-1970s when a number of analysts argued that Soviet forces could reach the channel in a few days from a standing start.
We have seen now several face-offs between NATO trained/influenced forces and Soviet/Russian trained forces. UA vs Russia, Azerbaijan vs Armenia, and before that, the US and allies vs Iraq. In all cases, the NATO side overperformed against the Soviet side.
A very salient point Richard, and one I am happy to admit I am the least qualified person to dispute!
I suppose my train of thought is more directly focused towards Auftragstaktik and, secondarily, the image of Soviet/Russian forces as a direct result - not strictly a NATO comparison per se. With the current conflagration in Ukraine, it appears, certainly to my mind, as an interesting and directly relevant comparison of ‘NATO’s translation of Auftragstaktik (in Mission Command)’, against the Russians - or the old Soviets - that the report I mentioned above is directed at. It appears as close to NATO v’s Russian/Soviet command ‘behaviour’ doctrine as the Generals’ Balck and Von Mellenthin experienced and advised on.
As I am told, the 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh War was a relatively low intensity war, which was singularly characterised by the successful use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) - nearly all battle damage was inflicted by Azeri unmanned platforms (probably co-ordinated directly by Turkish forces). By all accounts command behaviour and ground tactics of both Armenian and Azeri forces was poor - despite Turkish (NATO) training of the Azeri’s for some years. On this basis I’m not sure NATO Mission Command can be argued as playing a pivotal role. (although, notably, it was here - for the first time - that the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned drone showed it’s critical value - which was noticed in NATO - and as we are currently seeing in Ukraine, and (Israeli) loitering munitions, also being seen in Ukraine.)
Similarly with Gulf War 1/2, in the Iraqi army, C2 and command behaviour doctrine (if it in fact had formal behaviour doctrine - I don’t believe it did?) there were significant differences to Russian structure and doctrine. The singular peculiarity and varying capabilities differ here - of the leader, the command structure peculiarities, the training, forced conscription of dissenting sections of the population, etc, make the comparison difficult at best. And this, all without considering the chasm in weaponry between the two sides.
Yet Ukraine, post-2014, has undergone a root and branch transformation in both it’s military structure and doctrines, from top to bottom - the Defence Ministry, command staff, officers, NCO’s. The U.K.’s Op Orbital, from 2015, included Mission Command training (so I read). As well as similar training from the U.S., Canada etc. This is no less than a wholsesale switch from old Soviet doctrine to Mission Command doctrine.
So the comparison with the report by Generals’ Balck and von Mellenthin becomes more obvious and striking - a modern facsimile of the belligerents in WW2 - one Soviet trained, one trained in the NATO variant of auftragstaktik, both using a full suite of advanced weaponry, one small but synchronised and co-ordinated, one centrally directed and disorganised. Please don’t assume I believe Ukrainian forces are displaying a carbon copy of NATO Mission Command doctrine, but the apparent speed with which the Ukrainian forces are apparently utilising NATO’s directed ISR at the battle front is very impressive.
However, as I indicated at the start, what do I know !
Very cordially,
Another good article. I regret I only discovered the writer in the latter third of his career. I've no doubt missed a lot of gems. Please keep writing mate!
I'm inclined to think that Russia would be better off with a humiliating defeat leading to a return to the Jan 2022 boundaries. However, painful that would at least staunch the bleeding. The cumulative effect of years of military attrition, severe sanctions and near pariah status will be considerable if not massive. And this could go on for years and years. Russia is on a train that is leading slowly but surely towards becoming an 'advanced' 3rd World Country minus any respect or sympathy that such countries sometimes get.
Thank you so much for this highly relevant piece of analysis. This is brillant and I can only express my gratitude for it.
Thank you. Very kind