Will Russians continue to support the war? Will 2026 be a crunch year? Possibility of Ukrainian counter-attack?

More answers to your questions.

Following Sam’s answers to his questions here are the answers to mine. Unsurprisingly most of mine are linked in some way to the Russo-Ukraine War and I have tried to answer accordingly accordingly.

As always many of the questions are interesting and challenging. I haven’t been able to answer all – for reasons of knowledge as well as space – but I have fitted in most.

Issues covered include:

• The readiness of Russians to continue to support the war especially in the light of gathering economic problems;

• Whether 2026 will be a crunch year;

• The possibility of a Ukrainian counter-attack;

• The use of Russian sovereign assets held in the West;

• The possibility of a European protection force in Ukraine;

• Potential Russian use of low-yield nuclear weapons;

• Long-term Russian economic prospects;

• Future Russian military doctrine and threat to NATO;

• China’s role in the war;

• Impact of Farage government in UK on support for Ukraine;

• Future of war and of defence procurement;

• US down and China up;

• Macro-trends.

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There were many questions on the Russo-Ukraine War and the prospects for an early conclusion. Carol Gramm asks how long Russia (and the Russians) can support the war. Martin Treacy notes that 2026 will be a crunch year for Putin, when economic constraints and only very slow Russian progress (at great cost) plus increasing impacts on the Russian people (drone hits on power production, petrol shortages etc). Will this finally create some real pushback against his regime? Or will he just be able to continue to grind forward for years to come? Ben noted that in a recent post I mentioned Ukraine taking back some land could have a disproportionate impact, buy how likely is that ‘given Ukraine’s manpower shortage?’

Most Russians, relying on what they are told by state media, accept Putin’s rationale for the war – that this is a consequence of hostile attitudes by NATO countries combined with a Russophobe and illegitimate government in Kyiv. They find it hard to accept that the war might end other than with a Russia victory. Yet they would still be relieved if it ended soon. Much of the pain of the war up to now – in terms of manpower for the army and consequential deaths - has been felt largely in outlying regions and not Moscow and St Petersburg. Even those distant regions have been compensated as the war has boosted local economies. Almost four years on there is no clear victory or end in sight, with hopes for a peace deal dashed, and the adverse economic and social effects are starting to be felt. (I discussed this recently here).

But while people may like to see an end to the war they are not doing much about it. If dissatisfaction is building in Russia there are no obvious signs – political dissent is suppressed and many of the natural dissenters are now in exile. The population is largely passive. Putin still talks regularly of Russian military progress while insisting that any peace talks - which he claims to welcome – must conclude with a settlement on Russian terms.

Although Putin acknowledges the economic problems and the risks of stagflation he remains reluctant to end the war without achieving his political objectives. This requires further territorial gains and the effective subjugation of Ukraine. Kyiv refuses to capitulate and believes that it can withstand the pressure. As Russia is the aggressor and it is Putin that has made the most unrealistic demands then the war is unlikely to end until there is a change of heart in Moscow.

How might that happen?