Did you see that at least 20 of those mobilised died before they ever got close to the frontline? Sleeping in draughty buses, scant food and drink supplies, cold, hungry, getting into fatal fights with others in the same position.
For those of us too young to remember 1991, I cannot tell you how mind-blowing it is to read a post like this about what I consider a modern European country (having visited Moscow a few years ago and enjoyed it a lot). It's like a real-time history textbook. Thanks very much for your work Lawrence.
Excellent post. As lovely as it would be to see Russia withdraw and have a good think about what it’s done, clearly the instability resulting from a putch on Putin carries huge risks for people both inside and outside Russia. Not least WMDs but also secession wars and Russia becoming a chronic pariah state causing geopolitical chaos for years to come. There will need be a lot blood and treasure spent before any real peace can be found.
I do not have a crystal ball. But I look at Bakhmut, and watch Prigozhin, and imagine that when the Donbass offensive finally falters and Wagner is forced to withdraw or get outflanked, he will return to Moscow and become that unifying figure. The one who kept going forward until the bitter end, had the enemy flag in his grasp, etc, will be ready to sweep away the incompetents who mismanaged the war he could have won, if only they had let him. A Prigozhin regime would then further privatize the Russian military.
Wallenstein was a military entrepreneur who served a failing emperor and developed ambitions of replacing him on the throne. He seems an analogous historical figure, to me.
It's been noticed that he's upped his instagram game, posting his visits w his men, showing up to oversee operations in the middle of the night... doing the things I suppose Shoigu, Putin et al have not been seen doing.
That said Putin has now drawn Lukashenko closer, and may yet scapegoat Shoigu and Gerassimov (if rumors are true). Does Prigozhin have enough political and oligarchic support to transfer his military reputation into political capital?
That's the big question to ask but I am not a Kremlinologist, so I don't have an answer. You're right that his leadership style is much more charismatic and that's probably why he's in this position, now.
I don't think even Kremlinologists have a clear view of who and what are in play. Clearly Kadyrov and Prigozhin are vying for political power. Lapin seems to be in the picture as well. But who has the ear of Putin, and whether Putin trusts Kadyrov over Shoigu, or is simply trying to keep him in his place - who knows. These dynamics will develop with conditions on the field, wins and losses, embarrassments, and successes. (And these are the military men - there's also the GRU, FSB, etc to consider.) The frightening thing is how little we can forecast of what comes after Putin, assuming that eventually this edifice of lies comes crashing down.
Fairy tales. Hyperbole. A Bellicose pom-pom rattling piece thats only use is the mild sense of jingo one gets when backing the underdog. There’s only one point made in this pseudo analysis that resonates: war always ends when the desire for the blood purge ends, irrespective of the treasure it speculated to yield. The diplomatic road to peace needs to be paved. The bull shit positioning and lying needs to stop. The geopolitical trade offs need to be tabled. The US is yet again using another countries’ young generation of blood as a sump for its hegemony.
You've invented a quasi psychological lust for blood, suggested that it explains Putin's (or is it Russia's) motives, attached the lust for blood tangentially to a lust for spoils (which is the motive - blood lust or greed? Is it personal? Imperial? Perhaps there's no propaganda machine at work and this is all the workings of the "human condition?")
And then sleight of hand slip into media criticism because of course, hegemons, autocrats, democrats, capitalists are all only liars. Oh and in service of US imperialism.
If you're going to defend diplomacy, against which I have no complaints, do a better job.
As long as Moscow is bent on war against the Ukrainian people by one means or another, the question is not about war or peace. The question is whether or not there will be effective resistance. Now that Moscow has picked this fight and stumbled, Ukraine evidently wants to capitalize on it. There is no indication that the Ukrainian people want to stop, cede territory in which their countrymen will suffer under genocidal tyranny, and encourage Moscow to do this all over again; now that they're holding Putin by the short hairs, they want to kick him in his rear.
You say the US is "using" Ukraine, but Ukrainians clearly want to fight for their independence from Moscow; again, the only question is whether they have the support they need to do so. If the US helps them because it's in the US's interests, that's fine by Ukraine. They much prefer not living under a Lukashenko or directly under Putin.
Who are these hardliners we hear so much about these days? The only ones whose names I have seen mentioned seem to be people especially dependent upon Putin himself, and therefore especially likely to wish to be seen to support whatever it is he seems to want.
To what extent should we interpret Putin's words and behavior as communication - signaling intentions to escalate, to go nuclear, to stop at nothing, no bluffing - versus a genuine intent to win the war?
Are his ultimate aims his own power, or destruction of Ukraine? I can't help but think that he desires the former, but is being forced by political challengers, by his own propagandists, by in-fighting, to step up the war effort. Hoist on his own petard. Trapped by the logic of his own original sin, invading Ukraine, and now unable to waver from that commitment.
The war-fighting in that case is a proxy struggle for power, pride, and persuasion. The West should need only to support Ukraine with total resolve, and regime change takes care of itself.
Rajiv Gandhi once said that governing India was like flying a 747 whose wing tips were only partially attached to the joystick; the plane landed and took off according to its own instincts and logic and not t he pilot’s. Might this situation be increasingly a reality in the Russian forces on Ukraine where there is something of a gap between the aspirations of Putin and what formations do on the ground. If this s a possibility then they must be thinking hard about how they are going to spend the winter ,if possible in a well supplied and well protected line which they might go to regardless of Moscows instructions to the contrary. In which case should we be thinking our selves where this line might be as it could frame the next chapter. JOHNACKINLAY
Reading this, I'd really like to hear a more compelling argument for Russia not using nuclear weapons than the one you did before. Because if the likely outcome to the war is domestic chaos such that even the removal of Putin is unlikely to resolve it and/or lead to war termination, that seems like conclusive evidence for the fact that there is *nothing* Russia will not risk to win it.
There's no reason to think that use of a tactical nuclear weapon guarantees victory. In fact the opposite is more likely: the resulting crippling economic and political isolation would virtually ensure defeat. The Russian military has many more and similarly terrifying options at its disposal shy of use of tactical nukes.
How long before Russia burns through its entire missile supply, including those "repurposed" from sea and air defences?
Towards the end of WW2 the Nazis developed a jet aircraft which would have outflown any fighter the Allies possessed. However, Hitler insisted on using it as a bomber instead ; it wasn't a very useful bomber - too small a payload - and any tactical advantage was lost.
Candidates to take Putin’s place: The issue of succession is always a problem in dictatorships. The situation may become as unclear as in 1957 when Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich attempted a coup against Khrushchev and Zhukov. If someone unleashes nuclear weapons, who would it be? Scary.
But what was the strategic value in Ukraine bombing the Kerch Bridge?
If Russia's defeat is inevitable, why poke the bear and give Putin an excuse to rain missiles down on Ukrainian civilians?
Is it a negotiating ploy?
The West has already decided Putin is the evil aggressor; it needs no more examples of his brutality. It seems all the bombing has achieved is giving the Russians reasons to commit more atrocities ... possibly even nuclear ones.
This is a weak analogy, but if Russia bombed London's Vauxhall Bridge, wouldn't that demand a very strong response?
The strategic value in the Kerch Bridge is the ammo + food supplies for RU soldiers in the entire southern 2/3 of the country. War is all about logistics; once Ukraine got HIMARS, they started blowing up RU ammo depots. This increased RU's ammo consumption to catastrophic levels, because for every shell they fired, hundreds of other ones just blew up in the warehouse. The unthinkable has happened — Russia, with the entire ammo backstock of the former soviet union, is -running out of ammo-. In Kherson right now, they're begging on telegram for additional artillery support and not getting it. So they're out, locally, because the local stashes got blown up. They try to bring more in from Russia, but now they can't do that either, because the bridge is out.
That means those troops there are fucked. They fight until they're out of bullets, and then they die.
So yeah, it's an -extremely- militarily significant target. The only "insult to Putin" angle on it was that he was powerless to protect it.
Two memories arose for me. The first: in his book on the Vietnam war, Dispatches, the American journalist Michael Herr observed that while US troops fired off thousands of rounds of ammunition in any and every direction, the Viet Cong ("Charlie") placed a single round where it mattered. The second is a cartoon from Private Eye many years ago, by Bill Tidy, I think. It showed a general with his staff poring over the map table. I think it was probably meant as a standard satirical comment on WW1 generalship. The caption went something like: "Gentlemen, I believe the time has come for a futile gesture." Both might be applied as satirical comments on Russia's actions in the last couple of days which provide support for the view increasingly expressed that Putin has taken on personally the direction of operations in the war. Of course, it demonstrates that Russia's prosecution of the war is following the same self-destructive path it began on. Take time to think and plan before responding to the bridge attack? No, retaliate immediately and disproportionately. Key outcome? Ukraine's determination to fight is strengthened. Husband your most powerful and effective weapons for use in the key areas where the most important operations are currently underway and your army is losing? No, direct them principally at areas remote from the current battlefield. Key outcome? Your ability to contest the key space is reduced and your army's position weakened (again). Perhaps it is an apt comment on the appointment of General Surovikin. Was his appointment too recent to be able to influence the decision? Would he have wanted to? What lessons does he bring from Aleppo to THIS battle?
"Gentlemen, I believe the time has come for a futile gesture." - that's great! I'm reminded of the clip from Downfall that makes it into shambolic situations such as this.
The fact that the outcomes are so at odds with the moves does suggest incompetence and desperation. I would really like to know how much of this escalation is for the purpose of satisfying Russian internal politics, domestic support, satisfying milbloggers and hardliners, and the like.
Clearly Ukraine/West needs to be prepared for what may be a real escalation in Russia's approach to the war. But how much of it is application of a terrorism, which has a logic, albeit horrifying one, and how much of it is political desperation.
(And in the not so distant future, I think, we'll see more hybridization as well - more interference in European energy, more cyber, more political meddling and media manipulation.)
It is categorically impossible for Russia to escalate. The one, the only capability they haven't committed, is nukes.
In all other respects, Russia is already using 100% of its strength, and it's not enough. People keep using this trope of "what if Russia escalates" without thinking through what it actually means, and looking at the details of what Russia has committed to this war.
In most cases there's a vague sense in their mind that Russia ... somehow has some "Real Russian Army" held in reserve, floating out there somewhere in the mists of Russian propaganda, ready to barrel into Ukraine and turn the war from 5 up to 10. The reality is that the knob is already turned all the way up to 10, and cannot be turned higher. The Pentagon recently assessed that Russia had deployed 85% of all standing forces, in the entire Russian army, to fight in Ukraine.
Russia has spent multiple decades ... basically lying ... in outward-facing propaganda, about the size of its army; most people have a dim sense that it's about 1 million or more in size, whereas in reality, it's more like 300k fighters, of whom 50-70k are actual trained soldiers, and the rest are older teenagers pressed into a jury-duty-like temporary service for 6 months. It's been greatly to Russia's advantage to overinflate this perception, as in several conflicts (georgia, crimea, syria), it was able to spook opposition into being leery of fighting an opponent perceived to be large and dangerous.
Now that their bluff has finally been called, the true size of their armed forces have been revealed to the world. That's why they had to issue this "mobilization", recently; because they already sent the entire army, *and used it up*. The most damaging thing here is that despite issuing a commanded "mobilization", they're coming to the dire realization that their army really only has equipment for a few hundred thousand soldiers, and attempting to double the size of the army by fiat can't make that equipment materialize out of thin air.
There are other aspects of "escalation", they've issued, and they've been sad to watch. One of them has been increased recklessness. For months now, Ukraine's gotten increasingly robust SAM networks defending their airspace. Russian planes, hitherto, have been very reluctant to enter this death trap. Very recently, there's been an escalation by Russia where they've pivoted on this stance, and decided to risk flying their planes into Ukrainian airspace trying to provide close air support. They need results, and decided whoever the decision makers were had been far too cowardly and cautious. Unfortunately, those who were being cautious ended up being right, and it's turned into a turkey shoot; headlines are now coming out on a daily basis of 2+ planes being shot down PER DAY. For a Russia that only has several hundred planes, that sort of consumption rate would leave them without an air force within 1-2 years.
But what of escalation in the form of hybridizing the war? Indiscriminate shellings of civilian areas we're not used to seeing to date. Attacks on infrastructure. Further sabotage (assuming Russia = NordStream). Cyber. Political meddling. Influencer meddling (jury is out on Muskgate). Those all count as escalation to me.
I totally agree with you on the limitations to their military escalatory capabilities. Which is in part why I'm concerned with their, not only capability, but motivation, for escalation in non-conventional ways.
FWIW I don't see risk of strategic nuclear conflict as a concern at this point, and the arguments against tactical nuclear use are compelling enough to me.
So I view escalation as non-conventional, non-nuclear, hybrid and terror campaigns as being the issue. Thoughts?
If the Russians are committing so many troops and armament to the Ukraine front line (and losing it), are they leaving themselves vulnerable in other parts of their country? Are there any have-a-go countries that might cause issues on a different front?
Did you see that at least 20 of those mobilised died before they ever got close to the frontline? Sleeping in draughty buses, scant food and drink supplies, cold, hungry, getting into fatal fights with others in the same position.
For those of us too young to remember 1991, I cannot tell you how mind-blowing it is to read a post like this about what I consider a modern European country (having visited Moscow a few years ago and enjoyed it a lot). It's like a real-time history textbook. Thanks very much for your work Lawrence.
Excellent post. As lovely as it would be to see Russia withdraw and have a good think about what it’s done, clearly the instability resulting from a putch on Putin carries huge risks for people both inside and outside Russia. Not least WMDs but also secession wars and Russia becoming a chronic pariah state causing geopolitical chaos for years to come. There will need be a lot blood and treasure spent before any real peace can be found.
I do not have a crystal ball. But I look at Bakhmut, and watch Prigozhin, and imagine that when the Donbass offensive finally falters and Wagner is forced to withdraw or get outflanked, he will return to Moscow and become that unifying figure. The one who kept going forward until the bitter end, had the enemy flag in his grasp, etc, will be ready to sweep away the incompetents who mismanaged the war he could have won, if only they had let him. A Prigozhin regime would then further privatize the Russian military.
Wallenstein was a military entrepreneur who served a failing emperor and developed ambitions of replacing him on the throne. He seems an analogous historical figure, to me.
It's been noticed that he's upped his instagram game, posting his visits w his men, showing up to oversee operations in the middle of the night... doing the things I suppose Shoigu, Putin et al have not been seen doing.
That said Putin has now drawn Lukashenko closer, and may yet scapegoat Shoigu and Gerassimov (if rumors are true). Does Prigozhin have enough political and oligarchic support to transfer his military reputation into political capital?
That's the big question to ask but I am not a Kremlinologist, so I don't have an answer. You're right that his leadership style is much more charismatic and that's probably why he's in this position, now.
I don't think even Kremlinologists have a clear view of who and what are in play. Clearly Kadyrov and Prigozhin are vying for political power. Lapin seems to be in the picture as well. But who has the ear of Putin, and whether Putin trusts Kadyrov over Shoigu, or is simply trying to keep him in his place - who knows. These dynamics will develop with conditions on the field, wins and losses, embarrassments, and successes. (And these are the military men - there's also the GRU, FSB, etc to consider.) The frightening thing is how little we can forecast of what comes after Putin, assuming that eventually this edifice of lies comes crashing down.
Fairy tales. Hyperbole. A Bellicose pom-pom rattling piece thats only use is the mild sense of jingo one gets when backing the underdog. There’s only one point made in this pseudo analysis that resonates: war always ends when the desire for the blood purge ends, irrespective of the treasure it speculated to yield. The diplomatic road to peace needs to be paved. The bull shit positioning and lying needs to stop. The geopolitical trade offs need to be tabled. The US is yet again using another countries’ young generation of blood as a sump for its hegemony.
Pseudo critique is what I see here.
You've invented a quasi psychological lust for blood, suggested that it explains Putin's (or is it Russia's) motives, attached the lust for blood tangentially to a lust for spoils (which is the motive - blood lust or greed? Is it personal? Imperial? Perhaps there's no propaganda machine at work and this is all the workings of the "human condition?")
And then sleight of hand slip into media criticism because of course, hegemons, autocrats, democrats, capitalists are all only liars. Oh and in service of US imperialism.
If you're going to defend diplomacy, against which I have no complaints, do a better job.
As long as Moscow is bent on war against the Ukrainian people by one means or another, the question is not about war or peace. The question is whether or not there will be effective resistance. Now that Moscow has picked this fight and stumbled, Ukraine evidently wants to capitalize on it. There is no indication that the Ukrainian people want to stop, cede territory in which their countrymen will suffer under genocidal tyranny, and encourage Moscow to do this all over again; now that they're holding Putin by the short hairs, they want to kick him in his rear.
You say the US is "using" Ukraine, but Ukrainians clearly want to fight for their independence from Moscow; again, the only question is whether they have the support they need to do so. If the US helps them because it's in the US's interests, that's fine by Ukraine. They much prefer not living under a Lukashenko or directly under Putin.
Who are these hardliners we hear so much about these days? The only ones whose names I have seen mentioned seem to be people especially dependent upon Putin himself, and therefore especially likely to wish to be seen to support whatever it is he seems to want.
To what extent should we interpret Putin's words and behavior as communication - signaling intentions to escalate, to go nuclear, to stop at nothing, no bluffing - versus a genuine intent to win the war?
Are his ultimate aims his own power, or destruction of Ukraine? I can't help but think that he desires the former, but is being forced by political challengers, by his own propagandists, by in-fighting, to step up the war effort. Hoist on his own petard. Trapped by the logic of his own original sin, invading Ukraine, and now unable to waver from that commitment.
The war-fighting in that case is a proxy struggle for power, pride, and persuasion. The West should need only to support Ukraine with total resolve, and regime change takes care of itself.
What comes after will be messy but inevitably so.
Rajiv Gandhi once said that governing India was like flying a 747 whose wing tips were only partially attached to the joystick; the plane landed and took off according to its own instincts and logic and not t he pilot’s. Might this situation be increasingly a reality in the Russian forces on Ukraine where there is something of a gap between the aspirations of Putin and what formations do on the ground. If this s a possibility then they must be thinking hard about how they are going to spend the winter ,if possible in a well supplied and well protected line which they might go to regardless of Moscows instructions to the contrary. In which case should we be thinking our selves where this line might be as it could frame the next chapter. JOHNACKINLAY
Reading this, I'd really like to hear a more compelling argument for Russia not using nuclear weapons than the one you did before. Because if the likely outcome to the war is domestic chaos such that even the removal of Putin is unlikely to resolve it and/or lead to war termination, that seems like conclusive evidence for the fact that there is *nothing* Russia will not risk to win it.
There's no reason to think that use of a tactical nuclear weapon guarantees victory. In fact the opposite is more likely: the resulting crippling economic and political isolation would virtually ensure defeat. The Russian military has many more and similarly terrifying options at its disposal shy of use of tactical nukes.
How long before Russia burns through its entire missile supply, including those "repurposed" from sea and air defences?
Towards the end of WW2 the Nazis developed a jet aircraft which would have outflown any fighter the Allies possessed. However, Hitler insisted on using it as a bomber instead ; it wasn't a very useful bomber - too small a payload - and any tactical advantage was lost.
Candidates to take Putin’s place: The issue of succession is always a problem in dictatorships. The situation may become as unclear as in 1957 when Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich attempted a coup against Khrushchev and Zhukov. If someone unleashes nuclear weapons, who would it be? Scary.
All well and good.
But what was the strategic value in Ukraine bombing the Kerch Bridge?
If Russia's defeat is inevitable, why poke the bear and give Putin an excuse to rain missiles down on Ukrainian civilians?
Is it a negotiating ploy?
The West has already decided Putin is the evil aggressor; it needs no more examples of his brutality. It seems all the bombing has achieved is giving the Russians reasons to commit more atrocities ... possibly even nuclear ones.
This is a weak analogy, but if Russia bombed London's Vauxhall Bridge, wouldn't that demand a very strong response?
The strategic value in the Kerch Bridge is the ammo + food supplies for RU soldiers in the entire southern 2/3 of the country. War is all about logistics; once Ukraine got HIMARS, they started blowing up RU ammo depots. This increased RU's ammo consumption to catastrophic levels, because for every shell they fired, hundreds of other ones just blew up in the warehouse. The unthinkable has happened — Russia, with the entire ammo backstock of the former soviet union, is -running out of ammo-. In Kherson right now, they're begging on telegram for additional artillery support and not getting it. So they're out, locally, because the local stashes got blown up. They try to bring more in from Russia, but now they can't do that either, because the bridge is out.
That means those troops there are fucked. They fight until they're out of bullets, and then they die.
So yeah, it's an -extremely- militarily significant target. The only "insult to Putin" angle on it was that he was powerless to protect it.
Most helpful as usual.
Just got my copy of 'Command".
Long ago I read 'On the Psychology of Military Incompetence' by Norman Dixon, still very relevant today.
It's very unclear what might happen in Russia next. Whether it's true or not(I don't know) Putin is reported to be obsessed by the death of Gadaffi.
Sociopathy seems to be a common denominator in both east and west.
Two memories arose for me. The first: in his book on the Vietnam war, Dispatches, the American journalist Michael Herr observed that while US troops fired off thousands of rounds of ammunition in any and every direction, the Viet Cong ("Charlie") placed a single round where it mattered. The second is a cartoon from Private Eye many years ago, by Bill Tidy, I think. It showed a general with his staff poring over the map table. I think it was probably meant as a standard satirical comment on WW1 generalship. The caption went something like: "Gentlemen, I believe the time has come for a futile gesture." Both might be applied as satirical comments on Russia's actions in the last couple of days which provide support for the view increasingly expressed that Putin has taken on personally the direction of operations in the war. Of course, it demonstrates that Russia's prosecution of the war is following the same self-destructive path it began on. Take time to think and plan before responding to the bridge attack? No, retaliate immediately and disproportionately. Key outcome? Ukraine's determination to fight is strengthened. Husband your most powerful and effective weapons for use in the key areas where the most important operations are currently underway and your army is losing? No, direct them principally at areas remote from the current battlefield. Key outcome? Your ability to contest the key space is reduced and your army's position weakened (again). Perhaps it is an apt comment on the appointment of General Surovikin. Was his appointment too recent to be able to influence the decision? Would he have wanted to? What lessons does he bring from Aleppo to THIS battle?
"Gentlemen, I believe the time has come for a futile gesture." - that's great! I'm reminded of the clip from Downfall that makes it into shambolic situations such as this.
The fact that the outcomes are so at odds with the moves does suggest incompetence and desperation. I would really like to know how much of this escalation is for the purpose of satisfying Russian internal politics, domestic support, satisfying milbloggers and hardliners, and the like.
Clearly Ukraine/West needs to be prepared for what may be a real escalation in Russia's approach to the war. But how much of it is application of a terrorism, which has a logic, albeit horrifying one, and how much of it is political desperation.
(And in the not so distant future, I think, we'll see more hybridization as well - more interference in European energy, more cyber, more political meddling and media manipulation.)
It is categorically impossible for Russia to escalate. The one, the only capability they haven't committed, is nukes.
In all other respects, Russia is already using 100% of its strength, and it's not enough. People keep using this trope of "what if Russia escalates" without thinking through what it actually means, and looking at the details of what Russia has committed to this war.
In most cases there's a vague sense in their mind that Russia ... somehow has some "Real Russian Army" held in reserve, floating out there somewhere in the mists of Russian propaganda, ready to barrel into Ukraine and turn the war from 5 up to 10. The reality is that the knob is already turned all the way up to 10, and cannot be turned higher. The Pentagon recently assessed that Russia had deployed 85% of all standing forces, in the entire Russian army, to fight in Ukraine.
Russia has spent multiple decades ... basically lying ... in outward-facing propaganda, about the size of its army; most people have a dim sense that it's about 1 million or more in size, whereas in reality, it's more like 300k fighters, of whom 50-70k are actual trained soldiers, and the rest are older teenagers pressed into a jury-duty-like temporary service for 6 months. It's been greatly to Russia's advantage to overinflate this perception, as in several conflicts (georgia, crimea, syria), it was able to spook opposition into being leery of fighting an opponent perceived to be large and dangerous.
Now that their bluff has finally been called, the true size of their armed forces have been revealed to the world. That's why they had to issue this "mobilization", recently; because they already sent the entire army, *and used it up*. The most damaging thing here is that despite issuing a commanded "mobilization", they're coming to the dire realization that their army really only has equipment for a few hundred thousand soldiers, and attempting to double the size of the army by fiat can't make that equipment materialize out of thin air.
There are other aspects of "escalation", they've issued, and they've been sad to watch. One of them has been increased recklessness. For months now, Ukraine's gotten increasingly robust SAM networks defending their airspace. Russian planes, hitherto, have been very reluctant to enter this death trap. Very recently, there's been an escalation by Russia where they've pivoted on this stance, and decided to risk flying their planes into Ukrainian airspace trying to provide close air support. They need results, and decided whoever the decision makers were had been far too cowardly and cautious. Unfortunately, those who were being cautious ended up being right, and it's turned into a turkey shoot; headlines are now coming out on a daily basis of 2+ planes being shot down PER DAY. For a Russia that only has several hundred planes, that sort of consumption rate would leave them without an air force within 1-2 years.
But what of escalation in the form of hybridizing the war? Indiscriminate shellings of civilian areas we're not used to seeing to date. Attacks on infrastructure. Further sabotage (assuming Russia = NordStream). Cyber. Political meddling. Influencer meddling (jury is out on Muskgate). Those all count as escalation to me.
I totally agree with you on the limitations to their military escalatory capabilities. Which is in part why I'm concerned with their, not only capability, but motivation, for escalation in non-conventional ways.
FWIW I don't see risk of strategic nuclear conflict as a concern at this point, and the arguments against tactical nuclear use are compelling enough to me.
So I view escalation as non-conventional, non-nuclear, hybrid and terror campaigns as being the issue. Thoughts?
This may be of interest to you and your readers as one possible, even if unlikely, path.
https://robertsdavidn.substack.com/p/the-putin-gambit-a-conspiracy-theory
If the Russians are committing so many troops and armament to the Ukraine front line (and losing it), are they leaving themselves vulnerable in other parts of their country? Are there any have-a-go countries that might cause issues on a different front?