‘Jaw, jaw is better than war, war.’ Winston Churchill 1954, As is often the case with familiar quotes this is not quite what Churchill actually said. Official biographer Sir Martin Gilbert reports that the original was ‘Meeting jaw to jaw is better than war’ which is not quite as punchy. The sentiment remains the same, however - talking is to be preferred to fighting. But the context is also important because Churchill was explaining why summit diplomacy was vital to prevent another great power war. He was not arguing that diplomacy was always preferable to continuing with the fight once a war had begun. After all one of his first acts as Prime Minister in 1940 was to reject suggestions that it was time to explore a negotiated peace just because, at that time, Nazi Germany appeared to have the upper hand in the war.
Interesting interpretation, but to me this reads as though the author is detached both temporally and spacially from what is the actual reality on the ground. As a native from Baltics I cannot afford the same interpretation.
Firstly, the whole conflict started eight years ago. What happened in the last eight months shocked the west, but do not make this your reference point. Orcs had eight years to numb any feelings or thoughts of peace.
Secondly, they lie. About everything. To everyone. This is the soviet legacy. They lie, others know that they lie, they know that others know that they lie, and others know that they know that others know that they lie. This is why the USSR collapsed. So unless orcs are given no other choice but to accept their failure, they will lie until they get their way. And it is pointless to speculate otherwise, make western-logic based considerations, or consider the leadership to be anything more than a group of orcs.
Thirdly, assess the factual evidence. Ukraine has natural resources which could rival Russia, and that is an existential threat to orcs. They commit war crimes. They attack civilians. They destroy civilian infrastructure. They wage hybrid war. They oppress their own population. They threaten nuclear holocaust. And they know all this themselves. Does this limited amount of factors even play into "let's make peace" equation? Because if it does, there would be absolutely no doubt that peace is not an option for orcs. Never was, and never will be.
So forget the naive notions of any negotiated outcomes. Peace must be imposed by means of superior firepower. Help Ukraine achieve this and stop detracting by speculating otherwise.
Thanks for another great article that deals with an important but rarely asked question – why is Putin not showing no interest in genuine negotiations. My guess is there is no well thought out strategy going on here. It’s just a matter of kicking the can down the road and hoping that Ukraine and Western backers will fold. I think Lawrence is right – Putin won’t want to risk anything but clear success while the present situation of losing slowly seems bearable in the short and medium term.
That said I’m not sure Putin’s hope for Ukraine and his allies folding is well founded. The Ukrainians will be motivated to fight for a very long time. As for the allies, I’m suspect they’ll think that Russia’s military and economic strength dissipating in a long war is a much preferable to dealing with Russia if it succeeds in Ukraine. The Baltic Nations and Poland will argue this strongly. As long as Western soldiers aren’t dying I think public opinion will tolerate a long war and Putin has made himself so toxic to Western public opinion that doing what he would like would be politically costly.
Reading this post, I am reminded of the idea that authoritarian regimes seem strong, but often prove brittle. Or to put it another way: they seem strong, until we suddenly discover that they can splinter and rapidly disintegrate.
Maybe something like this will happen with Putin's regime: it will continue to look stable, until it suddenly starts to wobble, to splinter, and then it may disintegrate more quickly than we would expect.
One possible breaking point could happen when Russia has to mobilize another few hundred thousand men somewhere in 2023 to keep up the war. A second draft may well prove more disruptive in Russia, as it will undoubtedly raise questions of when it will all end. It would also lead to a renewed exodus of young men from Russia.
Those who would be drafted would likely prove even less enthusiastic for the war, as they will have absorbed another few months of miserable stories from friends on the front lines. This lack of motivation of new recruits may grow even further as Russia would likely have even less adequate equipment for them as it had for the first draft.
Another breaking point could happen with key supporters of Putin. Would Ramzan Kadyrov be willing to send even more Chechens to the front lines after a year of losing men in Ukraine? He may well feel that he needs these soldiers to stay in power in Chechnya and to maintain his position in a post-Putin Russia. He may also calculate that mobilizing more men in Chechnya may prove highly unpopular there.
The same sort of resistance may build among leaders of other regions and sectors that have supplied many of the soldiers so far, like Dagestan, the Wagner and the Far East.
In that, I think Ukraine's military effort is way more robust, as it seems built on strong foundations of rage, nationalism, survival, pride and a strong sense of justice.
I have no crystal ball to predict the future. But I would not be surprised if something, somehow, cracks in Russia somewhere in 2023.
This is a sober, realistic analysis of the situation. The two items it doesn't deal with are the questions of reparations and war crimes accountability. This must figure importantly in any Russian thinking about coming to terms for ending this war.
Perhaps Putin has one other gambit to play, public opinion in the United States, which he has already demonstrated he can manipulate to his advantage when aided by trolls on social media, Fox and right wing Republicans. Trump will soon be actively running for president again, his position on the war and Putin will be very influential.
I am no history scholar by any means, but in my 70 years here on this planet, I have noticed that I have never seen a war that unfolds in the manner that the initiators of that war imagine. Wars are their own being. It's like they have a mind of their own. Start a war, and you give rise to a beast that evolves in its own way that no one person or power can control. It is a deadly ugly rolling of the dice. I also have noticed that the society/nation that initiated the war is changed by that war in unpredictable ways.
Excellent analysis. I would only add that Putin rejoined the grain deal because his Black Sea Fleet is too terrified to leave port, anymore. Sinking grain ships wouldn't even make him blink. A more immediate problem is that the Ukrainian Navy has drones on, over, and under the surface, as well as shore-launched anti-ship missiles. Trying to sink grain ships in the Gulf of Odessa would be an excellent way to expose very limited remaining Russian naval assets to real risk of destruction.
Those arguing for the need for concessions to Russia in order to end the war might reflect on the fact that what Russia is doing would have seemed perfectly acceptable in the 19th century - or the 18th, 17th and so on. Putin was, of course, at one stage comparing himself to Peter the Great. But Putin is, essentially, an anachronism. The world of the 19th century etc. changed after WW1 and WW2. It became fundamentally unacceptable to advance perceived strategic or nationalist interests by launching aggressive wars. Instead, international competition became focussed on international trade with rules monitored by the WTO. This has brought great prosperity to the world with improved standards for hundreds of millions (e.g. China, India, Southeast Asia) and the prospect of improvement for many hundreds of millions more; and also the prospect of using this prosperity to deal (sensibly) with climate change. This is what is at stake for the world as a result of the war of aggression Putin began and what those urging compromise on the "West" and Ukraine need to remember.
Russia will have enough reserves to make taking the southern land bridge and much of Donbas impossible. Meanwhile, the EU won’t want a second winter with no gas and the US us not going to be gifting Ukraine $80 billion per annum in perpetuity (not least because the US is running low on weapons itself).
Will the NATO be willing to pay for the military aid proportionately rather than having the US bear most of the cost?
Is the EU committed to ongoing energy shortages and treating Russia as a pariah? Can Europe even afford a second winter like this?
Seems to me that Europe is the focal point. It is going to have to pay for US weapons to Ukraine and continue to suffer economically.
I can see a military ceasefire happening when the war stagnates around lines Russia can defend, but I can’t see Ukraine agreeing those territories are “Russian” nor can I see sanctions being lifted. This could be a frozen conflict until Putin leaves the scene (maybe until after the nationalist who follows Putin leaves the scene(.
I might add, Moscow has always lied to the Russian people, so
If tomorrow Russia says: “We have met our true objectives; Ukraine made [minor] changes to their Constitution; Ukraine and NATO have agreed to not host nuclear weapons in Ukraine; Ukraine will let all Russians return to Russia; and Moscow agrees to rebuild Ukrainian cities … “
I have heard many commentators describe winter as necessarily limiting offensive operations. And here you repeat this commentary and some of it's mid-range strategy implications: e.g. that Putin threw some draftees into the front lines now to buy time to let others get trained up over the winter. That's reasonable on its face, and it may be correct.
However, I've heard some claims that push the other way. First, as you covered earlier, Ukraine may be better logistically and materially prepared for fighting in winter conditions than Russia is. Second, while autumn (and especially spring) see rain and water-logged ground that limit vehicles to roads--winter features frozen ground (and some rivers) that does not hinder mechanized movement.
Is it the cold and snow, not the terrain, that are the major factors? i.e. Is the winter-advantage decisively to the defender: from being sheltered in a trench versus exposed in the open?
I'm not an expert in military tactics or the local climate, but how certain are we that winter is a materially worse time for offensives (especially Ukrainian ones if they have a comparative advantage) than summer and early-fall have been?
Interesting interpretation, but to me this reads as though the author is detached both temporally and spacially from what is the actual reality on the ground. As a native from Baltics I cannot afford the same interpretation.
Firstly, the whole conflict started eight years ago. What happened in the last eight months shocked the west, but do not make this your reference point. Orcs had eight years to numb any feelings or thoughts of peace.
Secondly, they lie. About everything. To everyone. This is the soviet legacy. They lie, others know that they lie, they know that others know that they lie, and others know that they know that others know that they lie. This is why the USSR collapsed. So unless orcs are given no other choice but to accept their failure, they will lie until they get their way. And it is pointless to speculate otherwise, make western-logic based considerations, or consider the leadership to be anything more than a group of orcs.
Thirdly, assess the factual evidence. Ukraine has natural resources which could rival Russia, and that is an existential threat to orcs. They commit war crimes. They attack civilians. They destroy civilian infrastructure. They wage hybrid war. They oppress their own population. They threaten nuclear holocaust. And they know all this themselves. Does this limited amount of factors even play into "let's make peace" equation? Because if it does, there would be absolutely no doubt that peace is not an option for orcs. Never was, and never will be.
So forget the naive notions of any negotiated outcomes. Peace must be imposed by means of superior firepower. Help Ukraine achieve this and stop detracting by speculating otherwise.
Thanks for another great article that deals with an important but rarely asked question – why is Putin not showing no interest in genuine negotiations. My guess is there is no well thought out strategy going on here. It’s just a matter of kicking the can down the road and hoping that Ukraine and Western backers will fold. I think Lawrence is right – Putin won’t want to risk anything but clear success while the present situation of losing slowly seems bearable in the short and medium term.
That said I’m not sure Putin’s hope for Ukraine and his allies folding is well founded. The Ukrainians will be motivated to fight for a very long time. As for the allies, I’m suspect they’ll think that Russia’s military and economic strength dissipating in a long war is a much preferable to dealing with Russia if it succeeds in Ukraine. The Baltic Nations and Poland will argue this strongly. As long as Western soldiers aren’t dying I think public opinion will tolerate a long war and Putin has made himself so toxic to Western public opinion that doing what he would like would be politically costly.
Reading this post, I am reminded of the idea that authoritarian regimes seem strong, but often prove brittle. Or to put it another way: they seem strong, until we suddenly discover that they can splinter and rapidly disintegrate.
Maybe something like this will happen with Putin's regime: it will continue to look stable, until it suddenly starts to wobble, to splinter, and then it may disintegrate more quickly than we would expect.
One possible breaking point could happen when Russia has to mobilize another few hundred thousand men somewhere in 2023 to keep up the war. A second draft may well prove more disruptive in Russia, as it will undoubtedly raise questions of when it will all end. It would also lead to a renewed exodus of young men from Russia.
Those who would be drafted would likely prove even less enthusiastic for the war, as they will have absorbed another few months of miserable stories from friends on the front lines. This lack of motivation of new recruits may grow even further as Russia would likely have even less adequate equipment for them as it had for the first draft.
Another breaking point could happen with key supporters of Putin. Would Ramzan Kadyrov be willing to send even more Chechens to the front lines after a year of losing men in Ukraine? He may well feel that he needs these soldiers to stay in power in Chechnya and to maintain his position in a post-Putin Russia. He may also calculate that mobilizing more men in Chechnya may prove highly unpopular there.
The same sort of resistance may build among leaders of other regions and sectors that have supplied many of the soldiers so far, like Dagestan, the Wagner and the Far East.
In that, I think Ukraine's military effort is way more robust, as it seems built on strong foundations of rage, nationalism, survival, pride and a strong sense of justice.
I have no crystal ball to predict the future. But I would not be surprised if something, somehow, cracks in Russia somewhere in 2023.
This is a sober, realistic analysis of the situation. The two items it doesn't deal with are the questions of reparations and war crimes accountability. This must figure importantly in any Russian thinking about coming to terms for ending this war.
Perhaps Putin has one other gambit to play, public opinion in the United States, which he has already demonstrated he can manipulate to his advantage when aided by trolls on social media, Fox and right wing Republicans. Trump will soon be actively running for president again, his position on the war and Putin will be very influential.
I am no history scholar by any means, but in my 70 years here on this planet, I have noticed that I have never seen a war that unfolds in the manner that the initiators of that war imagine. Wars are their own being. It's like they have a mind of their own. Start a war, and you give rise to a beast that evolves in its own way that no one person or power can control. It is a deadly ugly rolling of the dice. I also have noticed that the society/nation that initiated the war is changed by that war in unpredictable ways.
Excellent analysis. I would only add that Putin rejoined the grain deal because his Black Sea Fleet is too terrified to leave port, anymore. Sinking grain ships wouldn't even make him blink. A more immediate problem is that the Ukrainian Navy has drones on, over, and under the surface, as well as shore-launched anti-ship missiles. Trying to sink grain ships in the Gulf of Odessa would be an excellent way to expose very limited remaining Russian naval assets to real risk of destruction.
Those arguing for the need for concessions to Russia in order to end the war might reflect on the fact that what Russia is doing would have seemed perfectly acceptable in the 19th century - or the 18th, 17th and so on. Putin was, of course, at one stage comparing himself to Peter the Great. But Putin is, essentially, an anachronism. The world of the 19th century etc. changed after WW1 and WW2. It became fundamentally unacceptable to advance perceived strategic or nationalist interests by launching aggressive wars. Instead, international competition became focussed on international trade with rules monitored by the WTO. This has brought great prosperity to the world with improved standards for hundreds of millions (e.g. China, India, Southeast Asia) and the prospect of improvement for many hundreds of millions more; and also the prospect of using this prosperity to deal (sensibly) with climate change. This is what is at stake for the world as a result of the war of aggression Putin began and what those urging compromise on the "West" and Ukraine need to remember.
Fascinating analysis and forecast. Thanks.
Russia will have enough reserves to make taking the southern land bridge and much of Donbas impossible. Meanwhile, the EU won’t want a second winter with no gas and the US us not going to be gifting Ukraine $80 billion per annum in perpetuity (not least because the US is running low on weapons itself).
Will the NATO be willing to pay for the military aid proportionately rather than having the US bear most of the cost?
Is the EU committed to ongoing energy shortages and treating Russia as a pariah? Can Europe even afford a second winter like this?
Seems to me that Europe is the focal point. It is going to have to pay for US weapons to Ukraine and continue to suffer economically.
I can see a military ceasefire happening when the war stagnates around lines Russia can defend, but I can’t see Ukraine agreeing those territories are “Russian” nor can I see sanctions being lifted. This could be a frozen conflict until Putin leaves the scene (maybe until after the nationalist who follows Putin leaves the scene(.
Great analysis.
I might add, Moscow has always lied to the Russian people, so
If tomorrow Russia says: “We have met our true objectives; Ukraine made [minor] changes to their Constitution; Ukraine and NATO have agreed to not host nuclear weapons in Ukraine; Ukraine will let all Russians return to Russia; and Moscow agrees to rebuild Ukrainian cities … “
Then the Russian people will say: “I knew it!”
A brief thanks for this excellent essay and also the numerous very well considered comments below!
Excellent article
The presidential election in March 2024 is the ideal exit ramp for Putin.
One small, side note.
I have heard many commentators describe winter as necessarily limiting offensive operations. And here you repeat this commentary and some of it's mid-range strategy implications: e.g. that Putin threw some draftees into the front lines now to buy time to let others get trained up over the winter. That's reasonable on its face, and it may be correct.
However, I've heard some claims that push the other way. First, as you covered earlier, Ukraine may be better logistically and materially prepared for fighting in winter conditions than Russia is. Second, while autumn (and especially spring) see rain and water-logged ground that limit vehicles to roads--winter features frozen ground (and some rivers) that does not hinder mechanized movement.
Is it the cold and snow, not the terrain, that are the major factors? i.e. Is the winter-advantage decisively to the defender: from being sheltered in a trench versus exposed in the open?
I'm not an expert in military tactics or the local climate, but how certain are we that winter is a materially worse time for offensives (especially Ukrainian ones if they have a comparative advantage) than summer and early-fall have been?
Sanctions ladder aimed at economics and ‘prestige’ (UNSC veto) - no complete withdrawal by date A, this happens; date B, this happens . . .