Ukraine's Theory of Victory

A stalling Russian offensive and a stalling Russian economy

Oil tanks burning after a reported drone attack on a facility in Klintsy, Russia, earlier this year.

In a recent post I examined Russia’s theory of victory. In this post I consider Ukraine’s. Russia’s theory depends on the Ukrainians running out of men leading to their army collapsing. It reflects Moscow’s confidence in its inflated claims about Russian advances and Ukrainian casualties. This continued on 26 October when General Gerasimov told Putin, who was visiting a command post, that up to 5,000 Ukrainian military personnel were surrounded in the Kupyansk area and over 5,500 in the Krasnoarmeisk [Pokrovsk] area.

Russian military bloggers have already called this out: ‘Once again, the information reported does not correspond to reality on the ground.’ Ukrainian reports tell a different story: some Russian progress, including small groups infiltrating into the city centres, often but not always being taken out, but generally chaotic and confusing conditions.

Ukraine lacks the capacity for now to turn the military tide and push Russian forces out of the occupied territories. The essential feature of its theory of victory must be resilience in the face of regular Russian strikes against its cities and infrastructure and constant pressure along the front line. It depends on persuading Putin that he can’t win and should therefore cut his losses. Given the Russian leader’s expressed optimism about the imminence of a Russian victory, anything that dents his confidence, including the Ukrainian army liberating some territory, could have a disproportionate effect.

The most often expressed hope, however, is that the pressure will grow on Putin not only because of meagre military successes with high casualties but also a faltering Russian economy. This is a weakness that can be aggravated through a combination of more Western sanctions and continuing Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s oil infrastructure.

The headlines of declining growth, persistent inflation, and stretched federal budgets confirm that the economy is not in good shape. But how severe are the problems and are they likely to reach a point where the Kremlin really does have to reappraise its war strategy?

There is no formula that can identify a certain tipping point. At one extreme one could imagine economic disruption triggering mass discontent, runs on the banks and a collapsing currency - something functionally equivalent to a decisive military victory. But the point might be no more than realising that the choices between spending on the war and sustaining the civilian economy – between ‘guns’ and ‘butter’ - are becoming more acute and unlikely to get any easier.