Putin's Dilemma Part 2: "Yes, But..."

We’re delighted to welcome back Sir Roderic Lyne as our guest poster for March. Sir Roderic completed three postings in Moscow as a British diplomat and was Britain’s Ambassador to Russia from 2000 to 2004. He also served as a No. 10 private secretary to John Major covering foreign affairs and defence, and was Deputy Chair of Chatham House 2007-2016. Roderic has written for us twice before on Putin’s thinking as the conflict in Ukraine has progressed. (Here are links to his 2023 post and 2024 post).

In this post he looks at how Putin will be thinking about the US ceasefire offer, the Russian President’s wider objectives, and Russia’s future.

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Since Lawrence’s post of 12 March on “Putin’s Dilemma”, Putin has given a “yes, but” response to the American-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal. This is now under discussion between Washington and Moscow. Trump is due to speak to Putin today (19th March) and says that they will be talking about land, power plants and dividing up certain assets. He expresses optimism. Many in America are concerned that Putin is playing Trump.

The conflict cannot simply be resolved as a property transaction. Trump needs to square Russian demands with the minimum Ukrainian requirement for the preservation of their country’s sovereignty and security. He could cut off American aid to Ukraine. In extremis, he could impose sanctions on Ukraine. But he cannot force the Ukrainians to stop defending themselves.

In this post I shall try to explore Putin’s position and where he is leading Russia. I shall argue that a ceasefire is possible, though far from certain; but that an enduring peace, a definitive settlement, will not happen while Putin holds power, which probably means in his lifetime.

The Ukrainian position is clear. They can accept a ceasefire leading into negotiations for a settlement so long as it does not entail a formal surrender of territory, restrictions on their ability to defend themselves (including their ability to import arms) or a requirement to hold elections by a defined date.

Putin alone, not Zelensky nor Trump, has the power to stop the war: in the words of the Russian proverb, “if you dance with a bear, it’s not you who decides when the dance ends – it’s the bear”. His opening bid has not shifted his position by one iota. He insists that a ceasefire should lead to the removal of “the root causes of this crisis”. In Putin’s estimation, the root causes are the existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state and the existence of NATO.

The dilemma for Putin remains. Trump’s Presidency represents an opportunity; but Putin seeks Ukrainian capitulation. A deal with Trump would require Putin to dial back from his maximalist aims. Both Putin and Trump must by now know that the Ukrainians are not minded to surrender, and have the will and capacity to resist for a long time to come, even at the cost of losing ground while exacting a heavy toll in Russian casualties.