Israel/Gaza: Retrospect and Prospect

Planning for the 'Day After'

Explosions rip through the Er-Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City on December 21, 2023

In a previous post I looked back on my assessments of the Russo-Ukraine war. This piece addresses the Israel- Hamas War. I have not written as much on the substack on this topic, although I have contributed a few pieces elsewhere. From the start it was clear that the stakes were high and that there was no obvious route to victory for either side.

Hamas gave no impression of having thought through the implications of the vicious attacks on 7 October, other than to force the plight of the Palestinians back on to the international agenda, and perhaps using hostages to extract Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. Israel rushed into a strategy with objectives that were going to be difficult to obtain, though the effort to do so would have dire consequences for the Gazan population. The only outcome I could imagine that might resolve the conflict, at least in the short-term, would be one that took the future of Gaza out of the hands of both Israel and Hamas. That remains my view (and that of many others), although in this post I will explore why it is hard to identify the mechanisms that could allow it to happen.

I had been sceptical for many years of Israeli claims that they had the Palestinian issue under control, but with no evidence to the contrary. As Arab states were sorting out their relations with Israel while leaving the Palestinians behind I was beginning to wonder if the widespread Israeli assumption that they could keep the Palestinians boxed in was correct. The piece I was planning to write on Israel was going to be on the deep divisions that had opened up in the state as a result of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s self-serving judicial reforms. In this I would have noted the determination of those regularly demonstrating against the government’s proposals not to get sidetracked by the Palestinian issue, even though the extremists brought into the coalition to give Netanyahu his slight majority in the Knesset were deliberately stirring things up in the West Bank and Jerusalem.  

When the attack came my initial efforts were focused on working out why everybody had been caught by surprise, including me, and providing some general background on Israeli-Palestinian relations. This was true of the first substack I wrote but also other pieces for the Financial Times and New Statesman. The combination of Israeli fury and the collapse of their security concept for Gaza, which relied on threats and bribes, meant that their response was not going to be restrained. The logic of their new security concept, immediately adopted, that Hamas as a military entity must be eliminated and no longer operate out of Gaza, required the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) to fight their way through the Strip. Although there were some initial signs of hesitation that is what they attempted. The four considerations that might have encouraged hesitation –the fate of the hostages seized on 7 October, the economic strain of a long war, the prospect of a wider war involving Hezbollah, and the humanitarian distress bound to accompany an intensive fight – are still present as the IDF appears to have shifted to a less intensive strategy.

Heavy civilian casualties were always likely because of the extent to which Hamas’s military assets were integrated with civil society, including using mosques, schools, and hospitals as cover, and the underground tunnel network, but also because of the relaxed rules of engagement adopted by the Israelis. These casualties, along with people being pushed out of their homes into desperate conditions in the south, albeit so that they did not get caught up in the direct fighting in the north, inevitably created pressure for a cease-fire. This would by now be part of a Security Council resolution had this not been prevented by an American veto. In return for this cover, the Biden Administration has demanded serious efforts to protect civilians and allow relief. This has had some response, but the issue remains severe. Some hostages were released before a temporary truce collapsed. Hezbollah, as anticipated, has been torn between not wanting to abandon Hamas while avoiding a full-scale war of their own. This tension has yet to be resolved.

I missed completely the complicating role played by the Houthis in Yemen. Their interference with shipping in the Red Sea, which makes little difference to Gaza, has now led to the formation of an international grouping prepared to take it on. And last week there was a deadly attack mounted by ISIS in Teheran, which has even less to do with Gaza, but is a reminder of how unsettled this region has become.

In my long piece for the Financial Times a week after the Hamas attack I concluded with the following observation:

‘There are no good options for Israel. If there were good options they would already have been tried. Israel is trying to develop a military strategy to deal with the Hamas threat while it lacks a political strategy. For the moment it is impossible to identify a future modus vivendi with Gaza. No deals with Hamas will be trusted but nor is there a certain route to eliminate Hamas.’

In a later piece for the same paper I explored the difficulties of a political deal, while noting the problems with my own preference:

‘The only way to get a political process in place quickly is to internationalize the issue, getting the leading Arab states, as well as the US and Europeans, to agree on next steps. This approach, widely canvassed since the start of this war, is not greeted with enthusiasm by the likely participants. The issue is not so much the funding for reconstruction, but the difficulties of forging a consensus on what needs to be done, and the potential for a long-term commitment that will be thankless, onerous and possibly hazardous, especially if it involves peacekeeping forces. The Egyptians and Jordanians have resisted large numbers of Palestinian refugees being pushed in their direction.’

Nothing that has happened over the past weeks to make the situation look any better.

The Military Situation

I want to concentrate in this post on the prospects for a political deal. As part of the background it is important to note that Hamas has been hurt by the Israeli campaign thus far but is not beaten. Netanyahu framed as objectives at the start, reconfirmed in an article for the Jerusalem Post, that Hamas must be ‘demolished’, its military capabilities ‘dismantled’ and its political control over Gaza concluded. These aims have yet to be met and are likely to prove elusive.

It is an inescapable feature of the situation that going hard against Hamas will badly hurt the population, while bringing in relief to the population will help Hamas, because it eases the pressure on them to end the war and because they will make sure that they get their supplies first. Many Israeli commentators find the constraints this imposes on the IDF’s freedom of action infuriating. They are particularly irritated with what they see as the Biden administration’s readiness to agree that Hamas must be eliminated but not accept the logic of the situation and rebuke Israel for harming civilians. These concerns are seen to represent a soft naivete in Western countries, a misplaced idealism that is easy to embrace when not facing an existential threat from an enemy deliberately using civil society as a base from which to mount attacks.

But this is not a new dilemma facing those mounting counter-insurgency campaigns. If, as Mao Zedong put it, the guerrillas are to the population like fish to the sea, then to get at the guerrillas you need to separate them from the people. Israel has never really done ‘hearts and minds’ to win the population over and while extremists in the government hanker after mass expulsion – draining the sea – that is not going to happen. So the sea remains and the fish will keep swimming. The naivete lies in the belief that even supporters of Israel would find the sort of losses experienced by the Palestinians an acceptable price to pay or agree that there were no possible alternative strategies and tactics. The fact that Hamas is so embedded in Gaza, whatever one may think of the cynicism of its tactics, is part of the strategic reality that Israel must address.

Moreover as the fighting has become more difficult the IDF’s losses have started to mount adding to public impatience in Israel about the course of the war and concern about the fate of the remaining hostages. In its latest briefing the IDF reported that it had dismantled Hamas’s operations in northern Gaza, killing top commanders, including those responsible for the 7 October attacks, and some 8,000 fighters, as well as seizing caches of arms and vital intelligence. (Some 12 Hamas battalions - around 15,000 men - were stationed in northern Gaza and Gaza City at the start of the war). The IDF is also targeting Hamas in central Gaza, and in Khan Younis, where much of the leadership is believed to be hiding out and many of the (up to) 133 hostages are thought to be held. The battle for Khan Younis has been going on since early December. Here Israel has suffered serious losses in the fighting and although the IDF claims to have significantly damaged Hamas in Khan Younis, and destroyed parts of its tunnel network, it is still functioning. Further steps into southern Gaza will be harder. Having encouraged the population to move from north to south, and there being nowhere else for them to go, the areas into which the IDF might want to move have become even more crowded.

This appears to have led to a shift in Israeli strategy. It has been marked by the announced demobilisation of five brigades of reservists. This will have the benefit of easing the strain on the Israeli economy, though they may be needed if the fighting escalates on the northern border with Lebanon. The implication is that instead of clear and hold operations the future may see more opportunistic intelligence-based strikes. One possible indication of the shift in tactics might have been the assassination, on 2 January, of Saleh Arouri, a senior figure in Hamas, along with some senior aides in an apartment building in the Lebanese capital Beirut. The assassination is not a major departure in Israeli practice. If Yehiya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza, and the man behind the 7 October attack, was found and killed, that would enable Israel to claim a victory of sorts, although Hamas has replaced assassinated leaders in the past.

None of this suggests that Hamas is close to being demolished. Using more cautious language than the Prime Minister, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi has observed:

‘This war has goals that are essential and not simple to achieve, and is taking place in a complex area. Therefore, the war will continue for many more months and we will utilize different methods — so that the achievement will be longstanding. There are no magic solutions, no shortcuts in the thorough dismantling of a terrorist organization, but tenacious and determined fighting. And we are very, very determined.’

His promise at the end of this was more security and stability but that may end up disappointing those who really did expect to see Hamas eliminated as a fighting force and incapable of reconstitution.

Divided Israel

It is perhaps not surprising that a recent poll suggested that only 40% of Israelis were optimistic about the country’s future security. The sense that the fight is shifting in character and may not have a quick or satisfactory ending has led to a revival of internal debates in Israel. The supreme court has ruled against those government’s measures that would have reduced judicial powers. Crowds are returning to the streets demanding the resignation of the government and fresh elections. The trauma of 7 October, for which Netanyahu is largely blamed, continues with the fate of so many hostages uncertain and pressures building up as a result of growing casualties at the front and the impact of mobilization on the economy and society.

The divisions within the government were shown in sharp relief on 4 January as two competing visions for ‘The Day After’ were presented in one of the first serious cabinet-level discussions held on the topic. It is a discussion Netanyahu was desperate to avoid because he knows that there is no consensus and he dare not disappoint the right-wing members of his coalition who he needs if he is to stay in power.

On one side is the opposition leader and former IDF chief of staff Bennie Gantz who joined the government to demonstrate unity and now plays a key role in running the war. He has long urged the development of an exit strategy from Gaza, warning of the costs and dangers of getting stuck in the Strip indefinitely and the need for the IDF to know what it is fighting for. Well ahead of Netanyahu in the polls, he is in effect prime minister in waiting. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant had already fallen out with Netanyahu over the effect on the IDF of the controversies surrounding judicial reforms.

The Gantz/Gallant view is that Israel dare not ignore the demands of the Biden Administration for credible plans for the long-term future of Gaza. They are ready at least to engage with proposals for some sort of restored Palestinian Authority. This was the key feature of Gallant’s plan as presented on 4 January:

‘Hamas will not rule Gaza, and Israel will not exercise civil control over Gaza. It's Palestinians who live in the Gaza Strip, which is why Palestinian players will be responsible for it, on the condition that they are not hostile toward Israel and will not operate against it.’

On this basis he ruled out any Israeli civil presence or accepting any of the responsibilities of an occupying power. Israel will want to continue to monitor what goes in and out of the strip but will look to a multi-national force, led by the US, Western European countries and moderate Arab states, to rebuild and run Gaza, using the existing Palestinian administration. Over time the largely depopulated northern Gaza Strip will be made habitable (again this will largely depend on foreign assistance) so that people can return. None of this will happen until all hostages have been returned.

This, it should be noted, is the moderate side of the debate. A readiness to consider seriously proposals for a Palestinian state alongside Israel is confined to the depleted left, including the Labour Party. In Cabinet the alternative view comes from the right, notably represented by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir. They have proposed the far more radical remedy of encouraging ‘voluntary’ emigration of Gazans, while Israel takes control of the Strip, building new settlements. Smotrich justified his plan on the grounds that

‘a small country like ours cannot afford a reality where four minutes away from our communities there is a hotbed of hatred and terrorism, where two million people wake up every morning with aspiration for the destruction of the State of Israel and with a desire to slaughter and rape and murder Jews wherever they are.’

Such language confirms the claims of Israel’s critics that it is seeking the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians and invites international condemnation. The idea has already been dismissed by other members of the government, including from Netanyahu’s Likud party. The US State Department has described these proposals as ‘inflammatory and irresponsible.’ There is no practical basis for taking such schemes forward given the intense opposition of Egypt and Jordan. Even Smotrich has acknowledged the difficulty of finding countries keen to absorb thousands of Gazans.

Netanyahu has argued that there is no point talking about the ‘Day After’ until the ‘Day’ is reached when Israel’s military objectives have been realized. His problem is that this day may never come, and he is being pressed now for a political strategy to match his military strategy. He is aware of the importance of American largess and how the Smotrich/Ben Gvir line harms Israel’s international image, at a time when it is short of friends and admirers. But his own instincts are more with the right. He wants to limit the role of outsiders, including foreign peacekeepers, so that the IDF is in a position to ensure that Gaza stays demilitarized.

He presented his own views in his article in the Jerusalem Post, already mentioned, timed to appear after the Cabinet meeting. His main pitch, after the need to demolish Hamas, was that Gaza be demilitarized, requiring a ‘temporary security zone on the perimeter of Gaza’ and also an ‘inspection mechanism’ on the border between Gaza and Egypt to prevent weapons being smuggled into the territory. The main thrust of his article was to dismiss the idea that the Palestinian Authority (PA) could takeover in Gaza. It would not demilitarize nor ‘deradicalize’ Gaza. He demands a transformation of Palestinian civil society ‘so that its people support fighting terrorism rather than funding it.’ Netanyahu does not spend any time reflecting on whether anything Israel has done might possibly have contributed to the radicalization of Palestinian opinion.

In the event the cabinet meeting called for 4 January ended with the government looking even more broken than before. The proximate cause was Halevi’s decision to appoint a panel to probe the military’s failures ahead of October 7 and identify shortcomings which might need to be rectified. This is another issue that Netanyahu for understandable reasons does not want to discuss until after the war is over. Former chief of staff and defense minister Shaul Mofaz who is to chair the panel, was involved in the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, which the right now considers to have been a big mistake. Smotrich and Ben Gvir led the charge against Halevi, who was defended by Gantz and Gallant. After the meeting Gantz was forthright:

‘The cabinet was supposed to discuss strategic processes that will affect the continuation of the campaign and our security in the future. That didn’t happen, and the prime minister is responsible for that. It is his responsibility to fix this, and to choose — between unity and security or politics. If what is important now is security and unity, then we need to hold the essential meeting on the continuation of the fighting, and soon.’

This is only one of a number of issues which might lead the government to collapse. Smotrich and Ben Gvir have threatened to leave if the war was ended before the full defeat of Hamas, or if individuals charged with serious terrorist offences were released in return for hostages.

The most immediate issue is whether tax revenues are transferred to the PA. As Finance Minister Smotrich has been withholding the tax revenues Israel collects on the PA’s behalf which pays for services and salaries, in Gaza as well as the West Bank. There is a complicated plan involving Norway to get funds to the PA in a way that ensures that they do not get to Hamas in Gaza, but Smotrich has shown no interest in compromise. If one is not found then the PA will soon collapse financially, adding to the instability in the West Bank. Biden has reportedly demanded of Netanyahu that this matter be resolved quickly, reminding him how much he has gone out on a limb for Israel even though Netanyahu continues to make it hard for him to do so.

Smotrich has shown no interest in compromise, observing how much he

‘appreciates the support of the United States and President Biden very much but as long as I am the finance minister, we will not transfer a single shekel to the Palestinian Authority that will go to the families of the terrorists and Nazis in Gaza.’

While attention has naturally focussed on the dire situation in Gaza the West Bank has not been tranquil. Over 260 Palestinians have been killed, around 2,000 arrested and another 1,000 displaced from their homes. The PA has been helpless in the face not only of IDF operations but also settler vigilantes who have been acting with the support of elements within the Israeli government, including Ben Gvir. If it can no longer pay the bills then the security situation will become even more difficult, which is why the IDF – still stuck in Gaza and with tensions with Hezbollah still high – want to keep this area as calm as possible. Netanyahu is desperate to keep the right-wingers in his government but at some point choices will have to be made, and this is one that cannot be delayed much longer.

The Return of the Palestinian Authority?

The views of Joe Biden complicate Netanyahu’s task. Biden has dealt with the issue over many years, including while Barrack Obama’s Vice-President, and knows Netanyahu well. He made a calculated gamble that by showing generous support to Israel in the aftermath of 7 October he could push it towards sensible responses. His critics question whether he has done much more than offer cover to the Israelis, fending off pressure for a cease-fire, and showing scant concern for the plight of the Gazans. The counter is that the administration has got Israel to accept the need to get more relief into Gaza than it was inclined to do, the pause in the fighting that allowed for some hostages to be freed, and firm opposition to those pushing for the mass expulsion of Palestinians.

Biden had accepted the general view prior to 7 October that there was no peace process worth the name, and that the best option was to complete the deals with the major Arab states, and in particular Saudi Arabia. They would then be able to speak up for Palestinian rights. His conclusion after 7 October was that Israel would have to show that it accepted the case because otherwise it was going to be left even more isolated and in practice insecure. Palestinian grievances must be addressed and, as a start, the PA must be part of Gaza’s future, although that will require that it must be helped to reform itself.

The problem is that the PA is in a poor condition. Constitutionally it should be running Gaza. It still has some role paying public sector bills, left over from when it governed both the West Bank and Gaza, and before Hamas was able to gain monopoly political control. But Netanyahu has worked hard to weaken the PA over the years. As part of his divide and rule policy he allowed Hamas to convey the impression of greater strength. The 87 year old Mahmoud Abbas has little to show for his 19 years in office. In a poll before the war only 12 percent in Gaza chose him as their preferred president. Nor did Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh score highly, with 24 percent. The most popular option was Marwan Barghouti at 32 percent. He is occasionally touted as the best hope for a Palestinian Nelson Mandela. Other than having spent a long time imprisoned, so that he is not associated with the PA’s dismal record, it is not clear if he has the competence or broad-based support to play a unifying, peace-making role, even assuming that the Israelis were prepared to release him.

There would be no point in the PA just turning up and expecting to be able to run the show. To have any legitimacy it would need to demonstrate that it had a path to Palestinian political independence, including a commitment to elections. This would only work if the Israeli government had also made a political commitment to move in this direction. It may well be the case that Netanyahu might be out of office soon and that Gantz, if he does replace him as prime minister, might be open to more imaginative proposals. But it would be unwise to assume that any proposals that require trusting Palestinians will command popular support in Israel at the moment.

That explains Gallant’s preference for a multinational authority, including the leading Arab states, but with a Palestinian council and technocrats. The view of Arab governments is that this is a non-starter unless it can be shown to lead to a two-state solution. The UAE has stated that if it is expected to finance the Gaza Strip’s reconstruction it would need to ‘see a viable two-state solution plan, a road map that is serious, before we talk about the next day and rebuilding the infrastructure of Gaza.’ Even accepting that the PA is in no position to take over in its current enfeebled and corrupt form, part of the plan must be its revitalization and preparation to take over.

All of this assumes that Hamas is out of the picture but in practice it is still present. Proposals tabled by Egypt just before Christmas envisaged three stages: an extendable two-week halt to the fighting which would see more hostages released in return for more Palestinian prisoners; an Egypt-sponsored ‘Palestinian national talk’ aimed at ending the division between the Fatah party (that dominates the PA) and Hamas, leading to the formation of a technocratic government in the West Bank and Gaza to oversee the reconstruction of the Strip and eventual Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections; a comprehensive cease-fire, involving the release of all hostages in return for more prisoners, including some held for more serious terror offenses, Israeli withdrawal of its forces from Gaza and the return of those Gazans from the north to their homes.

Whether or not Israel could be convinced to engage with this plan, one might have thought that Hamas could be tempted. Indeed Ismail Haniyeh, Chairman of Hamas’s political bureau, based in Qatar, did show interest. He is aware that Hamas will struggle to stay in sole charge of the Strip, not least because they lack the funds and capacity for the massive reconstruction task ahead. To retain influence it would make sense to come together with Fatah, even though that could mean in effect recognising Israel and abandoning thoughts of its elimination.

But Hamas is also divided. Sinwar, the head of the military wing and de facto leader, has shown disdain for Haniyeh in the past (and did not inform him of what was planned for 7 October). He has rejected any new working arrangement with Fatah as ‘outrageous.’ He wants to be in charge of Gaza and, like Netanyahu, would prefer that all talk of Gaza’s future be put off until the fighting is over. As far as Sinwar is concerned the war is going fine and he will be content if it ends with Hamas still present and able to continue as before, whatever the wretched state of the territory. For now Hamas looks stronger than the ineffectual PA, daring to attack Israel and then getting prisoners released in return for hostages. In practice, if Hamas remains active but excluded, it can cause trouble for whoever tries to run Gaza, even if the Israelis have left.

So after three months of this war Israel has weakened Hamas but not eliminated it, and cannot promise that elimination can be achieved quickly, if at all. The Israeli government is close to breaking point and perhaps only if it breaks will there be an opportunity for a serious consideration of options for addressing the Palestinian issue. There are, however, reasons why this issue has proved to be intractable in the past. Even in the mid-1990s when the peace process was at its most active and promising, Hamas was doing its utmost to derail it using terrorist attacks, encouraging the Israeli right to denounce the whole process as a sham. If the US, Europeans, and Arabs really want to get a grip on this situation they are going to have to go beyond attempts to mediate between recalcitrant parties and engage more directly with the situation. Gallant wants them to take responsibility for the governance and reconstruction of Gaza. It is not clear who else could play this role, but if they do so, it should be on their terms, with Palestinian aspirations fully addressed.