Netanyahu's bet fails

The consequences of Israel's attack in Qatar

Smoke billowing from the building in Doha, Qatar, bombed by the Israelis on the 9th September (Photo by JACQUELINE PENNEY/AFPTV/AFP via Getty Images)

Yesterday’s strike by Israel was intended to kill off not only what was left of Hamas’s top leadership as they met in Qatar, but also the peace plan that they were discussing. It failed in the first objective. Did it also fail in the second? The natural assumption is that it is hard to complete even a mediated negotiation with people you have just tried to blow up. But the manner of the attack and its failure to achieve its primary aim changed the power dynamics behind the negotiations. This is especially the case because of the annoyance it caused Donald Trump.

Targeted assassinations have long played a prominent role in Israeli strategy against those organisations committed to its destruction. The value of such an approach is debated less than it should be. In practice these organisations rarely stay decapitated for long and it is not always the case that the successors are less competent or ruthless than those killed. In the case of the pursuit of those responsible for the attacks of 7 October 2023 there is clearly an element of retribution, but that leaves open the question of whether the elimination of particualr individuals makes it harder or easier to deal with Hamas militarily or politically.

At any rate Israel has worked hard on this element of its strategy and has achieved many successes. It has murdered over the years leaders of Hezbollah and of Hamas, as well as Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists. On 30 August Ahmed al-Rahawi, the prime minister of the Houthi-controlled government in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, was killed in an Israeli strike along with several ministers. In mounting these strikes, Israel has shown ingenuity in gathering intelligence on the movements and location of its targets. When it has decided to strike it has done so with impunity. The United States, which is the only country with any leverage, has not appeared too bothered by this practice. It has not been averse to targeted assassinations of its own.

The remaining top leadership of Hamas was targeted yesterday. Some in the firing line owed their positions to past assassinations. The most important figure present, Khalil al-Hayya, is the leader of Hamas’s Gaza units. He replaced Yahya Sinwa, the architect of the 7/10 attacks, in 2024. While he survived this attack, his son, chief of staff, and bodyguards were killed, along with one Qatari soldier. Also present was Zaher Jabarin, leader in the West Bank, who had replaced Saleh al-Arouri who had been assassinated in Beirut, also in 2024. Jabarin seems to spend much of his time in Turkey, from where he may have travelled to Qatar for this meeting.

Another figure present, Khaled Mashaal, the head of Hamas abroad, now has the distinction of surviving two assassination attempts. In 1997 Mossad agents tried to poison him in Jordan. Israel had recently signed a peace treaty with Jordan and a furious King Hussein threatened to end it unless Mashaal was given an antidote. Benjamin Netanyahu, already in power in Israel, refused until US prtesident Bill Clinton intervened. Mashaal was less supportive of the close links with Iran championed by Sinwar. He was part of the leadership group that fell out with Iran and Hezbollah over their support for the Assad regime in Syria and moved out of Damascus to Qatar in 2012 for that reason.

It had been assumed that Hamas leaders were safe in Qatar, and there are reports that the US had confirmed this to the Qataris quite recently. In Israel over the past day there have been regular expressions of contempt for Qatar for hosting the group, who live a comfortable, even luxurious, life in the capital, Doha, far removed from the suffering of their people in Gaza. But whatever Israel may say now, it has not always opposed this arrangement.