A third Russian victory parade without a victory . . . God be praised. 200 years ago, few would doubt that God had expressed an opinion about Russian aggression through the cold dump on the Russian parade.
I'm still celebrating 4/20, when Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, did the world a solid.
History has been going on long enough that all the important lines have been written. So, Putin can look forward to the hard times for Russia in the next few decades by simply borrowing from Louis XIV: "Après moi, le déluge."
I recall Jack Watling saying in an earlier piece that the one plausible path to victory for Russia is if Ukraine’s air defences become sufficiently degraded as to allow the Russian Air Force to begin bombing from medium altitude with relative impunity aka an Aleppo type scenario.
Whilst Congress’ passing of the supplemental aid package is welcome I worry it will not sufficiently address this issue. The lack of air defence interceptors is a big problem and from what I can tell is going to take longer to address than the artillery shortages. Add to this the reluctance of NATO countries (aside from Germany) to part with Patriot batteries and I don’t see how this gets resolved.
To what extent would any plausible Russian victory short of Ukraine's annihilation actually create worse problems for Putin (Let us assume de jure annexation of Crimea, de facto annexation of most of the rest of currently held territory, and vague but not toothless Western security guarantees for Ukraine)? Once the satisfaction of victory has died down wouldn't Putin be stuck with
a) the loss, or at least irrelevance, of his story/political project
b) a serious economic hangover &
c) a difficult and unpredictable new force in the shape of these ultra- nationalist warhawks?
Wouldn't he perhaps prefer a 'managed' war to this situation?
Thanks for the great analysis. I found very interesting your point about the economic pressure of taking on new populations in eastern Ukraine and Crimea which are mostly composed of more dependent people rather than net contributors to the tax base and society in general. In addition could those populations be expected to sabotage the occupiers' plans, or “quiet quit” to use the parlance of our times?
“Hardly worth a world war” reminds me of the war of Jenkins Ear. Public opinion, real or manufactured can often push us into non-logical decisions.
A third Russian victory parade without a victory . . . God be praised. 200 years ago, few would doubt that God had expressed an opinion about Russian aggression through the cold dump on the Russian parade.
I'm still celebrating 4/20, when Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, did the world a solid.
History has been going on long enough that all the important lines have been written. So, Putin can look forward to the hard times for Russia in the next few decades by simply borrowing from Louis XIV: "Après moi, le déluge."
I recall Jack Watling saying in an earlier piece that the one plausible path to victory for Russia is if Ukraine’s air defences become sufficiently degraded as to allow the Russian Air Force to begin bombing from medium altitude with relative impunity aka an Aleppo type scenario.
Whilst Congress’ passing of the supplemental aid package is welcome I worry it will not sufficiently address this issue. The lack of air defence interceptors is a big problem and from what I can tell is going to take longer to address than the artillery shortages. Add to this the reluctance of NATO countries (aside from Germany) to part with Patriot batteries and I don’t see how this gets resolved.
To what extent would any plausible Russian victory short of Ukraine's annihilation actually create worse problems for Putin (Let us assume de jure annexation of Crimea, de facto annexation of most of the rest of currently held territory, and vague but not toothless Western security guarantees for Ukraine)? Once the satisfaction of victory has died down wouldn't Putin be stuck with
a) the loss, or at least irrelevance, of his story/political project
b) a serious economic hangover &
c) a difficult and unpredictable new force in the shape of these ultra- nationalist warhawks?
Wouldn't he perhaps prefer a 'managed' war to this situation?
Thanks for the great analysis. I found very interesting your point about the economic pressure of taking on new populations in eastern Ukraine and Crimea which are mostly composed of more dependent people rather than net contributors to the tax base and society in general. In addition could those populations be expected to sabotage the occupiers' plans, or “quiet quit” to use the parlance of our times?